Can we make mistakes about what rationality requires? A natural answer is that we can, since it is a platitude that rational belief does not require truth; it is possible for a belief to be rational and mistaken, and this holds for any subject matter at all. However, the platitude causes trouble when applied to rationality itself. The possibility of rational mistakes about what rationality requires generates a puzzle. When combined with two further plausible claims – the enkratic principle, and (...) the claim that rational requirements apply universally – we get the result that rationality generates inconsistent requirements. One popular and attractive solution to the puzzle denies that it is possible to make rational mistakes about what rationality requires. I show why (contra Titelbaum (2015b), and Littlejohn (2015)) this solution is doomed to fail. (shrink)

The Enkratic Principle enjoys something of a protected status as a requirement of rationality. I argue that this status is undeserved, at least in the epistemic domain. Compliance with the principle should not be thought of as a requirement of epistemic rationality, but rather as defeasible indication of epistemic blamelessness. To show this, I present the Puzzle of Inconsistent Requirements, and argue that the best way to solve it is to distinguish two kinds of epistemic evaluation – requirement evaluations and (...) appraisal evaluations. This allows us to solve the puzzle while accommodating traditional motivations for thinking of the Enkratic Principle as a requirement of rationality. (shrink)

I argue that there are some situations in which it is praiseworthy to be motivated only by moral rightness de dicto, even if this results in wrongdoing. I consider a set of cases that are challenging for views that dispute this, prioritising concern for what is morally important in moral evaluation. In these cases, the agent is not concerned about what is morally important, does the wrong thing, but nevertheless seems praiseworthy rather than blameworthy. I argue that the views under (...) discussion cannot accommodate this, and should be amended to recognise that it is often praiseworthy to be motivated to do what is right. (shrink)

Is normative uncertainty like factual uncertainty? Should it have the same effects on our actions? Some have thought not. Those who defend an asymmetry between normative and factual uncertainty typically do so as part of the claim that our moral beliefs in general are irrelevant to both the moral value and the moral worth of our actions. Here I use the consideration of Jackson cases to challenge this view, arguing that we can explain away the apparent asymmetries between normative and (...) factual uncertainty by considering the particular features of the cases in greater detail. Such consideration shows that, in fact, normative and factual uncertainty are equally relevant to moral assessment. (shrink)

De Re Significance accounts of moral appraisal consider an agent’s responsiveness to a particular kind of reason, normative moral reasons de re, to be of central significance for moral appraisal. Here, I argue that such accounts find it difficult to accommodate some neuroatypical agents. I offer an alternative account of how an agent’s responsiveness to normative moral reasons affects moral appraisal – the Reasonable Expectations Account. According to this account, what is significant for appraisal is not the content of the (...) reasons an agent is responsive to, but rather whether she is responsive to the reasons it is reasonable to expect her to be responsive to, irrespective of their content. I argue that this account does a better job of dealing with neuroatypical agents, while agreeing with the De Re Significance accounts on more ordinary cases. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss Whiting’s (2021) account of rational belief and discuss some unresolved issues arising from its reliance on epistemic possibility and, by extension, perspective-relative aprioricity.

I argue for the unexceptionality of evidence about what rationality requires. Specifically, I argue that, as for other topics, one’s total evidence can sometimes support false beliefs about this. Despite being prima facie innocuous, a number of philosophers have recently denied this. Some have argued that the facts about what rationality requires are highly dependent on the agent’s situation and change depending on what that situation is like. (Bradley 2019). Others have argued that a particular subset of normative truths, those (...) concerning what epistemic rationality requires, have the special property of being ‘fixed points’—it is impossible to have total evidence that supports false belief about them. (Smithies 2012; Titelbaum 2015). Each of these kinds of exceptionality permits a solution to downstream theoretical problems that arise from the possibility of evidence supporting false belief about requirements of rationality. However, as I argue here, they incur heavy explanatory burdens that we should avoid. (shrink)

