*Weitere Angaben Inhalt: Mit der Frage nach der Zuständigkeit der eigenen Nase in Religionsangelegenheiten beginnt diese ungewöhnliche Reise in Erfahrungsbereiche, die von Theologen bislang eher gemieden wurden. Nicht der Inhalt von Glaubensbekenntnissen ist Gegenstand des Interesses, sondern der Tonfall, in dem sie vorgetragen werden. Von bestimmten Kirchengerüchen geht die Rede, von Körperhaltungen beim Gottesdienst, von Kindheitserinnerungen und vom Läuten der Glocken. Dabei stellt sich heraus, dass mit dem abgenützten Etikett des Religiösen die Sinnenfälligkeit des Erlebten nur sehr oberflächlich bezeichnet wird.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNGIn der gegenwärtigen theologischen Debatte über das zukünftige Schicksal des Individuums ist der Gerichtsgedanke mit seinem doppelten Ausgang, der zur Seligkeit oder zur Verdammnis führt, sehr umstritten. Darin zeigt sich, dass die Funktion eschatologischer Aussagen undeutlich ist. Der Beitrag unternimmt den Versuch, im Durchgang durch die protestantische Lehrtradition Funktion und Bedeutung eschatologischer Aussagen für das Verständnis des christlichen Glaubens herauszuarbeiten. Die Bedeutung von Himmel und Hölle liegt nicht in einer Beschreibung einer objektiven Realität, sondern in der Selbstbeschreibung des Glaubens als (...) einem unableitbaren Geschehen des Sich-Verständlich-Werdens des Menschen in der Geschichte.SUMMARYIn contemporary theological debates on the future destiny of the individual, the image of the Last Judgement with its twofold outcome of either leading to eternal bliss or to damnation is highly controversial. This calls for new reflection on the function of eschatological statements. This paper offers an elaboration of the function and meaning of eschatological statements for the understanding of the Christian faith by going through the protestant doctrinal tradition. The meaning of heaven and hell, it is argued, is not to be found in a description of an objective reality but in the self-description of faith as a contingent self-understanding of human being in history. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 37.1 (2003) 13-31 [Access article in PDF] A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of Computer Art Holle Humphries Before the computer is accepted unquestioningly as a legitimate artistic medium, some of the challenging aesthetic and philosophical issues raised by [computer art] must be solved. The most haunting questions concern the impact of the technology on the artist, the creative process, and the nature (...) of art. 1How might we lead students in an exploration of the philosophical issues regarding art created with a computer? The most important step is first to guide them in exploring ontological concepts and questions asked about the nature of art and computer art, before investigating related issues of epistemology, value, and criticism. Students need to understand the nature of their art tool and medium of choice. Therefore, it becomes a matter of concern to discover that when discussing and writing about computer art, students sometimes use such terms interchangeably as "computer art" and "computer-generated art," when they are not synonymous, and talk about "virtual reality" as though engaging in any activity that involves a computer constitutes experiencing one. It is clear that this problem arises because many have not paused to examine the nature of computer art within the context of the process and product of art, and the subtle nuances regarding what might distinguish each from other human enterprise. To help clarify their thinking, we might use the foundation of art theory and the strategy of philosophical inquiry, implemented by adopting questioning strategies, to guide students through an exploration of the ontological nature of computer art. This can begin by launching the question: "What is the nature of art — or computer art?" Philosophy of Art: "What is the Nature of Art?" Many philosophers have attempted to describe or define the nature of art formulated in a theory of art. A theory of art attempts to specify where the essence of art is thought to reside, or what exactly art's essence is. [End Page 13]The imitation theory, initiated in the 5th century B.C. by Plato, held that to be a work of art, an object must mirror reality. 2 As this theory placed the essence of art in the objective properties of the art work itself, we consider the imitation theory to be object-centered or objective in nature. Similarly, with his formalist theory of art, Clive Bell claimed that the essence of art lies in the object — within the structural design properties of a work of art. To qualify as a work of art, an object must exhibit significant form. Significant form consists of certain formal properties such as the art elements of lines and color combined in a particular way according to art principles, all used to create certain forms and relations of forms. 