in a nachlass fragment of 1888, Nietzsche refers to psychology as "Affektenlehre"—the doctrine or theory of the affects.1 Given his contention elsewhere that psychology represents the "path to the fundamental problems", it should come as no surprise that Nietzsche makes reference to affects in numerous prominent passages, and throughout some of his most important works.2 Yet, as Peter Poellner has claimed, one might "feel that not much is gained by [Nietzsche's] assertions in the absence of a detailed account of what (...) 'affects' are supposed to be". Literature on the topic has focused predominantly on the roles ascribed to affects in his moral... (shrink)

ABSTRACTWhile much recent attention has been directed towards Nietzsche’s reflections on the mind, and on consciousness in particular, his often-suggestive comments about thinking have thus far avoided comparable scrutiny. Starting from Nietzsche’s claims that we ‘think constantly, but [do] not know it’, and that only our conscious thinking ‘takes place in words,’ I draw out the distinct strands that underpin such remarks. The opening half of the paper focuses upon Nietzsche’s understanding of unconscious thinking, and the role of affects therein. (...) In what remains, I consider the difference between conscious and unconscious thought, with a particular focus on two important readings. The first, put forward by Paul Katsafanas, claims that conscious states alone have conceptually-articulated content. The second, defended most prominently by Mattia Riccardi, argues that Nietzsche’s various claims evince a form of HOT theory. I argue that neither reading is quite right, and instead propose an alternative interpretation of conscious thinking ‘in words’, which draws on work on inner speech. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

Alasdair MacIntyre noted that we appear to face a dilemma when engaging with the history of philosophy. Either we interpret great works “so as to make them relevant to our contemporary problems” or we read them “in their own terms, carefully preserving their idiosyncratic and specific character.” The former involves reshaping great thinkers into “what they would have been” had they been our philosophical contemporaries, and risks overlooking, downplaying, or distorting those features of their work that resist such efforts. The (...) latter approach, by contrast, threatens to resign the texts to a state such that “they cannot emerge into the present except as a set of museum pieces” (“The Relationship of Philosophy... (shrink)