Is logic normative for belief? A standard approach to answering this question has been to investigate bridge principles relating claims of logical consequence to norms for belief. Although the question is naturally an epistemic one, bridge principles have typically been investigated in isolation from epistemic debates over the correct norms for belief. In this paper we tackle the question of whether logic is normative for belief by proposing a Kripkean model theory accounting for the interaction between logical, doxastic, epistemic and (...) deontic notions and using this model theory to show which bridge principles are implied by epistemic norms that we have independent reason to accept, for example, the knowledge norm and the truth norm. We propose a preliminary theory of the interaction between logical, doxastic, epistemic and deontic notions that has among its commitments bridge principles expressing how logic is normative for belief. We also show how our framework suggests that logic is exceptionally normative. (shrink)

:In his famous book Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer articulates a thesis he calls the “Moral Equality of Soldiers,” namely, the principle that combatants have an equal right to kill other combatants in war, regardless of the justice of the cause for which they are fighting. The Moral Equality Thesis, as I shall call it, is an essential component of traditional Just War Theory, in that it provides the basis for distinguishing the jus in bello from the jus ad (...) bellum. It also plays a crucial role in identifying the nature of the difference between combatants and civilians. The Moral Equality Thesis has recently come under attack by scholars of Just War Theory, notably philosopher Jeff McMahan, on the grounds that killing for immoral purposes cannot be justified, and so it cannot be true that combatants all have an equal right to kill, regardless of the justice of their cause. In this essay, I defend the Moral Equality Thesis in its traditional formulation. Without it, I argue, the rule of law would not apply in war. The failure to recognize the equal right of combatants to kill in war, I suggest, creates an inconsistency between the rules of war and basic concepts in the law and morality of self-defense, an inconsistency that McMahan himself would think undesirable. I argue that McMahan’s argument applies more compellingly to armed conflict in asymmetrical warfare. Arguably, the Moral Equality Thesis does not apply in an armed conflict between combatants and unlawful combatants. In that context, the divergence from the law and morality of self-defense is less of a concern. View HTML Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.KILLING IN WAR AND THE MORAL EQUALITY THESISVolume 32, Issue 2Claire Finkelstein DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052516000169Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. KILLING IN WAR AND THE MORAL EQUALITY THESISVolume 32, Issue 2Claire Finkelstein DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052516000169Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. KILLING IN WAR AND THE MORAL EQUALITY THESISVolume 32, Issue 2Claire Finkelstein DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052516000169Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

To assess the merits and demerits of the content of Culp’s educational programme, the paper does three things: First, it discusses whether Culp’s defence against conceivable objections manages to effectively dispel the charge of cosmopolitan arrogance. Second, it spells out one implication of epistemic modesty, which Culp considers a core competence to be imparted by citizenship education. Third, it reflects upon the tricky task of motivating individuals to comply with the demands of justice. Taken together, the paper argues that Culp’s (...) case is impressively strong but nevertheless tends to suffer from a rationalist constriction. It does not leave sufficient room for tradition in private life and public reasoning. This rationalist constriction is problematic from a normative philosophical, and especially a practice-oriented viewpoint. (shrink)

We offer an ecological (Gibsonian) alternative to cognitive (im)penetrability. Whereas Pylyshyn explains cognitive (im)penetrability by focusing solely on computations carried out by the nervous system, according to the ecological approach the perceiver as a knowing agent influences the entire animal-environmental system: in the determination of what constitutes the environment (affordances), what constitutes information, what information is detected and, thus, what is perceived.

Indeterminate Bodies organizes a number of theoretical and empirical studies around the concept and actuality of indeterminacy, as it relates to body and society. Located within the struggle to apprehend different categories of ‘body’ in the volatile flows of late-capital, indeterminacy is considered through such multiple incarnations as economy, contingency, inheritance, question, force, uncertainty, materiality and affective resistance to determination. While indeterminacy is often positioned as the ‘trouble’ or friction in subject/object knowledge-formation (framed as ontological or empirical challenge), it also (...) engenders affects such that some subjects are both in and out of recognition. Questions of indeterminacy overlap with work on imperceptibility, giving rise to interlocked questions about the modes of representation, categorization, inclusion, exclusion and sensibility in the production of bodies. We address the hesitancies, difficulties and necessities of working with and through indeterminacy in order open up new descriptions, visions and modes of political work. (shrink)

