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  1. Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford (2009). Contextualism, SSI and the Factivity Problem. Analysis 69 (3):431-438.
    There is an apparent problem stemming from the factivity of knowledge that seems to afflict both contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism . 1 In this article, we will first explain how the problem arises for each theory, and then we will propose a uniform resolution.1. The factivity problem for contextualismLet K t stands for X knows _ at t. Let h stand for S has hands. According to contextualism, ‘K t’ is true as uttered in some ordinary conversational contexts. Let O (...)
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  2. Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford (2009). Thinking Animals and Epistemology. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):310-314.
    We consider one of Eric Olson's chief arguments for animalism about personal identity: the view that we are each identical to a human animal. The argument was originally given in Olson's book The Human Animal . Olson's argument presupposes an epistemological premise which we examine in detail. We argue that the premise is implausible and that Olson's defense of animalism is therefore in trouble.
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  3.  96
    Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford (2009). Bootstrapping and Knowledge of Reliability. Philosophical Studies 145 (3):407–412.
    This is a critical discussion of a paper on the problem of bootstrapping by Jose Zalabardo.
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  4. Christopher T. Buford (2010). Reply to Baumann on Factivity and Contextualism. Analysis 70 (3):486-489.
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  5.  78
    Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford (2012). A Tale of Two Fallibilists: On an Argument for Infallibilism. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):195-199.
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  6.  49
    Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford (2008). The Psychological Approach to Personal Identity: Non-Branching and the Individuation of Person Stages. Dialogue 47 (2):377.
    ABSTRACT: We begin by discussing some logical constraints on the psychological approach to personal identity. We consider a problem for the psychological approach that arises in fission cases. The problem engenders the need for a non-branching clause in a psychological account of the co-personality relation. We look at some difficulties in formulating such a clause. We end by rejecting a recently proposed formulation of non-branching. Our criticism of the formulation raises some interesting questions about the individuation of person stages.RÉSUMÉ: Ce (...)
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  7.  17
    Christopher T. Buford & Anthony Brueckner (2015). Effective Skeptical Arguments. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (1):55-60.
    _ Source: _Volume 5, Issue 1, pp 55 - 60 Peter Murphy has argued that effective skeptical scenarios all have the following feature: the subject involved in the scenario does not know that some ordinary proposition is true, even if the proposition is true in the scenario. So the standard “false belief” conception of skeptical scenarios is wrong, since the belief of the targeted proposition need not be mistaken in the scenario. Murphy then argues that this observation engenders a problem (...)
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  8.  66
    Christopher T. Buford (2013). Does Indeterminacy Matter? Theoria 79 (2):155-166.
    Derek Parfit has offered numerous arguments in an attempt to establish that identity is not what matters. Jens Johannson has recently argued that Parfit's various arguments for the claim that identity is not what matters fail to establish what Parfit takes such arguments to establish. Johannson contends that this is due in part to the invalidity of one of Parfit's key arguments, and the fact that Parfit ignores a position that is compatible with the conclusions of his successful arguments and (...)
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  9.  54
    Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford (2013). Becker on Epistemic Luck. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):171-175.
    Kelly Becker has argued that in an externalist anti-luck epistemology, we must hold that knowledge requires the satisfaction of both a modalized tracking condition and a process reliability condition. We raise various problems for the examples that are supposed to establish this claim.
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  10.  37
    Christopher T. Buford (2008). The Psychological Approach to Personal Identity. Dialogue 47 (2):377-386.
    We begin by discussing some logical constraints on the psychological approach to personal identity. We consider a problem for the psychological approach that arises in fission cases. The problem engenders the need for a non-branching clause in a psychological account of the co-personality relation. We look at some difficulties in formulating such a clause. We end by rejecting a recently proposed formulation of non-branching. Our criticism of the formulation raises some interesting questions about the individuation of person stages.
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