9 found
Order:
See also
Changsheng (Lex) Lai
Shanghai JiaoTong University
  1.  34
    Against Epistemic Absolutism.Changsheng Lai - forthcoming - Synthese:1-23.
    Epistemic absolutism is an orthodox view that propositional knowledge is an ungradable concept. Absolutism is primarily grounded in our ungradable uses of “knows” in ordinary language. This paper advances a thorough objection to the linguistic argument for absolutism. My objection consists of two parts. Firstly, arguments for absolutism provided by Jason Stanley and Julien Dutant will be refuted respectively. After that, two more general refutation-strategies will be proposed: counterevidence against absolutism can be found in both English and non-English languages; the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2.  7
    Epistemic Gradualism Versus Epistemic Absolutism.Changsheng Lai - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly:1-22.
    Epistemic absolutism holds that knowledge‐that is ungradable, while epistemic gradualism argues the opposite. This paper purports to remodel the gradualism/absolutism debate. The current model initiated by Stephen Hetherington fails to capture the genuine divergence between the two views, which makes the debate equivocal, and the gradualist side lacks appeal. I propose that the remodeled debate should focus on whether knowledge‐that is a ‘threshold concept’ or a ‘spectrum concept’. That is, whether there is a threshold distinguishing knowledge from non‐knowledge. The reconstructed (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  15
    The Basis Problem of Epistemological Disjunctivism and Paradigmatic Cases.Changsheng Lai - 2020 - Journal of Dialectics of Nature 42 (11):17-24.
    Epistemological disjunctivism argues that one can have perceptual knowledge that p in virtue of being in possession of factive and reflectively accessible rational support, e.g., one’s ‘seeing that p’. A well-known challenge to this view is the so-called basis problem of epistemological disjunctivism, which argues that one’s ‘seeing that p’ cannot constitute the rational support for one’s knowledge that p, as ‘seeing that p’ is just a way of ‘knowing that p’. The basis problem is taken to be based on (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4.  17
    Concept of Gradable Knowledge.Changsheng Lai - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    An orthodox view in epistemology holds that propositional knowledge is an absolute ‘yes or no’ affair, viz, propositional knowledge is ungradable. Call this view epistemic absolutism. This thesis purports to challenge this absolutist orthodoxy and develop an underexplored position—epistemic gradualism, which was initially proposed by Stephen Hetherington. As opposed to epistemic absolutism, epistemic gradualism argues that propositional knowledge can come in degrees. This thesis will examine motivations for endorsing absolutism and then, drawing on Hetherington’s original objections to absolutism, prove that (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5.  31
    Is ‘Knowing That P’ Identical with ‘Knowing That “P” Is True’?Changsheng Lai - 2019 - Philosophia:1-18.
    It is epistemological orthodoxy that the object of propositional knowledge is the truth of propositions. This traditional view is based on what I call the ‘KT-schema’, viz, ‘S knows that p, iff, S knows that “p” is true’. The purpose of this paper is to reject the KT-schema. By showing the paradoxical upshot of the KT-schema and providing counterexamples to the KT-schema, this paper argues that ‘knowing that p’ is more than ‘knowing that “p” is true’. Consequently, we shall rethink (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  6
    Is ‘Knowing That P’ Identical with ‘Knowing That “P” Is True’?Changsheng Lai - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (3):1075-1092.
    It is epistemological orthodoxy that the object of propositional knowledge is the truth of propositions. This traditional view is based on what I call the ‘KT-schema’, viz, ‘S knows that p, iff, S knows that “p” is true’. The purpose of this paper is to reject the KT-schema. By showing the paradoxical upshot of the KT-schema and providing counterexamples to the KT-schema, this paper argues that ‘knowing that p’ is more than ‘knowing that “p” is true’. Consequently, we shall rethink (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7.  33
    My Ordinary Anti-Sceptical Beliefs Are Not Insensitive.Changsheng Lai - 2019 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 14 (3):469-489.
    An orthodox sceptical hypothesis claims that one’s belief that “I am not a brain-in-a-vat (BIV)” (or any other ordinary anti-sceptical belief) is insensitive. A form of sensitivity-based scepticism, can thus be constructed by combining this orthodox hypothesis with the sensitivity principle and the closure principle. Unlike traditional solutions to the sensitivity-based sceptical problem, this paper will propose a new solution—one which does not reject either closure or sensitivity. Instead, I argue that sceptics’ assumption that one’s ordinary anti-sceptical beliefs are insensitive (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Scepticism and the Self-Hollowing Problem: A Dichotomous Solution to Sceptical Paradox.Changsheng Lai - 2016 - Dissertation,
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9.  57
    The Self-Hollowing Problem of the Radical Sceptical Paradox.Changsheng Lai - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (5):1269-1288.
    The purpose of this paper is to provide a new solution to the radical sceptical paradox. A sceptical paradox purports to indicate the inconsistency within our fundamental epistemological commitments that are all seemingly plausible. Typically, sceptics employ an intuitively appealing epistemic principle to derive the sceptical conclusion. This paper will reveal a dilemma intrinsic to the sceptical paradox, which I refer to as the self-hollowing problem of radical scepticism. That is, on the one hand, if the sceptical conclusion turns out (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark