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Charles Sayward [146]Charles W. Sayward [2]Charles Warren Sayward [1]
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Charles Sayward
University of Nebraska, Lincoln
  1.  36
    Intensionality and Truth: An Essay on the Philosophy of A. N. Prior.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1996 - kluwer.
    This book says Prior claims: (1) that a sentence never names; (2) what a sentence says cannot be otherwise signified; and (3) that a sentence says what it says whatever the type of its occurrence; (4) and that quantifications binding sentential variables are neither eliminable, substitutional, nor referential. The book develops and defends (1)-(3). It also defends (4) against the sorts of strictures on quantification of such philosophers as Quine and Davidson.
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  2.  92
    Expressions and Tokens.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1981 - Analysis 41 (4):181-187.
    The purpose of this paper is to uncover and correct several confusions about expressions, tokens and the relations between them that crop up in even highly sophisticated writing about language and logic.
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  3. A Problem About Conversational Implicature.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1979 - Linguistics and Philosophy 3 (1):19 - 25.
    Conversational implicatures are easy to grasp for the most part. But it is another matter to give a rational reconstruction of how they are grasped. We argue that Grice's attempt to do this fails. We distinguish two sorts of cases: (1) those in which we grasp the implicature by asking ourselves what would the speaker have to believe given that what he said is such as is required by the talk exchange; (2) those in which we grasp the implicature by (...)
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  4. Prior’s Theory of Truth.Charles Sayward - 1987 - Analysis 47 (2):83-87.
    This paper is a critical exposition of Prior’s theory of truth as expressed by the following truth locutions: (1) ‘it is true that’ prefixed to sentences; (2) ‘true proposition’; (3) true belief’, ‘true assertion’, ‘true statement’, etc.; (4) ‘true sentence’.
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  5. Quine and His Critics on Truth-Functionality and Extensionality.Charles Sayward - 2007 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 16 (1):45-63.
    Quine argues that if sentences that are set theoretically equivalent are interchangeable salva veritate, then all transparent operators are truth-functional. Criticisms of this argument fail to take into account the conditional character of the conclusion. Quine also argues that, for any person P with minimal logical acuity, if ‘belief’ has a sense in which it is a transparent operator, then, in that sense of the word, P believes everything if P believes anything. The suggestion is made that he intends that (...)
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  6.  85
    The Province of Logic.Charles Sayward - 1975 - Analysis 36 (1):47-48.
    Quine criticizes Strawson’s account of the province of logic. Robert Hadley proposes a refutation of Quine. This paper proposes a refutation of Hadley.
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  7.  40
    Definite Descriptions, Negation and Necessitation.Charles Sayward - 1993 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 13 (1):36-47.
    The principal question asked in this paper is: in the case of attributive usage, is the definite description to be analyzed as Russell said or is it to be treated as a referring expression, functioning semantically as a proper name? It answers by defending the former alternative.
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  8. W.D. Ross on Acting From Motives.Charles Sayward - 1988 - Journal of Value Inquiry 22 (4):299-306.
    This paper defends a position held by W, D, Ross that it is no part of one’s duty to have a certain motive since one cannot by choice have it here and now.
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  9.  98
    Is Heaven a Possible World?Douglas Erlandson & Charles Sayward - 1981 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12 (1):55 - 58.
    The goal of theodicy is to show how God could create our world with all its evil. This paper argues that the theodicist can achieve her goal only if she gives up one of these three propositions: (1) evil does not exist in heaven; (2) heaven is better than the present world; (3) heaven is a possible world. Second, it is argued that the theodicist can reject (3) without giving up her belief that heaven exists, so that (3) is her (...)
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  10.  60
    Frege on Identities.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2000 - History and Philosophy of Logic 21 (3):195-205.
    The idea underlying the Begriffsschrift account of identities was that the content of a sentence is a function of the things it is about. If so, then if an identity a=b is about the content of its contained terms and is true, then a=a and a=b have the same content. But they do not have the same content; so, Frege concluded, identities are not about the contents of their contained terms. The way Frege regarded the matter is that in an (...)
