Results for 'Chinese room'

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  1. The Chinese Room Argument.David Cole - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  2. The Chinese Room From a Logical Point of View.B. Jack Copeland - 2003 - In John M. Preston & John Mark Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
     
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  3. A Chinese Room That Understands.Herbert A. Simon & Stuart A. Eisenstadt - 2003 - In John M. Preston & John Mark Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
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  4. The Chinese Room Argument--Dead but Not yet Buried.Robert I. Damper - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (5-6):159-169.
    This article is an accompaniment to Anthony Freeman’s review of Views into the Chinese Room, reflecting on some pertinent outstanding questions about the Chinese room argument. Although there is general agreement in the artificial intelligence community that the CRA is somehow wrong, debate continues on exactly why and how it is wrong. Is there a killer counter-argument and, if so, what is it? One remarkable fact is that the CRA is prototypically a thought experiment, yet it (...)
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  5. Chinese Rooms and Program Portability.Mark D. Sprevak - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (4):755-776.
    I argue in this article that there is a mistake in Searle's Chinese room argument that has not received sufficient attention. The mistake stems from Searle's use of the Church-Turing thesis. Searle assumes that the Church-Turing thesis licences the assumption that the Chinese room can run any program. I argue that it does not, and that this assumption is false. A number of possible objections are considered and rejected. My conclusion is that it is consistent with (...)
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  6.  97
    The Chinese Room Revisited.J. R. Searle - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (2):345-348.
  7. Chinese Room Argument.Larry Hauser - 2001 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The Chinese room argument is a thought experiment of John Searle (1980a) and associated (1984) derivation. It is one of the best known and widely credited counters to claims of artificial intelligence (AI)—that is, to claims that computers do or at least can (someday might) think. According to Searle’s original presentation, the argument is based on two key claims: brains cause minds and syntax doesn’t suffice for semantics. Its target is what Searle dubs “strong AI.” According to strong (...)
     
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  8. The Chinese Room Argument: Consciousness and Understanding.Simone Gozzano - 1997 - In Matjaz Gams, M. Paprzycki & X. Wu (eds.), Mind Versus Computer: Were Dreyfus and Winograd Right? Amsterdam: IOS Press. pp. 43--231.
    In this paper I submit that the “Chinese room” argument rests on the assumption that understanding a sentence necessarily implies being conscious of its content. However, this assumption can be challenged by showing that two notions of consciousness come into play, one to be found in AI, the other in Searle’s argument, and that the former is an essential condition for the notion used by Searle. If Searle discards the first, he not only has trouble explaining how we (...)
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  9. The Chinese Room Argument Reconsidered: Essentialism, Indeterminacy, and Strong AI. [REVIEW]Jerome C. Wakefield - 2003 - Minds and Machines 13 (2):285-319.
    I argue that John Searle's (1980) influential Chinese room argument (CRA) against computationalism and strong AI survives existing objections, including Block's (1998) internalized systems reply, Fodor's (1991b) deviant causal chain reply, and Hauser's (1997) unconscious content reply. However, a new ``essentialist'' reply I construct shows that the CRA as presented by Searle is an unsound argument that relies on a question-begging appeal to intuition. My diagnosis of the CRA relies on an interpretation of computationalism as a scientific theory (...)
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  10. Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence.John Mark Bishop & John Preston (eds.) - 2002 - London: Oxford University Press.
  11. Escaping From the Chinese Room.Margaret A. Boden - 1988 - In John Heil (ed.), Computer Models of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
     
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  12.  54
    Zombie Mouse in a Chinese Room.Slawomir J. Nasuto, John Mark Bishop, Etienne B. Roesch & Matthew C. Spencer - 2015 - Philosophy and Technology 28 (2):209-223.
    John Searle’s Chinese Room Argument purports to demonstrate that syntax is not sufficient for semantics, and, hence, because computation cannot yield understanding, the computational theory of mind, which equates the mind to an information processing system based on formal computations, fails. In this paper, we use the CRA, and the debate that emerged from it, to develop a philosophical critique of recent advances in robotics and neuroscience. We describe results from a body of work that contributes to blurring (...)
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    The Chinese Room Comes of Age A Review of Preston & Bishop.Anthony Freeman - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (5-6):5-6.
    It was in 1980 that John Searle first opened the door of his Chinese Room, purporting to show that the conscious mind cannot, in principle, work like a digital computer. Searle, who speaks no Chinese, stipulated that locked in this fictitious space he had a supply of different Chinese symbols, together with instructions for using them . When Chinese characters were passed in to him, he would consult the instructions and pass out more symbols. Neither (...)
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  14. The Chinese Room Argument.Josef Moural - 2003 - In Barry Smith (ed.), John Searle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 214-260.
     
