33 found
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  1. Understanding Phenomena.Christoph9 Kelp - 2015 - Synthese 192 (12):3799-3816.
    The literature on the nature of understanding can be divided into two broad camps. Explanationists believe that it is knowledge of explanations that is key to understanding. In contrast, their manipulationist rivals maintain that understanding essentially involves an ability to manipulate certain representations. The aim of this paper is to provide a novel knowledge based account of understanding. More specifically, it proposes an account of maximal understanding of a given phenomenon in terms of fully comprehensive and maximally well-connected knowledge of (...)
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  2. What’s the Point of “Knowledge” Anyway?Christoph9 Kelp - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):53-66.
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  3. Justified Belief: Knowledge First‐Style.Christoph9 Kelp - unknown
    Recent knowledge first epistemology features a number of different accounts of justified belief, including a knowledge first reductionism according to which to believe justifiably is to know Sutton, Littlejohn, Williamson, a knowledge first version of accessibilism Millar and a knowledge first version of mentalism Bird. This paper offers a knowledge first version of virtue epistemology and argues that it is preferable to its knowledge first epistemological rivals: only knowledge first virtue epistemology manages to steer clear of a number of problems (...)
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  4. Knowledge: The Safe-Apt View.Christoph9 Kelp - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):265-278.
    According to virtue epistemology, knowledge involves cognitive success that is due to cognitive competence. This paper explores the prospects of a virtue theory of knowledge that, so far, has no takers in the literature. It combines features from a couple of different virtue theories: like Pritchard's [forthcoming; et al. 2010] view, it qualifies as what I call an ‘impure’ version of virtue epistemology, according to which the competence condition is supplemented by an additional condition; like Sosa's 2007, 2010 view, it (...)
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  5. Extended Cognition and Robust Virtue Epistemology: Response to Vaesen.Christoph9 Kelp - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (2):245-252.
    Pritchard and Vaesen have recently argued that robust virtue epistemology does not square with the extended cognition thesis that has enjoyed an increasing degree of popularity in recent philosophy of mind. This paper shows that their arguments fail. The relevant cases of extended cognition pose no new problem for robust virtue epistemology. It is shown that Pritchard’s and Vaesen’s cases can be dealt with in familiar ways by a number of virtue theories of knowledge.
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  6.  96
    Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology.Christoph9 Kelp - 2017 - In Adam Carter, Emma Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.
  7.  97
    Epistemic Frankfurt Cases Revisited.Christoph9 Kelp - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (1):27-37.
    In Kelp, it is argued that there are epistemic Frankfurt cases that serve to show that knowledge does not require safety from error. In this paper, these Frankfurt cases are revisited. It is first argued that a recent response to the earlier argument by Duncan Pritchard remains unsatisfactory. Then it is shown that Frankfurt cases impact a much wider range of accounts. Specifically, it is argued in some detail that, in conjunction with the infamous Fake Barn cases, they generate a (...)
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  8. Assertion: A Function First Account.Christoph9 Kelp - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):411-442.
    This paper aims to develop a novel account of the normativity of assertion. Its core thesis is that assertion has an etiological epistemic function, viz. to generate knowledge in hearers. In conjunction with a general account of etiological functions and their normative import, it is argued that an assertion is epistemically good if and only if it has the disposition to generate knowledge in hearers. In addition, reason is provided to believe that it makes sense to regulate the practice of (...)
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  9.  35
    Knowledge, Understanding, and Virtue.Christoph9 Kelp - unknown
    In a number of recent pieces, Duncan Pritchard has used cases with the structure of Goldman’s infamous fake barn case to argue against a promising virtue epistemological account of knowledge and a promising knowledge-based account of understanding. This paper aims to defend both of these views against Pritchard’s objections. More specifically, I outline two ways of resisting Pritchard’s objections. The first allows for knowledge in fake barn cases and explains the intuition of ignorance away. In contrast, the second response appeals (...)
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  10. In Defence of Virtue Epistemology.Christoph9 Kelp - 2011 - Synthese 179 (3):409-433.
    In a number of recent papers Duncan Pritchard argues that virtue epistemology's central ability condition—one knows that p if and only if one has attained cognitive success (true belief) because of the exercise of intellectual ability—is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. This paper discusses and dismisses a number of responses to Pritchard's objections and develops a new way of defending virtue epistemology against them.
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  11.  68
    Extended Cognition and Robust Virtue Epistemology: Response to Vaesen.Christoph9 Kelp - 2013 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):729-732.
