11 found
Order:
See also
Christopher Frey
University of South Carolina
  1.  40
    G.E.M. Anscombe on the Analogical Unity of Intention in Perception and Action.Christopher Frey & Jennifer A. Frey - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (3):202-247.
    Philosophers of action and perception have reached a consensus: the term ‘intentionality’ has significantly different senses in their respective fields. But Anscombe argues that these distinct senses are analogically united in such a way that one cannot understand the concept if one focuses exclusively on its use in one’s preferred philosophical sub-discipline. She highlights three salient points of analogy: (i) intentional objects are given by expressions that employ a “description under which;” (ii) intentional descriptions are typically vague and indeterminate; and (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  2.  22
    From Blood to Flesh: Homonymy, Unity, and Ways of Being in Aristotle.Christopher Frey - 2015 - Ancient Philosophy 35 (2):375-394.
    My topic is the fundamental Aristotelian division between the animate and the inanimate. In particular, I discuss the transformation that occurs when an inanimate body comes to be ensouled. When nutriment is transformed into flesh it is first changed into blood. I argue that blood is unique in being, at one and the same time, both animate and inanimate; it is inanimate nutriment in actuality (or in activity) and animate flesh in potentiality (or in capacity). I provide a detailed exposition (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  3. Two Conceptions of Soul in Aristotle.Christopher Frey - 2015 - In David Ebrey (ed.), Theory and Practice in Aristotle's Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 137-160.
    Aristotle outlines two methods in De Anima that one can employ when one investigates the soul. The first focuses on the exercises of a living organism’s vital capacities and the proper objects upon which these activities are directed. The second focuses on a living organism’s nature, its internal principle of movement and rest, and the single end for the sake of which this principle is exercised. I argue that these two methods yield importantly different, and prima facie incompatible, views about (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  4.  34
    Phenomenal Presence.Christopher Frey - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oup Usa. pp. 71-92.
    I argue that the most common interpretation of experiential transparency’s significance is laden with substantive and ultimately extraneous metaphysical commitments. I divest this inflated interpretation of its unwarranted encumbrances and consolidate the precipitate into a position I call core transparency. Core Transparency is a thesis about experience’s presentational character. The objects of perceptual experience are there, present to us, in a way that the objects of most beliefs and judgments are not. According to core transparency, it is in the disclosure (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  5. On the Rational Contribution of Experiential Transparency.Christopher Frey - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):721-732.
  6.  43
    Sensuous Experience, Phenomenal Presence, and Perceptual Availability.Christopher Frey - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (2):237-254.
    I argue that an experience’s sensuous elements play an ineliminable role in our being intentionally directed upon an entity through perception. More specifically, I argue that whenever we appreciate a sensuous element in experience, we appreciate an intrinsic and irreducibly phenomenal aspect of experience that I call phenomenal presence – an aspect of experience that I show is central to its presentational character – and that the appreciation of phenomenal presence is necessary for perceptual intentionality. If an experience is to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7. Organic Unity and the Matter of Man.Christopher Frey - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 32:167-204.
  8.  23
    Capacities and the Eternal in Metaphysics Θ.8 and De Caelo.Christopher Frey - 2015 - Phronesis 60 (1):88-126.
    _ Source: _Volume 60, Issue 1, pp 88 - 126 The dominant interpretation of Metaphysics Θ.8 commits Aristotle to the claim that the heavenly bodies’ eternal movements are not the exercises of capacities. Against this, I argue that these movements are the result of necessarily exercised capacities. I clarify what it is for a heavenly body to possess a nature and argue that a body’s nature cannot be a final cause unless the natural body possesses capacities that are exercised for (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  9.  11
    Greek Models of Mind and Self by A. A. Long. [REVIEW]Christopher Frey - 2015 - Review of Metaphysics 69 (1):145-146.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10.  3
    Einleitung.Christopher Frey - 1997 - Zeitschrift Für Evangelische Ethik 41 (1):161-161.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Aristotle on the Intellect and Limits of Natural Science.Christopher Frey - 2018 - In John E. Sisko (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in Antiquity: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 1. New York: Routledge. pp. 160-174.
    To which science, if any, does the intellect’s study belong? Though the student of nature studies every other vital capacity, most interpreters maintain that Aristotle excludes the intellect from natural science’s domain. I survey the three main reasons that lead to this interpretation: the intellect (i) is not realized physiologically in a proprietary organ, (ii) its naturalistic study would corrupt natural science’s boundaries and leave no room for other forms of inquiry, and (iii) it is not, as all other vital (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark