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Christian Piller [41]Christian Johannes Piller [1]
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Christian Piller
University of York
  1.  93
    Normative Practical Reasoning.Christian Piller - 2001 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):175 - 216.
    Practical reasoning is a process of reasoning that concludes in an intention. One example is reasoning from intending an end to intending what you believe is a necessary means: 'I will leave the next buoy to port; in order to do that I must tack; so I'll tack', where the first and third sentences express intentions and the second sentence a belief. This sort of practical reasoning is supported by a valid logical derivation, and therefore seems uncontrovertible. A more contentious (...)
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  2.  37
    Treating Broome Fairly.Christian Piller - 2017 - Utilitas 29 (2):214-238.
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  3. The Bootstrapping Objection.Christian Piller - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4):612-631.
    If our mental attitudes were reasons, we could bootstrap anything into rationality simply by acquiring these mental attitudes. This, it has been argued, shows that mental attitudes cannot be reasons. In this paper, I focus on John Broome’s development of the bootstrapping objection. I distinguish various versions of this objection and I argue that the bootstrapping objection to mind-based accounts of reasons fails in all its versions.
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  4.  81
    Content-Related and Attitude-Related Reasons for Preferences.Christian Piller - 2006 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 59:155-182.
    In the first section of this paper I draw, on a purely conceptual level, a distinction between two kinds of reasons: content-related and attitude-related reasons. The established view is that, in the case of the attitude of believing something, there are no attitude-related reasons. I look at some arguments intended to establish this claim in the second section with an eye to whether these argument could be generalized to cover the case of preferences as well. In the third section I (...)
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  5. Desiring the Truth and Nothing but the Truth.Christian Piller - 2009 - Noûs 43 (2):193-213.
  6.  63
    Beware of Safety.Christian Piller - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (4):01-29.
    Safety, as discussed in contemporary epistemology, is a feature of true beliefs. Safe beliefs, when formed by the same method, remain true in close-by possible worlds. I argue that our beliefs being safely true serves no recognisable epistemic interest and, thus, that this notion of safety should play no role in epistemology. Epistemologists have been misled by failing to distinguish between a feature of beliefs — being safely true — and a feature of believers, namely being safe from error. The (...)
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  7. What Is Goodness Good For?Christian Piller - 2015 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies Normative Ethics: Volume 4. pp. 179-209.
  8. How to Overstretch the Ethics-Epistemology Analogy: Berker’s Critique of Epistemic Consequentialism.Christian Piller - 2016 - In Pedro Schmechtig & Martin Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 307-322.
  9.  33
    Evidentialism, Transparency, and Commitments.Christian Piller - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):332-350.
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  10.  55
    Valuing Knowledge: A Deontological Approach.Christian Piller - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):413-428.
    The fact that we ought to prefer what is comparatively more likely to be good, I argue, does, contrary to consequentialism, not rest on any evaluative facts. It is, in this sense, a deontological requirement. As such it is the basis of our valuing those things which are in accordance with it. We value acting (and believing) well, i.e. we value acting (and believing) as we ought to act (and to believe). In this way, despite the fact that our interest (...)
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  11.  38
    Reliabilist Responses to the Value of Knowledge Problem.Christian Piller - 2009 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):121-135.
    After sketching my own solution to the Value of Knowledge Problem, which argues for a deontological understanding of justification and understands the value of knowing interesting propositions by the value we place on believing as we ought to believe, I discuss Alvin Goldman's and Erik Olsson's recent attempts to explain the value of knowledge within the framework of their reliabilist epistemology.
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  12. Vann McGee's Counterexample to Modus Ponens.Christian Piller - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (1):27 - 54.
  13.  75
    Doing What is Best.Christian Piller - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):208-226.
  14.  76
    ‘Kinds of Practical Reasons: Attitude-Related Reasons and Exclusionary Reasons’.Christian Piller - 2006 - In J. A. Pinto S. Miguens (ed.), Analyses. pp. 98-105.
    I start by explaining what attitude-related reasons are and why it is plausible to assume that, at least in the domain of practical reason, there are such reasons. Then I turn to Raz’s idea that the practice of practical reasoning commits us to what he calls exclusionary reasons. Being excluded would be a third way, additional to being outweighed and being undermined, in which a reason can be defeated. I try to show that attitude-related reasons can explain the phenomena Raz (...)
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  15. Morality's Place: Kierkegaard and Frankfurt.Christian Piller - 2008 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 64 (2/4):1207 - 1219.
    The aim of this paper is to look at Søren Kierkegaard's defence of an ethical way of life in the light of Harry Frankfurt's work. There are salient general similarities connecting Kierkegaard and Frankfurt: Both are sceptical towards the Kantian idea of founding morality in the laws of practical reason. They both deny that the concerns, which shape our lives, could simply be validated by subject-independent values. Furthermore, and most importantly, they both emphasize the importance of reflective endorsement of one's (...)
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  16.  75
    Practical Philosophy and the Gettier Problem: Is Virtue Epistemology on the Right Track?Christian Piller - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):73-91.
    One of the guiding ideas of virtue epistemology is to look at epistemological issue through the lens of practical philosophy. The Gettier Problem is a case in point. Virtue epistemologists, like Sosa and Greco, see the shortcoming in a Gettier scenario as a shortcoming from which performances in general can suffer. In this paper I raise some doubts about the success of this project. Looking more closely at practical philosophy, will, I argue, show that virtue epistemology misconceives the significance of (...)
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  17.  38
    Norm-Reasons and Evidentialism.Frank Hofmann & Christian Piller - 2019 - Analysis 79 (2):202-206.
    It has been argued by Clayton Littlejohn that cases of insufficient evidence provide an argument against evidentialism. He distinguishes between evidential reasons and norm-reasons, but this distinction can be accepted by evidentialists, as we argue. Furthermore, evidentialists can acknowledge the existence of norm-reasons stemming from an epistemic norm, like the norm that one should not believe a proposition if one has only insufficient evidence for it. An alternative interpretation of evidentialism according to which it rejects the existence of norm-reasons is (...)
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  18. Ways of Being Good.Christian Piller - 2001 - Acta Analytica 27:153-168.
     
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  19.  83
    The New Realism in Ethics.Christian Piller - 2003 - In Thomas Baldwin (ed.), The Cambridge History of Philosophy 1870-1945. pp. 377-388.
  20.  26
    Against Absolute Goodness, by Richard Kraut.Christian Piller - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):1124-1129.
  21.  59
    Two Accounts of Objective Reasons. [REVIEW]Christian Piller - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):444–451.
    GE Moore vehemently defended the view that what actually happens and not what we, even reasonably, expect to happen, determines what we ought to do. ‘The only possible reason that can justify any action’, Moore writes, ‘is that by it the greatest possible amount of what is good absolutely should be realized’. Moore is an objectivist about reasons and duties: The world and not our view of it gives us reasons to act; the way the world is, and not the (...)
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  22.  74
    Particularism and the Structure of Reasons.Christian Piller - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (2):87-102.
    I argue that particularism (or holism) about reasons, i.e., the view that a feature that is a reason in one case need not be a reason in another case, is true, but uninterestingly so. Its truth is best explained by principles that govern a weaker notion than that of being a reason: one thing can be ‘normatively connected’ to something else without its being a reason for what it is normatively connected to. Thus, even though true, particularism about reasons does (...)
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  23.  32
    Comment on Keith Lehrer and Vann McGee's Solution of Newcomb's Problem.Christian Piller - 1991 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 40 (1):221-228.
    Keith Lehrer's notion of acceptance and its relation to the notion of belief is analyzed in a way that a person only accepts some proposition p if she decides to believe it in order to reach the epistemic aim. This view of acceptance turns out to be untenable: Under the empirical claim that we don't have the power to decide what to beheve it follows that we cannot accept anything. If reaching the truth is the epistemic aim acceptance proves ill-formed, (...)
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  24.  35
    On Keith Lehrer’s Belief in Acceptance.Christian Piller - 1991 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 40 (1):37-61.
    Keith Lehrer's notion of acceptance and its relation to the notion of belief is analyzed in a way that a person only accepts some proposition p if she decides to believe it in order to reach the epistemic aim. This view of acceptance turns out to be untenable: Under the empirical claim that we don't have the power to decide what to beheve it follows that we cannot accept anything. If reaching the truth is the epistemic aim acceptance proves ill-formed, (...)
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  25. Critical Notice.Christian Piller - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):347-367.
    Critical notice of Smith, Michael, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994) pp. xiii, 226, A$49.95 (cloth), A$21.95 (paper).
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  26.  7
    Das Vindizierungsargument — seine Wichtigkeit, seine Wirksamkeit, seine Widerlegung.Christian Piller - 1987 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 29 (1):35-58.
