In response to a growing perception that America's youth lack the necessary values to grow and develop into adulthood in a socially healthy manner, character education has emerged as a rapidly growing proactive approach that serves to develop good character among young people. The authors examine several of the virtues thought to underlie good character from Character Counts!, a popular character education program, and emphasize the cultural complexities involved when promoting character education in a pluralistic society. 2012 APA, all rights (...) reserved). (shrink)
Suggests that acknowledging that social inquiry may be indelibly linked to ethical reflection raises difficult questions . There seem to be a few fundamental metatheoretical options available, each presuming some ontology of human existence and colored by at least a few basic moral or spiritual commitments. The options are briefly sketched, and their virtues and blind spots highlighted. The options include mainstream social science, "descriptivisms," liberal individualism, existential freedom, and contemporary hermeneutics. It is suggested that a hermeneutic view of social (...) theory as practice offers an alternative to both explanatory and constructionist accounts. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)
This article draws on hermeneutics and interactivism to challenge the prevailing dichotomization of culture/self and fact/value by proposing a theoretical perspective that culture provides a moral framework in which people are embedded and that cultural values and assumptions are distributed across different levels of knowing. I then address the problems of relativism raised by the claim that cultures are different moral topographies, and consider how hermeneutic dialogue is a way of working towards "truth without certainty." I conclude by suggesting that (...) mindfulness and contemplative practices offer tangible ways of fostering the openness required for hermeneutic dialogue and cultural learning. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)
This special double issue was borne out of a desire to bring together examples of current approaches to cultural theorizing in the field of psychology. These articles represent different ontological and epistemological positions from which one can consider the integration of culture and psychology. We see the first three articles as attempting to deepen our understanding of culture with conceptual framing and philosophical grounding that articulate the relationship of the cultural and the personal. These articles are committed to moving beyond (...) subject-object dualism towards a non-dualistic ontology. A second set of articles honors the existing work in the scientific tradition while proposing to bridge it with the interpretive approaches, creating metatheories as a result, and calling for methodological pluralism. One theme common to these articles is that bringing culture into psychology requires not only a broadening of theoretical perspectives, but also a greater inclusiveness in our epistemological and methodological commitments. Though we have tried to be inclusive, this present collection of articles is far from comprehensive in terms of the range of possible theoretical perspectives on culture. We invite future authors to turn the critical cultural lens on the theoretical efforts featured in this special issue, and to present other approaches that are not represented here. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)
Both the comic book series and TV show force us to confront our most cherished values and ask: would we still be able to hold onto these things in such a world? What are we allowed to do? What aren't we? Are there any boundaries left?
Our use of ‘I’, or something like it, is implicated in our self-regarding emotions, in the concern to survive, and so seems basic to ordinary human life. But why does that pattern of use require a referring term? Don't Lichtenberg's formulations show how we could have our ordinary pattern of use here without the first person? I argue that what explains our compulsion to regard the first person as a referring term is our ordinary causal thinking, which requires us to (...) find a persisting object as the mechanism that underpins the causal structure we naturally ascribe to the self. I thus argue against Peacocke's picture (2012), on which it's the cogito that explains one's knowledge of one's own existence. (shrink)