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Christoph Kelp [85]Christoph F. F. Kelp [1]
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Profile: Christoph Kelp (KU Leuven)
  1. Extended Cognition and Robust Virtue Epistemology.Christoph Kelp - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (2):245-252.
    Pritchard (Synthese 175,133–51, 2010) and Vaesen (Synthese forthcoming) have recently argued that robust virtue epistemology does not square with the extended cognition thesis that has enjoyed an increasing degree of popularity in recent philosophy of mind. This paper shows that their arguments fail. The relevant cases of extended cognition pose no new problem for robust virtue epistemology. It is shown that Pritchard’s and Vaesen’s cases can be dealt with in familiar ways by a number of virtue theories of knowledge.
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  2.  58
    Knowledge: The Safe-Apt View.Christoph Kelp - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):265-278.
    According to virtue epistemology, knowledge involves cognitive success that is due to cognitive competence. This paper explores the prospects of a virtue theory of knowledge that, so far, has no takers in the literature. It combines features from a couple of different virtue theories: like Pritchard's [forthcoming; et al. 2010] view, it qualifies as what I call an ?impure? version of virtue epistemology, according to which the competence condition is supplemented by an additional (safety) condition; like Sosa's 2007, 2010 view, (...)
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  3.  58
    Knowledge and Safety.Christoph Kelp - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:21-31.
    This paper raises a problem for so-called safety-based conceptions of knowledge: It is argued that none of the versions of the safety condition that can be found in the literature succeeds in identifying a necessary condition on knowledge. Furthermore, reason is provided to believe that the argument generalises at least in the sense that there can be no version of the safety condition that does justice to the considerations motivating a safety condition whilst, at the same time, being requisite for (...)
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  4.  77
    What's the Point of "Knowledge" Anyway?Christoph Kelp - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):53-66.
    In Knowledge and the State of Nature Edward Craig defends the thesis that the function of the concept of knowledge is to flag good informants. This paper aims to show that Craig’s thesis is false. In order to establish this, I will point to some data that CT fails to explain in a satisfactory manner. I will then introduce an alternative thesis that is not only able to secure the acclaimed benefits of CT, but also provides a neat explanation of (...)
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  5. In Defence of Virtue Epistemology.Christoph Kelp - 2011 - Synthese 179 (3):409-433.
    In a number of recent papers Duncan Pritchard argues that virtue epistemology's central ability condition—one knows that p if and only if one has attained cognitive success (true belief) because of the exercise of intellectual ability—is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. This paper discusses and dismisses a number of responses to Pritchard's objections and develops a new way of defending virtue epistemology against them.
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  6.  64
    Proper Bootstrapping.Igor Douven & Christoph Kelp - 2013 - Synthese 190 (1):171-185.
    According to a much discussed argument, reliabilism is defective for making knowledge too easy to come by. In a recent paper, Weisberg aims to show that this argument relies on a type of reasoning that is rejectable on independent grounds. We argue that the blanket rejection that Weisberg recommends of this type of reasoning is both unwarranted and unwelcome. Drawing on an older discussion in the philosophy of science, we show that placing some relatively modest restrictions on the said type (...)
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  7.  72
    Understanding Phenomena.Christoph Kelp - 2015 - Synthese 192 (12):3799-3816.
    The literature on the nature of understanding can be divided into two broad camps. Explanationists believe that it is knowledge of explanations that is key to understanding. In contrast, their manipulationist rivals maintain that understanding essentially involves an ability to manipulate certain representations. The aim of this paper is to provide a novel knowledge based account of understanding. More specifically, it proposes an account of maximal understanding of a given phenomenon in terms of fully comprehensive and maximally well-connected knowledge of (...)
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  8.  35
    Extended Cognition and Robust Virtue Epistemology: Response to Vaesen. [REVIEW]Christoph Kelp - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):729-732.
    In a recent exchange, Vaesen (Synthese 181: 515–529, 2011; Erkenntnis 78:963–970, 2013) and Kelp (Erkenntnis 78:245–252, 2013a) have argued over whether cases of extended cognition pose (part of) a problem for robust virtue epistemology. This paper responds to Vaesen’s (Erkenntnis 78:963–970, 2013) most recent contribution to this exchange. I argue that Vaesen latest argument against the kind of virtue epistemology I favour fails.
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  9.  8
    Justified Belief: Knowledge First-Style.Christoph Kelp - unknown
    Recent knowledge first epistemology features a number of different accounts of justified belief, including a knowledge first reductionism according to which to believe justifiably is to know Sutton, Littlejohn, Williamson, a knowledge first version of accessibilism Millar and a knowledge first version of mentalism Bird. This paper offers a knowledge first version of virtue epistemology and argues that it is preferable to its knowledge first epistemological rivals: only knowledge first virtue epistemology manages to steer clear of a number of problems (...)
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  10.  8
    Justified Belief: Knowledge First-Style.Christoph Kelp - unknown
    Recent knowledge first epistemology features a number of different accounts of justified belief, including a knowledge first reductionism according to which to believe justifiably is to know Sutton, Littlejohn, Williamson, a knowledge first version of accessibilism Millar and a knowledge first version of mentalism Bird. This paper offers a knowledge first version of virtue epistemology and argues that it is preferable to its knowledge first epistemological rivals: only knowledge first virtue epistemology manages to steer clear of a number of problems (...)
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  11.  7
    Inquiry and the Transmission of Knowledge.Christoph Kelp - unknown
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  12.  6
    Lotteries and Justification.Christoph Kelp - unknown
    The lottery paradox shows that the following three individually highly plausible theses are jointly incompatible: highly probable propositions are justifiably believable, justified believability is closed under conjunction introduction, known contradictions are not justifiably believable. This paper argues that a satisfactory solution to the lottery paradox must reject as versions of the paradox can be generated without appeal to either or and proposes a new solution to the paradox in terms of a novel account of justified believability.
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  13.  17
    No Justification for Lottery Losers.Christoph Kelp - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1):205-217.
    Igor Douven has recently developed a challenge for accounts of justification according to which beliefs about lottery losers are never justified. This article argues that champions of such accounts can rise to Douven's challenge and, what's more, that they can turn Douven's argument around in the sense that they can legitimately take it to provide a vindication of their preferred view.
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  14.  58
    Justified Belief: Knowledge First‐Style.Christoph Kelp - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):n/a-n/a.
    Recent knowledge first epistemology features a number of different accounts of justified belief, including a knowledge first reductionism according to which to believe justifiably is to know Sutton (), Littlejohn, Williamson, a knowledge first version of accessibilism Millar () and a knowledge first version of mentalism Bird (). This paper offers a knowledge first version of virtue epistemology and argues that it is preferable to its knowledge first epistemological rivals: only knowledge first virtue epistemology manages to steer clear of a (...)
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  15.  64
    A Practical Explication of the Knowledge Rule of Informative Speech Acts.Christoph Kelp - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):367-383.
    : This paper defends the knowledge rule of informative speech acts. It is argued that Edward Craig's insightful practical explication of the concept of knowledge can be extended to motivate the knowledge rule. A number of problem cases for the knowledge rule are addressed and accommodated.
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  16.  46
    Truth Approximation, Social Epistemology, and Opinion Dynamics.Igor Douven & Christoph Kelp - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (2):271-283.
  17. Two Deflationary Approaches to Fitch-Style Reasoning.Christoph Kelp & Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press. pp. 324--338.
    This paper considers two deflationary responses to the Fitch argument on behalf of the semantic anti-realistthat is, two responses which aim to evade the conclusion of that argument by, on a principled basis, weakening one of the principles essentially employed. The first deflationary approach that is consideredwhich proceeds by weakening the factivity principle for knowledgeis shown to be ultimately unpromising, but a second approachwhich proceeds by weakening the knowability principle that is at the heart of semantic anti-realismis shown to have (...)
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  18.  15
    Norms of Belief.Mona Simion, Christoph Kelp & Harmen Ghijsen - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):374-392.