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  11.  43
    Absurdity and Spanning.Charles Sayward & Stephen H. Voss - 1972 - Philosophia 2 (3):227-238.
    On the basis of observations J. J. C. Smart once made concerning the absurdity of sentences like 'The seat of the bed is hard', a plausible case can be made that there is little point to developing a theory of types, particularly one of the sort envisaged by Fred Sommers. The authors defend such theories against this objection by a partial elucidation of the distinctions between the concepts of spanning and predicability and between category mistakenness and absurdity in general. The (...)
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  12. Null Sentences.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1999 - Iyyun, The Jewish Philosophical Quarterly 48:23-36.
    In Tractatus, Wittgenstein held that there are null sentences – prominently including logical truths and the truths of mathematics. He says that such sentences are without sense (sinnlos), that they say nothing; he also denies that they are nonsensical (unsinning). Surely it is what a sentence says which is true or false. So if a sentence says nothing, how can it be true or false? The paper discusses the issue.
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  13. Bound Variables and Schematic Letters.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1981 - Logique Et Analyse 95 (95):425-429.
    The paper purports to show, against Quine, that one can construct a language , which results from the extension of the theory of truth functions by introducing sentence letter quantification. Next a semantics is provided for this language. It is argued that the quantification is neither substitutional nor requires one to consider the sentence letters as taking entities as values.
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  14. What’s So Special About Sentences?Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1995 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 28 (4):409-25.
    This paper is a discussion of Frege's maxim that it is only in the context of a sentence that a word has a meaning. Quine reads the maxim as saying that the sentence is the fundamental unit of significance. Dummett rejects this as a truism. But it is not a truism since it stands in opposition to a conception of meaning held by John Locke and others. The maxim denies that a word has a sense independently of any sentence in (...)
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  15. Kripke on Necessity and Identity.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1998 - Philosophical Papers 27 (3):151-159.
    It may be that all that matters for the modalities, possibility and necessity, is the object named by the proper name, not which proper name names it. An influential defender of this view is Saul Kripke. Kripke’s defense is criticized in the paper.
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  16. There Is A Problem with Substitutional Quantification.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2002 - Theoria 68 (1):4-12.
    Whereas arithmetical quantification is substitutional in the sense that a some-quantification is true only if some instance of it is true, it does not follow (and, in fact, is not true) that an account of the truth-conditions of the sentences of the language of arithmetic can be given by a substitutional semantics. A substitutional semantics fails in a most fundamental fashion: it fails to articulate the truth-conditions of the quantifications with which it is concerned. This is what is defended in (...)
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  17. The Structure of Type Theory.Stephen H. Voss & Charles Sayward - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (5):241-259.
    Formal principals are isolated to reveal a structure embedded in a wide range of studies, each of which partitions a domain of individuals into types and categories. It is thought that any reasonable theory of types should include these principles.
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  18. The Tree Theory and Isomorphism.Charles Sayward - 1980 - Analysis 41 (1):6-11.
    A main thesis of Fred Sommers' type theory, is that an isomorphism exists between any natural language and the categories discriminated by that language. Here the author gives an explanation of what this claim comes to. And then it is argued that, so understood, the claim is incompatible with Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. Finally, it is argued against trying to salvage the isomorphism thesis by appealing to some other set theory.
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  19. Quantifying Over the Reals.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1994 - Synthese 101 (1):53 - 64.
    Peter Geach proposed a substitutional construal of quantification over thirty years ago. It is not standardly substitutional since it is not tied to those substitution instances currently available to us; rather, it is pegged to possible substitution instances. We argue that (i) quantification over the real numbers can be construed substitutionally following Geach's idea; (ii) a price to be paid, if it is that, is intuitionism; (iii) quantification, thus conceived, does not in itself relieve us of ontological commitment to real (...)
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  20. A Defense of Sommers.Charles Sayward - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 29 (5):343 - 347.
    Jon Fjeld wrote a paper that he begins by nicely outlining why various criticisms of Fred Sommers theory of types and categories fail. Fjeld puts forth a criticism that avoids the problems with these other criticisms. But, it is argued, his criticism also fails.
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  21.  83
    What is a Second Order Theory Committed To?Charles Sayward - 1983 - Erkenntnis 20 (1):79 - 91.
