The purpose of this study is to explore with more rigor and detail the role of social norms in tax compliance. This study draws on Cialdini and Trost’s (The Handbook of Social Psychology: Oxford University Press, Boston, MA, 1998) taxonomy of social norms to investigate with more specificity this potentially decisive (Alm and McKee, Managerial and Decision Economics, 19:259–275, 1998) influence on tax compliance. We test our research hypotheses regarding the direct and indirect influences of social norms using a hypothetical (...) compliance scenario with 174 experienced taxpayers as participants. Factor analysis of the social norm questions successfully identified four distinct social norm constructs, in line with Cialdini and Trost (1998). Results of the path analysis show that individuals’ standards for behavior/ethical beliefs (personal norms) as well as the expectations of close others (subjective norms) directly influence tax compliance decisions, whereas general societal expectations (injunctive norms) and other individuals’ actual behavior (descriptive norms) have an indirect influence. This shows that social norms have important direct as well as indirect influences on tax compliance behavior. We also investigate a number of attitudinal variables that may be related to social norms and taxpayer compliance. The results of this study further clarify the important role that social norms have with regard to taxpayers’ compliance behavior. (shrink)
This book examines the strengths and weaknesses of four salient epistemological orientations in the field – positivism, relativism, interpretivism, and intersubjectivism – to identify the characteristics of a theoretically-informed epistemology for social science.
This book interrogates the nature and state of African American citizenship through the prism of Social Contract Theory. Challenging the United States’ commitment to African American citizenship, this book explores the idea of Social Nullification, the decision to reject, revoke and re-define the social contract with a state and society. Charles F. Peterson surveys the history of Social Contract Theory, examines Nullification as political and legal theory, argues public policy as a measure of the state’s commitment to the contractarian (...) relationship and frames the writings and activism of Martin R. Delany, Ida B. Wells-Barnett and the African American Reparations Movement as examples of Social Nullification and challenges to the terms of Black life in America. (shrink)
Reason and Rationality in Health and Human Services Delivery is the first book to discuss the topic of decisionmaking and services from a multidisciplinary approach. It uses theory and social considerations, not just technology, as a basis for improved services. Health and human service students and professionals will learn how to form rational and reasonable decisions that take their clients'cultural backgrounds into consideration when identifying an illness or appropriating any kind of intervention. With a particular emphasis on theories, models, organizational (...) settings, technologies, and practitioner training methods that lead to culturally sensitive decisions, Reason and Rationality will help you deliver efficient and improved medical and social services to clients from all ethnic backgrounds. Recognizing reason as the centerpiece of most of Western philosophy, this text reveals how our idea of truth, fact, and order are wrongly thought to be universal; yet, Western principles are continually used in the decision-making process for health and social services. Focusing on the policy implications of decisionmaking in medical and social service settings, this text works to incorporate a broad range of factors into the reasoning process, such as cultural traditions and beliefs, that will result in better treatment for patients. Giving you suggestions and strategies for upgrading reasoning and decision-making processes and applying them to every area of service, Reason and Rationality discusses different themes that will help you improve services to patients, such as: the rationale currently used to justify decision-making strategies concerning medical and human services using computer technology to make clinical assessments revising administrative structure, management theories, and organizational strategies so that decision-making processes enhance the overall quality of service delivery how the practitioner/patient relationship is important in choosing the proper treatment soliciting community-based input to assess the public's health and human service needs in order to lessen political involvement in decision-making stages In addition, Reason and Rationality provides information and examples that show why you should consider the "life-world"--the values, beliefs, and commitments of a culture's history-- as the key to understanding the powers of reasoning that specify parameters of health and illness. (shrink)
This article concerns the prescriptive function of decision analysis. Consider an agent who must choose an action yielding welfare that varies with an unknown state of nature. It is often asserted that such an agent should adhere to consistency axioms which imply that behavior can be represented as maximization of expected utility. However, our agent is not concerned the consistency of his behavior across hypothetical choice sets. He only wants to make a reasonable choice from the choice set that he (...) actually faces. Hence, I reason that prescriptions for decision making should respect actuality. That is, they should promote welfare maximization in the choice problem the agent actually faces. Any choice respecting weak and stochastic dominance is rational from the actualist perspective. (shrink)
" -- Dr. Daniel Gardner, Cornell University Medical College Charles Stevens, a prominent neurobiologist who originally trained as a biophysicist (with George Uhlenbeck and Mark Kac), wrote this book almost by accident.
