The Hurvich-Jameson (H-J) opponent-process network offers a familiar account of the empirical structure of the phenomenological color space for humans, an account with a number of predictive and explanatory virtues. Its successes form the bulk of the existing reasons for suggesting a strict identity between our various color sensations on the one hand, and our various coding vectors across the color-opponent neurons in our primary visual pathways on the other. But anti-reductionists standardly complain that the systematic parallels discovered by the (...) H-J network are just empirical correspondences, constructed post facto, with no predictive or explanatory purchase on the intrinsic characters of qualia proper. The present paper disputes that complaint, by illustrating that the H-J model yields some novel and unappreciated predictions, and some novel and unappreciated explanations, concerning the qualitative characters of a considerable variety of color sensations possible for human experience, color sensations that normal people have almost certainly never had before, color sensations whose accurate descriptions in ordinary language appear semantically ill-formed or even self-contradictory. Specifically, these "impossible" color sensations are activation-vectors (across our opponent-process neurons) that lie inside the space of neuronally possible activation-vectors, but outside the central 'color spindle' that confines the familiar range of sensations for possible objective colors. These extra-spindle chimerical-color sensations correspond to no reflective color that you will ever see objectively displayed on a physical object. But the H-J model both predicts their existence and explains their highly anomalous qualitative characters in some detail. It also suggests how to produce these rogue sensations by a simple procedure made available in the latter half of this paper. The relevant color plates will allow you to savor these sensations for yourself. (shrink)

In this conversation, four experts in animal research oversight—Christopher Stodgell, Lori Hill, Robert Kesterson, and Angelika Rehrig—discuss the complexities of stem cell-based chimeric animal experiments, especially in relation to traditional animal welfare practices. Each expert shares their experiences and suggestions for how best to conduct chimeric animal research, including discussing the importance of communication and collaboration between experts in animal behavior and welfare and the investigators conducting or proposing chimeric research studies.

Internalism in epistemology is the view that all the factors relevant to the justification of a belief are importantly internal to the believer, while externalism is the view that at least some of those factors are external. This extremely modest first approximation cries out for refinement (which we undertake below), but is enough to orient us in the right direction, namely that the debate between internalism and externalism is bound up with the controversy over the correct account of the distinction (...) between justified beliefs and unjustified beliefs.1 Understanding that distinction has occasionally been obscured by attention to the analysis of knowledge and to the Gettier problem, but our view is that these problems, while interesting, should not completely seduce philosophers away from central questions about epistemic justification. A plausible starting point in the discussion of justification is that the distinction between justified beliefs and unjustified beliefs is not the same as the distinction between true beliefs and false beliefs. This follows from the mundane observation that it is possible to rationally believe.. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIs discrimination based on caste equivalent to racism? This paper explores the complex relationship between genetic, race and caste. It also discusses the debate over the exclusion of a discussion of caste‐based discrimination at the 2001 World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance held in Durban, South Africa.

Is discrimination based on caste equivalent to racism? This paper explores the complex relationship between genetic, race and caste. It also discusses the debate over the exclusion of a discussion of caste‐based discrimination at the 2001 World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance held in Durban, South Africa.

I advance an approach to thinking about moral obligation and how it moves us that runs counter to mainstream thought in ethics. Many assume, with Kant, that bona fide moral obligation must involve some truly unconditional, categorical, or inescapable constraint. Following in Hume’s footsteps, I advocate for viewing our paradigmatic obligations as instead deriving from rules of important social practices, followed out of a felt sense of reverence or regard. I do not offer a complete defense of this more Humean (...) approach here; instead, I respond to a familiar kind of objection. Some allege that seeing our obligations this way can lead to a troubling kind of conflict between an agent’s motive to fulfill her obligations and the very values that, for her, make a given practice and its rules worthy of her devotion. In such circumstances, the objector alleges, any motive to fulfill her obligations will amount to little more than an agent’s “worshiping” of the rules. I disarm this charge of “rule-worship” as it has been levied against the Humean approach, though not by denying that this sort of motivational conflict can arise. Instead, I argue that once the source and nature of conflict are better understood, its possibility is no threat. Indeed, far from a strike against it, the way that the Humean approach to obligation helps us to make good sense of this kind of conflict is ethically attractive, and thus a selling point. (shrink)

