The main aim of this chapter is to trace the naturalistic traits present in classical Indian philosophical systems, which are well known for their “spiritual” orientation. Having set aside initial doubts regarding the possibility of discovering naturalism in the Indian philosophical scenario, it draws attention to different kinds of naturalism, viz., ontological, methodological, semantic, linguistic, moral, and aesthetic. With reference to ontological naturalism, it discusses in detail the full‐fledged naturalism of the Cārvāka materialists, the mitigated naturalism of the Naiyāyika‐s, the (...) Buddhists, and the Jainas, and the protonaturalism of the Sāmkhya philosophers. It then discusses methodological naturalism mainly with reference to the Nyāya epistemology and moral naturalism, keeping in mind those philosophical systems which uphold that moral values can be understood in terms of moral facts and therefore question the validity of the fact/value distinction. (shrink)
I would like to introduce the problematic to be addressed in this short article simply as follows. According to the majority of the modern interpreters of the Nyāya philosophy, the Naiyāyika-s are ontologically committed to an uncompromising direct realist theory of perception and to externalism both in epistemology and philosophy of mind. Computationalists, on the other hand, in their ontology, are frank or secret supporters of the view that what we cognize, even what we perceive, is representational. These two claims (...) appear to be opposed to each other. Naturally, the question arises: Is a computational account of intentional mental state, as proposed by Matilal, in his magnum opus Perception, admissible in the Navya-Nyāya framework? Though Matilal has not restricted the conundrum to Navya-Nyāya, the way he has analyzed the cognitive states are available only in the Navya-Nyāya literature. The main objective of this article is to strengthen Matilal’s position further with the help of some additional arguments from the Navya-Nyāya treatises. (shrink)
It is platitudinous to say that whenever we try to read some ancient text or interpret some theory distant in space and/or time, we employ contemporary tools of analysis, contemporary techniques of modeling. Even while building theories, theoreticians (philosophers and scientists alike) are found to take help from the technology of the time. Aristotle, for example, had a wax-tablet view of memory. Leibniz used the model of a clock to explain the harmonious universe. Freud used a hydraulic model of the (...) flow of libido, and the telephone switchboard model guided psychologists while they were theorizing on intelligence. Nearer to our time, we have seen physicists explaining the structure of an atom by the model of the .. (shrink)
Recent experimental research has revealed surprising patterns in people's intuitions about free will and moral responsibility. One limitation of this research, however, is that it has been conducted exclusively on people from Western cultures. The present paper extends previous research by presenting a cross-cultural study examining intuitions about free will and moral responsibility in subjects from the United States, Hong Kong, India and Colombia. The results revealed a striking degree of cross-cultural convergence. In all four cultural groups, the majority of (...) participants said that (a) our universe is indeterministic and (b) moral responsibility is not compatible with determinism. (shrink)
If a quiz‐master were to ask the question, “Is there anything common among the philosophies of the world?” the answer that should come from the participants with perfect aplomb is, “Yes, the concern for truth.” The presumed unanimity of this response, however, does not imply that philosophers possess a uniform understanding of the notion of truth. There are, indeed, many similarities in the way great minds think on this topic, yet divergences among them are also too significant to be ignored. (...) In this article, therefore, I propose to expound the various aspects of truth from a typically Indian perspective (although, of course, in the contemporary philosophical idiom) before making a comparative assessment of different philosophical theories of truth. (shrink)
This book provides a detailed analysis of classical and modern Indian views on consciousness along with their related meditative methods. It offers a critical analysis of three distinct trends of Indian thought.
