Esse estudo examina a concepção de virtude de Kant no texto pré-crítico Observações sobre o sentimento do belo e do sublime e no período crítico assim como a concepção de virtude de Schiller em Sobre a graça e a dignidade mostrando principalmente que existem algumas continuidades entre a posição de Kant a respeito da virtude no período pré-crítico e a concepção do período crítico do pensamento moral à luz do debate entre Kant e Schiller a respeito do papel dos sentimentos (...) na concepção de virtude ou perfeição moral. Palavras-chave: Virtude. Inclinação. Dever. Sublime. (shrink)
At the end of I.3, 319a29ff, Aristotle asks a series of questions. This difficult and condensed passage, whose translation is controversial at some points, raises two questions: what is what is not without qualification? and is the matter of earth and fire the same or different? In this essay, I shall focus on the second question.
re s u m o O pre s e nte artigo se inic ia com uma cláusula interna à filosof ia de l e u z e a na, a de que todo pens a me nto pode ser carc t e r i z a do pelo grau de ima n ê nc ia que o me s mo realiza. O pens a me nto de Hu me, como “e m p i r i s mo superior”, segundo ex (...) p ressão de Deleuze, pro mo v e r ia a ima n ê nc ia, ou seja, ele não se re nde r ia a ne n hum tra ns c e nde nt e. Ao me s mo tempo, como s u p e r i o r, se trata de um empirismo que não se pre nde ao ime d ia - t a me nte da do, como suporia um “e m p i r i s mo ing ê nuo”. Por isso, o empirismo seria um p e ns a me nto da ima n ê nc ia que apre s e nta certa alçada tra ns c e ndental, permitindo a Deleuze falar em “e m p i r i s mo tra ns c e nde nt a l ”. A complexa fórmula filosófica re s u m ida nessa ex p ressão de l e u z e a na será por nós, aqui, tratada sob o ponto de vista Hume, de mo do que o ceticismo humeano será tomado como um operador de imanência que of e - rece ao empirismo sua dimensão transcendental. Tal tra t a mento será levado a cabo em duas etapas, quais sejam: a) ceticismo e pro b l e ma da disjunção inclusiva na int e ra ç ã o das fa c u l da des ; b) ceticismo e tra ns c e ndent a l ida de dos juízos empíric o s. palavras-chave Ceticismo; Empirismo; Hume; Deleuze; Transcendental; Imanência. (shrink)
Toma-se como referências básicas algumas reflexões do filósofo Martin Heidegger sobre o domínio planetário da técnica para mostrar a penúria de uma época marcada pelo fim da filosofia mediante sua realização como metafísica nas ciências técnicas. Explicita-se ainda como esse fim da filosofia na era do domínio planetário da técnica pode se constituir o ponto de partida para um novo começo do pensar, que pensa para além dos limites impostos pelo pensamento calculador. Na parte conclusiva do artigo procura-se determinar o (...) caráter e a tarefa que caberia a essa nova forma de pensar e conhecer que nos aproxima das coisas tais como são. (shrink)
Este artigo procura desenvolver o âmbito da assim chamada ontopolítica como contribuição original do pensamento do G. Deleuze para a filosofia política contemporânea. Com este objetivo, veremos que Deleuze toma o conceito de poder em Foucault e lhe confere alçada ontológica. Este conceito de poder dá acesso a outro elemento importante da filosofia política deleuzeana, ou seja, o estudo dos diagramas históricos do poder nas denominadas sociedades disciplinar e de controle. Com o diagrama de funcionamento das mesmas podemos entender qual (...) o retrato deleuzeano para a democracia em sociedades contemporâneas. Adentrando a ontopolítica deleuzeana, nos dedicaremos aos conceitos de maioria, minoria e devir-minoritário. É neste ponto que se faz o encontro da ontopolítica de Deleuze com a ontologia matemática de Ch. Sanders Peirce. Acontece que os conceitos ontopolíticos de Deleuze, além de sua vinculação com uma ontologia do poder, recebem também um tratamento matemático, tendo em vista certas noções aritméticas (contável e não contável) e geométricas (linhas). As maiorias e minorias são conjuntos contáveis que são atravessados por devires não contáveis. Com isso, chegaremos ao ponto central do presente artigo, onde realizamos uma incursão inicial à imagem dos conceitos de maioria e minoria em Deleuze, com base na teoria das coleções e multidões de C. S. Peirce, principalmente com relação à ontologia matemática nela incluída. Quanto a isso, a principal operação será mostrar de que forma a distinção deleuzeana entre maiorias/minorias contáveis e devir-minoritário não contável pode ser escandida em termos de coleções discretas denominadas enumeráveis, denumeráveis e abnumeráveis ou pós-numeráveis, de acordo com a terminologia de Peirce. (shrink)
