I discuss what Aquinas’ doctrine of divine simplicity is, and what he takes to be its implications. I also discuss the extent to which Aquinas succeeds in motivating and defending those implications.

Saul Kripke, in a series of classic writings of the 1960s and 1970s, changed the face of metaphysics and philosophy of language. Christopher Hughes offers a careful exposition and critical analysis of Kripke's central ideas about names, necessity, and identity. He clears up some common misunderstandings of Kripke's views on rigid designation, causality and reference, and the necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori. Through his engagement with Kripke's ideas Hughes makes a significant contribution to ongoing debates on, inter alia, (...) the semantics of natural kind terms, the nature of natural kinds, the essentiality of origin and constitution, the relative merits of 'identitarian' and counterpart-theoretic accounts of modality, and the identity or otherwise of mental types and tokens with physical types and tokens. No specialist knowledge in either the philosophy of language or metaphysics is presupposed; Hughes's book will be valuable for anyone working on the ideas which Kripke made famous in the philosophy world. (shrink)

[I] Divine Simplicity: God and His Existence Types of Divine Simplicity Of the properties ascribed to God in Aquinas' natural theology, we may call one sort ...

Locke thought that it was impossible for there to be two things of the same kind in the same place at the same time. I offer (what looks to me like) a counterexample to that principle, involving two ships in the same place at the same time. I then consider two ways of explaining away, and one way of denying, the apparent counterexample of Locke's principle, and I argue that none is successful. I conclude that, although the case under discussion (...) does not refute Locke's principle, it constitutes a serious challenge to it. (shrink)

Sider has argued that four‐dimensionalism can be given a clear and coherent formulation, and has attempted to provide one. He has also argued that three‐dimensionalism resists adequate formulation. I argue that Sider's worries about whether there is an adequate formulation of three‐dimensionalism are misplaced, and suggest a formulation of three‐dimensionalism different from the ones considered and rejected by Sider. I then give a ‘matching’ formulation of four‐dimensionalism, and argue that it captures four‐dimensionalism better than Sider's own formulation of that doctrine.

Christopher Hughes; XII*—Is A Thing Just The Sum Of Its Parts?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 86, Issue 1, 1 June 1986, Pages 213–234, https:/.

Christopher Hughes; XII*—Is A Thing Just The Sum Of Its Parts?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 86, Issue 1, 1 June 1986, Pages 213–234, https:/.

Sider has argued that four‐dimensionalism can be given a clear and coherent formulation, and has attempted to provide one. He has also argued that three‐dimensionalism resists adequate formulation. I argue that Sider's worries about whether there is an adequate formulation of three‐dimensionalism are misplaced, and suggest a formulation of three‐dimensionalism different from the ones considered and rejected by Sider. I then give a ‘matching’ formulation of four‐dimensionalism, and argue that it captures four‐dimensionalism better than Sider's own formulation of that doctrine.

According to egalitarians, there is no privileged now-possible history. Egalitarianism seems to provide an attractive way to reconcile openness and omniscience, but, I argue, it does not.

I argue that the Proslogion 2 argument rests on Meinongian assumptions, and Meinongianism is more defensible than many metaphysicians think, but although Meinongianism can be defended from objections, the most promising strategies for doing that call into question the cogency of the Proslogion 2 argument, so that argument is less than convincing, even if Meinongianism is true.

I set out three (modal) cosmological arguments – one for the existence of a necessary fact, one for the existence of a necessary event, and one for the existence of a necessary individual. Although the arguments do not have the same premisses or conclusions, they have the same structure. Moreover, I argue, given some plausible ancillary assumptions, any one of the arguments can be made to do the work of any of the others. I then suggest that the arguments are (...) inconclusive, because they depend on a doubtful principle linking contingency and explicability. (shrink)

