Bishop Robert Grosseteste and Lincoln Cathedral provides a much-needed and in-depth investigation of Grosseteste’s relationship to the medieval cathedral at Lincoln and the surrounding city. The architecture and topography of Lincoln Cathedral are examined in their cultural contexts, in relation to scholastic philosophy, science and cosmology, and medieval ideas about light and geometry, as highlighted in the writings of Robert Grosseteste - bishop of Lincoln Cathedral. At the same time the architecture of the cathedral is considered in relation to the (...) roles of the clergy and masons; the policies of the bishop; matters of governance, worship and education; ecclesiastical hierarchy, church liturgy, politics and processionals. Investigations include parallel studies of Salisbury Cathedral and Charlemagne’s Palatine Chapel at Aachen, highlighting important connections in regard to ceremonial itineraries and political/religious hierarchies. Finally, the book explores Grosseteste’s ideas in the broader context of medieval and Renaissance cosmologies, optics/perspective, natural philosophy and experimental science. The contributors to this volume make an important contribution to our current understanding of the relation between architecture, theology, politics and society during the Middle Ages, and how religious spaces were conceived and experienced. (shrink)

In his new book, Brandom offers a new argument against the viability of Sellars’ scientific naturalism. Brandom attempts to show that if the Sellarsian it scientia mensura principle is understood as implying that manifest-image objects exist only if they are identical to scientific-image objects, it is undermined by the ‘Kant–Sellars’ thesis about identity which implies that manifest-image objects cannot be identical to scientific-image objects. This conclusion can be evaded by construing the relation between manifest and scientific objects as weaker than (...) that of identity, namely as a relation between manifest-image functional roles and scientific-image realizers. But Brandom again argues that even this weaker construal of the scientia mensura thesis is in conflict with another Sellarsian argument, this time against phenomenalism. It will be argued that this is not so. I will, moreover, suggest that the ‘function-realizer’ construal of the manifest-scientific image distinction is indeed tenable—especially if the process of determining the scientific-image realizers of functional roles specified in manifest-image is understood as the culmination of a self-correcting dynamic and diachronic process of conceptual change. Finally, I will argue that while Brandom is right to point out that Sellars’ adherence to the scientia mensura principle is based on a ‘unity-of-science’ view, he is wrong to think that his argument for the contrary conclusion is successful, because Brandom’s argument does not automatically tell against a weaker ‘unity-of-science’ view according to which incommensurability of explanatory levels in science is a pragmatically indispensable yet in principle dispensable feature of empirical inquiry. (shrink)