Human-nonhuman chimeric research—research on nonhuman animals who contain human cells—is being used to understand human disease and development and to create potential human treatments such as transplantable organs. A proposed advantage of chimeric models is that they can approximate human biology and therefore allow scientists to learn about and improve human health without risking harms to humans. Among the emerging ethical issues being explored is the question of at what point chimeras are “human enough” to have human rights and thus (...) be owed higher standards of research protection than that currently afforded to nonhuman animals. However, this question and other related questions assume that the ethics of experimenting on nonhuman animals have been settled, which they have not. In this essay, we argue that it is imperative to give adequate attention to familiar questions about nonhuman animal research as well as new questions about chimera research and that failure to do so will result in a distorted understanding of the ethics of chimera research. (shrink)

In this conversation, three researchers from the fields of developmental biology and stem cell science—Ali Brivanlou, Lorenz Studer, and May Schwarz—speak about the importance of conducting chimeric animal experiments. The scientists describe some of the stem cell-based chimeric research being conducted in the United States, responsibilities they have in using modified animals for experiments, and things they would like the public to understand about this research. This conversation illuminates not only what chimeric animal researchers are doing in the lab but (...) also how their work may benefit society and where this science might go in the future. (shrink)

I analyze David Hume’s "Of Miracles". I vindicate Hume’s argument against two charges: that it (1) defines miracles out of existence; (2) appeals to a suspect principle of balancing probabilities. He argues that miracles are, in a certain sense, maximally improbable. To understand this sense, we must turn to his notion of probability as ’strength of analogy’: miracles are incredible, according to him, because they bear no analogy to anything in our past experience. This reveals as anachronistic various recent Bayesian (...) reconstructions of his argument. But it exposes him to other charges, with which I conclude. (shrink)

Many marine invertebrates have the ability to combine tissues with conspecifics and form chimeras. This ability is usually accompanied by the presence of a polymorphic self/non-self recognition system that allows integration of closely related individuals, but blocks interactions between those more distantly related. The presence of a discriminatory allorecognition system suggests that there are costs and benefits to chimerism that are correlated to relatedness, but the nature of these costs and benefits is still poorly understood. Interestingly, allorecognition is found (...) throughout the animal kingdom, with examples in nearly all the multicellular phyla; however, the role of allorecognition in these different species is not always clear. In addition, the molecular mechanisms underlying allorecognition in different species are not related, suggesting a unique origin for each species. This brings up the question as to whether there is a universal need for self/non-self recognition processes among the metazoa, or if these systems evolve in response to different selective pressures. We are studying allorecognition and chimerism in the colonial ascidian, Botryllus schlosseri. Allorecognition takes place at the tips of the extracorporeal vasculature, and can result in a parabiosis, or a rejection reaction that blocks vascular fusion. Fusion has both hypothesized benefits as well as well-documented costs. This article will focus on characterizing the costs and benefits of fusion and chimerism in Botryllus, and put them into the broader context of the role of allorecognition in the metazoa. (shrink)

This paper tackles the concept of alterity through an embodied perspective. By questioning my lived experience of cancer and how illness—as a disruptive event (Carel, 2008, 2016, 2021)—enables philosophical reflection and the exploration of ‘other’ ways of being-in-the-world (Merleau-Ponty 2012 [1945]), I ask if an embodied ‘chimeric-thinking’ can be used to question established notions of alterity and reshape our relationship with ‘otherness’ (Leistle 2015, 2016b). Building on a phenomenological approach to illness (Carel 2012, 2014, 2016, 2021), and a feminist post-humanist (...) approach (Haraway 1990, 1991, 2016), I present a case in which an autoethnographic and phenomenological approach focused on embodied experience may help revise dominant perspectives, providing access to understanding and engaging with profound biopsychosocial and somatic transformations. (shrink)