    When in the business of offering an account of the epistemic normativity of belief, one is faced with the following dilemma: strongly externalist norms fail to account for the intuition of justification in radical deception scenarios, while milder norms are incapable to explain what is epistemically wrong with false beliefs. This paper has two main aims; we first look at one way out of the dilemma, defended by Timothy Williamson and Clayton Littlejohn, and argue that it fails. Second, we identify (...)
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  19.  22
    Epistemology Extended.Christoph Kelp - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):230-252.
    A common presupposition in epistemology is that the processes contributing to the generation of knowledge do not extend beyond the knower's skin. This paper challenges this presupposition. I adduce a novel kind case that causes trouble for a number of even the most promising accounts of knowledge in current literature, at least so long as the presupposition is in place. I then look at a couple of recent accounts of knowledge that drop the presupposition and expressly allow the relevant processes (...)
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  20.  54
    A Problem for Contrastivist Accounts of Knowledge.Christoph Kelp - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):287-92.
    This paper raises a problem for contrastivist accounts of knowledge. It is argued that contrastivism fails to succeed in providing a modest solution to the sceptical paradox—i.e. one according to which we have knowledge of a wide range of ordinary empirical propositions whilst failing to know the various anti-sceptical hypotheses entailed by them—whilst, at the same time, retaining a contrastivist version of the closure principle for knowledge.
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  21.  39
    Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology.Christoph Kelp - 2017 - In Adam Carter, Emma Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.
  22.  84
    Sustaining a Rational Disagreement.Christoph Kelp & Igor Douven - 2012 - In H. DeRegt, S. Hartmann & S. Okasha (eds.), EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 101--110.
    Much recent discussion in social epistemology has focussed on the question of whether peers can rationally sustain a disagreement. A growing number of social epistemologists hold that the answer is negative. We point to considerations from the history of science that favor rather the opposite answer. However, we also explain how the other position can appear intuitively attractive.
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  23.  78
    Not Without Justification.Christoph Kelp - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):581-595.
    In this paper I take issue with Jonathan Sutton's attempt at defending the thesis that knowledge is justified belief. I argue, first, that the arguments he adduces in support of it fail. Second, I provide independent reason to believe that knowledge and justified belief come apart.
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  24.  24
    Pritchard on Virtue Epistemology.Christoph Kelp - 2009 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (4):583-87.
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  25.  82
    Second-Order Knowledge.Christoph Kelp & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2010 - In D. Pritchard & S. Bernecker (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge.
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  26.  27
    Lotteries and Justification.Christoph Kelp - forthcoming - Synthese:1-12.
    The lottery paradox shows that the following three individually highly plausible theses are jointly incompatible: highly probable propositions are justifiably believable, justified believability is closed under conjunction introduction, known contradictions are not justifiably believable. This paper argues that a satisfactory solution to the lottery paradox must reject as versions of the paradox can be generated without appeal to either or and proposes a new solution to the paradox in terms of a novel account of justified believability.
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  27. How to Motivate Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.Christoph Kelp - 2013 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 88:211-225.
    Duncan Pritchard has recently defended an account of knowledge that combines a safety condition with an ability condition on knowledge. In order to explain this bipartite structure of knowledge he appeals to Edward Craig's work on the concept of knowledge. is paper argues that Pritchard's envisaged explanation fails and offers a better alternative.
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  28.  18
    In Defense of the Rational Credibility Account: A Reply to Casalegno.Igor Douven & Christoph Kelp - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (2):289-297.
  29.  22
    A Minimalist Approach to Epistemology.Christoph F. F. Kelp - unknown
    This thesis addresses the problem of the analysis of knowledge. The persistent failure of analyses of knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions is used to motivate exploring alternative approaches to the analytical problem. In parallel to a similar development in the theory of truth, in which the persistent failure to provide a satisfactory answer to the question as to what the nature of truth is has led to the exploration of deflationary and minimalist approaches to the theory of (...)