    The paper argues that no second order theory is ontologically commited to anything beyond what its individual variables range over.
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  22.  54
    A Defense of Mill on Other Minds.Charles Sayward - 2003 - Dialectica 57 (3):315–322.
    This paper seeks to explain why the argument from analogy seems strong to an analogist such as Mill and weak to the skeptic. The inference from observed behavior to the existence of feelings, sensations, etc., in other subjects is justified, but its justification depends on taking observed behavior and feelings, sensations, and so on, to be not merely correlated, but connected. It is claimed that this is what Mill had in mind.
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  23.  42
    Is English Inconsistent?Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1980 - Erkenntnis 15 (3):343 - 347.
    The significance of the semantical paradoxes for natural languages is examined. If Tarski’s reflections on the issue are correct, English is inconsistent. Paul Ziff responds to Tarskian reflections by arguing to the conclusion that no natural language is or can be inconsistent. The authors reject Ziff’s argument, but they defend something similar to its conclusion: no language, natural or otherwise, is or can be inconsistent in the way that Tarski holds languages capable of formulating the Epimenides are inconsistent.
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  24.  40
    Four Views of Arithmetical Truth.Charles Sayward - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (159):155-168.
    Four views of arithmetical truth are distinguished: the classical view, the provability view, the extended provability view, the criterial view. The main problem with the first is the ontology it requires one to accept. Two anti-realist views are the two provability views. The first of these is judged to be preferable. However, it requires a non-trivial account of the provability of axioms. The criterial view is gotten from remarks Wittgenstein makes in Tractatus 6.2-6.22 . It is judged to be the (...)
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  25.  39
    Theories of Truth and Semantical Primitives.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1977 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):349 - 354.
    Robert cummins has recently attacked this line of argument: if p is a semantically primitive predicate of a first order language l, then p requires its own clause in the definition of satisfaction integral to a definition of truth of l. thus if l has infinitely many such p, the satisfaction clause cannot be completed and truth for l will remain undefined. against this cummins argues that a single clause in a general base theory for l can specify satisfaction conditions (...)
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  26.  37
    Understanding Sentences.Charles Sayward - 2000 - Philosophical Investigations 23 (1):48–53.
    Doubts are raised about the claim that on mastering a finite vocabulary and a finitely stated set of rules we are prepared to understand a potential infinitude of sentences. One doubt is about understanding a potential infinitude of sentences. A second doubt is about the assumption that understanding a sentence must be a matter of figuring out its meaning from an antecedent knowledge of the meaning of its words and applying rules.
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  27.  21
    Eternal Sentences.Stephen H. Voss & Charles Sayward - 1976 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 54 (1):14 – 23.
    The paper argues that two apparently attractive conceptions of an eternal sentence are defective. An alternative conception is presented which the authors think allows greater insight into the nature of semantic concepts.
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  28.  19
    Is English Infinite?Charles Sayward - 1988 - Philosophical Papers 17 (2):141-151.
    It is argued that English is finite. By this is meant that it contains only finitely many expressions. The conclusion is reached by arguing: (1) only finitely many expressions of English are tokenable; (2) if E is an expression of English, then E is tokenable.
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  29.  62
    System Relativism.Charles Sayward - 1988 - Ratio 1 (2):163-175.
    The fundamental thought of moral relativism is set out as follows: moral criteria, derived from overall moral points of view, are used to derive particular moral judgments. Thus such a judgment might be correct relative to one overall moral point of view and incorrect relative to another. The evaluation of an overall moral point of view does not involve the application of moral criteria. Rather, the evaluation of a morality takes us outside the province of morality. The result of sharpening (...)
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  30. What Truth is There in Psychological Egoism?Charles Sayward - 2006 - Facta Philosophica 8 (1-2):145-159.
    Psychological egoism says that a purposive action is self-interested in a certain sense. The trick is to say in what sense. On the one hand, the psychological egoist wants to avoid a thesis that can be falsified by trivial examples. On the other hand, what is wanted is a thesis that lacks vacuity. The paper’s purpose is to arrive at such a thesis and show that it is a reasonable guess with empirical content.
