Attachment orientations reflect individuals’ expectations for interpersonal relationships and influence emotion regulation strategies and coping. Previous research has documented that anxious and avoidant attachment orientations have deleterious effects on the trauma recovery process leaving these survivors vulnerable to posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms. However, avoidant attachment may be more complicated. Prior work has also found those high in avoidant attachment but also low in anxious attachment may not experience such vulnerabilities. Further, avoidant attachment individuals often report higher self-efficacy than their anxiously (...) attached counterparts. The present study examined trauma coping self-efficacy as a previously unexamined mechanism of action between adult attachment and PTSD symptoms. Structural equation modeling results showed that anxious attachment was associated with lower CSE-T and greater PTSD symptoms six weeks later. Further, a significant indirect effect of anxious attachment on PTSD symptoms through CSE-T was found. Contrary to hypotheses, avoidant attachment also exhibited an indirect effect on PTSD symptoms through CSE-T, such that avoidant attachment was associated with lower CSE-T, which in turn, was associated with greater PTSD symptoms. Also contrary to hypotheses, the interaction between anxious and avoidant attachment was not significantly associated with either CSE-T or PTSD symptoms. Results suggest that both anxious and avoidant attachment orientations contribute to poor self-regulation following trauma, as they undermine perceptions of trauma coping self-efficacy. (shrink)

This book provides an overview of key features of (philosophical) materialism, in historical perspective. It is, thus, a study in the history and philosophy of materialism, with a particular focus on the early modern and Enlightenment periods, leading into the 19th and 20th centuries. For it was in the 18th century that the word was first used by a philosopher (La Mettrie) to refer to himself. Prior to that, ‘materialism’ was a pejorative term, used for wicked thinkers, as a near-synonym (...) to ‘atheist’, ‘Spinozist’ or the delightful ‘Hobbist’. The book provides the different forms of materialism, particularly distinguished into claims about the material nature of the world and about the material nature of the mind, and then focus on materialist approaches to body and embodiment, selfhood, ethics, laws of nature, reductionism and determinism, and overall, its relationship to science. For materialism is often understood as a kind of philosophical facilitator of the sciences, and the author want to suggest that is not always the case. Materialism takes on different forms and guises in different historical, ideological and scientific contexts as well, and the author wants to do justice to that diversity. Figures discussed include Lucretius, Hobbes, Gassendi, Spinoza, Toland, Collins, La Mettrie, Diderot, d’Holbach and Priestley; Büchner, Bergson, J.J.C. Smart and D.M. Armstrong. (shrink)

La question de l’union entre sagesse et bonheur se situe au cœur même de la tradition morale. Dans la perspective la plus traditionnelle, croître en sagesse revient automatiquement à augmenter son bonheur. La philosophie est ainsi la voie royale pour parvenir à un bonheur plus durable que dans la conception vulgaire, en détachant l’esprit des choses inessentielles et en l’amenant à connaître les vérités qui lui fourniront l’aliment le plus approprié à sa nature réelle. Néanmoins, le lien analytique entre sagesse (...) et bonheur a également été critiqué par la démonstration que l’effondrement de l’un des deux termes n’entraînait pas nécessairement l’effondrement de l’autre. Au premier chef de ces critiques se situent les sceptiques, qui de l’Antiquité à la période moderne s’accordent à nier la possibilité d’une connaissance réelle, tout en maintenant généralement la possibilité d’être heureux. Inversement, cette accessibilité du bonheur a pu être critiquée sans que soit remise en question la connaissance elle-même : c’est ce que révèlent les philosophies tragiques, qui assimilent plutôt sagesse et souffrance. Par la diversité des contributions, qui puisent principalement dans les traditions ancienne et moderne, mais offrent également quelques perspectives contemporaines et non euro-centrées, le présent volume illustre l’affrontement de ces deux grands courants dans l’histoire de la philosophie, et permet de penser à nouveaux frais ce problème essentiel à la morale qu’est l’utilité ou l’inutilité de la connaissance pour être heureux. Sigmund Freud, et surtout Jacques Lacan, m’ont apporté l’éclairage théorique nécessaire. (shrink)