This piece reproduces verbatim a performative talk on Anne Carson’s and Rosanna Bruno’s The Trojan Women: A Comic. The performance draws on my own poetry and installation-video art on the ancient Greek mythical figure Chimera, which I conceive as a composite being, a creature where different species meet inside one body as various bodily parts. I interlace commentary-poems, fragments, interviews, brief citations and personal notes. Each “speech-part” of this chimeric essay then explores scene-setting, the motif of absence; animal poetics, and (...) linguistic expression in the comic play, while underscoring the potential of my approach to capture Carson and her own chimeric work. More ambitiously, the essay challenges fixed notions of how academic and creative ideas should be framed and uttered. (shrink)

The use of pig derivatives in medicine is forbidden in Islamic law texts, despite the fact that certain applications offer medical advantages. Pigs can be one of the best human organ hosts; therefore, using human–pig chimeras may generate beneficial impact in organ transplantation, particularly in xenotransplantation. In Islam, medical emergencies may allow some pig-based treatments and medical procedures to be employed therapeutically. However, depending on the sort of medical use, emergency situation might differ. Using Islamic legal maxim as bioethical framework, (...) the purpose of this study is to examine the use of pigs for the purpose of human–pig chimeric transplant from the perspective of Islamic bioethics. According to the findings, chimeric organ transplantation using pigs should only be done in emergency situations. (shrink)

The joint international action against Iraq and the search for a new security doctrine following the end of the Cold War, led, in the early '90s, to a revival of the notion of collective security embodied in several international agreements. This notion is based on the assumption of responding collectively to international aggression. However, the international guagmires of recent years and especially the case of former Yugoslavia where international organizations have played the role of alibi to agression, has once more, (...) dealt a major blow to the illusion of the implementation of the principles of collective security. In a way similar to the 1930s and the bipolar balance of power of the Cold War, collective security seems ephemeral today. We can therefore safelypredict that in the foreseeable future, international relations wilt continue to be shaped by the balance of specific state interests and not by universally applied principles of collective security. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to probe the implications of Derrida’s linguistic theories in his late philosophy. Adopting an interdisciplinary and deconstructive approach to critical discourse analysis that erodes the foundation of anthropocentric binary thought paradigms, this exploration of Derrida’s ecolinguistic dream of a more biocentric language problematizes three specific cognitive structures that represent an unsustainable form of dichotomous thinking. The philosopher illustrates that the concept of “human” and “animal,” the “genesis myth,” and the Cartesian notion of the Bête (...) machine are deadly delusions that must be replaced with a more biocentric outlook on life. (shrink)

This study adopted an empirical method to investigate lay people’s attitudes toward the bioethical issues of human-animal chimeric brains. The results of online surveys showed that (1) people did not entirely reject chimeric brain research, but showed slightly more negative responses than ordinary animal testing; and that (2) their ethical concerns arose in connection with the perception that chimerism in the brain would humanize the animal. This means that people’s psychology was consistent with the ethical argument that crossing the (...) human-animal boundary would bring moral confusion to our society. Meanwhile, it was not in line with another argument that moral status depended on having high capacities, and that chimerism would cause a problem if it enhanced animals’ capacities. Furthermore, this study analyzed additional psychological factors related to people’s moral judgment and the relationship among those factors. Several psychological factors, such as the perception that chimeric brain research is unnatural, were identified as mediating the relationship between perception of animal humanization and ethical concerns about creating and using chimeric brains. Introducing an empirical approach to the ethics of human-animal chimeric brains brought two findings: (1) this study informed us of socially shared intuition regarding this novel technology; and (2) it unveiled the psychological processes behind people’s ethical concerns in more detail than they spontaneously mentioned. These findings will help to build normative arguments and future policies that are understandable and acceptable to society. (shrink)

