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Charlie Pelling
University of Reading (PhD)
  1.  62
    Assertion and The Provision of Knowledge.Charlie Pelling - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (251):293-312.
    Epistemic relationism in the theory of assertion is the view that an assertion's epistemic propriety depends purely on the relation between the asserter and the proposition asserted. Many accounts of assertion are relationist in this sense, including the familiar knowledge, belief, and justification accounts. A notable feature of such accounts is that they give no direct importance to the role of hearer: as far as such accounts are concerned, we need make no mention of hearers in characterising an assertion's propriety (...)
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  2.  69
    Assertion and Safety.Charlie Pelling - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3777-3796.
    Safety is a notion familiar to epistemologists principally because of the way in which it has been used in the attempt to cast light on the nature of knowledge. In particular, some have argued that an important constraint on knowledge is that one knows p only if one believes p safely. In this paper, I use safety for a different purpose: to cast light on the nature of assertion. I introduce what I call the safety account of assertion, according to (...)
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  3. Testimony, Testimonial Belief, and Safety.Charlie Pelling - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):205-217.
    Can one gain testimonial knowledge from unsafe testimony? It might seem not, on the grounds that if a piece of testimony is unsafe, then any belief based on it in such a way as to make the belief genuinely testimonial is bound itself to be unsafe: the lack of safety must transmit from the testimony to the testimonial belief. If in addition we accept that knowledge requires safety, the result seems to be that one cannot gain testimonial knowledge from unsafe (...)
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  4.  47
    Assertion, Telling, and Epistemic Norms.Charlie Pelling - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):335-348.
    There has been much recent interest in questions about epistemic norms of assertion. Is there a norm specific to assertion? Is it constitutive of the speech act? Is there a unique norm of this sort? What is its content? These are important questions, so it's understandable that they have received the attention which they have. By contrast, little attention?little separate attention, at least?has been given to parallel questions about telling: Which norm or norms govern telling, etc.? A natural explanation for (...)
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  5.  51
    Paradox and the Knowledge Account of Assertion.Charlie Pelling - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (5):977-978.
    In earlier work, I have argued that self-referential assertions of the form ‘this assertion is improper’ are paradoxical for the truth account of assertion. In this paper, I argue that such assertions are also paradoxical, though in a different way, for the knowledge account of assertion.
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  6. Conceptualism and the (Supposed) Non-Transitivity of Colour Indiscriminability.Charlie Pelling - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (2):211 - 234.
    In this paper, I argue that those who accept the conceptualist view in the philosophy of perception should reject the traditional view that colour indiscriminability is non-transitive. I start by outlining the general strategy that conceptualists have adopted in response to the familiar ‘fineness of grain’ objection, and I show why a commitment to what I call the indiscriminability claim seems to form a natural part of this strategy. I then show how together, the indiscriminability claim and the non-transitivity claim (...)
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  7.  72
    Conceptualism and the Problem of Illusory Experience.Charlie Pelling - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (3):169-182.
    According to the conceptualist view in the philosophy of perception, we possess concepts for all the objects, properties, and relations which feature in our experiences. Richard Heck has recently argued that the phenomenon of illusory experience provides us with conclusive reasons to reject this view. In this paper, I examine Heck’s argument, I explain why I think that Bill Brewer’s conceptualist response to it is ineffective, and I then outline an alternative conceptualist response which I myself endorse. My argument turns (...)
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  8.  13
    Indiscriminability, Indeterminacy, and Overlap.Charlie Pelling - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):639-640.
  9. Characterizing Hallucination Epistemically.Charlie Pelling - 2011 - Synthese 178 (3):437 - 459.
    According to the epistemic theory of hallucination, the fundamental psychological nature of a hallucinatory experience is constituted by its being 'introspectively indiscriminable', in some sense, from a veridical experience of a corresponding type. How is the notion of introspective indiscriminability to which the epistemic theory appeals best construed? Following M. G. F. Martin, the standard assumption is that the notion should be construed in terms of negative epistemics: in particular, it is assumed that the notion should be explained in terms (...)
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  10.  8
    Paradoxical Assertions: A Reply to Turri.Charlie Pelling - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (2):239-241.
    In earlier work, I have argued that the self-referential assertion that “this assertion is improper” is paradoxical for the truth account of assertion, the view onwhich an assertion is proper if and only if it is true. In a recent paper in this journal, John Turri has suggested a response to the paradox: one might simply deny that in uttering “this assertion is improper” one makes a genuine assertion. In this paper, I argue that this ‘no assertion’ response does not (...)
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