The materialist approach to the body is often, if not always understood in ‘mechanistic’ terms, as the view in which the properties unique to organic, living embodied agents are reduced to or described in terms of properties that characterize matter as a whole, which allow of mechanistic explanation. Indeed, from Hobbes and Descartes in the 17th century to the popularity of automata such as Vaucanson’s in the 18th century, this vision of things would seem to be correct. In this paper (...) I aim to correct this inaccurate vision of materialism. On the contrary, the materialist project on closer consideration reveals itself to be, significantly if not exclusively, (a) a body of theories specifically focused on the contribution that ‘biology’ or rather ‘natural history’ and physiology make to metaphysical debates, (b) much more intimately connected to what we now call ‘vitalism’ (a case in point is the presence of Théophile de Bordeu, a prominent Montpellier physician and theorist of vitalism, as a fictional character and spokesman of materialism, in Diderot’s novel D’Alembert’s Dream), and ultimately (c) an anti-mechanistic doctrine which focuses on the unique properties of organic beings. To establish this revised vision of materialism I examine philosophical texts such as La Mettrie’s Man a Machine and Diderot’s D’Alembert’s Dream; medical entries in the Encyclopédie by physicians such as Ménuret and Fouquet; and clandestine combinations of all such sources (Fontenelle, Gaultier and others). (shrink)

The organism is neither a discovery like the circulation of the blood or the glycogenic function of the liver, nor a particular biological theory like epigenesis or preformationism. It is rather a concept which plays a series of roles, sometimes masked, often normative, throughout the history of biology. Indeed, it has often been presented as a key-concept in life science and its ‘theorization’, but conversely has also been the target of influential rejections: as just an instrument of transmission for the (...) selfish gene, but also, historiographically, as part of an outdated ‘vitalism’. Indeed, the organism, perhaps because it is experientially closer to the ‘body’ than to the ‘molecule’, is often the object of quasi-affective theoretical investments presenting it as essential, as the pivot of a science or a particular approach to nature, while other approaches reject or attack it with equal force, assimilating it to a mysterious ‘vitalist’ ontology of extra-causal forces, or other pseudo-scientific doctrines. I do not seek to adjudicate between these debates, either regarding scientific validity or historical coherence; nor do I return to the well-studied issue of the organism-mechanism tension in biology. Recent scholarship has begun to discuss the emergence and transformation of the organism concept, but has not emphasized the way the latter is a shifting, ‘go-between’ concept – invoked as ‘natural’ by some thinkers to justify their metaphysics, but then presented as value-laden by others, over and against the natural world. The organism as go-between concept is also a hybrid, a boundary concept or a limit case, which continues to function in different contexts – as a heuristic, an explanatory challenge, a model of order, of regulation, etc. – despite having frequently been pronounced irrelevant and reduced to molecules or genes. Yet this perpetuation is far removed from any ‘metaphysics of organism’, or organismic biology. (shrink)

This is the introduction to a special issue of 'Science in Context' on vitalism that I edited. The contents are: 1. Guido Giglioni — “What Ever Happened to Francis Glisson? Albrecht Haller and the Fate of Eighteenth-Century Irritability” 2. Dominique Boury— “Irritability and Sensibility: Two Key Concepts in Assessing the Medical Doctrines of Haller and Bordeu” 3. Tobias Cheung — “Regulating Agents, Functional Interactions, and Stimulus-Reaction-Schemes: The Concept of “Organism” in the Organic System Theories of Stahl, Bordeu and Barthez” 4. (...) Charles T. Wolfe & Motoichi Terada — “The Animal Economy as Object and Program in Montpellier Vitalism” 5. Timo Kaitaro — “Can Matter Mark the Hours? – Eighteenth-Century Vitalist Materialism and Functional Properties” 6. Elizabeth Williams —“Of Two Lives One? Jean-Charles-Marguerite-Guillaume Grimaud and the Question of Holism in Vitalist Medicine” 7. Philippe Huneman — “Montpellier Vitalism and the Emergence of Alienism in France (1750-1800): The Case of the Passions” 8. Elke Witt —“Form – A Matter of Generation. The Relation of Generation, Form and Function in the Epigenetic Theory of C.F. Wolff” . (shrink)