The essays in this volume are certainly first rate, as is Natanson's introduction, which attempts to outline the more salient features of phenomenology as a method for philosophy and a philosophical evaluation of the other sciences. Included are Erwin Straus' "The Upright Posture," a translation of Sartre's "Faces" and "Official Portraits," Schutz's "Some Leading Concepts of Phenomenology," and Spiegelberg's "How Subjective is Phenomenology?" A balance between actual phenomenological analyses and historical and critical evaluations of phenomenology itself is attempted and achieved. (...) Other contributors include Aron Gurwitsch, James Street Fulton, Harmon Chapman, Michael Kullman and Charles Taylor, Fritz Kaufmann, and Paul-Louis Landsberg.—E. A. R. (shrink)
There are a number of reasons for being interested in uncertainty, and there are also a number of uncertainty formalisms. These formalisms are not unrelated. It is argued that they can all be reflected as special cases of the approach of taking probabilities to be determined by sets of probability functions defined on an algebra of statements. Thus, interval probabilities should be construed as maximum and minimum probabilities within a set of distributions, Glenn Shafer's belief functions should be construed as (...) lower probabilities, etc. Updating probabilities introduces new considerations, and it is shown that the representation of belief as a set of probabilities conflicts in this regard with the updating procedures advocated by Shafer. The attempt to make subjectivistic probability plausible as a doctrine of rational belief by making it more flowery -- i.e., by adding new dimensions -- does not succeed. But, if one is going to represent beliefs by sets of distributions, those sets of distributions might as well be based in statistical knowledge, as they are in epistemological or evidential probability. (shrink)
This book is a collection of essays in honor of Radoslav A. Tsanoff, Chairman of the Department of Philosophy at Rice University for forty years. Besides a tribute to Tsanoff written by J. S. Fulton, there are ten essays written by distinguished philosophers, each considering a topic in his field of interest. Virgil Aldrich discusses the importance of language in an essay entitled "Self-Consciousness." An examination of the new in art and an attempt to explicate its value and rationale is (...) presented by Van Meter Ames; illustrative material is drawn from such sources as contemporary film, pop art and chance music. In "Social Science and Social Norms" Clifford Barrett discusses the relevance of facts and norms in systematic considerations of social scientists. C. P. Snow's concept of two cultures is examined by A. Cornelius Benjamin in "Philosophy and the Cultures." Other essays presented are "Philosophy and Common Sense" by George Boas, "Conscience and Conscientiousness" by A. Campbell Garnett, "Criteria for Ideas of God" by C. Hartshorne, and "Sovereignty and the Idea of Republic" by C. W. Hendel. Charles Morris examines the common themes of the pragmatic movement, discussing such fields as epistemology, axiology and cosmology, and such philosophers as Peirce, Dewey, Mead and Lewis. In the concluding essay G. R. Morrow discusses Plato's views about a God and the many gods of the Greek pantheon. This book is a loose collection of papers, lacking any single theme or determinate relation between the essays presented; each essay, however, is competently handled and is interesting in its own right.—E. M. (shrink)
This is a review of the book Cultivating Original Enlightenment: Wŏnhyo's Exposition of the Vajrasamādhi-Sūtra, by Robert E. Buswell, Jr., published by the Univeristy of Hawaii Press. This volume, the first to be published in the Collected Works of Wŏnhyo series, contains the translation of a single text by Wŏnhyo, the Kŭmgang Sammaegyŏng Non.