IntroductionScientific pluralism is generally understood in the backdrop of scientific monism. So is mathematical pluralism. Though there are many culture-dependent mathematical practices, mathematical concepts and theories are generally taken to be culture invariant. We would like to explore in this paper whether mathematical pluralism is admissible or not.Materials and methodsMathematical pluralism may be approached at least from five different perspectives. 1. Foundational: The view would claim that different issues within mathematics need support of different foundations, apparently incompatible with one another. (...) 2. Ontological: The world itself is dappled—the mathematical counterpart of which can be traced to the admission of non-Euclidean spaces and also in simultaneous acceptance of set-theoretic and category theoretic entities in the ontology of mathematics. 3. The third route is epistemological. It follows from the view that the nature of reality is so complex that different aspects of it require alternative modes of representation and explanation sometimes severally, sometimes simultaneously, e.g., classical, constructivist, computer-aided and different finitist mathematics can be used depending on the knowledge situation. 4. The fourth route is semantic. Fuzzy mathematics, we know, gives up bivalence in theory of truth, and ascribes truth to mathematical propositions in degrees. 5. The last one is Programmatic: for some, mathematical pluralism is a stance, a programme. It provides a framework which strikes at the root of cultural hegemony and nourishes a climate of intellectual humility and tolerance. It is not my intention to hold the brief of any of these versions. I just want to present to the readers a more or less complete picture of the scenario, though not an exhaustive one. ConclusionUnlike monism, mathematical pluralism does not rule out any possibility—even the possibility of having a unitary over-arching framework of interpretation remains as an open option. This paper highlights the fact that motivations for upholding pluralism in mathematics have been many and one can be a pluralist just by subscribing to any of the views listed above. (shrink)
Philosophers have long debated whether, if determinism is true, we should hold people morally responsible for their actions since in a deterministic universe, people are arguably not the ultimate source of their actions nor could they have done otherwise if initial conditions and the laws of nature are held fixed. To reveal how non-philosophers ordinarily reason about the conditions for free will, we conducted a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic survey (N = 5,268) spanning twenty countries and sixteen languages. Overall, participants tended (...) to ascribe moral responsibility whether the perpetrator lacked sourcehood or alternate possibilities. However, for American, European, and Middle Eastern participants, being the ultimate source of one’s actions promoted perceptions of free will and control as well as ascriptions of blame and punishment. By contrast, being the source of one’s actions was not particularly salient to Asian participants. Finally, across cultures, participants exhibiting greater cognitive reflection were more likely to view free will as incompatible with causal determinism. We discuss these findings in light of documented cultural differences in the tendency toward dispositional versus situational attributions. (shrink)
This book is a unique re-conceptualization of Marxism that brings together works by leading Marxist scholars across disciplines ' historical, philosophical, economic, political, social, literary and aesthetic ' in one comprehensive corpus for the first time. It argues that the works and philosophy of Marx and Engels continue to be relevant today.
Abstract: Each affective state has distinct motor-expressions, sensory perceptions, autonomic, and cognitive patterns. Panksepp (1998) proposed seven neural affective systems of which the SEEKING system, a generalized approach-seeking system, motivates organisms to pursue resources needed for survival. When an organism is presented with a novel stimulus, the dopamine (DA) in the nucleus accumbens septi (NAS) is released. The DA circuit outlines the generalized mesolimbic dopamine-centered SEEKING system and is especially responsive when there is an element of unpredictability in forthcoming rewards. (...) We propose that when the outcome of this interaction is unexpected or unanticipated then Panksepp’s “cognitive or expectancy reset” mechanism involving the cognitive dissonance would yield the subjective emotion of surprise. In order to appropriately react to the environment’s stimuli one needs fundamental processes that would enable one to distinguish between what is novel and what has been already experienced, as well as the different degrees of novelty. Novel events are those whose essential features of the representation (visceral and perceptual) are altered and being discrepant provoke more sustained attention. Novelty arises from salient and arousing events and the organism experiences surprise, as coming out of a habitual state. In this framework, we shall look at established theories of emotions and propose a different approach to their taxonomy. (shrink)
In the remainder of this article, we will disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We will accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations of previous (...) research on stakes. Section 2 presents our study and concludes that there is little evidence for a substantial stakes effect. Section 3 responds to objections. The conclusion clears the way for classical invariantism. (shrink)
In this article, we present evidence that in four different cultural groups that speak quite different languages there are cases of justified true beliefs that are not judged to be cases of knowledge. We hypothesize that this intuitive judgment, which we call “the Gettier intuition,” may be a reflection of an underlying innate and universal core folk epistemology, and we highlight the philosophical significance of its universality.
