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Profile: Chaehyun Chong (Sogang University)
  1.  25
    Chaehyun Chong (1999). The Neo-Mohist Conception of Bian (Disputation). Journal of Chinese Philosophy 26 (1):1-19.
  2.  37
    Chaehyun Chong (2008). 맹자의 도덕내재주의는 어떻게 정당화될 수 있나? Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 9:207-221.
    The purpose of this paper is to show one way how the Mencian internalism of morality can be justified. Since previous studies of Mencius's internalism have paid too much attention to explaining or training it, they have failed to disclose the difficulties of and the importance of justifying it. In this study, I claim that Mencian internalism is a full development of Confucius' spirit of subjectivity and so can be justified in the same practical way as Kant used in justifying (...)
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  3.  35
    Chaehyun Chong (2008). Moism: Despotic or Democratic? Journal of Chinese Philosophy 35 (3):511-521.
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  4.  4
    Chaehyun Chong (2012). Xunzi'sSanhuo(Three Types Of Cognitive Delusions). Journal of Chinese Philosophy 39 (3):424-435.
    This article explicates Xunzi's three types of cognitive delusions in Xunzi's Zhengming Pian. The followings are my conclusions: first, general names such as “a white horse,” “a horse,” “a thief,” and “a man” are thought of as proper nouns because the classic Chinese theory of language concerned pragmatics rather than semantics. Second, classic Chinese epistemology does not address conceptual knowledge or knowledge based on argumentation distinguished from the art of description. Third, Gongsun Long believes in an extreme form of one‐name‐one‐thingism. (...)
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  5. Chaehyun Chong (1997). Abstraction and Theories of Lei : A Response to Chad Hansen's Mereological Interpretation of Ancient Chinese Philosophy. Dissertation, University of Hawai'i
    My aim in this dissertation is to challenge Chad Hansen's mereological interpretation of ancient Chinese philosophy by providing my own interpretation based on theories of lei. Hansen's mereological interpretation is composed of two radical claims: One is to say that since ancient Chinese philosophy is dominated by nominalism, we do not have to introduce any abstract entities in interpreting ancient Chinese philosophy. The other is to say that Chinese nominalism is mereological. ;Against Hansen's first claim, I argue that since nominalism (...)
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