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Claire Horisk [12]Claire Susan Horisk [1]
  1. Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions.Claire Horisk, Dorit Bar-On & William G. Lycan - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 101 (1):1 - 28.
  2.  42
    Dangerous jokes: how racism and sexism weaponize humor.Claire Horisk - 2024 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    In this book, Claire Horisk argues that the real problem with so-called offensive jokes-such as racist, sexist, and ethnic jokes-is not that they are offensive but that they are harmful, because they transmit and reinforce stereotypes and ideas that contribute to a network of unjust disadvantage for the derogated group. She distinguishes between belittling jokes, which shore up unjust disadvantage for social groups, and disparaging jokes, which derogate powerful groups such as doctors but do not contribute to unjust disadvantage. She (...)
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  3. The expressive role of truth in truth-conditional semantics.Claire Horisk - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):535–557.
    I define 'skim semantics' to be a Davidson-style truth-conditional semantics combined with a variety of deflationism about truth. The expressive role of truth in truth-conditional semantics precludes at least some kinds of skim semantics; thus I reject the idea that the challenge to skim semantics derives solely from Davidson's explanatory ambitions, and in particular from the 'truth doctrine', the view that the concept of truth plays a central explanatory role in Davidsonian theories of meaning for a language. The fate of (...)
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  4. Truth, Meaning, and Circularity.Claire Horisk - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (2):269-300.
    It is often argued that the combination of deflationism about truth and the truth-conditional theory of meaning is impossible for reasons of circularity. I distinguish, and reject, two strains of circularity argument. Arguments of the first strain hold that the combination has a circular account of the order in which one comes to know the meaning of a sentence and comes to know its truth condition. I show that these arguments fail to identify any circularity. Arguments of the second strain (...)
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  5.  24
    Can McGowan Explain Hepeating?Claire Horisk - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (3):519-527.
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  6. Explicit truth ascriptions.Claire Horisk - 2010 - In Cory Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
  7.  25
    Comments on Losonsky.Claire Horisk - 2004 - Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (2):185-188.
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  8.  76
    Meaning theory and communication.Claire Horisk - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (2):177–198.
    Strawson contends that the proper subject matter of a theory of meaning includes what is meant on an occasion of utterance. If his contention is correct, it rules out a recent proposal that Davidsonian semantic theory should limit its scope so that it does not capture the extension of what is meant or what is said. In this paper, I reject Strawson's arguments for his contention. Despite the persuasive ring of his claim that the essential character of linguistic rules is (...)
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  9.  41
    Pretense and Abstract Objects.Claire Horisk - 2003 - Southwest Philosophy Review 19 (2):85-88.
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  10.  17
    (In the Fiction/Myth) the Number Seventeen Crosses the Rubicon.Claire Horisk - 2003 - Southwest Philosophy Review 19 (1):125-134.
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  11.  32
    The Surprise Argument for Truth-Conditional Semantics.Claire Horisk - 2005 - ProtoSociology 21:20-40.
    Davidson’s Surprise argument promises to resolve a dispute that has arisen in contemporary formal semantics over the proper semantic value for a semantic theory. At issue are doubts that Pietroski raises about the compositionality of truth-conditions, and thereby about truthconditional semantics, which treats a truth value as the semantic value for a sentence. The dispute is recalcitrant because, as I show, Pietroski’s evidence that truth-conditions are not compositional can be explained away with attention to Cappelen and Lepore’s distinction between the (...)
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  12.  37
    What Should Deflationism be when it Grows up?Claire Horisk - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 125 (3):371-397.
    I argue that a popular brand of deflationism about truth, disquotationalism, does not adequately account for some central varieties of truth ascription. For example, given Boyle’s Law is “The product of pressure and volume is exactly a constant for an ideal gas”, disquotationalism does not explain why the blind ascription “Boyle’s Law is true” implies that the product of pressure and volume is exactly a constant for an ideal gas, and given Washington said only “Birds sing”, disquotationalism does not explain (...)
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