Following the speech act theory, we take hypotheses and assertions as linguistic acts with different illocutionary forces. We assume that a hypothesis is justified if there is at least a scintilla of evidence for the truth of its propositional content, while an assertion is justified when there is conclusive evidence that its propositional content is true. Here we extend the logical treatment for assertions given by Dalla Pozza and Garola by outlining a pragmatic logic for assertions and hypotheses. On the (...) basis of this extension we analyse the standard logical opposition relations for assertions and hypotheses. We formulate a pragmatic square of oppositions for assertions and a hexagon of oppositions for hypotheses. Finally, we give a mixed hexagon of oppositions to point out the opposition relations for assertions and hypotheses. (shrink)

In this paper we will give a critical account of Plantinga’s well-known argument to the effect that the existence of an omnipotent and morally perfect God is consistent with the actual presence of evil. After presenting Plantinga’s view, we critically discuss both the idea of divine knowledge of conditionals of freedom and the concept of transworld depravity. Then, we will sketch our own version of the Free-Will Defence, which maintains that moral evil depends on the misuse of human freedom. However, (...) our argument does not hinge on problematic metaphysical assumptions, but depends only on a certain definition of a free act and a particular interpretation of divine omniscience. (shrink)

The species concept is one of the central concepts in biological science. Although modern systematics speculates about the existence of a complex hierarchy of nested taxa, biological species are considered particularly important for the active role they play in evolution. However, neither theoretical biologists nor philosophers of biology have come to an agreement about what a species is. In this chapter, we address two questions pertaining to biological species: (1) are they individuals or universals? and (2) are they bona fide (...) or fiat entities? In section The Species-as-Individuals View, we illustrate the reasons that have led many scholars to support the view that species are individuals. In the next two sections, we show that the relational concepts of species – on which the species-as-individuals view is based – provide neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for species membership. This seriously undermines the species-as-individuals view. In the section A Conceptualist Model for the Metaphysics of Species, we advance the proposal that species are fiat concepts (and thus, universal entities partially dependent on the human mind) carved in a multi-dimensional space representing the properties that the biological organisms possess. The final section concludes. (shrink)

The pragmatic logic of assertions shows a connection between ignorance and decidability. In it, we can express pragmatic factual ignorance and first-order ignorance as well as some of their variants. We also show how some pragmatic versions of second-order ignorance and of Rumsfeld-ignorance may be formulated. A specific variant of second-order ignorance is particularly relevant. This indicates a strong pragmatic version of ignorance of ignorance, irreducible to any previous form of ignorance, which defines limits to what can justifiably be asserted (...) about higher-order ignorance. Finally, we relate the justified assertion of second-order ignorance with scientific assertions. (shrink)

Are identity criteria grounding principles? A prima facie answer to this question is positive. Specifically, two-level identity criteria can be taken as principles related to issues of identity among objects of a given kind compared with objects of a more basic kind. Moreover, they are grounding metaphysical principles of some objects with regard to others. In the first part of the paper we criticise this prima facie natural reading of identity criteria. This result does not mean that identity criteria could (...) not be taken as grounding principles. In the second part, we propose some basic steps towards a conceptual reading of grounding. Such a way of understanding it goes along with an epistemic reading of identity criteria. (shrink)

Following the speech act theory, we take hypotheses and assertions as linguistic acts with different illocutionary forces. We assume that a hypothesis is justified if there is at least a scintilla of evidence for the truth of its propositional content, while an assertion is justified when there is conclusive evidence that its propositional content is true. Here we extend the logical treatment for assertions given by Dalla Pozza and Garola (1995, Erkenntnis, 43, 81–109) by outlining a pragmatic logic for assertions (...) and hypotheses. On the basis of this extension we analyse the standard logical opposition relations for assertions and hypotheses. We formulate a pragmatic square of oppositions for assertions and a hexagon of oppositions for hypotheses. Finally, we give a mixed hexagon of oppositions to point out the opposition relations for assertions and hypotheses. (shrink)