Biological evolution provides a creative fount of complex and subtle adaptations, often surprising the scientists who discover them. However, because evolution is an algorithmic process that transcends the substrate in which it occurs, evolution’s creativity is not limited to nature. Indeed, many researchers in the field of digital evolution have observed their evolving algorithms and organisms subverting their intentions, exposing unrecognized bugs in their code, producing unexpected adaptations, or exhibiting outcomes uncannily convergent with ones in nature. Such stories routinely reveal (...) creativity by evolution in these digital worlds, but they rarely fit into the standard scientific narrative. Instead they are often treated as mere obstacles to be overcome, rather than results that warrant study in their own right. The stories themselves are traded among researchers through oral tradition, but that mode of information transmission is inefficient and prone to error and outright loss. Moreover, the fact that these stories tend to be shared only among practitioners means that many natural scientists do not realize how interesting and lifelike digital organisms are and how natural their evolution can be. To our knowledge, no collection of such anecdotes has been published before. This paper is the crowd-sourced product of researchers in the fields of artificial life and evolutionary computation who have provided first-hand accounts of such cases. It thus serves as a written, fact-checked collection of scientifically important and even entertaining stories. In doing so we also present here substantial evidence that the existence and importance of evolutionary surprises extends beyond the natural world, and may indeed be a universal property of all complex evolving systems. (shrink)

This paper distinguishes six elements in the Platonic concept of rationality as it appears in the Republic: (a) being fully informed; (b) thinking logically; (c) having the single correct ultimate end; (d) determining the appropriate means; (e) matching action to thought; and (f) promotingone’s own interest. The evidence linking the rational part of the soul (the logistikon) to each of these aspects is discussed. The philosopher-guardians are shown to exemplify full and complete “Platonic rationality”, whereas the unjust men in books (...) 8 and 9 exhibit different degrees of failure to conform to the six elements listed above. (shrink)

This paper distinguishes six elements in the Platonic concept of rationality as it appears in the Republic: (a) being fully informed; (b) thinking logically; (c) having the single correct ultimate end; (d) determining the appropriate means; (e) matching action to thought; and (f) promotingone’s own interest. The evidence linking the rational part of the soul (the logistikon) to each of these aspects is discussed. The philosopher-guardians are shown to exemplify full and complete “Platonic rationality”, whereas the unjust men in books (...) 8 and 9 exhibit different degrees of failure to conform to the six elements listed above. (shrink)

Retrospective rule-making has few supporters and many opponents. Defenders of retrospective laws generally do so on the basis that they are a necessary evil in specific or limited circumstances, for example to close tax loopholes, to deal with terrorists or to prosecute fallen tyrants. Yet the reality of retrospective rule making is far more widespread than this, and ranges from ’corrective’ legislation to ’interpretive regulations’ to judicial decision making. The search for a rational justification for retrospective rule-making necessitates a reconsideration (...) of the very nature of the rule of law and the kind of law that can rule, and will provide new insights into the nature of law and the parameters of societal order. This book examines the various ways in which laws may be seen as retrospective and analyses the problems in defining retrospectivity. In his analysis Dr Charles Sampford asserts that the definitive argument against retrospective rule-making is the expectation of individuals that, if their actions today are considered by a future court, the applicable law was discoverable at the time the action was performed. The book goes on to suggest that although the strength of this ’rule of law’ argument should prevail in general, exceptions are sometimes necessary, and that there may even be occasions when analysis of the rule of law may provide the foundation for the application of retrospective laws. (shrink)

Applied Christian Ethics addresses selected themes in Christian social ethics. Part one shows the roots of contributors in the realist school; part two focuses on different levels of the significance of economics for social justice; and part three deals with both existential experience and government policy in war and peace issues.

Philosophy of biology before biology -/- Edited by Cécilia Bognon-Küss & Charles T. Wolfe -/- Table of contents -/- Cécilia Bognon-Küss & Charles T. Wolfe. Introduction -/- 1. Cécilia Bognon-Küss & Charles T. Wolfe. The idea of “philosophy of biology before biology”: a methodological provocation -/- Part I. FORM AND DEVELOPMENT -/- 2. Stéphane Schmitt. Buffon’s theories of generation and the changing dialectics of molds and molecules 3. Phillip Sloan. Metaphysics and “Vital” Materialism: The Gabrielle Du Châtelet (...) Circle and French Vitalism 4. John Zammito. The Philosophical Reception of C. F. Wolff’s Epigenesis in Germany, 1770-1790: Herder, Tetens and Kant -/- Part II. ORGANISM & ORGANIZATION 5. François Duchesneau. Senebier and the Advent of General Physiology 6. Tobias Cheung. Organization and Process. Living Systems Between Inner and Outer Worlds: Cuvier, Hufeland, Cabanis. -/- Part III. SYSTEMS 7. Georg Toepfer. Philosophy of Ecology Long Before Ecology: Kant’s Idea of an Organized System of Organized Beings 8. Ina Goy. "All is leaf". Goethe's plant philosophy and poetry 9. Snait Gissis. ‘Biology’, Lamarck, Lamarckisms -/- POSTSCRIPTS 1. Lynn Nyhart. A Historical Proposal Around Prepositions -/- 2. Philippe Huneman. Philosophy after Philosophy of Biology before Biology -/- Cécilia Bognon-Küss and Charles T. Wolfe. Conclusion . (shrink)