Resumo Peter van Inwagen no seu An Essay of Free Will e, no muito mais tarde, “The Consequence Argument” formula várias versões daquilo que designou por “o argumento de consequência”. van Inwagen descreveu o “argumento da consequência” como um argumento para a incompatibilidade do determinismo com o livre arbítrio. Contudo, o autor deste artigo argumenta que a mais recente formulação do argumento da consequência não é, tal como está, um argumento para a incompatibilidade do determinismo com o livre arbítrio. Embora (...) possa ser transformado em um, não parece haver nenhuma maneira simples de transformá-lo em um argumento convincente para a incompatibilidade do determinismo com o livre arbítrio. Por isso, sugere-se, para a construção de um argumento convincente para a incompatibilidade do determinismo com o livre-arbítrio, que a melhor aposta passa pela reconstrução de uma definição do determinismo substancialmente diferente da de van Inwagen. Palavras-chave : argumento da consequência, determinismo, livre arbítrio, metafísica, van InwagenIn An Essay on Free Will, and in the much later “The Consequence Argument” Peter van Inwagen formulated various versions of what he calls “the consequence argument”. van Inwagen has described the consequence argument as an argument for the incompatibility of determinism with free will. But, I argue, the latest formulation of the consequence argument is not, as it stands, an argument for the incompatibility of determinism with free will. Although it can be turned into one, there does not seem to be any straightforward way of turning it into a cogent argument for the incompatibility of determinism with free will. I suggest that if we want to construct a cogent argument for the incompatibility of determinism with free will, our best bet is to start with a definition of determinism substantially different from van Inwagen’s. Keywords : consequence argument, determinism, free will, metaphysics, van Inwagen. (shrink)

First published in 2008. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Thomas Aquinas was the most influential philosopher of the Middle Ages, and one of the most famous Christian theologians of all time. His philosophy is a powerful synthesis of Aristotle and Plato presented within a Christian framework. His "five ways" to prove the existence of God are studied by undergraduates on many theology and philosophy of religion courses. Apart from his specifically theological works, he spent much of his time writing about metaphysics, all of which was to have important ramifications (...) for epistemology, philosophy of mind and ethics. Christophe Hughes focuses mostly on the philosophical Aquinas; beginning with a chapter on his life and works he goes on to discuss Aquinas's metaphysics and his theory of human beings in general, covering his ideas about body and soul, the mind, and free will. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas was the most influential philosopher of the Middle Ages, and one of the most famous Christian theologians of all time. His philosophy is a powerful synthesis of Aristotle and Plato presented within a Christian framework. His "five ways" to prove the existence of God are studied by undergraduates on many theology and philosophy of religion courses. Apart from his specifically theological works, he spent much of his time writing about metaphysics, all of which was to have important ramifications (...) for epistemology, philosophy of mind and ethics. Christophe Hughes focuses mostly on the philosophical Aquinas; beginning with a chapter on his life and works he goes on to discuss Aquinas's metaphysics and his theory of human beings in general, covering his ideas about body and soul, the mind, and free will. (shrink)

Port-wine birthmarks (PWBs) are caused by somatic, mosaic mutations in the G protein guanine nucleotide binding protein alpha subunit q (GNAQ) and are characterized by the formation of dilated, dysfunctional blood vessels in the dermis, eyes, and/or brain. Cutaneous PWBs can be treated by current dermatologic therapy, like laser intervention, to lighten the lesions and diminish nodules that occur in the lesion. Involvement of the eyes and/or brain can result in serious complications and this variation is termed Sturge-Weber syndrome (SWS). (...) Some of the biggest hurdles preventing development of new therapeutics are unanswered questions regarding disease biology and lack of models for drug screening. In this review, we discuss the current understanding of GNAQ signaling, the standard of care for patients, overlap with other GNAQ-associated or phenotypically similar diseases, as well as deficiencies in current in vivo and in vitro vascular malformation models. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas is one of the most important figures in the history of philosophy and philosophical theology. Relying on a deep understanding of Aristotle, Aquinas developed a metaphysical framework that is comprehensive, detailed, and flexible. Within that framework, he formulated a range of strikingly original and carefully explicated views in areas including natural theology, philosophy of mind, philosophical psychology, and ethics. In this book_, _Christopher Hughes focuses on Aquinas’s thought from an analytic philosophical perspective. After an overview of Aquinas’s life (...) and works, Hughes discusses Aquinas’s metaphysics, including his conception of substance, matter, and form, and his account of essence and existence; and his theory of the nature of human beings, including his critique of a substance dualism that Aquinas attributes to Plato, but is usually associated with Descartes. In the final chapters, Hughes discusses Aquinas’s account of the existence and nature of God, and his treatment of the problem of evil, as well as his ideas about the relation of goodness to being, choice, and happiness. Aquinas on Being, Goodness, and God is essential reading for students and scholars of Aquinas, and anyone interested in philosophy of religion or the history of medieval philosophy. (shrink)

Suppose there are possible worlds in which God exists but Anselm does not. Then (I argue) there are possible worlds in which Anselm does not exist, but God cannot even entertain the thought that he does not. In such worlds Anselm does not exist, but God does not know that. This, I argue, is incompatible with (a straightforward construal of) the doctrine of God's essential omniscience. Considerations involving negative existentials also call into question a certain picture of creation, on which (...) God chooses which particular (possible) individuals to create. They suggest that there is an element of brute contingency about which individuals exist. (shrink)