Animal models of human diseases are often used in biomedical research in place of human subjects. However, results obtained by animal models may fail to hold true for humans. One way of addressing this problem is to make animal models more similar to humans by placing human tissue into animal models, rendering them chimeric. Since technical and ethical limitations make neurological disorders difficult to study in humans, chimeric models with human neural tissue could help advance our understanding of neuropathophysiology. In (...) this article, we examine whether the introduction of human neural tissue and any consequent cognitive change is relevant to the way we ought to treat chimeras. We argue that changes in cognitive abilities are morally relevant to the extent that they increase the capacities that affect the moral status of any entity, including awareness, autonomy, and sociability. We posit that no being, regardless of species, should be treated in a way that is incommensurate with its moral status. Finally, we propose a framework that can be used to guide ethical assessment of research involving chimeras with advanced cognitive capacities. We advance this framework as a useful tool for bringing relevant considerations to the forefront for those considering the ethical merit of proposed chimeric research. In doing so, we examine concepts relevant to the question of how any entity may be treated, including moral status, dignity, and capacities. (shrink)

This article is the lead piece in a special report that presents the results of a bioethical investigation into chimeric research, which involves the insertion of human cells into nonhuman animals and nonhuman animal embryos, including into their brains. Rapid scientific developments in this field may advance knowledge and could lead to new therapies for humans. They also reveal the conceptual, ethical, and procedural limitations of existing ethics guidance for human‐nonhuman chimeric research. Led by bioethics researchers working closely with an (...) interdisciplinary work group, the investigation focused on generating conceptual clarity and identifying improvements to governance approaches, with the goal of helping scholars, funders, scientists, institutional leaders, and oversight bodies (embryonic stem cell research oversight [ESCRO] committees and institutional animal care and use committees [IACUCs]) deliver principled and trustworthy oversight of this area of science. The article, which focuses on human‐nonhuman animal chimeric research that is stem cell based, identifies key ethical issues in and offers ten recommendations regarding the ethics and oversight of this research. Turning from bioethics’ previous focus on human‐centered questions about the ethics of “humanization” and this research's potential impact on concepts like human dignity, this article emphasizes the importance of nonhuman animal welfare concerns in chimeric research and argues for less‐siloed governance and oversight and more‐comprehensive public communication. (shrink)

The use of nonhuman animals in research has long been a source of bioethical and scientific debate. We consider the oversight and use of nonhuman animals in chimeric research. We conducted interviews with twelve members of embryonic stem cell research oversight committees, nine members of institutional animal care and use committees, and fourteen scientists involved in human–nonhuman‐animal chimeric research in different areas of the United States. Interviews addressed animal welfare and conceptual issues associated with moral status and humanization of nonhuman (...) animals that contain human cells. Our findings suggest that concepts of enhanced moral status and consciousness are not very useful in human–nonhuman‐animal chimeric research in part because their meanings are not easily defined, which presents challenges to applying the concepts in research. Instead, scientists and oversight committee members we interviewed seemed to rely on standard assessments of changes in animal welfare when focusing on the ethics of human‐animal chimeric research. (shrink)

Fazendo uso da metáfora do riso e da quimera, o autor caracteriza o entendimento dos pensadores da Renascença sobre os fundamentos lógicos e linguísticos das discussões filosóficas medievais. O estudo é completado por referências a Ockham como um exemplo de pensamento lógico que veria em quebra-cabeças lógico-lingúísticos um modo de clarificar problemas filosóficos.