Everybody negotiates. But not everybody negotiates ethically. One driver of unethical negotiation behavior is power. Yet, we still haven’t discovered the principalmoderating and mediating influences between power and ethical negotiation behavior. In this pair of experimental studies we’re interested in finding out how resilience and moral identity affect an individual’s ethical behavior in both simple and complex negotiations when primed for power.

MEDIEVAL LOGICS LAMBERT MARIE DE RIJK (ed.), Die mittelalterlichen Traktate De mod0 opponendiet respondendi, Einleitung und Ausgabe der einschlagigen Texte. (Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Neue Folge Band 17.) Miinster: Aschendorff, 1980. 379 pp. No price stated. THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY MARTA FATTORI, Lessico del Novum Organum di Francesco Bacone. Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo 1980. Two volumes, il + 543, 520 pp. Lire 65.000. VIVIAN SALMON, The study of language in 17th century England. (Amsterdam Studies in the Theory (...) and History of Linguistic Science, Series 111: Studies in theHistory of Linguistics, Volume 17.) Amsterdam: John Benjamins B.V., 1979.x + 218 pp. Dfl. 65. Theoria cum Praxi. Zum Verhaltnis von Theorie und Praxis im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert. (Akten des 111. Internationalen Leibnizkongress, Hannover, 12. bis 17.November 1977, Band 111: Logik, Erkenntnistheorie, Wissenschaftstheorie, Metaphysik, Theologie.) Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1980. vii + 269 pp. DM 48. CLASSICAL AND NON-CLASSICAL LOGICS MICHAEL CLARK, The place of syllogistic in logical theory. Nottingham: University of Nottingham Press, 1980. ix + 151 pp. £3.00. A.F. PARKER-RHODES, The theory of indistinguishables. Dordrecht, Boston and London: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1981. xvii + 216 pp. Dfl.90.00/$39.50. NICHOLAS RESCHER and ROBERT BRANDOM, The logic of inconsistency. Oxford:Basil Blackwell, 1980. x + 174 pp. f 11.50. MISCELLANEOUS J. ZELENY, The logic of Marx. Translated from the German by T. Carver. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980. xcii + 247 pp. £12.50. FELIX KAUFMANN, The infinite in mathematics. Edited by Brian McGuinness. Introduction by E. Nagel. Translation from the German by Paul Foulkes. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978. xvii + 235 pp. Dfl 85/$39.50 (cloth); Dfl 45/$19.95 (paper). PAMELA MCCORDUCK, Machines who think. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1979. xiv + 275 pp. $14.95. J. MITTELSTRASS (ed.), Enzyklopadie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie Bd. 1 : A-G. Mannheim, Wien, Ziirich: Bibliographisches Institut, 1980. 835 pp. DM 128. (shrink)

Despite the accumulation of substantial cognitive science research relevant to education, there remains confusion and controversy in the application of research to educational practice. In support of a more systematic approach, we describe the Knowledge-Learning-Instruction (KLI) framework. KLI promotes the emergence of instructional principles of high potential for generality, while explicitly identifying constraints of and opportunities for detailed analysis of the knowledge students may acquire in courses. Drawing on research across domains of science, math, and language learning, we illustrate the (...) analyses of knowledge, learning, and instructional events that the KLI framework affords. We present a set of three coordinated taxonomies of knowledge, learning, and instruction. For example, we identify three broad classes of learning events (LEs): (a) memory and fluency processes, (b) induction and refinement processes, and (c) understanding and sense-making processes, and we show how these can lead to different knowledge changes and constraints on optimal instructional choices. (shrink)

Studies in philosophy: I. Tufts, J.H. On moral evolution. II. Willcos, W.F. The expansion of Europe in its influence upon population. III. Woods, R.A. Democracy a new unfolding of human power. IV. Sharp, F.C. An analysis of the moral judgment. V. Woodbridge, F.J.E. The problem of consciousness. VI. Norton, E.L. The intellectual element in music. VII. Raub, W.L. Pragmatism and Kantianism. VIII. Lyman, E.W. The influence of pragmatism upon the status of theology.--Studies in psychology: IX. Delabarre, E.B. Influence of surrounding (...) objects on the apparent direction of a line. X. Swift, E.J. Beginning a language; a contribution to the psychology of learning. XI. Pierce, A.H. An appeal from the prevailing doctrine of a detached subconsciousness. XII. Woodworth, R.S. The cause of a voluntary movement. XIII. Burnett, C.T. An experimental test of the classical theory of volition. (shrink)