3The expression theories of art shifted attention to the artist and audience and thus are considered subject centered, or subjective, bound up in notions of the experience of creation by the artist and/or the response of the audience. Benedetto Croce asserted that a work of art resides in the mind of the artist. An artist must experience an intuition, and it is this mental process that constitutes art, not the object which the artist might create thereafter. 4 Robin Collingwood claimed that art is an exploration, clarification, and expression of an artist's emotion, made clear to an audience through a medium. 5 Leo Tolstoy believed that art should be a vehicle by which the emotion experienced by the artist at the time of creation is transmitted to an audience, so that the audience can experience that emotion as well. 6Morris Weitz asserted that none of these theories capture an essence of art because they are either too broad, too narrow, or else are circular. He claimed that the concept of art cannot be limited to one essence delimited in a definition. Weitz suggested that we must instead look at what theories of art have to say is important about art so that we know what to... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 37.1 (2003) 13-31 [Access article in PDF] A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of Computer Art Holle Humphries Before the computer is accepted unquestioningly as a legitimate artistic medium, some of the challenging aesthetic and philosophical issues raised by [computer art] must be solved. The most haunting questions concern the impact of the technology on the artist, the creative process, and the nature (...) of art. 1How might we lead students in an exploration of the philosophical issues regarding art created with a computer? The most important step is first to guide them in exploring ontological concepts and questions asked about the nature of art and computer art, before investigating related issues of epistemology, value, and criticism. Students need to understand the nature of their art tool and medium of choice. Therefore, it becomes a matter of concern to discover that when discussing and writing about computer art, students sometimes use such terms interchangeably as "computer art" and "computer-generated art," when they are not synonymous, and talk about "virtual reality" as though engaging in any activity that involves a computer constitutes experiencing one. It is clear that this problem arises because many have not paused to examine the nature of computer art within the context of the process and product of art, and the subtle nuances regarding what might distinguish each from other human enterprise. To help clarify their thinking, we might use the foundation of art theory and the strategy of philosophical inquiry, implemented by adopting questioning strategies, to guide students through an exploration of the ontological nature of computer art. This can begin by launching the question: "What is the nature of art — or computer art?" Philosophy of Art: "What is the Nature of Art?" Many philosophers have attempted to describe or define the nature of art formulated in a theory of art. A theory of art attempts to specify where the essence of art is thought to reside, or what exactly art's essence is. [End Page 13]The imitation theory, initiated in the 5th century B.C. by Plato, held that to be a work of art, an object must mirror reality. 2 As this theory placed the essence of art in the objective properties of the art work itself, we consider the imitation theory to be object-centered or objective in nature. Similarly, with his formalist theory of art, Clive Bell claimed that the essence of art lies in the object — within the structural design properties of a work of art. To qualify as a work of art, an object must exhibit significant form. Significant form consists of certain formal properties such as the art elements of lines and color combined in a particular way according to art principles, all used to create certain forms and relations of forms. 3The expression theories of art shifted attention to the artist and audience and thus are considered subject centered, or subjective, bound up in notions of the experience of creation by the artist and/or the response of the audience. Benedetto Croce asserted that a work of art resides in the mind of the artist. An artist must experience an intuition, and it is this mental process that constitutes art, not the object which the artist might create thereafter. 4 Robin Collingwood claimed that art is an exploration, clarification, and expression of an artist's emotion, made clear to an audience through a medium. 5 Leo Tolstoy believed that art should be a vehicle by which the emotion experienced by the artist at the time of creation is transmitted to an audience, so that the audience can experience that emotion as well. 6Morris Weitz asserted that none of these theories capture an essence of art because they are either too broad, too narrow, or else are circular. He claimed that the concept of art cannot be limited to one essence delimited in a definition. Weitz suggested that we must instead look at what theories of art have to say is important about art so that we know what to... (shrink)

