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Charlotte Franziska Unruh
Technische Universität München
  1.  35
    The Strings Attached to Bringing Future Generations Into Existence.Charlotte Franziska Unruh - 2021 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 38 (5):857-869.
    Many people believe that we have moral duties towards those we bring into existence in the short term: our children. Many people also believe that we have moral duties towards those we bring into existence in the long term: future generations. In this article, I explore how these beliefs are connected. I argue that the present generation is morally responsible for future generations in virtue of bringing them into existence. This responsibility entails moral duties to ensure that future people have (...)
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  2.  51
    A Hybrid Account of Harm.Charlotte Franziska Unruh - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-14.
    When does a state of affairs constitute a harm to someone? Comparative accounts say that being worse off constitutes harm. The temporal version of the comparative account is seldom taken seriously, due to apparently fatal counterexamples. I defend the temporal version against these counterexamples, and show that it is in fact more plausible than the prominent counterfactual version of the account. Non-comparative accounts say that being badly off constitutes harm. However, neither the temporal comparative account nor the non-comparative account can (...)
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  3.  19
    Doing and Allowing Good.Charlotte Franziska Unruh - forthcoming - Analysis.
    Many people think that the moral reason against doing harm is stronger than the moral reason against allowing harm. What should these people think about doing and allowing good? I address this question by distinguishing two ways of understanding the doing/allowing distinction. The agency view implies that the moral reason for doing good is stronger than the moral reason for allowing good. The imposition view implies that the moral reason against preventing good is stronger than the moral reason against failing (...)
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  4.  29
    Letting Climate Change.Charlotte Franziska Unruh - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (3):368-386.
    Recent work by Ingmar Persson and Jason Hanna has posed an interesting new challenge for deontologists: How can they account for so-called cases of letting oneself do harm? In this article, I argue that cases of letting oneself do harm are structurally similar to real-world cases such as climate change, and that deontologists need an account of the moral status of these cases to provide moral guidance in real-world cases. I then explore different ways in which deontologists can solve this (...)
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