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Charles Siewert [34]Charles Peter Siewert [1]
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Charles Siewert
Rice University
  1. The Significance of Consciousness.Charles Siewert - 1998 - Princeton University Press.
    "This is a marvelous book, full of subtle, thoughtful, and original argument.
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  2.  54
    Phenomenal Thought.Charles Siewert - 2011 - In Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 236-267.
  3. Is Experience Transparent?Charles Siewert - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):15-41.
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  4. On the Phenomenology of Introspection.Charles Siewert - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 129.
  5. Is the Appearance of Shape Protean?Charles Siewert - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12:1-16.
    </b>This commentary focuses on shape constancy in vision and its relation to sensorimotor knowledge. I contrast “Protean” and “Constancian” views about how to describe perspectival changes in the appearance of an object’s shape. For the Protean, these amount to changes in apparent shape; for Constance, things are not merely judged, but literally appear constant in shape. I give reasons in favor of the latter view, and argue that Noë’s attempt to combine aspects of both views in a “dual aspect” account (...)
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  6. Consciousness and Intentionality.Charles Siewert - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  7. Phenomenality and Self-Consciousness.Charles Siewert - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 235.
  8. In Favor of (Plain) Phenomenology.Charles Siewert - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):201-220.
    Plain phenomenology explains theoretically salient mental or psychological distinctions with an appeal to their first-person applications. But it does not assume that warrant for such first-person judgment is derived from an explanatory theory constructed from the third-person perspective. Discussions in historical phenomenology can be treated as plain phenomenology. This is illustrated by a critical consideration of Brentano’s account of consciousness, drawing on some ideas in early Husserl. Dennett’s advocacy of heterophenomenology on the grounds of its supposed “neutrality” does not show (...)
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  9.  95
    Attention and Sensorimotor Intentionality.Charles Siewert - 2005 - In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 270.
  10.  30
    Respecting Appearances: A Phenomenological Approach to Consciousness.Charles Siewert - 2012 - In Dan Zahavi (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter reports the philosophy focusing mainly on just three foundational concerns. These are: the character of a phenomenological approach; its use to clarify the notion of phenomenal consciousness ; and its application to questions about a specifically sensory phenomenality and its ‘intentionality’ or ‘object-directedness’. Phenomenology involves the use of ‘first-person reflection’. The ways into the notion of phenomenality are elaborated. The ‘subjective experience’ conception of phenomenality uses a conception of experience on which this is something that coincides with the (...)
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  11.  29
    Who’s Afraid of Phenomenological Disputes?Charles Siewert - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1):1-21.
    There are general aspects of mental life it is reasonable to believe do not vary even when subjects vary in their first-person judgments about them. Such lack of introspective agreement gives rise to “phenomenological disputes.” These include disputes over how to describe the perspectival character of perception, the phenomenal character of perceptual recognition and conceptual thought, and the relation between consciousness and self-consciousness. Some supposethat when we encounter such disputes we have no choice but to abandon first-person reflection in philosophy (...)
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  12. Self-Knowledge and Phenomenal Unity.Charles Siewert - 2001 - Noûs 35 (4):542-68.
  13.  2
    Saving Appearances: A Dilemma for Physicalists.Charles Siewert - 2009 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
  14. Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective. [REVIEW]Charles Siewert - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):840-843.
  15.  41
    Self-Knowledge and Rationality: Shoemaker on Self-Blindness.Charles Siewert - 2003 - In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate. pp. 131.
  16. Is Visual Experience Rich or Poor?Charles Siewert - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):131-40.
  17. Socratic Introspection and the Abundance of Experience.Charles Siewert - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1):63-91.
    I examine the prospects of using Hurlburt's DES method to justify his very 'thin'view of experience, on which visual experience is so infrequent as to be typically absent when reading and speaking. Such justification would seem to be based on the claim that, in DES 'beeper' samples, subjects often deny they just had any visual experi-ence. But if the question of 'visual experience' is properly construed, then it is doubtful they are deny-ing this. And even if they were, that would (...)
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  18.  53
    What Dennett Can't Imagine and Why.Charles Siewert - 1993 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (1-2):93-112.
    Woven into Dennett's account of consciousness is his belief that certain possibilities are not conceivable. This is manifested in his view that we are not conscious in any sense in which we can imagine that philosophers? ?zombies? might not be conscious, and also in his claims about ?Hindsight?, and what possibilities this can coherently suggest to us. If the possibilities Dennett denies none the less seem conceivable to us, then if he does not give us reason to think they are (...)
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  19. Embodied Consciousness and the Explanatory Gap.Charles Siewert - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (5-6):117 - 138.
  20. Plato's Division of Reason and Appetite.Charles Siewert - 2001 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 18 (4):329 - 352.