Este artigo analisa a importância do papel desempenhado pelo diplomata George Frost Kennan na elaboração da política externa dos Estados Unidos durante a Guerra Fria. Ao final da Segunda Guerra Mundial, no contexto marcado pelas apreensões relativas às rivalidades globais entre os EUA e a URSS, Kennan recomendou uma estratégia com a intenção de conter as potenciais tendências expansionistas da União Soviética. Em sua consideração, a principal ameaça posta pela União Soviética não era militar, mas sua capacidade de influência (...) ideológica, veiculada pelos partidos comunistas e seus seguidores no interior das sociedades democráticas ocidentais. Desta hipótese precedente, Kennan arquitetou a Doutrina de Contenção, uma estratégia crucial da política externa dos Estados Unidos durante a Guerra Fria. Como um diplomata de carreira e grande autoridade nos estudos relacionados à sociedade Soviética, Kennan escreveu durante a sua vida uma extraordinária obra relacionada à diplomacia dos EUA e aos seus desafios colossais no ambiente do conflito global. No entanto, desde o início da segunda Administração Truman, Kennan observou que a estratégia estadunidense em relação à Guerra Fria havia se tornado mais militarista e intensificado a corrida armamentista. Ao assumir uma posição crítica em relação a essas diretrizes, que, de acordo com a sua perspectiva, levava à distorção da sua concepção original da teoria da Contenção, Kennan foi marginalizado pelo novo Secretário de Estado, Dean Acheson e deslocado do núcleo de elaboração política do governo. Posteriormente, ele questionou a adopção da Doutrina Truman, a criação da OTAN e o envolvimento dos Estados Unidos nas guerras da Coréia e do Vietnam.George Frost Kennan and the architecture of U.S. Foreign Policy in the genesis of the Cold War This article analyzes the major role performed by diplomat George Frost Kennan in the United States Foreign Policy during the Cold War. By the end of World War II, amidst apprehensions concerning the U.S. and the USSR global rivalries, Kennan recommended a strategy intending to contain the potential expansionist tendencies of the Soviet Union. In his consideration, the core threat upraised by Soviet Union was not military, but its ideological influence conveyed by Communist parties and fellow travelers inside the western democratic societies. From this preceding hypothesis, Kennan designed the doctrine of containment, a crucial strategy of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. As a career diplomat and major authority on Soviet society, Kennan wrote during his lifetime an remarkable work related to U.S. diplomacy and its colossal challenges in the environment of that global conflict. Nonetheless, since the inauguration of the second Truman administration, Kennan observed that U.S. Cold War strategy had become more militaristic and that it had strengthened the arms race. For assuming a critical position towards this path, which, according to his perspective, was a distortion of his original containment theory, Kennan was marginalized by the new Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, and displaced from core government power. Subsequently, he stood up against the adoption of the Truman Doctrine, the creation of NATO and the commitment of the United States in the Korean and Vietnam wars. Resumen George Frost Kennan y la arquitectura de la política externa de los EUA en el origen de la Guerra Fría Este artículo analiza la importancia del papel desempeñado por el diplomático George Frost Kennan en la elaboración de la política externa de los Estados Unidos durante la Guerra Fría. Al finalizar la Segunda Guerra Mundial, en el contexto marcado por las aprehensiones vinculadas a las rivalidades globales entre los EUA y la URSS, Kennan recomendó una estrategia con la intención de contener las potenciales tendencias expansionistas de la Unión Soviética. En su entendimiento, la principal amenaza de la Unión Soviética no era militar, y sí su capacidad de influencia ideológica, vehiculada por los partidos comunistas y sus seguidores en el interior de las sociedades democráticas occidentales. Partiendo de esta hipótesis, Kennan ideó la Doctrina de Contención, una estrategia crucial de la política externa de los EEUU durante la Guerra Fría. Como diplomático de carrera y una autoridad en estudios relacionados a la Unión Soviética, Kennan escribió durante su vida una extraordinaria obra relacionada a la diplomacia estadounidense y sus desafíos colosales en el ambiente del conflicto global. Sin embargo, desde el inicio de la segunda administración Truman, Kennan observó que la estrategia de los EUA en relación a la Guerra Fría se había tornado más militarista, intensificándose la carrera armamentista. Al asumir una posición crítica en relación a estas directrices que, de acuerdo a su perspectiva, conducía a la distorsión de su original teoría de la Contención, Kennan fue marginado por el nuevo Secretario de Estado, Dean Acheson, y desplazado del núcleo de elaboración política del gobierno. Posteriormente, él cuestionó la adopción de la Doctrina Truman, la creación de la OTAN y la participación de Estados Unidos en las guerras de Corea y de Vietnam. (shrink)

When referring to his first efforts in philosophy, particularly those contained in his Hypothesis Physica Nova and Theoria Motusa, Leibniz would often introduce them with vaguely disparaging remarks, such as “When my philosophy was not yet mature…,” or “Before I became a mathematician….” This is understandable, I would think, in terms of his desire to show how much his thought had progressed since that time, especially in mathematics. But some commentators, on being confronted with the unsystematic style of these early (...) works and the apparent contradictions of the theory of the continuum contained in them, seem to have interpreted Leibniz’s disclaimers as amounting to a complete renunciation of them. At any rate, they have been correspondingly dismissive in their estimation of the content of these early works. (shrink)

In this article, we will attempt to understand Sellars’ puzzling notion of ‘adequate picturing’ and its relation to the Sellarsian ‘conceptual order’ through Spinoza’s intuitive knowledge. First, it will be suggested that there are important structural similarities between Sellarsian ‘adequate picturing’ and Spinoza’s intuitive knowledge which can illuminate some ‘dark’ and not so well understood features of Sellarsian picturing. However, there remain some deep differences between Sellars’ and Spinoza’s philosophy, especially with regard to their notion of ‘adequacy’ and the sense (...) in which an idea can be said to ‘correspond’ with its object. As a consequence of those differences it turns out that, from a Sellarsian viewpoint, Spinoza’s notion of intuitive knowledge is a version of the myth of the Given. However, Sellars’ own proposed way out of the Myth has problematic consequences by Sellars’ own lights: His sharp distinction between the ‘space of reasons’ level and the level of picturing makes the Sellarsian vision of the ‘stereoscopic fusion’ of those levels virtually unintelligible. Finally, it will be argued that a non-standard interpretation of Spinoza’s intuitive knowledge -proposed in Baltas -, combined with a Sellars-inspired bifurcated understanding of Dreyfusian expert knowledge, can provide the means 1) for constructing a notion of intuitive knowledge that evades the myth of the Given, and, 2) for making full sense of the claim that the ‘space of reasons’ dimension of understanding the world can in principle be fused with the ‘picturing’ dimension and provide us with a single complex coherent experience of reality and our place in it. (shrink)