By drawing attention to these facts and to the relationship between Cantor’s and Husserl's ideas, I have tried to contribute to putting Frege's attack on Husserl "in the proper light" by providing some insight into some of the issues underling criticisms which Frege himself suggested were not purely aimed at Husserl's book. I have tried to undermine the popular idea that Frege's review of the Philosophy of Arithmetic is a straightforward, objective assessment of Husserl’s book, and to give some specific (...) reasons for thinking that the uncritical reading of Frege's review has unfairly distorted philosophers' perception of a work they do not know very well. (shrink)

Disabled people frequently find themselves in situations where their quality of life and wellbeing is being measured or judged by others, whether in decisions about health care provision or assessments for social supports. Recent debates about wellbeing and how it might be assessed (through subjective and/or objective measures) have prompted a renewed focus on disabled people’s wellbeing because of its seemingly ‘anomalous’ nature; that is, whilst to external (objective) observers the wellbeing of disabled people appears poor, based on subjective assessments, (...) people with disabilities report a good quality of life. In this paper, I examine an article by the philosopher Dan Moller in which he seeks to explain this ‘disability paradox’. Despite agreeing with his analysis that there is more to what people value than happiness, his explanation reflects some of the difficulties presented in philosophical accounts which seek to understand the lives of disabled people: this includes an analysis which fails to problematise definitions of wellbeing and who has the ‘voice’ to do the defining; which negates the multiple identities and subject positions that disabled people occupy; and which lacks recognition of the social contexts which mediate disabled people’s lives. I suggest that there is a need to incorporate disabled people’s voices into research which deepens our empirical knowledge about the relationship between impairment and wellbeing, including the social circumstances that shape disabled people’s agency. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 13, Issue 6, pp 641 - 651 During the last three decades, moral philosophy has seen an increased interest in the ethics of special relationships. The relationship that has gained the most attention in recent years is the family. While there has been some progress in understanding family relationships and their ethical implications, there is still much theoretical ground to cover. In this special issue of the Journal of Moral Philosophy, we present four papers that discuss new (...) questions concerning the rights and duties that are implied by the relationship between parents and children. These include the question whether persons have a right to parent their biological offspring, or a duty to adopt a child, rather than create one; under which circumstances dependent children owe their parents gratitude for the care they provide; and how family relationships can lead to moral blackmailing and thus to moral exploitation of some of their members. (shrink)

Your phone and its apps know a lot about you. Who you are talking to and spending time with, where you go, what music, games, and movies you like, how you look, which news articles you read, who you find attractive, what you buy with your credit card and how many steps you take. Personal information about individual preferences, characteristics, and actions has turned digital. Nearly everything you might want to know about a person is available or can be inferred (...) from stored 1s and 0s. This information is already being exploited to sell us products, services, or politicians. Online traces allow companies like Google or Facebook to infer your political opinions, consumer preferences, whether you are a thrill-seeker, a pet lover, or a small employer, how probable it is that you will soon become a parent, or even whether you are likely to suffer from depression or insomnia. With the use of artificial intelligence and the further digitalization of human lives, it is no longer unthinkable that AI might come to know you better than you know yourself. Since knowing yourself and improving your life choices is advantageous in many ways, it might seem that an AI that lets you know who you are and what you should do would be great. I want to raise two reasons why it is not. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to an examination of Bolzano’s notion of necessary existence, which has so far received relatively little attention in the literature. We situate Bolzano’s ideas in their historical context and show how he proposed to correct various flaws of his predecessors’ definitions. Further, we relate Bolzano’s conception to his metaphysical and theological assumptions, arguing that some consequences of his definition which have been deemed counterintuitive by some of his interpreters turn out to be more reasonable given the (...) broadly Leibnizian background of his metaphysics. Finally, we consider some difficulties that arise from Bolzano’s evolving views on freedom, which, at least in his early thought, was intimately linked with contingency. In an appendix, we discuss a recent debate on Bolzano’s notion of necessary truth between Textor and Rusnock that has some bearing on our overall line of interpretation of Bolzano’s notion of necessary existence. (shrink)