Our recent article begins by describing a new technique for creating human–animal chimeras. This technique—known as interspecies blastocyst complementation—may enable us to generate human organs inside of human–pig chimeras. One central concern about farming human–pig chimeras for their organs is that their moral status would be uncertain and potentially significant. Our article is partly, but not only, about such concerns. At the heart of our paper are two broader questions. First, how should we treat beings of uncertain moral status? And (...) second, do our reasons for thinking that human–pig chimeras have uncertain moral status also provide reason to think regular, non-chimeric pigs have uncertain moral status? We thank Mike King, Christian Munthe, David Resnik, Per Sandin and Rob Streiffer for their commentaries on our paper, each of which serves to clarify the ethical issues at play. In this response, we want to respond to one criticism, acknowledge the force of several others, and point towards some philosophical work that remains to be done. First, the criticism. Resnik questions the parallel we draw between human–pig chimeras and regular pigs. In the case of regular pigs, there is currently a social consensus that it is morally acceptable to farm pigs for food. For Resnik, this consensus imposes a special burden on those who wish to argue against it; ‘one needs substantial evidence that the majority view is wrong’.1 Since an equivalent consensus does not exist in relation to human–pig chimeras, one might think that moral uncertainty concerns have less force in the context of meat production than human–animal chimera research. We do not think the social consensus in favour …. (shrink)

L’objectif de cet article est de mettre en lumière quelques éléments tirés des écrits politiques de John Milton et de John Locke, en fonction de leur attitude à l’égard des différents médias. Dans son argumentation contre la censure, John Milton doit démontrer que toutes les anciennes instances de censure, citées souvent à son époque, peuvent être interprétées comme des exemples d’un autre phénomène. Cependant, John Milton reconnaît, en analysant les lieux communs dans la République de Platon ainsi que dans certains (...) textes bibliques, la portée et la signification des formes nonconceptuelles, nonimprimées, nonverbales de communication ; il les décrit comme des signes d’un comportement enfantin, féminin ou inculte, comme des phénomènes sans importance d’un point de vue de liberté politique incarnée dans la liberté de la presse. La position de John Locke est la même. Je montrerai l’enchaînement des idées, similiaire à celui de Milton, dans ses ouvrages Deux traités du gouvernement et Lettre sur la tolérance, en focalisant mon analyse sur le concept d’adiaphora. (shrink)

Proteolysis-targeting chimeric molecules represent an emerging technique that is receiving much attention for therapeutic intervention. The mechanism is based on the inhibition of protein function by hijacking a ubiquitin E3 ligase for protein degradation. The hetero-bifunctional PROTACs contain a ligand for recruiting an E3 ligase, a linker, and another ligand to bind with the protein targeted for degradation. Thus, PROTACs have profound potential to eliminate “undruggable” protein targets, such as transcription factors and non-enzymatic proteins, which are not limited to physiological (...) substrates of the ubiquitin-proteasome system. These findings indicate great prospects for PROTACs in the development of therapeutics. However, there are several limitations related to poor stability, biodistribution, and penetrability in vivo. This review provides an overview of the main PROTAC-based approaches that have been developed and discusses the promising opportunities and considerations for the application of this technology in therapies and drug discovery. The hetero-bifunctional PROTAC molecules contain a ligand for recruiting an E3 ligase linked with a ligand to bind with the protein targeted for degradation. Thus, PROTACs have profound potential to eliminate “undruggable” disease-causing proteins, which are not limited to physiological substrates of the ubiquitin-protease system, suggesting great prospects for therapeutic development. (shrink)

Since the beginning of time, the pre-biological and the biological world have seen a steady increase in complexity of form and function based on a process of combination and re-combination. The current modern synthesis of evolution known as the neo-Darwinian theory emphasises population genetics and does not explain satisfactorily all other occurrences of evolutionary novelty. The authors suggest that symbiosis and hybridisation and the more obscure processes such as polyploidy, chimerism and lateral transfer are mostly overlooked and not featured (...) sufficiently within evolutionary theory. They suggest, therefore, a revision of the existing theory including its language, to accommodate the scientific findings of recent decades. (shrink)