    Es wird versucht, die Stellung des Vindizierungsarguments im Gesamtzusammenhang des Induktionsproblems genauer festzulegen, und eine neue Sichtweise dieses Arguments als entscheidungstheoretisches Dominanzargument wird vorgeschlagen. Diese neue Interpretation bewährt sich in der Konfrontation mit alten Einwänden, doch zeigt sich schließlich, daß sich auch gegen diese Form des Vindizierungsarguments ein erfolgreicher Widerlegungsversuch führen läßt. Eine allgemeine Formulierung des vorgebrachten Einwandes erweist sich als stark genug, um auch die dem Vindizierungsargument analogen Rechtfertigungsversuche in anderen Bereichen zurückweisen zu können.
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  27.  13
    Das Vindizierungsargument — seine Wichtigkeit, seine Wirksamkeit, seine Widerlegung.Christian Piller - 1987 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 29 (1):35-58.
    Es wird versucht, die Stellung des Vindizierungsarguments im Gesamtzusammenhang des Induktionsproblems genauer festzulegen, und eine neue Sichtweise dieses Arguments als entscheidungstheoretisches Dominanzargument wird vorgeschlagen. Diese neue Interpretation bewährt sich in der Konfrontation mit alten Einwänden, doch zeigt sich schließlich, daß sich auch gegen diese Form des Vindizierungsarguments ein erfolgreicher Widerlegungsversuch führen läßt. Eine allgemeine Formulierung des vorgebrachten Einwandes erweist sich als stark genug, um auch die dem Vindizierungsargument analogen Rechtfertigungsversuche in anderen Bereichen zurückweisen zu können.
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  28.  24
    Preface.Johannes Brandl, Wolfgang Gombocz & Christian Piller - 1991 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 40:1-2.
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  29.  12
    On Keith Lehrer’s Belief in Acceptance.Christian Piller - 1991 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 40 (1):37-61.
    Keith Lehrer's notion of acceptance and its relation to the notion of belief is analyzed in a way that a person only accepts some proposition p if she decides to believe it in order to reach the epistemic aim. This view of acceptance turns out to be untenable: Under the empirical claim that we don't have the power to decide what to beheve it follows that we cannot accept anything. If reaching the truth is the epistemic aim acceptance proves ill-formed, (...)
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  30.  11
    Comment on Keith Lehrer and Vann McGee's Solution of Newcomb's Problem.Christian Piller - 1991 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 40 (1):221-228.
    Keith Lehrer's notion of acceptance and its relation to the notion of belief is analyzed in a way that a person only accepts some proposition p if she decides to believe it in order to reach the epistemic aim. This view of acceptance turns out to be untenable: Under the empirical claim that we don't have the power to decide what to beheve it follows that we cannot accept anything. If reaching the truth is the epistemic aim acceptance proves ill-formed, (...)
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  31.  11
    Two Accounts of Objective Reasons.Christian Piller - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):444-451.
    GE Moore vehemently defended the view that what actually happens and not what we, even reasonably, expect to happen, determines what we ought to do. ‘The only possible reason that can justify any action’, Moore writes, ‘is that by it the greatest possible amount of what is good absolutely should be realized’. Moore is an objectivist about reasons and duties: The world and not our view of it gives us reasons to act; the way the world is, and not the (...)
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  32.  9
    Antikritische Bemerkungen: Eine Verteidigung des Angriffs auf das Vindizierungsargument.Christian Piller - 1988 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 32 (1):197-204.
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  33.  9
    Choices: An Introduction to Decision Theory. [REVIEW]Christian Piller - 1987 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 30 (1):197-207.
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  34.  11
    Practical Reality. [REVIEW]Christian Piller - 2003 - Philosophy 78 (3):414-425.
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  35.  25
    Practical Reality, by Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press 2000. Pp. XII + 187.Christian Piller - 2003 - Philosophy 78 (3):414-425.
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  36.  18
    Schwierige Metaethik.Christian Piller - 2006 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1):241-252.
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  37.  9
    Choices.Christian Piller - 1987 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 30:197-207.
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  38.  14
    Book Reviews. [REVIEW]Christian Piller - 1994 - Erkenntnis 41 (1):127-133.
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  39.  4
    Preface.Johannes Brandl, Wolfgang Gombocz & Christian Piller - 1991 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 40:1-2.
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  40.  7
    Antikritische Bemerkungen.Christian Piller - 1988 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 32 (1):197-204.
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  41.  14
    Metamind, Knowledge, and Coherence: Essays on the Philosophy of Keith Lehrer.Johannes Brandl, Wolfgang Gombocz & Christian Piller (eds.) - 1992 - Rodopi.