    In a recent exchange, Vaesen and Kelp have argued over whether cases of extended cognition pose a problem for robust virtue epistemology. This paper responds to Vaesen’s most recent contribution to this exchange. I argue that Vaesen latest argument against the kind of virtue epistemology I favour fails.
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  12.  19
    Towards a Knowledge-Based Account of Understanding.Christoph9 Kelp - 2016 - In S. Grimm, C. Baumberger & S. Ammon (eds.), Explaining Understanding. Routledge.
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  13.  82
    Norms of Belief.Mona3 Simion, Christoph9 Kelp & Harmen8 Ghijsen - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):374-392.
    When in the business of offering an account of the epistemic normativity of belief, one is faced with the following dilemma: strongly externalist norms fail to account for the intuition of justification in radical deception scenarios, while milder norms are incapable to explain what is epistemically wrong with false beliefs. This paper has two main aims; we first look at one way out of the dilemma, defended by Timothy Williamson and Clayton Littlejohn, and argue that it fails. Second, we identify (...)
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  14.  91
    Proper Bootstrapping.Igor2 Douven & Christoph9 Kelp - 2013 - Synthese 190 (1):171-185.
    According to a much discussed argument, reliabilism is defective for making knowledge too easy to come by. In a recent paper, Weisberg aims to show that this argument relies on a type of reasoning that is rejectable on independent grounds. We argue that the blanket rejection that Weisberg recommends of this type of reasoning is both unwarranted and unwelcome. Drawing on an older discussion in the philosophy of science, we show that placing some relatively modest restrictions on the said type (...)
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  15.  36
    Perceptual Justification: Factive Reasons and Fallible Virtues.Christoph9 Kelp & Harmen8 Ghijsen - 2016 - In C. Mi, M. Slote & E. Sosa (eds.), Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy. Routledge.
    Two different versions of epistemological disjunctivism have recently been upheld in the literature: a traditional, Justified True Belief Epistemological Disjunctivism (JTBED) and a Knowledge First Epistemological Disjunctivism (KFED). JTBED holds that factive reasons of the form “S sees that p” provide the rational support in virtue of which one has perceptual knowledge, while KFED holds that factive reasons of the form “S sees that p” just are ways of knowing that p which additionally provide justification for believing that p. We (...)
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  16.  91
    Commodious Knowledge.Christoph9 Kelp & Mona3 Simion - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1487-1502.
    This paper offers a novel account of the value of knowledge. The account is novel insofar as it advocates a shift in focus from the value of individual items of knowledge to the value of the commodity of knowledge. It is argued that the commodity of knowledge is valuable in at least two ways: in a wide range of areas, knowledge is our way of being in cognitive contact with the world and for us the good life is a life (...)
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  17.  42
    Epistemology Extended.Christoph9 Kelp - unknown
    A common presupposition in epistemology is that the processes contributing to the generation of knowledge do not extend beyond the knower's skin. This paper challenges this presupposition. I adduce a novel kind case that causes trouble for a number of even the most promising accounts of knowledge in current literature, at least so long as the presupposition is in place. I then look at a couple of recent accounts of knowledge that drop the presupposition and expressly allow the relevant processes (...)
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  18.  74
    How to Be A Reliabilist.Christoph9 Kelp - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):346-374.
    In this paper, I aim to develop a novel virtue reliabilist account of justified belief, which incorporates insights from both process reliabilism and extant versions of virtue reliabilism. Like extant virtue reliabilist accounts of justi- fied belief, the proposed view takes it that justified belief is a kind of competent performance and that competent performances require reliable agent abilities. However, unlike extant versions of virtue reliabilism, the view takes abilities to essentially involve reliable processes. In this way, the proposed takes (...)
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  19. A Practical Explication of the Knowledge Rule of Informative Speech Acts.Christoph9 Kelp - unknown
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  20. Sustaining a Rational Disagreement.Christoph9 Kelp & Igor Douven - unknown
    Much recent discussion in social epistemology has focussed on the question of whether peers can rationally sustain a disagreement. A growing number of social epistemologists hold that the answer is negative. We point to considerations from the history of science that favor rather the opposite answer. However, we also explain how the other position can appear intuitively attractive.
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  21.  95
    A Problem for Contrastivist Accounts of Knowledge.Christoph9 Kelp - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):287-292.
    This paper raises a problem for contrastivist accounts of knowledge. It is argued that contrastivism fails to succeed in providing a modest solution to the sceptical paradox—i.e. one according to which we have knowledge of a wide range of ordinary empirical propositions whilst failing to know the various anti-sceptical hypotheses entailed by them—whilst, at the same time, retaining a contrastivist version of the closure principle for knowledge.