Drawing on newspaper articles, ad campaigns, declassified government archives, and old movies, Ken Hollings shows the culture of postwar America and its dream of limitless technological and human development.

In the history of mathematics, the algebraic theory of semigroups is a relative new-comer, with the theory proper developing only in the second half of the twentieth century. Before this, however, much groundwork was laid by researchers arriving at the study of semigroups from the directions of both group and ring theory. In this paper, we will trace some major strands in the early development of the algebraic theory of semigroups. We will begin with the aspects of the theory which (...) were directly inspired by, and were analogous to, existing results for both groups and rings, before moving on to consider the first independent theorems on semigroups: theorems with no group or ring analogues. (shrink)

Mirror-touch synaesthesia is a condition where observing touch to another’s body induces a subjective tactile sensation on the synaesthetes body. The present study explores which characteristics of the inducing stimulus modulate the synaesthetic touch experience. Fourteen mirror-touch synaesthetes watched videos depicting a touch event while indicating whether the video induced a tactile sensation, on which side of their body they felt this sensation and the intensity of the experienced sensation. Results indicate that the synaesthetes experience stronger tactile sensations when observing (...) touch to real bodies, whereas observing touch to dummy bodies, pictures of bodies and disconnected dummy body parts elicited weaker sensations. These results suggest that mirror-touch synaesthesia is not entirely bottom-up driven, but top-down information, such as knowledge about real and dummy body parts, also modulate the intensity of the experience. (shrink)

This book examines the epistemic function of perception and the relation between language and conceptual thought, and provides new ways of conceptualizing the Buddhist defense of the reflexivity thesis of consciousness: namely, that each cognitive event is to be understood as involving a pre-reflective implicit awareness of its own occurrence.

Anger, indignation, guilt, rumination, victim compensation, and perpetrator punishment are considered primary responses associated with justice sensitivity. However, injustice and high JS may predispose to further responses. We had N = 293 adults rate their JS, 17 potential responses toward 12 unjust scenarios from the victim’s, observer’s, beneficiary’s, and perpetrator’s perspectives, and several control variables. Unjust situations generally elicited many affective, cognitive, and behavioral responses. JS generally predisposed to strong affective responses toward injustice, including sadness, pity, disappointment, and helplessness. It (...) impaired trivialization, victim-blaming, or justification, which may otherwise help cope with injustice. It predisposed to conflict solutions and victim compensation. Particularly victim and beneficiary JS had stronger effects in unjust situations from the corresponding perspective. These findings add to a better understanding of the main and interaction effects of unjust situations from different perspectives and the JS facets, differences between the JS facets, as well as the links between JS and behavior and well-being. (shrink)

To what extent are visual fantasies constrained by our perceptual experience of the real world? Our study exploits the fact that people’s knowledge of the appearance of individuals from the early 20th Century derives predominantly from viewing black-and-white media images. An initial experiment shows that mental imagery for individuals from this period are experienced as significantly less colourful than imagery for individuals from the era of colour media. A second experiment manipulated whether participants were instructed to explicitly imagine using colour (...) or not . Results show that colour manipulation only influences imagery for black-and-white era individuals, with no comparable effect on imagery for colour era individuals. This finding is replicated in a third experiment that includes an additional control condition of imagining generic characters . Again, only imagery for black-and-white era individuals is affected by the colour manipulation. Overall these results provide evidence for long-term perceptual specificity effects in mental imagery. We argue that visual fantasies can be constrained by surface features of underlying representations in memory, even when imagining something we have never directly perceived. (shrink)

The World Health Organization has been subjected to serious criticism for its handling of the COVID-19 virus, specifically that it failed to act decisively to stop the global outbreak and tha...

In the early years of the twentieth century, the so-called ‘postulate analysis’—the study of systems of axioms for mathematical objects for their own sake—was regarded by some as a vital part of the efforts to understand those objects. I consider the place of postulate analysis within early twentieth-century mathematics by focusing on the example of a group: I outline the axiomatic studies to which groups were subjected at this time and consider the changing attitudes towards such investigations.