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  15. The Chinese Room Argument.Larry Hauser - 2001
    _The Chinese room argument_ - John Searle's (1980a) thought experiment and associated (1984) derivation - is one of the best known and widely credited counters to claims of artificial intelligence (AI), i.e., to claims that computers _do_ or at least _can_ (someday might) think. According to Searle's original presentation, the argument is based on two truths: _brains cause minds_ , and _syntax doesn't_ _suffice for semantics_ . Its target, Searle dubs "strong AI": "according to strong AI," according to (...)
     
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  16. The Chinese Room is a Trick.Peter Kugel - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):153-154.
    To convince us that computers cannot have mental states, Searle (1980) imagines a “Chinese room” that simulates a computer that “speaks” Chinese and asks us to find the understanding in the room. It's a trick. There is no understanding in the room, not because computers can't have it, but because the room's computer-simulation is defective. Fix it and understanding appears. Abracadabra!
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  17. Computers, Persons, and the Chinese Room. Part 1: The Human Computer.Ricardo Restrepo - 2012 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 33 (1):27-48.
    Detractors of Searle’s Chinese Room Argument have arrived at a virtual consensus that the mental properties of the Man performing the computations stipulated by the argument are irrelevant to whether computational cognitive science is true. This paper challenges this virtual consensus to argue for the first of the two main theses of the persons reply, namely, that the mental properties of the Man are what matter. It does this by challenging many of the arguments and conceptions put forth (...)
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  18.  16
    The Chinese Room Revisited : Artificial Intelligence and the Nature of Mind.Rodrigo Gonzalez - 2007 - Dissertation, KU Leuven
    Charles Babbage began the quest to build an intelligent machine in the nineteenth century. Despite finishing neither the Difference nor the Analytical engine, he was aware that the use of mental language for describing the functioning of such machines was figurative. In order to reverse this cautious stance, Alan Turing postulated two decisive ideas that contributed to give birth to Artificial Intelligence: the Turing machine and the Turing test. Nevertheless, a philosophical problem arises from regarding intelligence simulation and make-believe as (...)
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  19. A Logical Hole the Chinese Room Avoids.Donald Nute - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (3):431-433.
    Searle’s Chinese room argument (CRA) was recently charged as being unsound because it makes a logical error. It is shown here that this charge is based on a misinterpretation of the modal scope of a major premise of the CRA and that the CRA does not commit the logical error with which it is charged.
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  20. Computers, Persons, and the Chinese Room. Part 2: Testing Computational Cognitive Science.Ricardo Restrepo - 2012 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 33 (3):123-140.
    This paper is a follow-up of the first part of the persons reply to the Chinese Room Argument. The first part claims that the mental properties of the person appearing in that argument are what matter to whether computational cognitive science is true. This paper tries to discern what those mental properties are by applying a series of hypothetical psychological and strengthened Turing tests to the person, and argues that the results support the thesis that the Man performing (...)
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  21. Subsymbolic Computation and the Chinese Room.David J. Chalmers - 1992 - In J. Dinsmore (ed.), The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 25--48.
    More than a decade ago, philosopher John Searle started a long-running controversy with his paper “Minds, Brains, and Programs” (Searle, 1980a), an attack on the ambitious claims of artificial intelligence (AI). With his now famous _Chinese Room_ argument, Searle claimed to show that despite the best efforts of AI researchers, a computer could never recreate such vital properties of human mentality as intentionality, subjectivity, and understanding. The AI research program is based on the underlying assumption that all important aspects of (...)
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  22. The Chinese Room.Josef Moural - 2003 - In Barry Smith (ed.), John Searle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 214-260.
     
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  23. The Chinese Room Argument.Ajit Narayanan - 1991 - In Logical Foundations. New York: St Martin's Press.
     
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  24. How Helen Keller Used Syntactic Semantics to Escape From a Chinese Room.William J. Rapaport - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (4):381-436.
    A computer can come to understand natural language the same way Helen Keller did: by using “syntactic semantics”—a theory of how syntax can suffice for semantics, i.e., how semantics for natural language can be provided by means of computational symbol manipulation. This essay considers real-life approximations of Chinese Rooms, focusing on Helen Keller’s experiences growing up deaf and blind, locked in a sort of Chinese Room yet learning how to communicate with the outside world. Using the SNePS (...)
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  25. A Chinese Room That Understands.A. Herbert - 2002 - In John M. Preston & John Mark Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press. pp. 95.
     
