I explore the economic, social and cultural constraints of the regional mission of a university located beyond a metropolitan area or urban agglomeration, henceforth referred to as a “peripheral university.” In the first part of the paper, I briefly describe the “third mission” of a university and analyze it within the context of a “peripheral university”. The main constraints on the influence of regional mission and regional development are described. In the second part, I examine one type of a “peripheral (...) university,” namely a cross-border university, on a case study of a consortium of two universities: Viadrina University in Frankfurt am Oder and Collegium Polonicum – a department of Adam Mickiewicz University. I focus on issues like civil mission or problems of the regional contribution of a border university. I also analyze hidden-agenda concerns with respect to the trans-culture added value of the cross-border university. The ensuing analysis is based on interviews made with present and former rectors of those universities. (shrink)
This book analyses and defends the deflationist claim that there is nothing deep about our notion of truth. According to this view, truth is a 'light' and innocent concept, devoid of any essence which could be revealed by scientific inquiry. Cezary Cieśliński considers this claim in light of recent formal results on axiomatic truth theories, which are crucial for understanding and evaluating the philosophical thesis of the innocence of truth. Providing an up-to-date discussion and original perspectives on this central (...) and controversial issue, his book will be important for those with a background in logic who are interested in formal truth theories and in current philosophical debates about the deflationary conception of truth. (shrink)
One of the popular explications of the deflationary tenet of ‘thinness’ of truth is the conservativeness demand: the declaration that a deflationary truth theory should be conservative over its base. This paper contains a critical discussion and assessment of this demand. We ask and answer the question of whether conservativity forms a part of deflationary doctrines.
Conservativeness has been proposed as an important requirement for deflationary truth theories. This in turn gave rise to the so-called ‘conservativeness argument’ against deflationism: a theory of truth which is conservative over its base theory S cannot be adequate, because it cannot prove that all theorems of S are true. In this paper we show that the problems confronting the deflationist are in fact more basic: even the observation that logic is true is beyond his reach. This seems to conflict (...) with the deflationary characterization of the role of the truth predicate in proving generalizations. However, in the final section we propose a way out for the deflationist — a solution that permits him to accept a strong theory, having important truth-theoretical generalizations as its theorems. (shrink)
We investigate what happens when ‘truth’ is replaced with ‘provability’ in Yablo’s paradox. By diagonalization, appropriate sequences of sentences can be constructed. Such sequences contain no sentence decided by the background consistent and sufficiently strong arithmetical theory. If the provability predicate satisfies the derivability conditions, each such sentence is provably equivalent to the consistency statement and to the Gödel sentence. Thus each two such sentences are provably equivalent to each other. The same holds for the arithmetization of the existential Yablo (...) paradox. We also look at a formulation which employs Rosser’s provability predicate. (shrink)
Niniejszy tekst jest poświęcony kwestii nicości w myśleniu Heideggera. Dokonana w Byciu i czasie analiza struktury Dasein wydobywa na jaw wiele jej istotnych aspektów, a właściwie egzystencjałów, z których jednym byłaby trwoga. W trwodze świat „staje się” nicością, ukazuje się w sposób pusty i bezlitosny, ale zarazem odsłania to Dasein możliwość jego autentycznej egzystencji, możliwość zin¬dywidualizowanego bycia-w-świecie. W wykładzie Czym jest metafizyka? Heidegger powraca do problematyki nicości, rozumiejąc ją już inaczej niż czyniła to metafizyka: mianowicie nicość była warunkiem umożliwiającym jawność (...) bytu dla człowieka. Bycie: nicość: to samo – ogólnie rzecz ujmując, Heidegger będzie twierdził, że nicość przynależy do bycia, co syntetycznie wyraża właśnie ta jego późna formuła. Ponieważ kwestia bycia jest ściśle związana z kwestią czasu, stąd problematyka nicości łączy się najściślej u Heideggera z problematyką temporalności, temporalności ujmowanej – co koniecznie trzeba podkreślić – ekstatycznie. Temporalizacja byłaby według Heideggera wolną oscylacją pierwotnej czasowości otwartego horyzontu, co umożliwiałoby światowanie (Welten), czyli wchodzenie bytów w świat. Z tej perspektywy, w wykładzie Metafizyczne podstawy logiki, nicość jest określana jako nihil originarium. Świat to nicość, która wydarza się wraz i dzięki pierwotnemu czasowaniu się, co późny Heideggera będzie także rozumiał jako czwarty wymiar czasu (Czas i bycie). Nicość jest także tematyzowana przez Heidggera w Przyczynkach do filozofii, gdzie jest z kolei objaśniana jako istotowa wibracja (Erzitterung) Bycia (Sein). Podczas seminarium w Le Thor (1969) Heidegger powie, że w wydarzaniu (Ereignis) nie zostało już pomyślane nic greckiego. Wydarzanie nie „jest”, ale „daje”, „wydarza” bycie i czas. Bycie to jednak nie metafizycznie rozumiana obecność. Bycie to także nie nieobecność, nie sprowadza się ono bowiem do metafizycznie rozumianej nicości, nicości pojmowanej w opozycji do bytu, ale to nicość w sensie nihil originarium, nicość w sensie temporalnym, a może nawet i energetycznym. Tak ujmowana przez Heideggera nicość zdaje się i tak jednak „zanikać” w nieprzedstawianym, niewyrażalnym wydarzaniu, wydarzaniu uchodzącym za ostatnie „słowo” jego filozofii. (shrink)
We show that a typed compositional theory of positive truth with internal induction for total formulae (denoted by PT tot ) is not semantically conservative over Peano arithmetic. In addition, we observe that the class of models of PA expandable to models of PT tot contains every recursively saturated model of arithmetic. Our results point to a gap in the philosophical project of describing the use of the truth predicate in model-theoretic contexts.