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  30.  2
    How to Be A Reliabilist.Christoph Kelp - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    In this paper, I aim to develop a novel virtue reliabilist account of justified belief, which incorporates insights from both process reliabilism and extant versions of virtue reliabilism. Like extant virtue reliabilist accounts of justi- fied belief, the proposed view takes it that justified belief is a kind of competent performance and that competent performances require reliable agent abilities. However, unlike extant versions of virtue reliabilism, the view takes abilities to essentially involve reliable processes. In this way, the proposed takes (...)
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  31.  12
    Justified Belief: Knowledge First‐Style.Christoph Kelp - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):79-100.
    Recent knowledge first epistemology features a number of different accounts of justified belief, including a knowledge first reductionism according to which to believe justifiably is to know Sutton (), Littlejohn, Williamson, a knowledge first version of accessibilism Millar () and a knowledge first version of mentalism Bird (). This paper offers a knowledge first version of virtue epistemology and argues that it is preferable to its knowledge first epistemological rivals: only knowledge first virtue epistemology manages to steer clear of a (...)
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  32.  56
    Learning From Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge – Jennifer Lackey.Christoph Kelp - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):748-750.
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  33.  25
    Commodious Knowledge.Christoph Kelp & Mona Simion - forthcoming - Synthese:1-16.
    This paper offers a novel account of the value of knowledge. The account is novel insofar as it advocates a shift in focus from the value of individual items of knowledge to the value of the commodity of knowledge. It is argued that the commodity of knowledge is valuable in at least two ways: in a wide range of areas, knowledge is our way of being in cognitive contact with the world and for us the good life is a life (...)
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  34. Classical Invariantism and the Puzzle of Fallibilism.Christoph Kelp - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):221-44.
    This paper revisits a puzzle that arises for theories of knowledge according to which one can know on the basis of merely inductive grounds. No matter how strong such theories require inductive grounds to be if a belief based on them is to qualify as knowledge, there are certain beliefs (namely, about the outcome of fair lotteries) that are based on even stronger inductive grounds, while, intuitively, they do not qualify as knowledge. This paper discusses what is often regarded as (...)
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  35.  37
    Sosa on Knowledge, Assertion and Value.Christoph Kelp - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):229-237.
    This paper takes issues with a couple of recent arguments due to Ernest Sosa according to which knowledge is the norm of assertion and the thesis that knowledge is specially valuable is equivalent to the thesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion. It is argued that while both of these arguments fail, an argument that knowledge is the norm of belief and that the thesis that knowledge is specially valuable is equivalent to the thesis that knowledge is the norm (...)
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  36.  39
    Knowledge and Approximate Knowledge.Lieven Decock, Igor Douven, Christoph Kelp & Sylvia Wenmackers - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S6):1129-1150.
    Traditionally, epistemologists have held that only truth-related factors matter in the question of whether a subject can be said to know a proposition. Various philosophers have recently departed from this doctrine by claiming that the answer to this question also depends on practical concerns. They take this move to be warranted by the fact that people’s knowledge attributions appear sensitive to contextual variation, in particular variation due to differing stakes. This paper proposes an alternative explanation of the aforementioned fact, one (...)
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  37.  26
    Pritchard on Knowledge, Safety, and Cognitive Achievements.Christoph Kelp - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:51-53.
  38.  38
    Do 'Contextualist Cases' Support Contextualism?Christoph Kelp - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (1):115-120.
    This paper addresses the argument from ‘contextualist cases’—such as for instance DeRose’s Bank cases—to attributor contextualism. It is argued that these cases do not make a decisive case against invariantism and that the debate between contextualists and invariantists will have to be settled on broader theoretical grounds.
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  39.  10
    Unreflective Epistemology.Christoph Kelp - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):411-422.
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  40.  19
    How and How Not to Take on Brueckner's Sceptic. [REVIEW]Christoph Kelp - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):386-391.
