Husserl's Phenomenology and the Foundations of Natural Science develops a reading of Husserl's phenomenology as a response to the philosophical problems motivated by the metaphysics of early natural science; in particular, the problems which grew from the methodological distinction between a real objective world and the so-called "subjective" world in which we live. ;Husserl's unfulfilled claim in the Ideas 33) that the epoche and reductions will be developed in a graded series is taken to heart, and this graded series is (...) developed in terms of its still inchoate appearance in the Crisis. Epoche is read as the act which motivates the event of reduction and the first act of epoche is read as the suspension of the objective scientific world, i.e., "Nature," while reduction is read as the disclosure of the "life-world," or, as a return to the "things-themselves." The second act of epoche is read as a suspension of these "things of the world" and reduction is read as reduction to the appearances. ;The role of constitutional analyses in Husserl's phenomenology is then developed as the third requisite step in Husserl's attempt to provide phenomenological foundations for the natural sciences. It is shown that epoche without reduction is blind, while reduction without constitution is mute. Only with the well-connected descriptions which are the constitutional analyses of the synthetic processes of consciousness, does the "constructive" work of phenomenology begin. Constitutional analyses of reduced experiences are argued to provide the constructive/synthetic element via which the world of "life" and the world of natural science are regained--eventually, as phenomenologically grounded. ;The dissertation concludes by summarizing phenomenology's role as a "meaning-restorative" to meaning-depleted sciences, and by defending Husserl's notion of "reduction.". (shrink)

This essay attempts to understand the search for authenticity in terms of the breakdown of authority in the modern world. The sense of autonomy, I argue, emerges from the need to choose the authorities one will accept. The ever-increasing difficulty of choosing from among authorities is internalized and is experienced as a difficulty of choosing, or “finding” oneself. The shattered authorities on the outside become a fragmented self on the inside. The search for the authentic self, then, is the search (...) for an authority on the inside that has been broken and lost on the outside. The prospects for achieving such selfhood are criticially evaluated. (shrink)

In this response I argue that Jones’ minimalist realism is, also, a minimalist constructionism. And that the silent sphere ofevidence that Jones’ uses to ground his realism, may not be able to supply even a minimalist, strictly negative ground for epistemic endeavors.

Three problems are raised for Nicholas Georgalis’s recent work: a problem with regard to the supposed noninferential knowledge of minimal content, a problem with the “necessary condition” Georgalis stipulates for the legitimate application of a first-person methodology to a science of the mind, and a problem with regard to denying phenomenal content to intentional acts.

In this essay Charles Harvey offers a worried reflection on the range, extent, depth, affects, and effects of the perpetual assessment of the person in industrial nations in the contemporary world. Harvey begins his analysis by appealing to the work of Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault, and Jean Baudrillard to provide an interpretive framework of our situation. He then focuses and concretizes these ideas through examples from his own life and, by extension, the readers. Finally, in light of Pierre Bourdieu's concept (...) of the habitus, Harvey speculates on the implications for selfhood in the contemporary world. Throughout the essay, Harvey uses assessment procedures in higher and public education as exemplary instances of his thesis. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that popular entertainment can be understood in terms of Husserl’s concepts of epochē, reduction and constitution, and, conversely, that epochē, reduction and constitution can be explicated in terms of popular entertainment. To this end I use Husserl’s concepts to explicate and reflect upon the psychological and ethical effects of an exemplary instance of entertainment, the renowned Star Trek episode entitled “The Measure of a Man.” The importance of such an exercise is twofold: to demonstrate, once (...) again, the fecundity of the methodological procedures Husserl bequeathed to us; more than any other philosopher, he tapped into the fundamental manners in which we lose, make and remake the meanings of our lives; and to demonstrate how popular entertainment, similarly, plays a central role in the making and remaking of the meanings of our lives. If my zig-zag procedure between Husserl’s philosophy and popular entertainment is productive and cogent, in addition to elucidating Husserl’s philosophy, it will demonstrate the reality-generating potency and the constitutive power of entertainment in the contemporary world. Entertainment, via ourselves, has become the primary producer of the meanings via which consciousness constitutes the world. (shrink)

If Bob and Joe switched minds, but kept the same bodies, who would be Bob and who would be Joe? If time has no beginnning, how could it have reached now? Conundrums provides a basic, quick introduction to some key problems of philosophy by asking concise questions that evoke classical philosophical problems in a striking manner. It is written in a lively, engaging style and promotes critical thinking skills. This pocketbook is intended for introductory philosophy courses and may be used (...) to generate class discussion or for essay assignments. Topics covered include mind and reality, self and others, God, space and time, and life and death. (shrink)

In this essay I describe how primary and secondary narcissism are the underlying and motivating psychological states for fundamentalist religious belief. I describe the psychodynamics that produce such a belief state and I make the case that the "fundamentalist personality" is best understood as a form of barely sublimated pathological narcissism. Given the brutality of the human condition, it is understandable why this psychological-metaphysical option is an enticing one, but I follow Ralph Ellis in the conclusion that the consequences of (...) such belief systems produce much more harm than benefit for individuals and humanity at Iarge. (shrink)

In this essay I note some surprisingly deep parallels between the accounts of technology offered by Martin Heidegger and by Kevin Kelly. While Heidegger's insight is panoramic and almost prophetic, and grounded in his reading of the history of philosophy, Kelly's account is grounded in empirical and historical data, driven by a naturalistic and scientific understanding of our world. The similarities between these two authors are surprising in light of their different methodological frameworks and theu antithetical attitudes about the benefits (...) and dangers of technology. After setting them in conversation, I ask: "Who has the correct methodological approach and evaluative attitude toward technology"? With some hesitation, I side with Kelly's more hopeful outlook. (shrink)

Kockelmans' contribution to the philosophy of science stems from ideas in this second chapter, developments and applications of ideas found in Husserl's phenomenology, Heidegger's existential analytic, and Gadamer's hermeneutics. Kockelmans makes the now familiar claim that, as ever placed within the world, human thinking starts from the world, presupposing it, its things, structures, values, and meanings; there is no radically detached cogito. To be done, natural science and its ontology, presupposes human being-in-the-world and the life-world ontology constituted through everyday human (...) interpretive activity. These sciences, in turn, help us discover real things about that world of which our ordinary life-world philosophies may have never dreamt. Philosophy, and in particular philosophy of science, is essentially an ex post facto critical reflection on the lifeworld, its sciences, arts, and meaning-making activities in general. This is a role, Kockelmans argues, that cannot be abridged by the sciences, any more than the sciences can be supplanted by philosophical reflection. In some very nice lines reminiscent of Hegel, Kockelmans writes: "Experience wants to be reason without knowing this explicitly". "Philosophy, therefore, is the reflection of reason on itself". And, "as reason's consciousness of itself, philosophy becomes an element of man's total experience; afterwards it tries to withdraw from this experience in order to give direction in all realms of experience to the processes of rationalization which always are already on their way". Philosophy, then, in Kockelmans' view, resurrects, restores, refines, and maintains the meaning of human endeavor and consequence; further, it can thereby, within limits, articulate future possibilities for these endeavors. (shrink)

I argue that hopes and claims about the liberating power of liberal education are typically exaggerated, naive and wrong. Reflecting upon and borrowing terms from Jim Shelton's essay on "The Subversive Nature of Liberal Education," I use the work of Ivan Illich, Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron to argue that social education—training in efficient and productive consumeristic life—absorbs, muffles and domesticates any radical content liberal arts education may manage to provide. As with virtually all education, liberal education conserves (...) the society from which it emerges. (shrink)

In this essay I use personal narrative concerning my father and myself to compare and contrast the Heideggerian/sociological idea of "being-alongside-others" in the public world with the more classical philosophical ideal of inter subjective contact between two selves. I try to show that "being-alongside-others " in the public world does not dissolve the issue of intersubjectivity. To do this, I use narrative vignettes and develop some ideas about the role that intimacy plays in developing the sense of self; in particular, (...) I reflect on this process in terms of the relations of parents and children. (shrink)

From its inception in 1993, the Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World has encouraged philosophy "done at the borders." It has encouraged "high-risk," experimental philosophy—exploratory philosophy that, via adventuresome thinking and writing, might suggest new ways and means to deal with problems in contemporary life. Hence, first among the statements concerning the society's mission is this: "We invite original, creative, and unconventional thinking. We encourage submissions for our conference and our journal … that cross disciplinary boundaries or represent new (...) departures.". (shrink)

This paper sketches the history of unethical behavior of Homo sapiens to other forms of life on planet Earth. I ask, and sketch responses to, the question: How and why is it that we, the so-called “ethical animal,” have been the worst of all animals in relation to other life-forms on our planet? In response to the answers to this question, I claim that we know, and have known for a very long time, what it means to be morally good. (...) But in light of the natural bases of our behavior, I wonder if it will ever be possible for us, as a species, to become so. (shrink)

In this essay we show how certain tendencies of theself are enhanced and hindered by technologicallyorganized places. We coordinate a cognitive andbehavioral technology for the control of personalidentity with the technologically totalizedenvironments that we call synthetic sites. Weproceed by describing Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi''sstrategy for intensifying experience and organizingthe self. Walt Disney World is then considered as theexample, par excellence, of a synthetic sitethat promotes ordered experience via self-shrinkage. Finally, we reflect briefly on problems andpossibilities of human life lived in a world (...) that canbe described with increasing accuracy as anarchipelago of synthetic sites. (shrink)

“Paradise Well Lost” offers a description and criticism of communitarian claims that in contemporary liberal society the self is in sad shape, that liberal society is out of harmony with the needs of the self, and that such a society makes the good life nearly impossible to achieve. It is argued that communitarian thought is driven by a false and deluded nostalgia for a self-world unity that never was andnever can be, that human consciousness prohibits the neatly unified communialization of (...) self and world that seems desired by much communitarian thinking. A final argument claims that there are nontrivial connections between the communitarian desire for self-world unity, and the twentieth-century emergence of totalitarian society--connections about which it is wise to be worried. (shrink)

From its inception in 1993, the Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World has encouraged philosophy "done at the borders." It has encouraged "high-risk," experimental philosophy—exploratory philosophy that, via adventuresome thinking and writing, might suggest new ways and means to deal with problems in contemporary life. Hence, first among the statements concerning the society's mission is this: "We invite original, creative, and unconventional thinking. We encourage submissions for our conference and our journal … that cross disciplinary boundaries or represent new (...) departures.". (shrink)

“Paradise Well Lost” offers a description and criticism of communitarian claims that in contemporary liberal society the self is in sad shape, that liberal society is out of harmony with the needs of the self, and that such a society makes the good life nearly impossible to achieve. It is argued that communitarian thought is driven by a false and deluded nostalgia for a self-world unity that never was andnever can be, that human consciousness prohibits the neatly unified communialization of (...) self and world that seems desired by much communitarian thinking. A final argument claims that there are nontrivial connections between the communitarian desire for self-world unity, and the twentieth-century emergence of totalitarian society--connections about which it is wise to be worried. (shrink)