The timeless solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom has many advantages. Still, the relationship between a timeless God and temporal beings is problematic in a number of ways. In this paper, we focus on the specific problems the timeless view has to deal with when certain assumptions on the metaphysics of time are taken on board. It is shown that on static conception of time God’s omniscience is easily accounted for, but human freedom is threatened, while (...) a dynamic conception has no problems with human freedom, but, on this view, some truths seem not to be knowable by a timeless God. We propose Fragmentalism as a metaphysics of time in which the divine timeless knowledge of temporal events and human freedom can be reconciled. -/- . (shrink)

In this paper, we will defend a particular version of the timeless solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. Our strategy is grounded on a particular temporal framework, which models the flow of time and a libertarian understanding of freedom. The propositions describing a certain act by an agent have an indeterminate truth value until the agent makes her choice; therefore, they become true or false when a decision is made. In order to account for this change (...) of truth value, a multiple frame structure is introduced in which every frame presents a privileged time, with its past and the possible alternative futures, which are still open. God atemporally knows all the frames and the truth values of propositions with respect to each one. Since divine knowledge of what an agent decides in a certain temporal frame depends on the agent’s act itself, divine knowledge does not conflict with the agent’s free will. (shrink)

In addressing the problem of the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom, philosophers of religion encounter problems regarding the metaphysics and structure of time. Some models of temporal logic developed for completely independent reasons have proved especially appropriate for representing the temporal structure of the world as Molinism conceives it. In particular, some models of the Thin Red Line ) seem to imply that conditionals of freedom are true or false, as Molinists maintain. Noting the resemblance between Molinism and (...) \ models, Restall Molinism: the contemporary debate, pp 227–239, 2011) has advanced some criticisms of Molinism that have also been leveled against \ models. In particular, Restall believes that the implication \ is not true in \ models. Because Molinists must also accept that this implication is not true, this is a problem for them. We will show that Restall’s criticism is wide of the mark. Firstly, it will be demonstrated that in many open future models ) the implication \ is invalid. Secondly, while it is possible to account for this implication, some modifications are required in respect of the branching time semantics. In proposing one such modification, we show that this new semantics can be adopted by advocates of the \ and, as a consequence, by Molinists as well. We conclude that the principle stated by Restall is either a problem for many open future models or can be accounted for by these models and so is not a problem for Molinists either. (shrink)

The idea of omnipotence plays a crucial role within the framework of classical theism. God is typically considered omnipotent, that is, able to perform any action. Sometimes, it is said that for God there is no difference between will and action; everything he wishes happens. However, as one reflects on the concept of omnipotence, some rather complex questions arise; the range of God’s possible “actions” is not clear. What are the boundaries of the power of an omnipotent being, if these (...) boundaries exist at all? In this paper, we will examine an interesting question: is it possible that two omnipotent beings exist? Or, does the property of omnipotence necessarily imply the uniqueness of its instantiation? Intuitively, the existence of more than one omnipotent being seems to be contradictory. However, we will demonstrate that under some conditions the existence of two omnipotent beings is possible. (shrink)

Hume’s Principle states that the cardinal number of the concept F is identical with the cardinal number of G if and only if F and G can be put into one-to-one correspondence. The Schwartzkopff-Rosen Principle is a modification of HP in terms of metaphysical grounding: it states that if the number of F is identical with the number of G, then this identity is grounded by the fact that F and G can be paired one-to-one, 353–373, 2011, 362). HP is (...) central to the neo-logicist program in the philosophy of mathematics ; in this paper we submit that, even if the neo-logicists wish to venture into the metaphysics of grounding, they can avoid the SR Principle. In Section 1 we introduce neo-logicism. In Sections 2 and 3 we examine the SR Principle. We then formulate an account of arithmetical facts which does not rest on the SR Principle; we finally argue that the neo-logicists should avoid the SR Principle in favour of this alternative proposal. (shrink)