Does the Ship of Theseus present a genuine puzzle about persistence due to conflicting intuitions based on “continuity of form” and “continuity of matter” pulling in opposite directions? Philosophers are divided. Some claim that it presents a genuine puzzle but disagree over whether there is a solution. Others claim that there is no puzzle at all since the case has an obvious solution. To assess these proposals, we conducted a cross-cultural study involving nearly 3,000 people across twenty-two countries, speaking eighteen (...) different languages. Our results speak against the proposal that there is no puzzle at all and against the proposal that there is a puzzle but one that has no solution. Our results suggest that there are two criteria—“continuity of form” and “continuity of matter”— that constitute our concept of persistence and these two criteria receive different weightings in settling matters concerning persistence. (shrink)
Affective information processing is analysed considering the emotion circuits within the brain substrates of emotionality. Based on Gärdenfors’ conceptual spaces model we try to examine an emotion episode from its elicitation to the differentiation into affective processes. An affectiveconceptual spaces model is developed taking in consideration Panksepp’s nested BrainMind hierarchies.
"Consciousness has remained an enigma even after close scientific scrutiny. The last two decades of the twentieth century, therefore, witnessed an explosion of interest in consciousness. Lack of consensus about the nature, definition and taxonomy of consci".
Since at least Hume and Kant, philosophers working on the nature of aesthetic judgment have generally agreed that common sense does not treat aesthetic judgments in the same way as typical expressions of subjective preferences—rather, it endows them with intersubjective validity, the property of being right or wrong regardless of disagreement. Moreover, this apparent intersubjective validity has been taken to constitute one of the main explananda for philosophical accounts of aesthetic judgment. But is it really the case that most people (...) spontaneously treat aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity? In this paper, we report the results of a cross‐cultural study with over 2,000 respondents spanning 19 countries. Despite significant geographical variations, these results suggest that most people do not treat their own aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for theories of aesthetic judgment and the purpose of aesthetics in general. (shrink)
These essays, as the editor has very aptly put it, indeed “provide insights into both Indian philosophy and Mohanty—Indian philosophy via Mohanty and Mohanty via and beyond Indian philosophy”. Though the articles were written on different occasions, I think there is a central idea around which colorful strands of thoughts are woven. Mohanty’s main preoccupation here is to build a bridge between tradition and modernity through hermeneutic reinterpretation. This is how in every epoch outstanding philosophers have advanced philosophical thinking by (...) examining issues from within the tradition. For like men, concepts and words too grow in course of time. So, shows Mohanty, Samkara, Gandhi, Aurobindo, K. C. Bhattachryya, N. V. Banerjee, B. K. Matilal, P. K. Mukhopadhyay—all were engaged in this exercise in their own way, at their own times; only the tools of analysis were different in each case. (shrink)
This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to (...) engage in “reflective” thinking. (shrink)
This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong-Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to engage (...) in “reflective” thinking. (shrink)
Is behavioral integration (i.e., which occurs when a subjects assertion that p matches her non-verbal behavior) a necessary feature of belief in folk psychology? Our data from nearly 6,000 people across twenty-six samples, spanning twenty-two countries suggests that it is not. Given the surprising cross-cultural robustness of our findings, we suggest that the types of evidence for the ascription of a belief are, at least in some circumstances, lexicographically ordered: assertions are first taken into account, and when an agent sincerely (...) asserts that p, non-linguistic behavioral evidence is disregarded. In light of this, we take ourselves to have discovered a universal principle governing the ascription of beliefs in folk psychology. (shrink)
Is behavioral integration a necessary feature of belief in folk psychology? Our data from over 5,000 people across 26 samples, spanning 22 countries suggests that it is not. Given the surprising cross-cultural robustness of our findings, we argue that the types of evidence for the ascription of a belief are, at least in some circumstances, lexicographically ordered: assertions are first taken into account, and when an agent sincerely asserts that p, nonlinguistic behavioral evidence is disregarded. In light of this, we (...) take ourselves to have discovered a universal principle governing the ascription of beliefs in folk psychology. (shrink)
