Stephens and Grahamset themselves an apparently modest task, to understand why people who experience alien voices and inserted thoughts do not believe that they themselves are the source of these experiences. However, it soon becomes clear that there are many connected issues here. In eight short chapters, they address the phenomenology and ontology of consciousness, the phenomenology of alien voices, inserted thoughts, obsessive-compulsive thoughts and feelings, and other cases of unusual experience often associated with psychopathology, including brief discussion of multiple (...) personality disorder. They survey some of the main empirical explanations of the phenomenology, set out the shortcomings of these theories, and end by proposing their own schematic account. (shrink)
Within child and adolescent psychiatry, there are a number of potential dilemmas pertaining to diagnosis, treatment, the protection of the child, as well as the child's own developing intelligence and moral judgement. Diagnostic Dilemmas in Child and Adolescent Psychiatry is the first in the IPPP series to explore this highly complex topic.
An important way to become self-deceived, omitted by Mele, is by intentionally ignoring and avoiding the contemplation of evidence one has for an upsetting conclusion, knowing full well that one is giving priority to one's present peace of mind over the search for truth. Such intentional self-deception may be especially hard to observe scientifically.
J’explore de façon critique la supposition du DSM et de théoriciens tels que Wakefield et Gert selon laquelle les troubles mentaux doivent être attribués à un individu plutôt qu’à un groupe de personnes. Cette supposition est particulièrement problématique en pédopsychiatrie où le système familial est très souvent au centre de l’attention clinique. Il y a bien sûr des éléments de preuve substantiels indiquant que certains troubles mentaux des individus sont causés par leurs relations avec les autres et que leur guérison (...) est grandement facilitée en traitant le groupe, tel que la famille, comme un tout. Malgré cela, il y a eu beaucoup moins de travail conceptuel visant à définir ce que cela pourrait être pour un couple, une famille ou un autre groupe que de se voir attribuer un trouble mental. Pour traiter de cette question, j’utilise un débat entre Wakefield et Murphy et Woolfolk sur la question de savoir s’il fait partie du concept de trouble mental que celui-ci soit causé par une dysfonction interne de la personne. Je discute aussi de la proposition faite par Bolton d’abandonner complètement le concept de trouble mental et d’utiliser plutôt le concept, plus large, de problème de santé mentale. Je soutiens qu’en fin de compte le caractère individuel des troubles mentaux ne constitue pas une vérité conceptuelle a priori, et qu’il faut faire intervenir des considérations pragmatiques pour décider s’il est utile de nous limiter à une telle définition ou si nous pourrions être mieux servis par une définition plus extensive. Je fais le lien avec le pragmatisme et je soutiens qu’une approche pluraliste non réductive est particulièrement appropriée en pédopsychiatrie.I critically explore the assumption of the DSM and theorists such as Wakefield and Gert that mental disorder must be attributed to an individual rather than a group of people. This assumption is especially problematic in child and adolescent psychiatry where very often the focus of clinical attention is the family system. There is of course substantial evidence that some mental disorders of individuals are caused by their relationships with other people and that their recovery is greatly facilitated by treating the group, such as a family, as a whole. However, there has been much less conceptual work on defining what it might be for a couple, family or other group to itself be attributed a mental disorder. To address this issue, I employ a debate between Wakefield , Murphy and Woolfolk on whether it is part of the concept of a mental disorder that it is caused by an internal malfunction of a person. I also discuss the proposal of Bolton that we do away with the concept of mental disorder altogether and instead use a broader concept of mental health problem. I argue that ultimately it is not an a priori conceptual truth that mental disorders are individual, and we need to bring in pragmatic considerations to decide whether it is helpful to restrict ourselves to such a definition or whether we could be better served by a more expansive definition. I link this to the philosophical view of pragmatism and argue that a pluralistic nonreductive approach is especially appropriate in child and adolescent psychiatry. (shrink)
Gold & Stoljar's target article is important because it shows the limitations of neurobiological theories of the mind more powerfully than previous philosophical criticisms, especially those that focus on the subjective nature of experience and those that use considerations from philosophy of language to argue for the holism of the mental. They use less controversial assumptions and clearer arguments, the conclusions of which are applicable to the whole of neuroscience. Their conclusions can be applied to psychiatry to argue that, contrary (...) to many researchers' assumptions, the approaches to both understanding and treating mental disorders must be interdisciplinary. (shrink)
Exactly when Philosophy of Psychiatry started as a subfield of Philosophy is hard to say. There are several different estimates of how old psychiatry itself is, from one hundred to three hundred years, and of course there has been discussion and treatment of mental illness for at least a couple of thousand years. A host of issues which could count as belonging to the field have been discussed just within the last hundred years. For instance, a large literature on the (...) philosophy of psychoanalysis dates back to the beginning of the century, and in the last thirty years there has been discussion of amnesia and multiple personality in the philosophy of mind, bioethical debate about involuntary hospitalization and the ability of the mentally ill to give informed consent to drug trials, and recent continental philosophy has shown much interest in madness, civilization, capitalism and schizophrenia. However, I suggest that Philosophy of Psychiatry reached a sense of itself as a separate field only in the 1990s. In this time, it has gained its own association, journal, and a book series with a prestigious press. I refer to the American Association for Philosophy and Psychiatry, the associated journal, Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, and the MIT Press series, Philosophical Psychopathology: Disorders of Mind, edited by Owen Flanagan and George Graham. Jennifer Radden's Divided Minds and Successive Selves is the first book in that series. (shrink)
There is much to admire in Michelle Ciurria’s provocative approach to ascribing moral responsibility. Her work is detailed and spells out explicitly her methodological assumptions. In this commentary, my main focus is on the methodological assumptions she makes. Ciurria’s arguments often depend on our reactions to actual cases and thought experiments. She takes it for granted that we need a theory that matches certain of our intuitions. This is not an unreasonable way to proceed. We definitely need a good reason (...) if we are going to adopt a theory that does not fit with well-established moral intuitions. Nevertheless, we need to be cautious in using these cases to guide our theory choice, especially when our .. (shrink)
Lou Marinoff's Philosophical Practice outlines the rise of the new profession of philosophical practice and argues that philosophy should aim to be more applicable to issues people face in their everyday lives. Marinoff is the President of the American Philosophical Practitioners Association, and author of Plato Not Prozac, and he has arguably managed to draw more attention to philosophical counseling than any other person in America.