12 found
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  1. What’s the Point of “Knowledge” Anyway?Christoph9 Kelp - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):53-66.
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  2. Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology.Christoph9 Kelp - 2017 - In Adam Carter, Emma Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.
  3.  66
    Towards a Knowledge-Based Account of Understanding.Christoph9 Kelp - 2016 - In S. Grimm, C. Baumberger & S. Ammon (eds.), Explaining Understanding. Routledge.
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  4. Epistemic Frankfurt Cases Revisited.Christoph9 Kelp - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (1):27-37.
    In Kelp, it is argued that there are epistemic Frankfurt cases that serve to show that knowledge does not require safety from error. In this paper, these Frankfurt cases are revisited. It is first argued that a recent response to the earlier argument by Duncan Pritchard remains unsatisfactory. Then it is shown that Frankfurt cases impact a much wider range of accounts. Specifically, it is argued in some detail that, in conjunction with the infamous Fake Barn cases, they generate a (...)
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  5.  58
    Knowledge, Understanding, and Virtue.Christoph9 Kelp - unknown
    In a number of recent pieces, Duncan Pritchard has used cases with the structure of Goldman’s infamous fake barn case to argue against a promising virtue epistemological account of knowledge and a promising knowledge-based account of understanding. This paper aims to defend both of these views against Pritchard’s objections. More specifically, I outline two ways of resisting Pritchard’s objections. The first allows for knowledge in fake barn cases and explains the intuition of ignorance away. In contrast, the second response appeals (...)
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  6. Proper bootstrapping.Igor2 Douven & Christoph9 Kelp - 2013 - Synthese 190 (1):171-185.
    According to a much discussed argument, reliabilism is defective for making knowledge too easy to come by. In a recent paper, Weisberg aims to show that this argument relies on a type of reasoning that is rejectable on independent grounds. We argue that the blanket rejection that Weisberg recommends of this type of reasoning is both unwarranted and unwelcome. Drawing on an older discussion in the philosophy of science, we show that placing some relatively modest restrictions on the said type (...)
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  7. Sustaining a rational disagreement.Christoph9 Kelp & Igor Douven - unknown
    Much recent discussion in social epistemology has focussed on the question of whether peers can rationally sustain a disagreement. A growing number of social epistemologists hold that the answer is negative. We point to considerations from the history of science that favor rather the opposite answer. However, we also explain how the other position can appear intuitively attractive.
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  8.  60
    Perceptual Justification: Factive Reasons and Fallible Virtues.Christoph9 Kelp & Harmen8 Ghijsen - 2016 - In C. Mi, M. Slote & E. Sosa (eds.), Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy. Routledge.
    Two different versions of epistemological disjunctivism have recently been upheld in the literature: a traditional, Justified True Belief Epistemological Disjunctivism (JTBED) and a Knowledge First Epistemological Disjunctivism (KFED). JTBED holds that factive reasons of the form “S sees that p” provide the rational support in virtue of which one has perceptual knowledge, while KFED holds that factive reasons of the form “S sees that p” just are ways of knowing that p which additionally provide justification for believing that p. We (...)
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  9. Two deflationary approaches to fitch-style reasoning.Christoph9 Kelp & Duncan Pritchard - unknown
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  10.  53
    Unreflective epistemology.Christoph9 Kelp - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):411-422.
    Virtue epistemological accounts of knowledge claim that knowledge is a species of a broader normative category, to wit of success from ability. Fake Barn cases pose a difficult problem for such accounts. In structurally analogous but non-epistemic cases, the agents attain the relevant success from ability. If knowledge is just another form of success from ability, the pressure is on to treat Fake Barn cases as cases of knowledge. The challenge virtue epistemology faces is to explain the intuitive lack of (...)
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  11. Second-Order Knowledge.Christoph9 Kelp & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2010 - In D. Pritchard & S. Bernecker (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge.
  12.  37
    How and How not to Take on Brueckner's Sceptic.Christoph9 Kelp - unknown
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