  21.  88
    Precis of The Significance of Consciousness.Charles Siewert - 2000 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 6.
    The aims of this book are: to explain the notion of phenomenal consciousness in a non-metaphorical way that minimizes controversial assumptions; to characterize the relationship between the phenomenal character and intentionality of visual experience, visual imagery and non-imagistic thought; and to clarify the way in which conscious experience is intrinsically valuable to us. It argues for the legitimacy of a first-person approach to these issues--one which relies on a distinctively first-person warrant for judgments about one's own experience. Thought experiments are (...)
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  22.  8
    Angela A. Mendelovicithe Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality. Oxford University Press, 2018. 296 Pages. Isbn:9780190863807. [REVIEW]Charles Siewert - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
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  23.  57
    Consciousness, Intentionality, and Self-Knowledge Replies to Ludwig and Thomasson.Charles Siewert - 2002 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 8.
    Both Ludwig and Thomasson question my claim that many phenomenal features are intentional features. Further, Ludwig raises numerous objections to my claim that higher order mental representation is not essential to phenomenal consciousness. While Thomasson does not share those objections, she wonders how my view permits me to make first-person knowledge of mind depend on phenomenal consciousness. I respond to these challenges, drawing together questions about the forms of mental representation, the phenomenal character of sensory experience, rational agency, and introspection.
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  24.  6
    Consciousness Neglect and Inner Sense: A Reply to Lycan.Charles Siewert - 2001 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7.
    Lycan is concerned that I fail to explain my sense of 'phenomenal consciousness' sufficiently, and that I would unjustifiably criticize his "inner sense" theory for consciousness neglect. In response, I argue that my explanation of what I mean provides an adequate basis for disambiguating and answering Lycan's questions about the relation of phenomenal consciousness to "visual awareness" and the like. While I do not charge Lycan's theory with consciousness neglect, I do argue it employs a notion of non-conceptual higher order (...)
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  25.  11
    Eliminativism, First-Person Knowledge and Phenomenal Intentionality A Reply to Levine.Charles Siewert - 2003 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 9.
    Levine suggests the following criticisms of my book. First, the absence of a positive account of first-person knowledge in it makes it vulnerable to eliminativist refutation. Second, it is a relative strength of the higher order representation accounts of consciousness I reject that they offer explanations of the subjectivity of conscious states and their special availability to first-person knowledge. Further, the close connection I draw between the phenomenal character of experience and intentionality is unwarranted in the case of both color (...)
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  26.  55
    For Analytic Phenomenology.Charles Siewert - 2016 - In Harald A. Wiltsche & Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (eds.), Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium. De Gruyter. pp. 95-110.
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  27.  43
    First-Person Reflection and Hidden Physical Features: A Reply to Witmer.Charles Siewert - 2003 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 9.
    My response to Witmer comes in three sections: In the first I address concerns about my book's blindsight thought-experiment, remarking specifically on the role imagination plays in it, and my grounds for thinking that a first-person approach is valuable here. In Section Two I consider the relation of the thought-experiment to theses regarding possibility and necessity, and Witmer's discussion of ways of arguing for the impossibility of "Belinda-style" blindsight, despite its apparent conceivability. Finally, in Section Three, I consider Witmer's suggestion (...)
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  28.  41
    On needing time to think: consciousness, temporality, and self-expression.Charles Siewert - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (3):413-429.
    I examine an argument proposed by Tye and Wright, inspired by Geach, which holds that a correct understanding of how conceptual thought occurs in time demands we expel it from experience. This would imply—pace William James— that the “stream of consciousness” is not, even in part, a “stream of thought.” I argue that if we closely examine what seems to support crucial premises of their argument, we will find this undermines its other assumptions, and points us to a way of (...)
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  29. Replies.Charles Siewert - 2004 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness.
     
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  30.  73
    Review of Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind[REVIEW]Charles Siewert - 2008 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (1).
  31.  48
    Subjectivity and Selfhood.Charles Siewert - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):840-843.
  32.  6
    Spontaneous Blindsight and Immediate Availability: A Reply to Carruthers.Charles Siewert - 2001 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7.
    Carruthers' "immediate availability" theory of consciousness is criticized on the grounds that it offers no reasonable alternative to asserting the metaphysical impossibility of spontaneous blindsight. In defense, Carruthers says he can admit a spontaneous blindsight that relies on unconscious behavioral cues, and deny only its possibility without such mechanisms. I argue: This involves him in an unwarranted denial of the possibility that conscious visual discrimination could depend on behavioral cues. We can conceive of blindsight without behavioral cuing; if we can, (...)
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  33.  20
    The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality, by Angela A. Mendelovici. Oxford University Press, 2018. 296 Pages. ISBN:9780190863807. [REVIEW]Charles Siewert - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (4):1097-1100.
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