In this paper, first, I will focus on the divergent interpretations of two leading Sellars’ scholars, Willem deVries and James O’Shea, as regards Sellars’ view on the being of the normative. It will be suggested that this conflict between deVries’ and O’Shea’s viewpoints can be resolved by the provision of an account of what I shall call ‘ready-tohand’ normativity, which incorporates the insights of both deVries’ and O’Shea’s interpretive perspectives, while at the same time going beyond them. It shall be (...) further argued that the resulting ‘phenomenologically’ informed view of normativity, pointing as it does towards its ideal integration not only with practical action but also with perceptual experience, in the form of what I shall call ‘kinaesthetic’ normativity, can potentially pose problems to Sellars’ own view on the matter, and, in particular, to the way normativity can allegedly be ‘stereoscopically fused’ with the ultimate ontology of the ideal scientific image. However, I shall argue that these problems are not unsurpassable: although the possibility of a specifically ‘kinaesthetic’ form of normativity seems to have eluded Sellars’ grasp, his views about the way in which the productive imagination is implicated in perceptual experience, do indeed provide the conceptual resources that make possible the stereoscopic fusion of this kind of normativity with the ontology of the ideal scientific image. (shrink)

I provide an account of the cognitive attitude of trust that explains the role trust plays in the planning of rational agents. Many authors have dismissed choosing to trust as either impossible or irrational; however, this fails to account for the role of trust in practical reasoning. A can have therapeutic, coping, or corrective reasons to trust B to ${\phi}$ , even in the absence of evidence that B will ${\phi}$ . One can choose to engage in therapeutic trust to (...) inspire trustworthiness, coping trust to simplify one’s planning, or corrective trust to avoid doing a testimonial injustice. To accommodate such types of trust, without accepting doxastic voluntarism, requires an account of the cognitive attitude of trust broader than belief alone. I argue that trust involves taking the proposition that someone will do something as a premise in one’s practical reasoning, which can be a matter of believing or accepting the proposition. I defend this account against objections that it (i) provides insufficient rational constraints on trust, (ii) conflates trust and pretense of trust, and (iii) cannot account for the rationality of back-up planning. (shrink)

New Materialisms brings into focus and explains the significance of the innovative materialist critiques that are emerging across the social sciences and humanities. By gathering essays that exemplify the new thinking about matter and processes of materialization, this important collection shows how scholars are reworking older materialist traditions, contemporary theoretical debates, and advances in scientific knowledge to address pressing ethical and political challenges. In the introduction, Diana Coole and Samantha Frost highlight common themes among the distinctive critical projects that (...) comprise the new materialisms. The continuities they discern include a posthumanist conception of matter as lively or exhibiting agency, and a reengagement with both the material realities of everyday life and broader geopolitical and socioeconomic structures. Coole and Frost argue that contemporary economic, environmental, geopolitical, and technological developments demand new accounts of nature, agency, and social and political relationships; modes of inquiry that privilege consciousness and subjectivity are not adequate to the task. New materialist philosophies are needed to do justice to the complexities of twenty-first-century biopolitics and political economy, because they raise fundamental questions about the place of embodied humans in a material world and the ways that we produce, reproduce, and consume our material environment. Contributors Sara Ahmed Jane Bennett Rosi Braidotti Pheng Cheah Rey Chow William E. Connolly Diana Coole Jason Edwards Samantha Frost Elizabeth Grosz Sonia Kruks Melissa A. Orlie. (shrink)