It ‘seems altogether inconceivable', says Hume, that this ‘new relation' ought ‘can be a deduction' from others ‘which are entirely different from it' The idea that you can't derive an Ought from an Is, moral conclusions from non-moral premises, has proved enormously influential. But what did Hume mean by this famous dictum? Was he correct? How does it fit in with the rest of his philosophy? And what does this suggest about the nature of moral judgements? This collection, the first (...) on this topic for forty years, assembles a distinguished cast of international scholars to discuss these questions. The book combines, historical scholarship, meta-ethics and cutting-edge research in philosophical logic. It includes three distinct attempts to reformulate and prove No-Ought-From-Is in the face of Prior's famous counterexamples. -/- Contributors: A.N. Prior, Gerhard Schurz, Charles Pigden, J.M.Shorter, Annette.C.Baier, Wade Robison, Adrian Heathcote, Alan Musgrave, Norva Y.S. Lo, Gillian Russell, Hakan Salwén, Greg Restall, Peter Vranas, Edwin Mares, Stephen Maitzen. (shrink)

In "Against the Indicative," AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 72 (1994): 17-26, and more recently in "Classifying `Conditionals': the Traditional Way is Wrong", ANALYSIS 60 (2000): 147, V.H. Dudman argues that (a) `If Oswald didn't shoot Kennedy then someone else did' and (b) `If Oswald doesn't shoot Kennedy then someone else will' should not be classified together as "indicative conditionals." Dudman relies on the assumption that (a) is entailed by (c) `Someone shot Kennedy', whereas (b) is not entailed by (d) `Someone (...) will shoot Kennedy'. I argue that the same reasoning which shows that (d) does not entail (b) also shows that (c) does not entail (a). One upshot is that Dudman's and Mellor's respective interpretations of so-called past indicative conditionals cannot be correct. (shrink)