The classic programme of conceptual engineering (Cappelen, Herman. 2018. Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Eklund, Matti. 2021. “Conceptual Engineering.” In The Routledge Handbook of Social and Political Philosophy of Language, edited by Justin Khoo, and Rachel Sterken, 15–30. London: Routledge) envisages a two-stage ameliorating process. First, we assess ‘F’ and determine what the term should express. Second, we bring it about that ‘F’ expresses what it should express. The second stage gives rise to a (...) practical challenge: the implementation challenge. Engineering advocates need to explain by what means they can implement specific conceptual changes in the natural language shared by a community – a feat Herman Cappelen (2018. Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020; “Conceptual Engineering: The Master Argument.” In Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, edited by Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen, and David Plunkett, 132–151. Oxford: Oxford University Press) argues to be beyond our understanding and control both on an externalist and on an internalist meta-semantics. I devise a new answer to the implementation challenge. Enlisting the influential theory of social norms by Cristina Bicchieri, I argue that engineering social norms in Bicchieri’s technical sense amounts to an effective, specific, and feasible means to implement specific conceptual change, at least on internalist premises. I also argue that Bicchieri’s social norms are an essential addition to the more familiar conventions and moral norms when it comes to conceptual engineering. (shrink)

How should you decide what to do when you’re uncertain about basic normative principles? A natural suggestion is to follow some "second-order:" norm: e.g., obey the most probable norm or maximize expected choiceworthiness. But what if you’re uncertain about second-order norms too—must you then invoke some third-order norm? If so, any norm-guided response to normative uncertainty appears doomed to a vicious regress. This paper aims to rescue second-order norms from the threat of regress. I first elaborate and defend the claim (...) some philosophers have made that the regress problem forces us to accept normative externalism, the view that at least one norm is incumbent on all agents regardless of their normative beliefs. But, I then argue, we need not accept externalism about first-order norms, thus closing off any question of how agents should respond to normative uncertainty. Rather, we can head off the threat of regress by ascribing external force to a single second-order norm: the enkratic principle. (shrink)

This paper maps out various options for thinking about two issues: the structural relationship between practical wisdom and the moral virtues, and the various functions of practical wisdom. With the help of a case study of the virtue of honesty, three main concerns are raised for what I call the Standard Model of practical wisdom. Two other models, the Socratic Model and the Fragmentation Model, are also critically evaluated. I end by taking seriously an eliminativist approach according to which the (...) trait of practical wisdom does not exist. (shrink)

This article examines the methodology of a core branch of contemporary political theory or philosophy: “analytic” political theory. After distinguishing political theory from related fields, such as political science, moral philosophy, and legal theory, the article discusses the analysis of political concepts. It then turns to the notions of principles and theories, as distinct from concepts, and reviews the methods of assessing such principles and theories, for the purpose of justifying or criticizing them. Finally, it looks at a recent debate (...) on how abstract and idealized political theory should be, and assesses the significance of disagreement in political theory. The discussion is carried out from an angle inspired by the philosophy of science. (shrink)

The paper presents the donkey's bray in Robert Bresson's film (F 1966) that disturbs the montage insistently as an open sound object and puts it in the context of bioacoustics. The donkey's hee-haw diversifies noise in such a way that the borderline between object and creature becomes permeable. Bresson's passion proves to be an experiment to perceive the acoustic channels of communication as transformers of animals, spaces and that kind of transmission that researchers informed by cybernetics call »language«.