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  22. Two Deflationary Approaches to Fitch-Style Reasoning.Christoph9 Kelp & Duncan Pritchard - unknown
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  23. Classical Invariantism and the Puzzle of Fallibilism.Christoph9 Kelp - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):221-244.
    This paper revisits a puzzle that arises for theories of knowledge according to which one can know on the basis of merely inductive grounds. No matter how strong such theories require inductive grounds to be if a belief based on them is to qualify as knowledge, there are certain beliefs that are based on even stronger inductive grounds, while, intuitively, they do not qualify as knowledge. This paper discusses what is often regardedas the most promising classical invariantist solution to the (...)
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  24.  32
    How to Motivate Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.Christoph9 Kelp - 2013 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 88 (1):211-225.
    Duncan Pritchard has recently defended an account of knowledge that combines a safety condition with an ability condition on knowledge. In order to explain this bipartite structure of knowledge he appeals to Edward Craig's work on the concept of knowledge. This paper argues that Pritchard's envisaged explanation fails and offers a better alternative.
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  25.  70
    Sosa on Knowledge, Assertion and Value.Christoph9 Kelp - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):229-237.
    This paper takes issues with a couple of recent arguments due to Ernest Sosa according to which knowledge is the norm of assertion and the thesis that knowledge is specially valuable is equivalent to the thesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion. It is argued that while both of these arguments fail, an argument that knowledge is the norm of belief and that the thesis that knowledge is specially valuable is equivalent to the thesis that knowledge is the norm (...)
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  26.  44
    Unreflective Epistemology.Christoph9 Kelp - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):411-422.
    Virtue epistemological accounts of knowledge claim that knowledge is a species of a broader normative category, to wit of success from ability. Fake Barn cases pose a difficult problem for such accounts. In structurally analogous but non-epistemic cases, the agents attain the relevant success from ability. If knowledge is just another form of success from ability, the pressure is on to treat Fake Barn cases as cases of knowledge. The challenge virtue epistemology faces is to explain the intuitive lack of (...)
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  27. Second-Order Knowledge.Christoph9 Kelp & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2010 - In D. Pritchard & S. Bernecker (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge.
  28.  43
    No Justification for Lottery Losers.Christoph9 Kelp - unknown
    Igor Douven has recently developed a challenge for accounts of justification according to which beliefs about lottery losers are never justified. This article argues that champions of such accounts can rise to Douven's challenge and, what's more, that they can turn Douven's argument around in the sense that they can legitimately take it to provide a vindication of their preferred view.
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  29.  56
    Knowledge and Approximate Knowledge.Lieven Decock, Igor Douven, Christoph9 Kelp & Sylvia9 Wenmackers - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S6):1129-1150.
    Traditionally, epistemologists have held that only truth-related factors matter in the question of whether a subject can be said to know a proposition. Various philosophers have recently departed from this doctrine by claiming that the answer to this question also depends on practical concerns. They take this move to be warranted by the fact that people’s knowledge attributions appear sensitive to contextual variation, in particular variation due to differing stakes. This paper proposes an alternative explanation of the aforementioned fact, one (...)
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  30.  72
    Do ‘Contextualist Cases’ Support Contextualism?Christoph9 Kelp - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (1):115-120.
    This paper addresses the argument from ‘contextualist cases’—such as for instance DeRose’s Bank cases—to attributor contextualism. It is argued that these cases do not make a decisive case against invariantism and that the debate between contextualists and invariantists will have to be settled on broader theoretical grounds.
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  31.  6
    No Justification for Lottery Losers.Christoph9 Kelp - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (2):205-217.
    Igor Douven has recently developed a challenge for accounts of justification according to which beliefs about lottery losers are never justified. This article argues that champions of such accounts can rise to Douven's challenge and, what's more, that they can turn Douven's argument around in the sense that they can legitimately take it to provide a vindication of their preferred view.
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  32.  36
    How and How Not to Take on Brueckner's Sceptic.Christoph9 Kelp - unknown
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  33.  4
    Classical Invariantism and the Puzzle of Fallibilism.Christoph9 Kelp - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):221-244.
    This paper revisits a puzzle that arises for theories of knowledge according to which one can know on the basis of merely inductive grounds. No matter how strong such theories require inductive grounds to be if a belief based on them is to qualify as knowledge, there are certain beliefs that are based on even stronger inductive grounds, while, intuitively, they do not qualify as knowledge. This paper discusses what is often regardedas the most promising classical invariantist solution to the (...)
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