IntroductionThis paper focuses on a radical feminist engagement with mathematical pluralism. Radical Feminists are interested in a project of methodological re-tooling. Mathematical pluralism appears to be a possible source of help in this direction.Materials and MethodsWith this aim in view the article examines the contributions of Mihir Chakraborty and AmitaChatterjee. By using the method of philosophical argument their theses have been judged from a feminist perspective.ResultsSome very interesing results have been arrived at in terms of accommodating vagueness (...) and pluralism into feminist methodology by the help of mathematical pluralism.DiscussionBy the way of an ongoing discussion the paper states the contours of a radical feminist road map and specifies the kind help they seek from mathematical pluralism. (shrink)
The most pressing issues of the twenty-first century—climate change and persistent hunger in a world of food surpluses, to name only two—are not problems that can be solved from within individual disciplines, nation-states, or cultural perspectives. They are predicaments that can only be resolved by generating sustained and globally robust coordination across value systems. The scale of the problems and necessity for coordinated global solutions signal a world historical transit as momentous as the Industrial Revolution: a transition from the predominance (...) of technical knowledge to that of ethical deliberation. This volume brings together leading thinkers from around the world to deliberate on how best to correlate worth (value) with what is worthwhile (values), pairing human prosperity with personal, environmental, and spiritual flourishing in a world of differing visions of what constitutes a moral life. Especially in the aftermath of what is now being called the Great Recession, awareness has mounted of the imperative to question the modern divorce of economics from ethics. While the domains of economics and ethics were from antiquity through at least the eighteenth century understood in many cultures to be coterminous and mutually entailing, the modern assumption has been that the goal of maximizing human prosperity and the aim of justly enhancing our lives as persons and as communities were functionally and practically distinct. Working from a wide array of perspectives, the contributors to this volume offer a set of challenges to the assumed independence of the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of human and planetary well-being. Reflecting on the complex interrelationship among economics, justice, and equity, the book resists "one size fits all" approaches and struggles to revitalize the marriage of economics and ethics by activating cultural differences as the basis of mutual contribution to shared human flourishing. The publication of this important collection will stimulate or extend critical debates among scholars and students working in a number of disciplines in the social sciences and humanities, including philosophy, history, environmental studies, economics, and law. Contributors: Roger T. Ames, James Behuniak Jr., Steve Bein, Nalini Bhushan, Purushottama Bilimoria, Steven Burik, AmitaChatterjee, Baoyan Cheng, Gordon Davis, Jay L. Garfield, Steven F. Geisz, Peter D. Hershock, Larry A. Hickman, Kathleen M. Higgins, Heidi M. Hurd, Thomas P. Kasulis, Workineh Kelbessa, Lori Keleher, Oliver Leaman, James McRae, Jin Y. Park, James Peterman, Naoko Saito, May Sim, Robert Smid, Paul Standish, Kenneth W. Stikkers, Karsten J. Struhl, Meera Sushila Viswanathan, Wu Shiu- Ching, Xu Di, T. Yamauchi, Yang Liuxin. (shrink)
Religion has in the past, it may be truefully admitted, done more than its share of fostering the spirit of ‘we’ over against ‘they’. Economic and political factors have unfortunately, throughout history, clogged the channels of communication between men of one faith and those of another. The most unhappy aspect of the relation between religion and society has been the way in which the former has fostered the distinction between the insider and the outsider. Typical of this is the fact (...) that most religious communities have a word which describes the religious outsider and the word is never a flattering one. That there should be religious diversity in the first place should occasion no surprise. Diversification is the order of things in the biological realm and we would not expect to find a sudden departure from this, that is, a move towards convergence, in the sphere of religion. But unless diversification is matched with understanding and with communication we face the future at our peril. It is for this reason that the question of inter-religious communication, the ground of its possibility, can be regarded not only as the most pressing of problems for the student of comparative religion but as a matter of pressing urgency for all. (shrink)