In thirteen specially written essays, leading philosophers explore Kantian themes in moral and political philosophy that are prominent in the work of Thomas E. Hill, Jr., such as respect and self-respect, practical reason, conscience, and duty. In conclusion Hill offers an overview of his work and responses to the preceding essays.
Ontology is one strategy for promoting interoperability of heterogeneous data through consistent tagging. An ontology is a controlled structured vocabulary consisting of general terms (such as “cell” or “image” or “tissue” or “microscope”) that form the basis for such tagging. These terms are designed to represent the types of entities in the domain of reality that the ontology has been devised to capture; the terms are provided with logical defi nitions thereby also supporting reasoning over the tagged data. Aim: This (...) paper provides a survey of the biomedical imaging ontologies that have been developed thus far. It outlines the challenges, particularly faced by ontologies in the fields of histopathological imaging and image analysis, and suggests a strategy for addressing these challenges in the example domain of quantitative histopathology imaging. The ultimate goal is to support the multiscale understanding of disease that comes from using interoperable ontologies to integrate imaging data with clinical and genomics data. (shrink)
It is shown how a consistent kinematic resolution of Ehrenfest's paradox may be given in accordance with the special theory of relativity. Some statements by T. E. Phipps, Jr., connected with these matters, are commented upon. Problems connected with the relation between stress and strain are solved by a manifestly covariant formulation of Hooke's law.
A problem which was widely recognised during Schleiermacher's life, and one which I think is not yet satisfactorily solved, concerned the integration of feeling and concepts within human consciousness. Within the domain of philosophy of religion it may be phrased as follows: How does religious feeling relate to rational reflection such that each complements and enriches the other? Schleiermacher was convinced that religion never originates in human understanding or autonomy and that one's understanding of the world is not necessarily dependent (...) on religious faith. But he was equally convinced that reflection and religion ought to enjoy a harmony which reflects the harmony of the universe, and this ideal motivated his continuous attempt to construct a complementary philosophy and theology. His hope was to show that ‘understanding and feeling… remain distinct, but they touch each other and form a galvanic pile.… The innermost life of the spirit consists in the galvanic action thus produced in the feeling of the understanding and the understanding of the feeling, during which, however, the two poles always remain deflected from each other.’. (shrink)
This celebratory Festschrift dedicated to CharlesKahn comprises some 23 articles by friends, former students and colleagues, many of whom first presented their papers at the international "Presocratics and Plato" Symposium in his honor. The conference was organized and sponsored by the HYELE Institute for Comparative Studies, Parmenides Publishing, and Starcom AG, with endorsements from the International Plato Society, and the Dean of the School of Arts and Sciences, University of Pennsylvania. While Kahn's work reaches far beyond (...) the Presocratics and Plato, it is in these subject areas that the distinction of his scholarship has come to be regarded as virtually unrivaled. The articles contributed to this volume are by some of the most renowned scholars working on these topics today, their breadth and depth bearing witness to his profound impact and influence on the discipline of Ancient Greek Philosophy._ CharlesKahn taught Classics and Philosophy at Columbia University from 1957 to 1965, and has since been teaching in the Philosophy Department of the University of Pennsylvania. He spent a year as Visiting Professor at the American School of Classical Studies in Athens, and had additional Visiting Fellowships at Balliol College, Oxford and Clare Hall, Cambridge, and a term as Visiting Professor at Harvard. He is the recipient of several prestigious research grants, from the American Council of Learned Societies, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the Guggenheim Foundation. In 2000 he was elected Fellow of the National Academy of Arts and Sciences. He is the author of _Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology, The Verb “Be” in Ancient Greek, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans, and Essays on Being_. His latest book,_Plato and the Post-Socratic Dialogue_, is forthcoming from Cambridge University Press. _ Contributors: Julia Annas Sarah Broadie Lesley Brown Tomás Calvo-Martínez Diskin Clay John M. Dillon Dorothea Frede Arnold Hermann Carl A. Huffman Enrique Hülsz Piccone D. M. Hutchinson Paul Kalligas Vassilis Karasmanis Aryeh Kosman Anthony A. Long Richard McKirahan Susan Sauvé Meyer Alexander P.D.Mourelatos Satoshi Ogihara Richard Patterson Christopher J. Rowe David Sedley Richard Sorabji. (shrink)