Le langage est le lieu de tous les possibles et de tous les impossibles. Par le langage l'homme exprime la realite, la depasse et la nie au niveau de l'imaginaire. Par quels chemins a-t-il pris conscience de ce pouvoir des mots sur les choses, sur son intelligence et sur sa sensibilite? La theorie de la signification s'est d'abord construite a partir d'une presupposition selon laquelle les mots postulent les choses. Mais le sens d'un enonce se revele bien souvent a partir (...) de la negation d'une telle relation, car l'usage que l'homme fait de son langage repose frequemment sur la liberte qu'il experimente a partir des mots de recreer un imaginaire qui s'oppose aux donnees du reel. C'est dans l'espace historique et dans celui, actuel, des theories linguistiques qu'il convient de proposer une interpretation des relations complexes de l'homme avec son langage. Le probleme du sens est actuellement au cur des preoccupations de la linguistique. Cet ouvrage de reflexion s'efforce d'eclairer le probleme du sens a la fois dans ses aspects diachroniques et synchroniques, tout en faisant siens les cadres theoriques herites de Saussure et de Guillaume. La demarche suivie bouscule bien des barrieres et se limite volontairement a l'esquisse d'une theorie de la signification integrant les dimensions convergentes d'une systematique de la langue, de la pragmatique du discours et d'une ontogenie du sens qui se construit d'abord dans le champ clos de toute conscience individuelle. La cle de toute theorie linguistique, depassant la langue saisie comme un objet, se trouve dans une approche neurolinguistique qui replace le sujet parlant au cur du debat. Si cet ouvrage heurte quelques principes et peut susciter de violentes reactions, sinon des contestations, conduisant a poser les problemes sous des jours nouveaux, il aura atteint son but essentiel. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Philosophy’s Second Revolution: Early and Recent Analytic Philosophy by D. S. Clarke, and: The Rise of Analytic Philosophy ed. by Hans-Johann Glock, and: Early Analytic Philosophy: Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein. Essays in Honor of Leonard Linsky by William W. TaitCharles LandesmanD. S. Clarke. Philosophy’s Second Revolution: Early and Recent Analytic Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1997. Pp. xii + 232. Cloth, $42.95. Paper, $19.95.Hans-Johann Glock, editor. The Rise (...) of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997. Pp. xiv + 95. Paper, $19.95.William W. Tait, editor. Early Analytic Philosophy: Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein. Essays in Honor of Leonard Linsky. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1997. Pp. viii + 291. Cloth, $54.95. Paper, $26.95.A remark once made by a justice of the Supreme Court about pornography may also apply to analytic philosophy: one can’t define it, but one knows it when one sees it. Can one do better than this? For D. C. Clarke, Western philosophy has undergone two revolutionary breaks with its past: the first initiated by Descartes directed against classical philosophy and the second initiated at the turn of this century that came to be known as analytic philosophy. (Continental philosophy is barely mentioned. Heidegger is briefly referred to as a bad example of a philosopher who “employs vacuously general language better designed for expressing attitudes than for advancing claims vulnerable to criticism” [192].) A revolutionary shift of framework, for Clarke, eliminates a whole set of problems. Even though the problems discussed by analytic philosophers seem similar to many of those discussed by Plato and Descartes, in fact the relation is tenuous, and current problems have new meanings (190).Clarke offers little help in defining analytic philosophy for “we find today the clear sense of purpose of analytic philosophy which flourished forty years ago being replaced by a variety of programs sharing no easily discernible common thread” (xi). It looks as if the revolutionary élan has been replaced by business as usual. Clarke’s volume is not, however, a history of analytic philosophy but a survey intended for students and the general reader of the views of analytic philosophers on a selected group of problems: approaches to language, the relation of mind to body, the nature of belief, knowledge, and understanding, the relation between philosophy and science, ethics, and philosophical method. Clarke discusses each issue with clarity and insight and argues for his own views, which are always interesting. He criticizes the current tendency in analytic philosophy toward excessive specialization and argues that the special task of philosophy is to search for a framework capable of integrating various aspects of culture. He emphasizes the importance of the study of the history of philosophy: “The central concepts of any integrating framework are few.... The history of philosophy is an indispensable aid in providing such understanding in choosing those [End Page 481] concepts that can serve this function in the present” (191). This book can be recommended for courses in analytic philosophy and in the history of philosophy in the twentieth century.Most of the essays in the volume edited by Glock are concerned to advance ways of characterizing analytic philosophy. Most of them reject Dummett’s claim that analytic philosophy is distinguished by its concern with explaining thought by giving an account of language. In his essay, Dagfinn Føllesdal recognizes the difficulty of constructing any useful classification of intellectual trends. Because analytical philosophy cannot be characterized by reference to doctrines or problems, he proposes to distinguish it by reference to its approach to philosophical problems: “analytic philosophy is very strongly concerned with argument and justification. An analytic philosopher asks: what reasons are there for accepting or rejecting this position?” (7). The interest in language is merely an offshoot of this more fundamental concern. It follows that “the analytic/non-analytic distinction runs across other divisions.... Whether one is an analytic philosopher depends on what importance one ascribes to argument and justification” (14). Thus Aquinas and Descartes, among others, count as analytic philosophers but not Heidegger or Derrida because “they predominantly make use of rhetoric” (12). Føllesdal thinks that there are ethical reasons for being an analytic philosopher... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:92 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY seulement apr~s qu'on a drmontr6 son existence (pp. 182, 183, 185, 188). Or ceci nous parait tout h fait erronr: la critique mrt~physique de l'activit6 rrv~le qu'elle implique drpendance, et non seulement par rapport ~t d'autres 8tres finis (ce qu'Aristote a drift vu), mais par rapport ~t une Cause transcendante et infinie qui, en crrant l'~tre fini, lui donne constamment le pouvoir de se drpasser (...) en produisant ses aetes seconds. C'est pourquoi l'analyse mrtaphysique de l'activit6 est une des voies qui conduisent ~t la drcouverte de Dieu. Scot lui-m~me, du reste, reconnait que tout changement implique drpendance et rrv~le l'existence d'un Etre immuable et absolu (pp. 184-185). Ceci nous donne l'occasion de revenir h la prima via de Thomas d'Aquin. La libert6 avec laquelle nous avons discut6 nagu~re la valeur des quinque viae ne permet pas de nous SOUl~onner d'attachement servile aux positions du saint Docteur. La prima via est une preuve incomplete de l'existence de Dieu entendu comme le Crrateur unique de l'univers, nous avons dit et redit pourquoi. Mais l'argumentation qui s'appuie sur le principe de motion nous a toujours paru et nous parait encore inattaquable: dans la Summa contra Gentiles (I, 13), Thomas 6tait encore emp~tr6 dans la physique d'Aristote, mais, dans la Summa theologiae il se maintient strictement au plan mrtaphysique : un ~tre qui change vraiment ne saurait changer par lui-mSme. Ce principe est inrbranlable et la critique de Duns Scot est inol~rante ici. F. VAN STEENBERGHEN Louvain Francesco Sanchez. By Salvatore Miecolis. (Bari: Tipografia Levante, 1965. Universith di Bari, Pubblicazioni dell'Istituto di filosofia, no. 8. Pp. 100, one plate. No price given). Francisco Sanches,1 the Portuguese philosopher and physician of Jewish parentage who was also a relative of Montaigne, ranks as one of the more interesting of sixteenthcentury thinkers. Not only is he an important reviver of scepticism in the sixteenth century, but his best known work Quod nihil scitur (first printed in 1581) was still well enough known in the next century to draw several separate attacks. What is more, various scholars have pointed out the similarities between the arguments used in Sanches' work and Descartes' cogito argument. Though there are now quite a number of studies on Sanches, especially in Portuguese, there is not yet a defnitive study of aU aspects of his life, thought, and influence. In English there is very little indeed and we could well use a monograph or at least an article on Sanches to make some of his ideas accessible to a wider audience. A definitive study will require much work and 1 This is the Portuguese form of his name. It is also sometimes given the Spanish spelling 'Sanchez' as in the title of Miccolis' book. He was born near the Spanish-Portuguese border about 1550 and moved to France, while still a boy, and there spent the remainder of his life. There has been much discussion whether Sanches was in fact Portuguese or Spanish by birth and, consequently, which is the correct form of his name. It does not seem as though the question of his nationality can be answered with certainty. We have chosen to use the Portuguese form since the Portuguese seem to have adopted him as one of their philosophers more frequently than have the Spanish. BOOK REVIEWS 93 would have to use the extensive notes made by H. P. Cazac, who died before he could utilize all of the material which he had collected,z For these reasons one might look to Miccolis' book as a new contribution to Sanches studies. One is bound to be disappointed, however, for little new material is brought forth here and even previous studies on Sanches are not fully utilized. Although this study has the format of a book, its length is little more than that of a substantial article (ca. 25,000 words). After a very brief introductory section on the life and works of Sanches, the author treats the Quod nihil scitur and 'Sanches and medicine' in... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Return of Scepticism: From Hobbes and Descartes to BayleSébastien CharlesGianni Paganini, editor. The Return of Scepticism: From Hobbes and Descartes to Bayle. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003. Pp. xxviii + 486. Cloth, $180.00.Cette édition des actes du congrès international « The Return of Scepticism », organisé par Gianni Paganini à l'Université du Piémont-Oriental de Vercelli en mai 2000, a pour ambition de faire le point sur l'état de la (...) recherche actuelle en cherchant à cerner au mieux les implications épistémologiques et les répercussions européennes du scepticisme à la période moderne. Placés sous le patronage de Richard H. Popkin, dont un essai ouvre l'ouvrage et pave la voie à de futures recherches sur la question, les textes rassemblés par Gianni Paganini ont pour trait commun d'insister sur la prégnance du scepticisme à l'époque moderne, tout en prenant garde au fait de bien replacer chaque stratégie sceptique dans l'environnement culturel et philosophique qui fut le sien. Divisé en sept sections, l'ouvrage fournit une vue d'ensemble de la question sceptique qui s'étale sur deux siècles, le XVIIe et le XVIIIe.Dans la première section, l'accent est mis sur un aspect délaissé de l'histoire du scepticisme moderne, à savoir le traitement particulier qui lui fut réservé dans la pensée anglaise des XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles. Sont abordés ici les cas de Hobbes, dont le traitement du scepticisme est pensé en relation inversée avec celui de Descartes (G. Paganini), Locke, qui tend à faire sien le principe sceptique de la limitation du savoir (G. A. J. Rogers), et les Platoniciens de Cambridge, qui s'inspirent de la méthode sceptique pour compartimenter le champ du savoir (F. Tomasoni).Dans la deuxième section, c'est la pensée continentale qui est à l'honneur, avec des textes consacrés à Descartes spécifiquement ou à La Mothe le Vayer et Descartes, avec pour objectif commun de questionner l'originalité du travail cartésien en insistant notamment sur le rôle de l'epoché chez Charron comme source possible du cogito (J. R. Maia Neto) et sur une tradition sceptique non fidéiste présente dans les œuvres de La Mothe le Vayer comme de Descartes (J.-P. Cavaillé).La troisième section évoque la prise de conscience des enjeux sceptiques chez les sectateurs et les adversaires de Descartes, qui s'accordent tous à reconnaître l'insuffisance de la réfutation du scepticisme proposée par ce dernier. Ce point fait l'unanimité tant chez les opposants à Descartes—Martin Schoock (A. Del Prete), Pierre Villemandy (C. Borghero), Pierre-Daniel Huet (T. M. Lennon), et les philosophes italiens Fardella et Doria (M. T. Marcialis)—que chez ceux qui se sont inspirés de sa philosophie—Arnauld (G. Belgioioso), Malebranche, Foucher et Desgabets (E. Scribano).La prise en compte des enjeux sceptiques aux plans politique et religieux est intégrée dans la quatrième partie au sein de laquelle sont évoquées des thématiques plurielles comme la présence du probabilisme néo-académique chez Pascal (A. McKenna), l'interprétation sceptique, voire libertine, du pouvoir et de la liberté rattachée à la théorie hobbesienne de l'état de nature chez Samuel Sorbière (L. Bianchi), ou le rapport existant entre scepticisme et tolérance (L. Simonutti).La section suivante délaisse politique et religion pour aborder le cas de la science, et de l'effet du scepticisme au niveau épistémologique. Le cas de Martín Martínez témoigne du fait que le scepticisme peut être conciliable avec une vision empiriste de la science et qu'une physique sceptique reste possible (J. C. Laursen). De même, le rapport des savants italiens comme Redi, Magalotti ou Dati à l'égard du scepticisme est évocateur de la prise de conscience des dangers que le scepticisme pose pour le domaine du démontrable (M. Torrini), ce qui vaut également pour toute théorie de la signification, dont les implications sceptiques sont patentes (G. Hassler), ou pour toute approche historique minée par des considérations pyrrhoniennes (C. Grell... (shrink)