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  26. The Chinese-Room as a Test of the Turing Test, Can Machine Think.R. Rheinwald - 1992 - Philosophische Rundschau 39 (1-2):133-156.
     
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  27. Yes, She Was!: Reply to Ford’s “Helen Keller Was Never in a Chinese Room”.William J. Rapaport - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (1):3-17.
    Ford’s Helen Keller Was Never in a Chinese Room claims that my argument in How Helen Keller Used Syntactic Semantics to Escape from a Chinese Room fails because Searle and I use the terms ‘syntax’ and ‘semantics’ differently, hence are at cross purposes. Ford has misunderstood me; this reply clarifies my theory.
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    From Chinese Rooms to Irish Rooms.Paul Me Kevin & Chengming Quo - 1997 - In S. O'Nuillain, Paul McKevitt & E. MacAogain (eds.), Two Sciences of Mind. John Benjamins. pp. 179.
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  29. A Logical Hole in the Chinese Room.Michael John Shaffer - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (2):229-235.
    Searle’s Chinese Room Argument (CRA) has been the object of great interest in the philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence and cognitive science since its initial presentation in ‘Minds, Brains and Programs’ in 1980. It is by no means an overstatement to assert that it has been a main focus of attention for philosophers and computer scientists of many stripes. It is then especially interesting to note that relatively little has been said about the detailed logic of the argument, (...)
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  30. Helen Keller Was Never in a Chinese Room.Jason Ford - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (1):57-72.
    William Rapaport, in “How Helen Keller used syntactic semantics to escape from a Chinese Room,” (Rapaport 2006), argues that Helen Keller was in a sort of Chinese Room, and that her subsequent development of natural language fluency illustrates the flaws in Searle’s famous Chinese Room Argument and provides a method for developing computers that have genuine semantics (and intentionality). I contend that his argument fails. In setting the problem, Rapaport uses his own preferred definitions (...)
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  31. John Searle's Chinese Room Argument.John McCarthy - manuscript
    John Searle begins his ``Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion and Cognitive Science'' with " ``Ten years ago in this journal I published an article criticising what I call Strong AI, the view that for a system to have mental states it is sufficient for the system to implement the right sort of program with right inputs and outputs. Strong AI is rather easy to refute and the basic argument can be summarized in one sentence: {it a system, me for example, could implement (...)
     
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  32. Cyborgs in the Chinese Room: Boundaries Transgressed and Boundaries Blurred.Alison Adam - 2003 - In John M. Preston & John Mark Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press. pp. 319--337.
     
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  33. Is the Chinese Room the Real Thing?David Anderson - 1987 - Philosophy 62 (July):389-93.
  34. A Note on the Chinese Room.Hanoch Ben-Yami - 1993 - Synthese 95 (2):169-72.
    Searle's Chinese Room was supposed to prove that computers can't understand: the man in the room, following, like a computer, syntactical rules alone, though indistinguishable from a genuine Chinese speaker, doesn't understand a word. But such a room is impossible: the man won't be able to respond correctly to questions like What is the time?, even though such an ability is indispensable for a genuine Chinese speaker. Several ways to provide the room with (...)
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  35. Consciousness, Computation, and the Chinese Room.Roger Penrose - 2003 - In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
     
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  36. Escaping From the Chinese Room.Margaret A. Boden - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
     