This book offers a major reassessment of Leibniz's metaphysics. Christia Mercer has exposed the underlying doctrines of Leibniz's philosophy. By analysing Leibniz's early works she demonstrates that the metaphysics of pre-established harmony developed many years earlier than previously believed and for reasons which have not been understood. As a result of this analysis she has unearthed a philosophical school that Leibniz scholars have not recognized. A much deeper understanding of some of Leibniz's key doctrines emerges. Moreover, since the Leibniz (...) that is revealed here does not fit neatly into the standard accounts of the history of philosophy and science, Christia Mercer's study will prompt scholars to reconsider their basic assumptions about early modern philosophy and science. (shrink)

Robert Frost is by far the most celebrated major American poet of the twentieth century. In part, this is because his poetry seems, on the surface, to be so accessible, even homey. But Frost was not just a powerful writer of popular lyric and narrative verse, argues Peter J. Stanlis in this major contribution to American literary study and philosophy. Rather, his work is deeply rooted in a complex philosophical dualism that opposes both idealistic monism, centered in spirit, (...) and scientific positivism, which posits that the universe can be understood as nothing but matter. In _Robert Frost: The Poet as Philosopher,_ Stanlis shows how Frost’s philosophical dualism of spirit and matter is perceived through metaphors and applied to science, religion, art, education, and society. He further argues that Frost’s dualism provides a critique of the monistic forces that were instrumental in the triumph of twentieth-century totalitarianism. Thoroughly informed by his twenty-three year friendship and correspondence with Frost, Stanlis’s landmark volume is the first attempt to deal with the poet’s philosophy in a systematic manner. It will appeal not only to fans of Frost but to all who understand poetry as a form of revelation for understanding human nature. (shrink)

Robert Frost is by far the most celebrated major American poet of the twentieth century. In part, this is because his poetry seems, on the surface, to be so accessible, even homey. But Frost was not just a powerful writer of popular lyric and narrative verse, argues Peter J. Stanlis in this major contribution to American literary study and philosophy. Rather, his work is deeply rooted in a complex philosophical dualism that opposes both idealistic monism, centered in spirit, (...) and scientific positivism, which posits that the universe can be understood as nothing but matter. In _Robert Frost: The Poet as Philosopher_, Stanlis shows how Frost’s philosophical dualism of spirit and matter is perceived through metaphors and applied to science, religion, art, education, and society. He further argues that Frost’s dualism provides a critique of the monistic forces that were instrumental in the triumph of twentieth-century totalitarianism. Thoroughly informed by his twenty-three year friendship and correspondence with Frost, Stanlis's landmark volume is the first attempt to deal with the poet’s philosophy in a systematic manner. It will appeal not only to fans of Frost but to all who understand poetry as a form of revelation for understanding human nature. (shrink)

La educación en línea forzada por la pandemia del 2020, puede ser un trampolín de oportunidades para la inclusión de personas con discapacidad visual gracias a las tecnologías de asistencia; o bien, las puede dejar fuera por el analfabetismo que existe en la sociedad con respecto a dónde encontrar y cómo usar dichas tecnologías de asistencia para favorecer la inclusión de este colectivo. Por ello, es de vital importancia implementar tecnologías de asistencia y metodologías didácticas innovadoras, que permitan aprendizajes significativos (...) y generen motivación en los estudiantes con discapacidad visual para participar de manera más proactiva. El juego y la formación aleatoria de equipos que permiten las plataformas potencializa la capacidad adaptativa de estos estudiantes en la comunidad educativa, al tiempo que se ejerce el derecho a la accesibilidad mediante la información en múltiples formatos de diseño universal para el aprendizaje. En este ensayo la autora, quien conduce una sala tiflotécnica en una universidad politécnica, discute el tipo de tecnologías digitales que coadyuvan a eliminar barreras al aprendizaje de personas con discapacidad visual, colectivo al que ella misma pertenece, con el propósito que se puedan generar el tipo de escenarios educativos que requieren. (shrink)

Why awaken the soul to justice if the only result can be to increase awareness of the futility of aspiring to justice in the world? Zwicky documents challenges to the belief that teaching philosophy will result in a fairer polity and suggests that perception of being’s integrity sustains pursuit of philosophy as a way of life.

Iris Murdoch was a philosopher and novelist who wrote extensively on the themes of love, goodness, religion, and morality. In this article, we explore her notion of ‘moral vision’; the idea that morality is not just about how we act and make choices, but how we see the world in a much broader sense.