In the last decade, there has been a notable upsurge in property (PD) and generic substance dualism (SD). By SD I mean the view that there is a spiritual substantial soul that is different from but variously related to its body. SD includes Cartesian, certain forms of late Medieval hylomorphic (e.g., Aquinas'), and Haskerian emergent SD. Nevertheless, some form of physicalism remains the majority view in philosophy of mind. Several fairly standard objections have been raised against SD, and SDists have (...) been preoccupied with these objections. As a result, a potent objection has not been given the attention it deserves. The purpose of this article is to fill that lacuna by raising the visibility of this objection and providing plausible responses to it. First, I shall clarify the explanatory–impotence challenge and, second, provide defeaters against it. Note that several of the issues to follow apply both to PD and SD. I will focus mostly on SD, but sometimes PD is a part of the discussion in that certain arguments for and against PD indirectly affect SD. When it is important for me to note that either SD or PD is specifically being addressed, I will notify the reader. (shrink)

I argue that chimericity is a property that we typically experience when listening to multi-instrumental music. It is the property of hearing as a unified whole a melody or a harmony that does not belong to any single sound source but instead consists of the assembling of melodic or harmonic fragments coming from different sources. Chimericity is not reducible to the low-level audible properties of pitch and loudness; it is cognized at the perceptual level thanks to the auditory mechanism of (...) primitive grouping. My aim is to show that chimericity is a perceptual property, one that we can genuinely hear. In developing this view, I engage with the debate within the philosophy of sense perception between rich vs thin views of the content of perceptual experience. (shrink)

Philosophy long sought to set knowledge on a firm foundation, through derivation of indubitable truths by infallible rules. For want of such truths and rules, the enterprise foundered. Nevertheless, foundationalism's heirs continue their forbears' quest, seeking security against epistemic misfortune, while their detractors typically espouse unbridled coherentism or facile relativism. Maintaining that neither stance is tenable, Catherine Elgin devises a via media between the absolute and the arbitrary, reconceiving the nature, goals, and methods of epistemology. In Considered Judgment, she argues (...) for a reconception that takes reflective equilibrium as the standard of rational acceptability. A system of thought is in reflective equilibrium when its components are reasonable in light of one another, and the account they comprise is reasonable in light of our antecedent convictions about the subject it concerns. Many epistemologists now concede that certainty is a chimerical goal. But they continue to accept the traditional conception of epistemology's problematic. Elgin suggests that in abandoning the quest for certainty we gain opportunities for a broader epistemological purview--one that comprehends the arts and does justice to the sciences. She contends that metaphor, fiction, emotion, and exemplification often advance understanding in science as well as in art. The range of epistemology is broader and more variegated than is usually recognized. Tenable systems of thought are neither absolute nor arbitrary. Although they afford no guarantees, they are good in the way of belief. (shrink)

Philosophy long sought to set knowledge on a firm foundation, through derivation of indubitable truths by infallible rules. For want of such truths and rules, the enterprise foundered. Nevertheless, foundationalism's heirs continue their forbears' quest, seeking security against epistemic misfortune, while their detractors typically espouse unbridled coherentism or facile relativism. Maintaining that neither stance is tenable, Catherine Elgin devises a via media between the absolute and the arbitrary, reconceiving the nature, goals, and methods of epistemology. In Considered Judgment, she argues (...) for a reconception that takes reflective equilibrium as the standard of rational acceptability. A system of thought is in reflective equilibrium when its components are reasonable in light of one another, and the account they comprise is reasonable in light of our antecedent convictions about the subject it concerns.Many epistemologists now concede that certainty is a chimerical goal. But they continue to accept the traditional conception of epistemology's problematic. Elgin suggests that in abandoning the quest for certainty we gain opportunities for a broader epistemological purview--one that comprehends the arts and does justice to the sciences. She contends that metaphor, fiction, emotion, and exemplification often advance understanding in science as well as in art. The range of epistemology is broader and more variegated than is usually recognized. Tenable systems of thought are neither absolute nor arbitrary. Although they afford no guarantees, they are good in the way of belief. (shrink)