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  37.  43
    From Searle’s Chinese Room to the Mathematics Classroom: Technical and Cognitive Mathematics.Dimitris Gavalas - 2007 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 26 (2):127-146.
    Employing Searle’s views, I begin by arguing that students of Mathematics behave similarly to machines that manage symbols using a set of rules. I then consider two types of Mathematics, which I call Cognitive Mathematics and Technical Mathematics respectively. The former type relates to concepts and meanings, logic and sense, whilst the latter relates to algorithms, heuristics, rules and application of various techniques. I claim that an upgrade in the school teaching of Cognitive Mathematics is necessary. The aim is to (...)
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    Machine Understanding and the Chinese Room.Natika Newton - 1989 - Philosophical Psychology 2 (2):207-15.
    John Searle has argued that one can imagine embodying a machine running any computer program without understanding the symbols, and hence that purely computational processes do not yield understanding. The disagreement this argument has generated stems, I hold, from ambiguity in talk of 'understanding'. The concept is analysed as a relation between subjects and symbols having two components: a formal and an intentional. The central question, then becomes whether a machine could possess the intentional component with or without the formal (...)
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    Re-Entering the Chinese Room.Graham Button, Jeff Coutler & John R. E. Lee - 2000 - Minds and Machines 10 (1):149-152.
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    Otto in the Chinese Room.Philip Murray McCullough - 2010 - Spontaneous Generations 4 (1):129-137.
    The purpose of this paper is to explore a possible resolution to one of the main objections to machine thought as propounded by Alan Turing in the imitation game that bears his name. That machines will, at some point, be able to think is the central idea of this text, a claim supported by a schema posited by Andy Clark and David Chalmers in their paper, “The Extended Mind” (1998). Their notion of active externalism is used to support, strengthen and (...)
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    Machine Understanding and the Chinese Room.Natika Newton - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (2):207 – 215.
    John Searle has argued that one can imagine embodying a machine running any computer program without understanding the symbols, and hence that purely computational processes do not yield understanding. The disagreement this argument has generated stems, I hold, from ambiguity in talk of 'understanding'. The concept is analysed as a relation between subjects and symbols having two components: a formal and an intentional. The central question, then becomes whether a machine could possess the intentional component with or without the formal (...)
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  42. Unlocking the Chinese Room.L.-M. Russow - 1984 - Nature and System 6 (December):221-8.
     
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  43.  18
    Deconstructing the Chinese Room.Gordon G. Globus - 1991 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 12 (3):377-91.
    The "Chinese Room" controversy between Searle and Churchland and Churchland over whether computers can think is subjected to Derridean "deconstruction." There is a hidden complicity underlying the debate which upholds traditional subject/object metaphysics, while deferring to future empirical science an account of the problematic semantic relation between brain syntax and the perceptible world. I show that an empirical solution along the lines hoped for is not scientifically conceivable at present. An alternative account is explored, based on the productivity (...)
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  44. Searle's Chinese Box: Debunking the Chinese Room Argument. [REVIEW]Larry Hauser - 1997 - Minds and Machines 7 (2):199-226.
    John Searle's Chinese room argument is perhaps the most influential andwidely cited argument against artificial intelligence. Understood astargeting AI proper – claims that computers can think or do think– Searle's argument, despite its rhetorical flash, is logically andscientifically a dud. Advertised as effective against AI proper, theargument, in its main outlines, is an ignoratio elenchi. It musterspersuasive force fallaciously by indirection fostered by equivocaldeployment of the phrase "strong AI" and reinforced by equivocation on thephrase "causal powers" equal to (...)
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    Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. [REVIEW]Jonathan Waskan - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):277-282.
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    Dismantling the Chinese Room with linguistic tools: a framework for elucidating concept-application disputes.Lawrence Lengbeyer - forthcoming - AI and Society:1-19.
    Imagine advanced computers that could, by virtue merely of being programmed in the right ways, act, react, communicate, and otherwise behave like humans. Might such computers be capable of understanding, thinking, believing, and the like? The framework developed in this paper for tackling challenging questions of concept application answers in the affirmative, contrary to Searle’s famous ‘Chinese Room’ thought experiment, which purports to prove that ascribing such mental processes to computers like these would be necessarily incorrect. The paper (...)
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  47. Double on Searle's Chinese Room.Christopher A. Fields - 1984 - Nature and System 6 (March):51-54.
     
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  48. What’s Really Going On in Searle’s “Chinese Room‘.Georges Rey - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (September):169-85.
  49. Quantum Linguistics and Searle's Chinese Room Argument.J. M. Bishop, S. J. Nasuto & B. Coecke - 2011 - In V. C. Muller (ed.), Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence. Springer. pp. 17-29.
    Viewed in the light of the remarkable performance of ‘Watson’ - IBMs proprietary artificial intelligence computer system capable of answering questions posed in natural language - on the US general knowledge quiz show ‘Jeopardy’, we review two experiments on formal systems - one in the domain of quantum physics, the other involving a pictographic languaging game - whereby behaviour seemingly characteristic of domain understanding is generated by the mere mechanical application of simple rules. By re-examining both experiments in the context (...)
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  50. Transcendental Idealism From the Chinese Room: Does God Speak Chinese?Kent Baldner - unknown - Proceedings of the Heraclitean Society 15.
     
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