5 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Christopher D. Viger [6]Christopher David Viger [2]
  1. Is the aim of perception to provide accurate representations? A case for the 'no' side.Christopher D. Viger - 2006 - In Robert Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
  2.  60
    Where do Dennett's stances stand? Explaining our kinds of minds.Christopher D. Viger - 2000 - In Don Ross, Andrew Brook & David Thompson (eds.), Dennett’s Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  3.  87
    Sort-of symbols?Daniel C. Dennett & Christopher D. Viger - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):613-613.
    Barsalou's elision of the personal and sub-personal levels tends to conceal the fact that he is, at best, providing the “specs” but not yet a model for his hypothesized perceptual symbols.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  4. Locking on to the language of thought.Christopher David Viger - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):203-215.
    I demonstrate that locking on, a key notion in Jerry Fodor's most recent theory of content, supplemented informational atomism (SIA), is cashed out in terms of asymmetric dependence, the central notion in his earlier theory of content. I use this result to argue that SIA is incompatible with the language of thought hypothesis because the constraints on the causal relations into which symbols can enter imposed by the theory of content preclude the causal relations needed between symbols for them to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  5.  54
    (1 other version)The possibility of subisomorphic experiential differences.Christopher D. Viger - 1999 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 22 (6):975-975.
    Palmer=s main intuition pump, the Acolor machine, @ greatly underestimates the complexity of a system isomorphic in color experience to humans. The neuroscientific picture of this complexity makes clear that the brain actively produces our experiences by processes that science can investigate, thereby supporting functionalism and leaving no (color) room for a passive observer to witness subisomorphic experiential differences.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation