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  1. Motivational Approaches to Intellectual Vice.Charlie Crerar - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):753-766.
    Despite the now considerable literature on intellectual virtue, there remains relatively little philosophical discussion of intellectual vice. What discussion there is has been shaped by a powerful assumption—that, just as intellectual virtue requires that we are motivated by epistemic goods, intellectual vice requires that we aren't. In this paper, I demonstrate that this assumption is false: motivational approaches cannot explain a range of intuitive cases of intellectual vice. The popularity of the assumption is accounted for by its being a manifestation (...)
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  2. Taboo, hermeneutical injustice, and expressively free environments.Charlie Crerar - 2016 - Episteme 13 (2).
    In this paper I draw attention to a shortcoming in Miranda Fricker's 2007 account of hermeneutical injustice: that the only hermeneutical resource she acknowledges is a shared conceptual framework. Consequently, Fricker creates the impression that hermeneutical injustice manifests itself almost exclusively in the form of a conceptual lacuna. Considering the negative hermeneutical impact of certain societal taboos, however, suggests that there can be cases of hermeneutical injustice even when an agent's conceptual repertoire is perfectly adequate. I argue that this observation (...)
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  3. Hermeneutical Justice for Extremists?Trystan S. Goetze & Charlie Crerar - 2022 - In Leo Townsend, Ruth Rebecca Tietjen, Michael Staudigl & Hans Bernard Schmid (eds.), The Philosophy of Fanaticism: Epistemic, Affective, and Political Dimensions. London: Routledge. pp. 88-108.
    When we encounter extremist rhetoric, we often find it dumbfounding, incredible, or straightforwardly unintelligible. For this reason, it can be tempting to dismiss or ignore it, at least where it is safe to do so. The problem discussed in this paper is that such dismissals may be, at least in certain circumstances, epistemically unjust. Specifically, it appears that recent work on the phenomenon of hermeneutical injustice compels us to accept two unpalatable conclusions: first, that this failure of intelligibility when we (...)
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  4. Harms and Wrongs in Epistemic Practice.Simon Barker, Charlie Crerar & Trystan S. Goetze - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:1-21.
    This volume has its roots in two recent developments within mainstream analytic epistemology: a growing recognition over the past two or three decades of the active and social nature of our epistemic lives; and, more recently still, the increasing appreciation of the various ways in which the epistemic practices of individuals and societies can, and often do, go wrong. The theoretical analysis of these breakdowns in epistemic practice, along with the various harms and wrongs that follow as a consequence, constitutes (...)
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    Must We Love Epistemic Goods?Charlie Crerar - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4):pqaa072.
    It is widely held that for an agent to have any intellectual character virtues, they must be fundamentally motivated by a love of epistemic goods. In this paper, I challenge this ‘strong motivational requirement’ on virtue. First, I call into question three key reasons offered in its defence: that a love of epistemic goods is needed to explain the scope, the performance quality, or the value of virtue. Secondly, I highlight several costs and restrictions that we incur from its acceptance. (...)
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  6. (1 other version)Harms and wrongs in epistemic practice.Simon Barker, Charlie Crerar & Trystan S. Goetze (eds.) - 2018 - New York, NY, USA: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge.
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  7.  47
    The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance Edited by Rik Peels and Martijn Blaauw Cambridge University Press, 2016. 217pp, $99.99 ISBN: 9780511820076. [REVIEW]Charlie Crerar - 2019 - Philosophy 94 (1):161-166.
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