The timeless solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom has many advantages. Still, the relationship between a timeless God and temporal beings is problematic in a number of ways. In this paper, we focus on the specific problems the timeless view has to deal with when certain assumptions on the metaphysics of time are taken on board. It is shown that on static conception of time God’s omniscience is easily accounted for, but human freedom is threatened, while (...) a dynamic conception has no problems with human freedom, but, on this view, some truths seem not to be knowable by a timeless God. We propose Fragmentalism as a metaphysics of time in which the divine timeless knowledge of temporal events and human freedom can be reconciled. (shrink)

This paper has a twofold aim. The first is to offer a precise definition of soft fact. Without such definition it is impossible to assess the Ockhamist solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom in an accurate way. The second purpose is to identify the costs of such a solution, distinguishing them from some of the other costs usually ascribed to Ockhamism, which Ockhamism does not actually need to pay. In particular, it is argued that Ockhamism is (...) committed to the view that a true future exists and to a form of backward causation. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is twofold: First, we present and develop a system of logic for pragmatics including the act of denial. Second, we analyse in our framework the so-called paradox of assertability. We show that it is possible to yield sentences that are not assertable. Moreover, under certain conditions, a symmetric result can be obtained: There is a specular paradox of deniability. However, this paradox is based on the problematic principle of classical denial equivalence.

The present paper is devoted to present two pragmatic logics and their corresponding intended interpretations according to which an illocutionary act of hypothesis-making is justified by a scintilla of evidence. The paper first introduces a general pragmatic frame for assertions, expanded to hypotheses, ${\mathsf{AH}}$ and a hypothetical pragmatic logic for evidence ${\mathsf{HLP}}$. Both ${\mathsf{AH}}$ and ${\mathsf{HLP}}$ are extensions of the Logic for Pragmatics, $\mathcal{L}^P$. We compare ${\mathsf{AH}}$ and $\mathsf{HLP}$. Then, we underline the expressive and inferential richness of both systems in (...) dealing with hypothetical judgements, especially when based on different, sometimes conflicting, evidence. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 20 The concept of soft facts is crucial for the Ockhamistic analysis of the divine knowledge of future contingents; moreover, this notion is important in itself because it concerns the structure of the facts that depend—in some sense—on other future facts. However, the debate on soft facts is often flawed by the unaware use of two different notions of soft facts. The facts of the first kind are supervenient on temporal facts: By bringing about a temporal (...) fact, the agent can bring about these facts. However, on the one hand, the determination of the existence of these facts does not affect the past; on the other hand, assimilating divine knowledge into this kind of facts does not help the Ockhamist. The authors will argue that, to vindicate Ockhamism, another definition of “soft fact” is necessary, which turns out to be much more demanding from a metaphysical point of view. (shrink)

In this paper, we have analyzed a number of solutions to the antinomy between divine foreknowledge and human freedom. If we assume that God is temporal, then a sort of backwards causation of past divine beliefs by future human acts must be acknowledged. Since this solution runs into difficulties, we consider the prospects of the view according to which God is outside time. A timeless and omniscient God seems to imply a B-theory of time and, at least at first glance, (...) seems to jeopardize human freedom. Therefore, we have examined what happens when a non-standard A-theory of time like Fragmentalism is assumed. We demonstrate that in this case the prospects of a timeless view of God are much better: both human freedom and divine knowledge of the results of human choices are preserved if this metaphysics of time is adopted. The costs of this solution are, however, very high. From the logical point of view, it rejects bivalence; from the metaphysical point of view, the world is regarded as fragmentary and incoherent. However, if one is ready to accept these costs, this solution is one of the most successful in the search for a solution to the centuries-old problem of the conciliation between divine foreknowledge and human freedom. (shrink)

Analytic philosophy of religion has witnessed a significant increase in interest in the ontological presuppositions of the various theological doctrines. This special issue collects new essays on various divine attributes.