By a classical result of Kotlarski, Krajewski and Lachlan, pathological satisfaction classes can be constructed for countable, recursively saturated models of Peano arithmetic. In this paper we consider the question of whether the pathology can be eliminated; we ask in effect what generalities involving the notion of truth can be obtained in a deflationary truth theory (a theory of truth which is conservative over its base). It is shown that the answer depends on the notion of pathology we adopt. It (...) turns out in particular that a certain natural closure condition imposed on a satisfaction class—namely, closure of truth under sentential proofs—generates a nonconservative extension of a syntactic base theory (Peano arithmetic). (shrink)
We discuss two desirable properties of deflationary truth theories: conservativeness and maximality. Joining them together, we obtain a notion of a maximal conservative truth theory - a theory which is conservative over its base, but can't be enlarged any further without losing its conservative character. There are indeed such theories; we show however that none of them is axiomatizable, and moreover, that there will be in fact continuum many theories of this sort. It turns out in effect that the deflationist (...) still needs some additional principles, which would permit him to construct his preferred theory of truth. (shrink)
Disquotational theories of truth are often criticised for being too weak to prove interesting generalisations about truth. In this paper we will propose a certain formal theory to serve as a framework for a solution of the generalisation problem. In contrast with Horwich’s original proposal, our framework will eschew psychological notions altogether, replacing them with the epistemic notion of believability. The aim will be to explain why someone who accepts a given disquotational truth theory Th, should also accept various generalisations (...) not provable in Th. The strategy will consist of the development of an axiomatic theory of believability, one permitting us to show how to derive the believability of generalisations from basic axioms that characterise the believability predicate, together with the information that Th is a theory of truth that we accept. (shrink)
We present an overview of typed and untyped disquotational truth theories with the emphasis on their (non)conservativity over the base theory of syntax. Two types of conservativity are discussed: syntactic and semantic. We observe in particular that TB—one of the most basic disquotational theories—is not semantically conservative over its base; we show also that an untyped disquotational theory PTB is a syntactically conservative extension of Peano Arithmetic.
We investigate the properties of Yablo sentences and for- mulas in theories of truth. Questions concerning provability of Yablo sentences in various truth systems, their provable equivalence, and their equivalence to the statements of their own untruth are discussed and answered.
Answering a question formulated by Halbach (2009), I show that a disquotational truth theory, which takes as axioms all positive substitutions of the sentential T-schema, together with all instances of induction in the language with the truth predicate, is conservative over its syntactical base.
This paper describes Tarski’s project of rehabilitating the notion of truth, previously considered dubious by many philosophers. The project was realized by providing a formal truth definition, which does not employ any problematic concept.
Peer review is widely recognized as a mechanism for quality control of academic content. This research article aims at comparing the review reports and decisions of reviewers who are members of the editorial board of the European Scientific Journal with those reviewers suggested by the authors and who are not affiliated with the journal. 457 review reports on 378 papers submitted to the ESJ in the period of October–December 2017 were analysed. Statistical methods including OLS and Wilcoxon rank-sum test were (...) applied based on the score approach toward the reviewers’ assessments of the papers and their characteristics related to the country, gender, and time of revisions. Results show the difference between the decisions these two groups of reviewers made. Even though editor-suggested and author-suggested reviewers need equal time to review a paper, the former are less favourable towards the authors of the papers. It is also concluded that factors such as time and country of the reviewers influence their decisions. In this regard, the editors should avoid relying their decisions solely on review reports received from reviewers suggested by the authors. However, further research with larger sample sizes should be conducted. (shrink)
We present a semantic proof of Gödel's second incompleteness theorem, employing Grelling's antinomy of heterological expressions. For a theory T containing ZF, we define the sentence HETT which says intuitively that the predicate “heterological” is itself heterological. We show that this sentence doesn't follow from T and is equivalent to the consistency of T. Finally we show how to construct a similar incompleteness proof for Peano Arithmetic.