O presente artigo quer trazer a pesquisa entorno do pensamento ético/político de Charles Taylor na compreensão das fontes da identidade pessoal. Para isso, a relação entre reconhecimento e identidade é fundamental na construção do self e no reconhecimento de sua originalidade. Reconhecer a identidade pessoal é um movimento contínuo que se desenvolve na troca dialógica, no espaço moral, numa formação positiva ou pela via negativa do reconhecimento da identidade. Por isso, o agente humano deve estar inserido no contexto social (...) e reconhecer-se na cultura da comunidade como pertencente à mesma. O reconhecimento não se dá de forma monológica, isolado, mas pela troca, no diálogo do agente social com seus significantes humanos. Todavia, a identidade pessoal requer uma narrativa da pergunta “quem sou eu”, que é desvelada na medida em que o agente vai se relacionando no espaço social e se projetando. Por isso, reconhecer “quem sou” é narrar o “quem fui” e o “quem quero ser”. Reconhecer a identidade pessoal é reconhecer o seu lugar no mundo e, assim, ser o protagonista da própria história a partir daquilo que desenvolve em relação aos demais agentes sociais. (shrink)
Este ensayo es una investigación sobre las relaciones entre las concepciones de modernidad e identidad en la obra del filósofo canadiense Charles Taylor. En los escritos recientes de Taylor, el concepto de identidad es una herramienta útil para percibir claramente la concepción del yo, en el contexto de una nueva visión del espacio moral. En su búsqueda de las fuentes morales del yo, Taylor centra su análisis en la modernidad. Subraya en este período el rol de la interioridad, la (...) preeminencia de la vida ordinaria de la familia y la economía y la emergencia de la naturaleza y la expresión, el giro expresivista. En sus ensayos de fines de la década de 1980 y en los 1990, Taylor le asigna gran significación al ideal expresivista de la autenticidad y explora sus relaciones con la idea de reconocimiento. Es en este lenguaje moderno de la autenticidad y el reconocimiento que podemos expresar mejor el renacimiento del nacionalismo y la religión como un símbolo de la identidad cultural. Otras consecuencias prácticas de estas distinciones y conceptos de Taylor pueden encontrarse en el multiculturalismo, la filosofía política y la filosofía del lenguaje. Al final del texto se exploran muy sintéticamente alguna críticas a las concepciones de la autenticidad de Taylor. En particular, me parece muy interesante la crítica del filósofo español José María González que se centra en la ausencia del barroco en el filósofo canadiense, y en la idea barroca de una identidad múltiple. (shrink)
Affirmative action programs remain controversial, I suspect, partly because the familiar arguments for and against them start from significantly different moral perspectives. Thus I want to step back for a while from the details of debate about particular programs and give attention to the moral viewpoints presupposed in different types of argument. My aim, more specifically, is to compare the “messages” expressed when affirmative action is defended from different moral perspectives. Exclusively forward-looking arguments, I suggest, tend to express the wrong (...) message, but this is also true of exclusively backward-looking arguments. However, a moral outlook that focuses on cross-temporal narrative values suggests a more appropriate account of what affirmative action should try to express. Assessment of the message, admittedly, is only one aspect of a complex issue, but it is a relatively neglected one. My discussion takes for granted some common-sense ideas about the communicative function of action, and so I begin with these. Actions, as the saying goes, often speak louder than words. There are times, too, when only actions can effectively communicate the message we want to convey and times when giving a message is a central part of the purpose of action. What our actions say to others depends largely, though not entirely, upon our avowed reasons for acting; and this is a matter for reflective decision, not something we discover later by looking back at what we did and its effects. The decision is important because “the same act” can have very different consequences, depending upon how we choose to justify it. (shrink)
