Chris Dorst [4]Christopher Dorst [1]
See also
Chris Dorst
Washington University in St. Louis
  1.  38
    Humean Laws, Explanatory Circularity, and the Aim of Scientific Explanation.Chris Dorst - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    One of the main challenges confronting Humean accounts of natural law is that Humean laws appear to be unable to play the explanatory role of laws in scientific practice. The worry is roughly that if the laws are just regularities in the particular matters of fact (as the Humean would have it), then they cannot also explain the particular matters of fact, on pain of circularity. Loewer (2012) has defended Humeanism, arguing that this worry only arises if we fail to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography  
  2.  27
    Toward a Best Predictive System Account of Laws of Nature.Chris Dorst - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axy016.
    This paper argues for a revised best system account of laws of nature. David Lewis's original BSA has two main elements. On the one hand, there is the Humean base, which is the totality of particular matters of fact that obtain in the history of the universe. On the other hand, there is what I call the ‘nomic formula’, which is a particular operation that gets applied to the Humean base in order to output the laws of nature. My revised (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  3.  13
    Evidence, Significance, and Counterfactuals: Schramm on the New Riddle of Induction.Chris Dorst - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (1):143-154.
    In a recent paper in this journal, Schramm presents what he takes to be an answer to Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction. His solution relies on the technical notion of evidential significance, which is meant to distinguish two ways that evidence may bear on a hypothesis: either via support or confirmation. As he puts his view in slogan form: “confirmation is support by significant evidence”. Once we make this distinction, Schramm claims, we see that Goodman’s famous riddle is dissolved, and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  4.  17
    Bet Accepted: A Reply to Freitag.Christopher Dorst - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (270):175-183.
    Wolfgang Freitag claims to have developed a proposal that solves Goodman's famous New Riddle of Induction. His proposal makes use of the notion of ‘derivative defeat’; the claim is that in certain circumstances, the projection of some predicates is derivatively defeated, i.e., it is inductively invalid. Freitag develops the proposal using some compelling examples, and then shows that it likewise applies to the argument at the basis of the New Riddle. There, he alleges, the projection of ‘grue’ is derivatively defeated, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography  
  5.  6
    In All Probability, Quite Handy. [REVIEW]Chris Dorst - 2018 - Metascience 27 (2):223-226.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography