This book raises in a new way a central question of Christology: what is the divine motive for the incarnation? Throughout Christian history a majority of Western theologians have agreed that God's decision to become incarnate in the person of Jesus Christ was made necessary by "the Fall": if humans had not sinned, the incarnation would not have happened. This position is known as "infralapsarian." A minority of theologians however, including some major 19th- and 20th-century theological figures, championed a "supralapsarian" (...) Christology, arguing that God has always intended the incarnation, independent of "the Fall." Edwin Chr. van Driel offers the first scholarly monograph to map and analyze the full range of supralapsarian arguments. He gives a thick description of each argument and its theological consequences, and evaluates the theological gains and losses inherent in each approach. Van Driel shows that each of the three ways in which God is thought to relate to all that is not God -- in creation, in redemption, and in eschatological consummation -- can serve as the basis for a supralapsarian argument. He illustrates this thesis with detailed case studies of the Christologies of Schleiermacher, Dorner, and Barth. He concludes that the most fruitful supralapsarian strategy is rooted in the notion of eschatological consummation, taking interpersonal interaction with God to be the goal of the incarnation. He goes on to develop his own argument along these lines, concluding in an eschatological vision in which God is visually, audibly, and tangibly present in the midst of God's people. (shrink)
In this essay I argue that John Duns Scotus offers two arguments to support his well-known supralapsarian Christological position: a formal argument based on the ordering within God’s will, and a material argument based on the ordering of God’s love. While the latter is constructively more fruitful, its most natural reading, according to which God becomes incarnate so as to be loved not just by Godself but also by another, is also inconsistent with Scotus’s own account of the metaphysics of (...) the incarnation. An alternative reading, according to which God hypostatically unites with the human soul of Christ because God falls in love with it, is equally untenable. I offer therefore an alternative reading that, while not consistent with the letter of Scotus’s argument, I believe nonetheless to be consistent with its spirit. On this reading, the love expressed in the incarnation is directed at creation. In deciding to become incarnate, God decides to give Godself to that what is not God; the embodiment of this decision is Christ. The incarnation is not an expression of divine self-love, or love for one particular soul, but an expression of love for others. (shrink)
Kaum einer hat die offene Gesellschaft in der politischen Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts so leidenschaftlich verteidigt wie Karl Popper. Sein Demokratieverstandnis ist eng gekoppelt an seine Wissenschaftstheorie und die Kritik an Platon, Hegel, Marx. Als Liberaler und sozialer Reformist wird er parteiubergreifend zum Stichwortgeber bundesdeutscher Politik seit den 70er Jahren. Popper-Rezeptionen finden sich bis in die Staatsrechtslehre (namentlich Peter Haberle) und das Bundesverfassungsgericht hinein. Noch heute lasst sich mit Popper gegen Diktaturen wie uberhaupt gegen Konzepte von "Gemeinschaft" Position beziehen - (...) aber auch gegen einen pseudo-liberalen, gnadenlosen Kapitalismus der "Ich-AGs". Mit Beitragen von Dorothea Frede, Peter Haberle, Herbert Keuth, Hubert Kiesewetter, Martin H. W. Mollers, Jurgen Nordmann, Harald Stelzer, Robert Chr. van Ooyen, Robert Zimmer. (shrink)
Tvnicam linteam pro lanea uulgo Romae saeculo tertio post Chr. n. gestatam esse iure optimo Friedlaenderus contendit, sed idem Romanos fortasse iam antea eo uestimento usos esse addit, idque fretus loco Iuuenalis, quern supra indicaui. Mihi tamen uidentur uersus illi Aquinatis non posse afferri ad Friedlaenderi sententiam tuendam, quod ut demonstrem, eos infra describam et tractabo.
The thesis developed and defended in this paper is that is it false that all knowledge is founded on experience. Much of our knowledge (or alleged knowledge), it is argued, is based on testimony. Still, many philosophers have either not dealt with testimony at all, or treated it very unkindly. One of the reasons for this is that those philosophers (such as Descartes and Locke) work with a concept of knowledge according to which knowledge is certain, indubitable, and/or self-evident. And (...) if knowledge is what these philosophers say it is, then there is no such thing as knowledge based on testimony indeed. Thomas Reid is introduced as holding that we do have testimonial knowledge and that therefore Descartes' and Locke's concept of knowledge is untenable. Reid furthermore holds that human beings are endowed with a disposition to accept or believe what otherstell us („the principle of credulity”). The working of this principle is refined through all kinds of experience. What Reid says or shows is how this disposition in fact operates. Many epistemologists, however, have higher aspirations and look for reasons or arguments that can justify our factual acceptance of testimony. The inductive argument Hume offers, it is argued, is unconvincing. There is even reason to think that the principle of credulity can never be justified by adducing reasons. This does not imply, however, that acceptance of testimony is unjustified. Whether or not it is depends, among other things, on the concept of justification one uses. On an internalist concept of justification (as Locke's or Hume's) this disposition may never be justified. But on an externalist conception it may. This may be disappointing, given some widely held philosophical aspirations, but at the same time it is, as Alston has said, a lesson in intellectual humility. (shrink)