Epistemology, as I understand it, is a branch of philosophy especially concerned with general questions about how we can know various things or at least justify our beliefs about them. It questions what counts as evidence and what are reasonable sources of doubt. Traditionally, episte-mology focuses on pervasive and apparently basic assumptions covering a wide range of claims to knowledge or justified belief rather than very specific, practical puzzles. For example, traditional epistemologists ask “How do we know there are material (...) objects?” and not “How do you know which are the female beetles?” Similarly, moral epistemology, as I understand it, is concerned with general questions about how we can know or justify our beliefs about moral matters. Its focus, again, is on quite general, pervasive, and apparently basic assumptions about what counts as evidence, what are reasonable sources of doubt, and what are the appropriate procedures for justifying particular moral claims. (shrink)
Ancient moral philosophers, especially Aristotle and his followers, typically shared the assumption that ethics is primarily concerned with how to achieve the final end for human beings, a life of “happiness” or “human flourishing.” This final end was not a subjective condition, such as contentment or the satisfaction of our preferences, but a life that could be objectively determined to be appropriate to our nature as human beings. Character traits were treated as moral virtues because they contributed well toward this (...) ideal life, either as means to it or as constitutive aspects of it. Traits that tended to prevent a “happy” life were considered vices, even if they contributed to a life that was pleasant and what a person most wanted. The idea of “happiness” was central, then, in philosophical efforts to specify what we ought to do, what sort of persons we should try to become, and what sort of life a wise person would hope for. (shrink)
This essay first distinguishes different questions regarding moral objectivity and relativism and then sketches a broadly Kantian position on two of these questions. First, how, if at all, can we derive, justify, or support specific moral principles and judgments from more basic moral standards and values? Second, how, if at all, can the basic standards such as my broadly Kantian perspective, be defended? Regarding the first question, the broadly Kantian position is that from ideas in Kant's later formulations of the (...) Categorical Imperative, especially human dignity and rational autonomous law-making, we can develop an appropriate moral perspective for identifying and supporting more specific principles. Both the deliberative perspective and the derivative principles can be viewed as “constructed,” but in different senses. In response to the second question, the essay examines two of Kant's strategies for defending his basic perspective and the important background of his arguments against previous moral theories. (shrink)
Philosophers have debated for millennia about whether moral requirements are always rational to follow. The background for these debates is often what I shall call “the self-interest model.” The guiding assumption here is that the basic demand of reason, to each person, is that one must, above all, advance one's self-interest. Alternatively, debate may be framed by a related, but significantly different, assumption: the idea that the basic rational requirement is to develop and pursue a set of personal ends in (...) an informed, efficient, and coherent way, whether one's choice of ends is based on self-interested desires or not. For brevity I refer to this as “the coherence-and-efficiency model.” Advocates of both models tend to think that, while it is sufficiently clear in principle what the rational thing to do is, what remains in doubt is whether it is always rational to be moral. They typically assume that morality is concerned, entirely or primarily, with our relations to others, especially with obligations that appear to require some sacrifice or compromise with the pursuit of self-interest. (shrink)
What, if anything, are we morally required to do on behalf of others besides respecting their rights? And why is such regard for others a reasonable moral requirement? These two questions have long been major concerns of ethical theory, but the answers that philosophers give tend to vary with their beliefs about human nature. More specifically, their answers typically depend on the position they take on a third-question: To what extent, if any, is it possible for us to act altruistically?