I argue that the study of variability rather than invariance should head the reading research agenda, and that strong claims of orthographic are unwarranted. I also expand briefly on Frost's assertion that an efficient orthography must represent sound and meaning, by considering writing systems as dual-purpose devices that must provide decipherability for novice readers and automatizability for the expert.

Despite what you have heard over the years, the famous evil deceiver argument in Meditation One is not original to Descartes. Early modern meditators often struggle with deceptive demons. The author of the Meditations is merely giving a new spin to a common rhetorical device. Equally surprising is the fact that Descartes’ epistemological rendering of the demon trope is probably inspired by a Spanish nun, Teresa of Ávila, whose works have been ignored by historians of philosophy, although they were a (...) global phenomenon during Descartes’ formative years. In this paper, I first answer the obvious question as to why previous early modernists have missed something so important as the fact that Descartes’ most famous publication relies on a well-established genre and that his deceiver argument bears a striking similarity to ideas in Teresa’s final work, El Castillo Interior? I discuss the meditative tradition at the end of which Descartes’ Meditations stands, present evidence to support the claim that Descartes was familiar with Teresa’s proposals, contrast their meditative goals, and make a point-by-point comparison between the meditative steps in Teresa’s Interior Castle and those in Descartes’ Meditations which constitute their common deceiver strategy. My conclusion makes a case for a broader and more inclusive history of philosophy. (shrink)

Christia Mercer’s magnum opus, Leibniz’s Metaphysics: Its Origin and Development, long awaited, is finally about to appear from Cambridge University Press. It was well worth the wait. The book is impressive in the wealth of detailed argumentation and historical background that fills the work. Mercer’s general thesis is still that Leibniz’s mature thought emerges from a view that Leibniz shares with his teachers, an eclectic philosophy that sees truth lurking in many places, and that he sees the task of (...) the philosopher as mining the past for its truths, and showing how the different philosophies can be made consistent with one another and made into a single system. As in her earlier work, the resolution of the conflict between Aristotelianism and the new mechanism is important. But Mercer also claims to have discovered something else utterly unexpected, a strong Platonistic strain in seventeenth-century German thought. While Aristotelianism and mechanism may have dominated thought about the physical world, Mercer has discovered strongly Platonistic strains in the conception of God and the soul, both in the young Leibniz and in his teachers. Even more surprising, Mercer argues that the main tenets of Leibniz’s mature thought emerged out of this mixture, and did so as early as 1670 and 1671. In particular, she argues that both the pre-established harmony and the idealism characteristic of his mature thought emerged in these years, as the result of an attempt to harmonize different elements of Aristotelian, Platonic, and mechanist philosophies, in response to particular problems in philosophy, theology, and even physics that gripped him at that time. If she is right, this will fundamentally alter our view of Leibniz. (shrink)

while no one was looking, contextualism replaced rational reconstructionism as the dominant methodology among English-speaking early modern historians of philosophy. In this paper, I expose the contours of this silent revolution, show that rational reconstructionism is a thing of the past among early modern historians, and examine the current state of early modern scholarship.1 As the contextualist revolution has increasingly widened our perspective and revealed the period’s philosophical diversity, it has encouraged early modernists to develop new skills and expertise. I (...) propose here that current early modern historians are devoted to maximize... (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to properly situate and contrast McDowell’s and Sellars’ views on intuitional content and relate them to their corresponding views on the myth of the Given. Although McDowell’s and Sellars’ views on what McDowell calls ‘intuitional’ content seem at first strikingly similar, at a deeper level they are radically different. It will be suggested that this divergence is intimately related to their different understanding of what the myth of the Given consists in and how it (...) should be best avoided. It will also be argued that certain McDowell-inspired objections against the viability of the Sellarsian concept of the Categorial Given actually misconstrue the place of this notion in Sellars’ system. If the myth of the Categorial Given can be considered as a genuine version of the Myth then McDowell’s account of intuitional content does indeed fall prey to it. I shall further argue that a McDowell-inspired objection against Sellars to the effect that his account of proper sensibles compromises the openness of intuitional content to the world ultimately fails, and, finally, I shall suggest that Sellars’ views on proper sensibles and intuitional content provide a more promising account of the way our thought and experience can be rationally open to the world itself than McDowell’s position. (shrink)

