Two models of the relationship between individual behaviour and health status are examined. On the Freedom Model, the individual is presumed to be capable of free choices including many that have important health consequences. Freedom entails accountability. Thus individuals can be held responsible for health conditions that result from choices they have made. To hold otherwise—to refuse to acknowledge the freedom and responsibilities of individuals—is bad faith. On the Facticity Model, behaviour is a result of facts—genetic and environmental—beyond an individual's (...) control. There is little or no freedom; people are the bodies and roles they inherit. Important among these facts is socio-economic position since it determines much of behaviour and resulting health status. Many people who are poor and lack education also suffer from poor health. To blame their poor health on their behaviour is to blame people already victimised by their circumstances. The relationships of these two models to health promotion are explored. Though conflicting in theory, some justice can be done to each model in the practical world of health promotion by appealing to the freedom in individuals in health education and to the facts that shape individuals in other health promotion and health care contexts. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to review the rising influence of commercialism in American medicine and to examine some of the consequences of this trend. Increased competition subverts physician collegiality, draws hospitals into for-profit ownership and behavior, and leads clinical investigators into secrecy and possibly into bias and abuse. Medicine faces a deprofessionalization evidenced in loss of control over the clinical setting and over self-regulation. Health care becomes a commodity relying on cultivation of desires instead of satisfaction of needs, (...) even as many basic needs go unmet. Patients become consumers empowered with lawsuits and the connection of medicine to the relief of suffering is attenuated. Medical encounters are increasingly impersonal, dominated by specialization, technology, and bureaucracy. Patients are losing their physician-advocates to new conflicts of interests, physicians are losing their impulse to charity, and trust in the doctor-patient relationship and in medicine generally is eroding. (shrink)

This is a time of change in American healthcare. Market forces are restructuring local delivery systems around competing managed care networks. Many leading proposals for healthcare reform intend a reshaping of the national healthcare marketplace itself. Periods of change create an opportunity to reassess traditional values and practices. Such reassessments can be used to help insure that current innovations and proposed reforms preserve and strengthen the best in the traditions of medicine. A legitimate focus of concern in the medical and (...) medical ethics community has been the effect of these delivery system changes on the physician-patient relationship. For example, will the future American healthcare system support and encourage compassion by physicians? Suppose it does not. Would something of significant moral value have been lost? More pointedly, would a system that undervalued or frustrated physician compassion be incompatible with the moral obligations of physicians? In order to address these questions, we examine the meaning of compassion and the role it should play in the physician-patient relationship. We argue that compassion is a duty of all physicians. Because this is so, we believe that changes in the healthcare system must be judged, in part, by how well they protect and encourage compassionate conduct by physicians. (shrink)

Since the publication of Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen at the outset of this century, the notion of phenomenology has had a long and important history on the European continent. Of the many claims made on its behalf perhaps the most interesting is that phenomenology is able to ground philosophical assertions in a manner which is neither purely formal nor purely empirical, i.e., that phenomenology as a method is capable of transcending this very distinction. For example, phenomenologists argue that their reduction of (...) essences provides a way of knowing which is neither analytic nor synthetic but both. Having reached such an eidetic intuition phenomenologists claim to have attained a non-trivial universality and necessity. (shrink)