20 found
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  1. Conceptual Dependency as the Language of Thought.Charles E. M. Dunlop - 1990 - Synthese 82 (2):275-96.
    Roger Schank's research in AI takes seriously the ideas that understanding natural language involves mapping its expressions into an internal representation scheme and that these internal representations have a syntax appropriate for computational operations. It therefore falls within the computational approach to the study of mind. This paper discusses certain aspects of Schank's approach in order to assess its potential adequacy as a (partial) model of cognition. This version of the Language of Thought hypothesis encounters some of the same difficulties (...)
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  2. Wittgenstein on Sensation and 'Seeing-As'.Charles E. M. Dunlop - 1984 - Synthese 60 (September):349-368.
    This essay begins by providing a new account of wittgenstein's private language argument. Wittgenstein's rejection of a "cartesian" account of mind is examined, And it is argued that this rejection carries no commitment to behaviorism, Or to the view that sensation terms have public meanings and private references. Part ii of the essay attempts to forge a link between the two parts of the "philosophical investigations", By arguing that wittgenstein's discussion of "seeing-As" reinforces and illuminates his account of how sensation (...)
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  3.  86
    Searle's Unconscious Mind.Charles E. M. Dunlop - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (1):123-148.
    In his book The rediscovery of the mind John Searle claims that unconscious mental states (1) have first-person "aspectual shape", but (2) that their ontology is purely third-person. He attempts to eliminate the obvious inconsistency by arguing that the aspectual shape of unconscious mental states consists in their ability to cause conscious first-person states. However, I show that this attempted solution fails insofar as it covertly acknowledges that unconscious states lack the aspectual shape required for them to play a role (...)
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  4.  80
    Mentalese Semantics and the Naturalized Mind.Charles E. M. Dunlop - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):77-94.
    In a number of important works, Jerry Fodor has wrestled with the problem of how mental representation can be accounted for within a physicalist framework. His favored response has attempted to identify nonintentional conditions for intentionality, relying on a nexus of casual relations between symbols and what they represent. I examine Fodor's theory and argue that it fails to meet its own conditions for adequacy insofar as it presupposes the very phenomenon that it purports to account for. I conclude, however, (...)
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  5.  62
    Dreams, Skepticism, and Scientific Research.Charles E. M. Dunlop - 1978 - Philosophia 8 (2-3):355-65.
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  6.  32
    Lehrer and Ellis on Incorrigibility.Charles E. M. Dunlop - 1977 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (3):201-5.
  7.  20
    William H. Calvin, How Brains Think: Evolving Intelligence, Then and Now. [REVIEW]Charles E. M. Dunlop - 1999 - Minds and Machines 9 (2):276-280.
  8.  46
    Belief in Dreams.Charles E. M. Dunlop - 1978 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):61-64.
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  9.  44
    Performatives and Dream Skepticism.Charles E. M. Dunlop - 1974 - Philosophical Studies 25 (4):295 - 297.
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  10.  8
    Kim’s “Supervenient Mind”.Charles E. M. Dunlop - 1983 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):145-149.
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  11.  40
    M. Gams, M. Paprzycki and X. Wu, Eds., Mind Versus Computer: Were Dreyfus and Winograd Right?, Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, Vol. 43, Amsterdam: IOS Press, 1997, XIII + 235 Pp. (Paper), ISBN 90-5199-357-. [REVIEW]Charles E. M. Dunlop - 2000 - Minds and Machines 10 (2):289-296.
  12.  26
    Anamnesis in the Phaedo.Charles E. M. Dunlop - 1975 - New Scholasticism 49 (1):51-61.
  13.  9
    Review of “Knowledge, Possiblity and Consciousness”. [REVIEW]Charles E. M. Dunlop - 2003 - Essays in Philosophy 4 (2):9.
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  14.  21
    Book Reviews. [REVIEW]Margaret Gilbert, E. D. Klemke, E. D. Klemke & Charles E. M. Dunlop - 1983 - Philosophia 12 (3-4):423-445.
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  15.  20
    Book Reviews. [REVIEW]Charles E. M. Dunlop, Susan M. Haller & James Moor - 1991 - Minds and Machines 1 (2):221-232.
  16.  16
    Kim's “Supervenient Mind”.Charles E. M. Dunlop - 1983 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):145-149.
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  17.  16
    Book Reviews and Critical Studies. [REVIEW]Charles E. M. Dunlop - 1981 - Philosophia 9 (3-4):391-403.
  18. An Analysis of Dreaming.Charles E. M. Dunlop - 1972 - Dissertation, Duke University
  19. Philosophical Essays on Dreaming.Charles E. M. Dunlop (ed.) - 1977 - Cornell University Press.
  20. Philosophical Essays on Dreaming.Charles E. M. Dunlop - 1980 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 170 (1):48-49.
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