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  31.  83
    Austin On Whether Every Proposition Has A Contradictory.Michael Durrant & Charles Sayward - 1967 - Analysis 27 (April):167-170.
    Austin rejects the contention that every proposition has a contradictory. This paper finds problems with the case Austin makes for rejecting the contention in question.
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  32.  74
    Philosophical Logic: An Introduction to Advanced Topics.George Englebretsen & Charles Sayward - 2010 - continuum.
    This title introduces students to non-classical logic, syllogistic, to quantificational and modal logic. The book includes exercises throughout and a glossary of terms and symbols. Taking students beyond classical mathematical logic, "Philosophical Logic" is a wide-ranging introduction to more advanced topics in the study of philosophical logic. Starting by contrasting familiar classical logic with constructivist or intuitionist logic, the book goes on to offer concise but easy-to-read introductions to such subjects as quantificational and syllogistic logic, modal logic and set theory. (...)
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  33.  39
    Arithmetic and Ontology: A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - rodopi.
    In this book a non-realist philosophy of mathematics is presented. Two ideas are essential to its conception. These ideas are (i) that pure mathematics--taken in isolation from the use of mathematical signs in empirical judgement--is an activity for which a formalist account is roughly correct, and (ii) that mathematical signs nonetheless have a sense, but only in and through belonging to a system of signs with empirical application. This conception is argued by the two authors and is critically discussed by (...)
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  34. Are All Tautologies True?Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1989 - Logique Et Analyse 125 (125-126):3-14.
    The paper asks: are all tautologies true in a language with truth-value gaps? It answers that they are not. No tautology is false, of course, but not all are true. It also contends that not all contradictions are false in a language with truth-value gaps, though none are true.
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  35.  26
    A Fregean Principle.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1998 - History and Philosophy of Logic 19 (3):125-135.
    Frege held that the result of applying a predicate to names lacks reference if any of the names lack reference. We defend the principle against a number of plausible objections. We put forth an account of consequence for a first-order language with identity in which the principle holds.
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  36. Analytical Table of Contents.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:31-33.
  37. Chapter 6: Arithmetic and Necessity.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:159-182.
  38. Chapter 7: Arithmetic and Rules.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:183-211.
  39. Chapter 5: Existence, Number, and Realism.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:129-155.
  40. Chapter 1: Introduction.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:35-42.
  41. Chapter 2: Notes to Grundlagen.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:45-72.
  42. Chapter 3: Objectivism and Realism in Frege's Philosophy of Arithmetic.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:73-101.
  43. Chapter 10: Thesis Three.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:254-283.
     
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  44. Chapter 8: Thesis One.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:215-240.
     
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  45. Chapter 4: The Peano Axioms.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:105-128.
  46. Chapter 9: Thesis Two.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90:241-253.
     
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  47.  34
    Can There Be a Proof That an Unprovable Sentence of Arithmetic is True?Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1989 - Dialectica 43 (43):289-292.
    Various authors of logic texts are cited who either suggest or explicitly state that the Gödel incompleteness result shows that some unprovable sentence of arithmetic is true. Against this, the paper argues that the matter is one of philosophical controversy, that it is not a mathematical or logical issue.
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  48.  5
    Can There Be A Proof That Some Unprovable Arithmetic Sentence Is True?Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1989 - Dialectica 43 (3):289-292.
  49. Domains of Discourse.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1987 - Logique Et Analyse 117 (17):173-176.
    Suppose there is a domain of discourse of English, then everything of which any predicate is true is a member of that domain. If English has a domain of discourse, then, since ‘is a domain of discourse of English’ is itself a predicate of English and true of that domain, that domain is a member of itself. But nothing is a member of itself. Thus English has no domain of discourse. We defend this argument and go on to argue to (...)
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  50.  86
    Did the Greeks Discover the Irrationals?Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1999 - Philosophy 74 (2):169-176.
    A popular view is that the great discovery of Pythagoras was that there are irrational numbers, e.g., the positive square root of two. Against this it is argued that mathematics and geometry, together with their applications, do not show that there are irrational numbers or compel assent to that proposition.
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