In this article, it is argued that Sellars’ view of normativity is the key for a proper resolution of the debate between normativism and anti-normativism, as the latter is described in Turner’s recent book Explaining the Normative. Drawing on an early Sellarsian article , I suggest that both normativism and anti-normativism are ultimately unsatisfactory positions and for the same reason: due to their failure to draw a distinction between causal or explanatory reducibility and logical or conceptual reducibility of the normative (...) to the non-normative. (shrink)

In this article, I investigate the possibility of reconciling a radically disenchanted scientific naturalism in ontology with the unconditional and non-instrumental character of the moral point of view. My point of departure will be Sellars’s philosophy, which attempts to satisfy both those, seemingly unreconcilable, demands at once. I shall argue that there is a tension between those two demands that finds expression both at the theoretical and practical level, and which is not adequately resolved from a strictly Sellarsian perspective. I (...) will then develop a neo-Sellarsian framework, close to the spirit—if not the letter—of Sellars’s philosophy, which, as I will suggest, can live up to this task. This solution depends on insisting on both the semantic irreducibility and explanatory reducibility of moral normativity to non-normative facts, while simultaneously acknowledging that those two dimensions mutually presuppose and support on another, and on recognizing that the instrumental facets of theoretical-scientific rationality need not imply a coercive attitude toward nature, ourselves, and others. (shrink)

In a recent article Sachs suggests that the concept of somatic intentionality is the key to understanding how the conceptual order is externally constrained by something outside itself which is nonetheless fully intentional in nature. Sachs claims that his proposal fares better than Sellars’ view on the issue of how our experience can so much as be about objective reality. In this paper, I shall argue that this is not the case because Sellars’ view is in crucial respects misdescribed. Sachs (...) suggests that Sellars’ view is problematic because 1) conceptual intentionality cannot objectively constrain the conceptual order due to its essential discursive form, and 2) a non-intentional consciousness cannot provide an objective worldly constraint on conceptual intentionality because it is not world-directed. However neither of these points succeeds in capturing Sellars’ actual position. Further I will suggest the deepest problem which phenomenological views of a Merleau-Pontyan stripe face in the.. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to examine Sellars’s envisaged stereoscopic fusion between the manifest and the scientific image in regard to the central issue of the being of the normative. I shall propose that the best way to make sense of the notion of the Sellarsian ‘stereoscopic fusion’ is to hold both that the core function of normative discourse is to point toward something that does not exist, but ought to exist, namely a regulative ideal and that the raison (...) d’être of normatively infused items is for them to be materially realized at the level of non-normative objects and processes. On this view, the effected elimination of the normative level itself in the Sellarsian ‘synoptic vision’ can be best understood in terms of the concrete realization of what I call ‘generalized absorbed skillful coping,’ that is, our ability for absorbed skillful coping within our—and indeed, in any possible—environment. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is threefold: First, I provide a framework – based on Sellars' distinction between the manifest and the scientific image – for illuminating the distinction between liberal and ‘orthodox’ scientific naturalism. Second, I level a series of objections against expanded liberal naturalism and its core commitment to the autonomy of manifest-image explanations. Further, I present a view which combines liberal and scientific naturalism, albeit construed in resolutely non-representationalist terms. Finally, I attempt to distinguish my own (Sellars- (...) and Peirce-inspired) position from the very similar pragmatic liberal naturalist view, that of Huw Price. I do this by suggesting that a ‘monistic’ Peircian evolutionary naturalism which accepts the Sellarsian scientia mensura principle not only is consistent with ungrudging recognition of the irreducibility of normative facts and the plurality of our discursive practices, but also shows how this irreducibility, by being understood in terms of an evolution-by-selection of a population of perceptual-practical-inferential habits, can be at the same time considered as naturalistically explicable – without any appeal to an expanded manifest-image conception of nature. (shrink)

This article examines Wilfrid Sellars's views on the epistemic status of philosophical propositions. It suggests that according to Sellars philosophical propositions are normative and practically oriented. They do not form a theory for the description of reality; their function is, rather, that of motivating actions which aim at changing reality. The article argues that the role of philosophical propositions can be illuminated if they are understood as a special kind of (proposed) “material” rules of inference, provided that the latter are (...) construed as being firmly entrenched in practice. To this end, a distinction between “theoretical” and “practical” anomalies is drawn to better elucidate—and in some cases criticize and further expand—Sellars's position on the relation between the theoretical and practical dimensions of philosophical activity. In this connection, the Weberian notion of the “disenchantment of the world” is used to throw light on the relation between these two dimensions. (shrink)