The paper contains a discussion of a basic difficulty encountered by adherents of the disquotational conception of truth. The problem is that the disquotational theory seems to weak to prove many important truth-theoretical generalizations, like e.g. "All substitutions of the law of excluded middle are true". Various ways of saving the disquotationalist from this objection are analyzed and deemed unsatisfactory.
In this paper I describe three similar projects, and investigate origins of their success. All of them are non-governmental and non-profit voluntary international initiatives that developed from small local projects. I claim that the basis of their success is universality of their underlying philosophy.
We present a semantic proof of Löb's theorem for theories T containing ZF. Without using the diagonalization lemma, we construct a sentence AUT T, which says intuitively that the predicate autological with respect to T (i.e. applying to itself in every model of T) is itself autological with respect to T. In effect, the sentence AUT T states I follow semantically from T. Then we show that this sentence indeed follows from T and therefore is true.
In the paper two definitions of moments of time as the sets of events are considered. The first one is Russell’s definition based on a relation simultaneity of events. The second one is my construction of moments of time grounded on a relation of being immediately preceding.
The paper consists of two pats. The first part contains a critical review of "Gödel theorems, possible worlds and intensionality" by W. Krysztofiak. Krysztofiak argues that Gödel's incompleteness theorem and, in particular, the technique of aritmetization of syntax, gives rise to intensionality and intentionality in arithmetic. The author tries to show that these claims are mistaken and based on a simple misunderstanding of the incompleteness theorem and its proof. In the second part the author explains the traditional use (in the (...) sense of Feferman) of the term "intensional" as applied to arithmetical context. (shrink)
The aim of this paper is to consider the question about the reasons of the indefinability of truth. We note at the start that a formula with one free variable can function as a truth predicate for a given set of sentences in two different (although related) senses: relative to a model and relative to a theory. By methods due to Alfred Tarski it can be shown that some sets of sentences are too large to admit a truth predicate (in (...) any of the above senses); the limit case being the set of all sentences. The key question considered by us is: what does "too large" mean, i.e. which exactly sets of sentences don't have a truth predicate. We give a partial answer to this question: a set of sentences K has a truth predicate in an axiomatizable, consistent theory T iff for some natural number n, all the sentences belonging to K are equivalent (in T) to Sn sentences. Here the notion of a "too large" set receives a clear and definite sense. However, the case of a model-theoretic truth predicate seems to be more complicated: this second problem we leave as open, indicating only some possible directions of future research. (shrink)
In this essay the problem which logically equivalent sentences present to a Tarski-style truth conditional semantics is disscused. The difficulty is that we can obtain deviant theorems which follow by logic alone from our truth theory. After criticizing E.LePore's and B.Loewer's solution, an alternative way of dealing with this problem is presented, making use of the notion of a canonically proved T-theorem.
-/- Medytacje filozoficzne, Fundacja na Rzecz Myślenia im. Barbary Skargi, Warszawa 2015. -/- Publikacja współfinansowana przez Muzeum Łazienki Królewskie w Warszawie. -/- Zbiór tekstów powstałych na podstawie wykładów, które zostały wygłoszone w ramach cyklu "Medytacje filozoficzne w Łazienkach" w latach 2013-2015. -/- -/- Spis treści: -/- Cezary Wodziński, Premedytacja Krzysztof Pomian, O wyjątkowości człowieka Zygmunt Bauman, O miłości i nienawiści… Tropami Barbary Skargi Tadeusz Sławek, Ciemne liturgie. Język, historia i gest błogosławieństwa Lech Witkowski, Rozprawa z autorytetem: w strone autorytu (...) przejścia Władysław Stróżewski, Doświadczenie czasu, doświadczenie istnienia Juliusz Domański, „Pradawna waśń filozofów z poetami” a kłopoty z dziedzictwem antycznym Serhij Żadan, Wolność jako odpowiedzialność Marcin Poręba, Co to jest rzeczywistość? Szymon Wróbel, Co to jest historia filozofii? Magdalena Środa, Moralność życia publicznego Kostiantyn Tyszczenko, Po co językoznawstwu metateoria? (shrink)