Humean Laws for Human Agents presents cutting-edge research by leading experts on the Humean account of laws, chance, possibility, and necessity. A central question in metaphysics and philosophy of science is: What are laws of nature? Humeans hold that laws are not sui generis metaphysical entities but merely particularly effective summaries of what actually happens. The most discussed recent work on Humeanism emphasizes the laws' usefulness for limited agents and uses pragmatic considerations to address fundamental and long-standing problems. The current (...) volume develops and critically examines pragmatic Humean accounts, with innovative new work on the epistemology of laws and chance, the problem of induction, counterfactuals, special science laws, and a Humean account of essence. Taken together, the papers provide a roadmap for developing pragmatic Humeanism and connate views, setting the agenda for future research. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung: Seit Langem sieht die Welt sich wieder einer globalen pandemischen Bedrohung ausgesetzt, die nicht nur wissenschaftlich, wirtschaftlich, politisch und gesellschaftlich, sondern auch künstlerisch zu bewältigen versucht wird. Dabei dominieren vor allem zwei visuelle Phänomene die Bildwelten der journalistischen und sozialen Medien: das Bild der Maske und das Bild des Virus selbst. Beide Bilder sind insbesondere in der Verbindung mit epi- und pandemischer Erfahrung bereits hoch aufgeladen. Die Sichtbarkeit der Maske und die Sichtbarmachung des Virus verweisen auf ihre komplexen historischen (...) Dimensionen und rufen philosophisch-ethische Fragen auf. Durch eine Gegenüberstellung von künstlerischen Zeugnissen historischer und gegenwärtiger Seuchenerfahrung werden im vorliegenden Beitrag historisch tradierte Muster von narrativen und visuellen Seuchendarstellungen, die auch den gegenwärtigen Pandemiediskurs bestimmen, herausgearbeitet und kritisch hinterfragt. Dabei wird gefragt, wie Kunst und Literatur zu einer rhetorischen und metaphorischen Deeskalation aktueller und zukünftiger pandemischer Krisendiskurse beitragen und damit auch eine der Ästhetik inhärente Ethik aufzeigen können. (shrink)

We consider the investigation of the embedding of semigroups in groups, a problem which spans the early-twentieth-century development of abstract algebra. Although this is a simple problem to state, it has proved rather harder to solve, and its apparent simplicity caused some of its would-be solvers to go awry. We begin with the analogous problem for rings, as dealt with by Ernst Steinitz, B. L. van der Waerden and Øystein Ore. After disposing of A. K. Sushkevich’s erroneous contribution in this (...) area, we present A. I. Maltsev’s example of a cancellative semigroup which may not be embedded in a group, which showed for the first time that such an embedding is not possible in general. We then look at the various conditions that were derived for such an embedding to take place: the sufficient conditions of Paul Dubreil and others, and the necessary and sufficient conditions obtained by A. I. Maltsev, Vlastimil Pták and Joachim Lambek. We conclude with some comments on the place of this problem within the theory of semigroups, and also within abstract algebra more generally. (shrink)

Der Ruf des Esels als offenes Klangobjekt in Robert Bressons Film Au hazard Balthazar (F 1966), der die Bild-Montage insistierend stört, wird in diesem Beitrag in den Kontext der Bioakustik gestellt. Am JA des Esels differenzieren sich Geräusche medial so aus, dass die Grenze zwischen Ding und Kreatur durchlässig wird. Bressons Passion erweist sich damit als Experiment, die akustischen Kanäle der Kommunikation als Transformatoren von Lebewesen, Räumen und jener Übertragung wahrzunehmen, die kybernetisch informierten Tierforschern Sprache heißt. The paper presents the (...) donkey's bray in Robert Bresson's film (F 1966) that disturbs the montage insistently as an open sound object and puts it in the context of bioacoustics. The donkey's hee-haw diversifies noise in such a way that the borderline between object and creature becomes permeable. Bresson's passion proves to be an experiment to perceive the acoustic channels of communication as transformers of animals, spaces and that kind of transmission that researchers informed by cybernetics call »language«. (shrink)

Between December 1855 and March 1856, a public dispute raged, in British national newspapers and locally published pamphlets, between two teachers at the University of Oxford: the mathematical lecturer Francis Ashpitel and Bartholomew Price, the professor of natural philosophy. The starting point for these exchanges was the particularly poor results that had come out of the final mathematics examinations in Oxford that December. Ashpitel, as one of the examiners, stood accused of setting questions that were too difficult for the ordinary (...) student, with the consequence that, in Price’s view, further mathematical study in Oxford – never as robust as in Cambridge – would be discouraged. We examine this short-lived affair, and use it not only to gain insight into the status of mathematical study in Oxford in the mid-nineteenth century, but also to point towards the increasing importance of competitive examinations in British public life at that time. (shrink)