This paper is a reaction to G. Küng's and J. T. Canty's Substitutional Quantification and Leniewskian quantifiers'Theoria 36 (1970), 165–182. I reject their arguments that quantifiers in Ontology cannot be referentially interpreted but I grant that there is what can be called objectual — referential interpretation of quantifiers and that because of the unrestricted quantification in Ontology the quantifiers in Ontology should not be given a so-called objectual-referential interpretation. I explain why I am in agreement with Küng and Canty's recommendation (...) that Ontology's quantifiers not be substitutionally interpreted even if Leniewski intended them to be so interpreted. A notion of an interpretation which is referential but yet which does not interpret as an assertor of existence of objects in a domain is developed. It is then shown that a first order version of Ontology is satisfied by those special kind of referential interpretations which read as Something as epposed to Something existing. (shrink)
As time passed, I discovered with surprise that the important role I assigned to literature was not recognized by everyone.iThis essay constitutes one aspect of an overall project to spell out the implications for the literary arts of Wittgenstein's systematic distinction between acts of description that carry truth values and acts of expression that display states of mind and feeling but do not describe them. My full case will require a book. That is good news for me but bad news (...) for the present reader, since I feel I have to offer a painfully brief version of my overall theoretical position as a backdrop for what I will say about appreciation. Expressions elicit or solicit attunement rather than propose .. (shrink)
In many classes of structures, each computable structure has computable dimension 1 or $\omega$. Nevertheless, Goncharov showed that for each $n < \omega$, there exists a computable structure with computable dimension $n$. In this paper we show that, under one natural definition of relativized computable dimension, no computable structure has finite relativized computable dimension greater than 1.
The present book is intended to help students overcome difficulties by presenting Jaspers' thoughts in comparatively clear and straightforward fashion. While it denies that philosophy is "practical" in any cheap and obvious sense, it follows Jaspers in attempting to avoid the otiose and emphasize the relevance of philosophy to matters of ultimate concern. Those who wish a more theoretical and systematic presentation may well call to mind that, as Heidegger's followers express it, Jaspers, like Kierkegaard- and to some extent Sartre- (...) quite deliberately spurned the "ontological" in favor of the "ontic.". (shrink)
The authors are known for an analytic commentary on Wittgenstein: Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning. The preface reveals their original hope to write an analytic commentary on a philosopher more systematic than the later Wittgenstein. They planned a year for a short undergraduate introduction to the general principles of Frege's philosophy. In that year they failed to find in Frege a philosophical system similar to a monumental building to which instructors could take students and point out what made it such an (...) architectural marvel. Other philosophers apparently believed in a monumental Fregean edifice to which they could lead people, and on whose materials and structural merits they could elaborate. But these authors found only ruins and rubble. The debris did not even clearly give evidence of past glory, let alone provide any useful material, foundations, or plans for a reconstruction. (shrink)
Econometric analysis of discrete choice has made considerable use of random utility models to interpret observed choice behavior. Much empirical research concerns choice problems in which persons act with partial knowledge of the utilities of the feasible actions. Economists use random expected utility models to analyze such choice problems. A common practice is to specify fully the expectations that persons hold, in which case choice analysis reduces to inference on preferences alone. However, the expectations assumptions made in empirical research rarely (...) have much foundation. To enable more credible research, this paper considers inference when one specifies a set of expectations that decision makers may plausibly hold. I first pose the idea in abstraction and then specialize to binary response with linear utilities, where the analysis is particularly straightforward. I initially assume that decision makers possess unique subjective probability distributions on the states of nature and make choices that maximize expected utility. I later consider the possibility that persons place only partial probabilistic structure on the states of nature and make undominated choices. (shrink)