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  41. Knowledge and Approximate Knowledge.Lieven Decock, Igor Douven, Christoph Kelp & Sylvia Wenmackers - unknown
    Traditionally, epistemologists have held that only truth-related factors matter in the question of whether a subject can be said to know a proposition. Various philosophers have recently departed from this doctrine by claiming that the answer to this question also depends on practical concerns. They take this move to be warranted by the fact that people’s knowledge attributions appear sensitive to contextual variation, in particular variation due to differing stakes. This paper proposes an alternative explanation of the aforementioned fact, one (...)
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  42. Knowledge and Approximate Knowledge.Lieven Decock, Igor Douven, Christoph Kelp & Sylvia Wenmackers - unknown
    Traditionally, epistemologists have held that only truth-related factors matter in the question of whether a subject can be said to know a proposition. Various philosophers have recently departed from this doctrine by claiming that the answer to this question also depends on practical concerns. They take this move to be warranted by the fact that people’s knowledge attributions appear sensitive to contextual variation, in particular variation due to differing stakes. This paper proposes an alternative explanation of the aforementioned fact, one (...)
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  43. In Defense of the Rational Credibility Account: A Reply to Casalegno.Igor Douven & Christoph Kelp - unknown
    A majority of philosophers nowadays hold that the practice of assertion is governed by the rule that one must assert only what one knows. In his last published paper, Paolo Casalegno sides with this view and criticizes rival accounts of assertion on which rational belief or rational credibility will do for warranted assertion. We take issue with Casalegno's criticisms and find them wanting.
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  44. In Defense of the Rational Credibility Account: A Reply to Casalegno.Igor Douven & Christoph Kelp - unknown
    A majority of philosophers nowadays hold that the practice of assertion is governed by the rule that one must assert only what one knows. In his last published paper, Paolo Casalegno sides with this view and criticizes rival accounts of assertion on which rational belief or rational credibility will do for warranted assertion. We take issue with Casalegno's criticisms and find them wanting.
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  45. Proper Bootstrapping.Igor Douven & Christoph Kelp - unknown
    According to a much discussed argument, reliabilism is defective for making knowledge too easy to come by. In a recent paper, Weisberg aims to show that this argument relies on a type of reasoning that is rejectable on independent grounds. We argue that the blanket rejection that Weisberg recommends of this type of reasoning is both unwarranted and unwelcome. Drawing on an older discussion in the philosophy of science, we show that placing some relatively modest restrictions on the said type (...)
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  46. Proper Bootstrapping.Igor Douven & Christoph Kelp - unknown
    According to a much discussed argument, reliabilism is defective for making knowledge too easy to come by. In a recent paper, Weisberg aims to show that this argument relies on a type of reasoning that is rejectable on independent grounds. We argue that the blanket rejection that Weisberg recommends of this type of reasoning is both unwarranted and unwelcome. Drawing on an older discussion in the philosophy of science, we show that placing some relatively modest restrictions on the said type (...)
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  47. Truth Approximation, Social Epistemology, and Opinion Dynamics.Igor Douven & Christoph Kelp - unknown
    This paper highlights some connections between work on truth approximation and work in social epistemology, in particular work on peer disagreement. In some of the literature on truth approximation, questions have been addressed concerning the efficiency of research strategies for approximating the truth. So far, social aspects of research strategies have not received any attention in this context. Recent findings in the field of opinion dynamics suggest that this is a mistake. How scientists exchange and take into account information about (...)
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  48. A Practical Explication of the Knowledge Rule of Informative Speech Acts.Christoph Kelp - unknown
    This paper defends the knowledge rule of informative speech acts. It is argued that Edward Craig's insightful practical explication of the concept of knowledge can be extended to motivate the knowledge rule. A number of problem cases for the knowledge rule are addressed and accommodated.
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  49. A Practical Explication of the Knowledge Rule of Informative Speech Acts.Christoph Kelp - unknown
    This paper defends the knowledge rule of informative speech acts. It is argued that Edward Craig's insightful practical explication of the concept of knowledge can be extended to motivate the knowledge rule. A number of problem cases for the knowledge rule are addressed and accommodated.
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  50. A Problem for Contrastivist Accounts of Knowledge.Christoph Kelp - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):287-292.
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