The movement and its members.--H. C. Brokmeyer.--W. T. Harris.--Denton J. Snider.--Bibliography.

Dear Comrades, On Saturday the 18th of September, I received what purports to be a ‘backgrounder’ on Alliance revenue policy. I say ‘purports’ because as a backgrounder it leaves a lot to be desired. a) Anyone not already familiar with the issues would have considerable difficulty working out what the dispute is all about. b) You would expect a REAL backgrounder on what is a controversial matter within the federal Party to present BOTH sides of the question. This ‘backgrounder’ is (...) a one-sided polemic in favour of one option, an option which breaks with previous Alliance policy and which is vehemently opposed by at least ONE of the federated parties (the NLP). It is true that the document is a badly argued and not very convincing polemic, but its defects as a polemic don’t add up to virtues as a backgrounder. This reply is an attempt a) to explain the issues, b) to argue for the alternative option and c) to respond to the backgrounder. It is a labour I perform with some reluctance and not a little difficulty since I don’t have access to much of the relevant data. I resent the fact that I have had to spend so much time on this task when a more even-handed backgrounder or a companion piece explaining the NLP’s alternative would have saved me the trouble. Undemocratic attempts to manipulate the debate - which is what this backgrounder seems to be - are not just shabby in themselves: they tend to waste the time and the energy of party workers. (shrink)

En interrogeant les rapports en philosophie et politique à l'âge classique, de la fin du XVIe siècle à la fin du XVIIIe, ce livre entend mettre en évidence la teneur philosophique des concepts politiques qui émergent à cette époque ou y font l'objet d'une définition renouvelée. Cete démarche consiste à réactiver une interrogation sur les présuppositions et les implications métaphysiques de ces concepts. Une question ne peut dès lors manquer de surgir : en quoi la politique a-t-elle besoin de la (...) métaphysique? C'est en vue de répondre à cette question qu'Y.C. Zarka examine le cadre métaphysique explicite ou implicite dans lequel s'inscrit la réflexion politique. Il aborde ensuite certains des concepts majeurs de la pensée politique de l'âge classique dans un parcours qui mène du renouvellement de l'idée de république à la philosophie de la liberté, en passant par la fondation philosophique de la notion de tolérance. Ce livre relève d'une historiographie philosophique où l'érudition n'est plus une simple conversation du patrimoine culturel, mais se trouve animée d'un ressort nouveau qui associe au souci de l'exactitude historique celui de la spéculation philosophique. (shrink)