« Les relations extraconjugales qui durent constituent une énigme qui dérange à la fois les normes conjugales, les normes amoureuses et les normes qui régissent la masculinité et la féminité » (p. 27). C’est sur cette énigme que se penche la sociologue Marie-Carmen Garcia, désireuse de traiter un sujet peu abordé en sociologie, soit parce qu’il reste sous le sceau du secret de la part des intéressés, soit par qu’il est jugé légèrement frivole, voire totalement inconvenant par les chercheuses...

The proposed national PrEP program would serve people who are uninsured as well as those enrolled in Medicaid. In this article, the authors propose a set of recommendations for the proposed program’s implementers as well as state Medicaid agencies and Medicaid managed care organizations to ensure PrEP access for people enrolled in Medicaid, addressing gaps without undermining the important role of the Medicaid program in covering and promoting PrEP.

In french and english speaking countries, the articulation between epistemological beliefs, conceptions of teaching and learning and pedagogical practices of secondary school teachers in the natural sciences and humanities has been little studied (Araújo-Oliveira, 2012 ; Bartos et Lederman, 2014 ; Wanlin et al., 2019). Yet, while teachers display predominantly constructivist beliefs about teaching and learning, their teaching practices remain rather passive (OECD, 2019). Like in Therriault et al. (2018-2023), this article explores the characteristics of epistemological beliefs, conceptions of teaching (...) and learning, and teaching practices among a population of 112 secondary school teachers (beginners, intermediate and experienced) in the humanities and natural sciences in French-speaking Belgium. In a second step, we explore the articulations between these three theoretical constructs either from statistical analyses or from a more interpretative perspective. Quantitative analysis of the data (PCA, factorial ANOVA, correlations and Chi-square) show that teachers’ epistemological beliefs are rather refined, that there is an effect of professional seniority on these beliefs and that there is a link between refined epistemological beliefs and traditional conceptions of teaching and learning. Finally, teachers’ self-reported practices appear to be insensitive to the discipline being taught. (shrink)

Collaborative forms of work such as extended networks, expert groups, and consortia increasingly structure biomedical activities. They are particularly prominent in the cancer field, where procedures such as multicenter clinical trials have been instrumental in establishing the specialty of oncology, and subfields such as cancer genetics, where bioclinical activities—for example, testing for breast and ovarian cancer genes and follow-up interventions—are predicated on the articulation of a number of tasks performed by new clinical collectives. In this article, we examine the founding (...) and development of a French bioclinical collective—the Groupe Génétique et Cancer —that coordinates and structures the activities of most French actors in cancer genetics and operates simultaneously in the clinical, research, and regulatory domains. To examine the group’s structure and dynamics, the article combines information gathered through traditional fieldwork methods with information elicited from a coauthorship and semantic-network analysis of the publications of GGC members from 1969 to 2001. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce qu'un enseignement? Une pensée? Qu'autorisent-ils? À la suite de Claire Brunet, Sandra Laugier et Frédérique Ildefonse qui dirigent ce volume, d'anciens étudiants, aujourd'hui chercheurs renommés ou plus discrets, creusent à travers le sillon de leur discipline ce que leur a permis l'enseignement de leur maître commune à l'École normale supérieure. Les amitiés intellectuelles s'y joignent. Ce que l'on appelle communément communication dans le monde académique devient texte. Tous, en creux, décrivent l'influence d'un enseignement, la liberté qu'il permet à (...) des esprits pour s'épanouir et nous laissent découvrir un portrait intellectuel d'une grande originalité. La pensée de Claude Imbert, philosophe, logicienne, longtemps directrice du département de philosophie de la rue d'Ulm, n'a pas les honneurs médiatiques français en sus des "académiques" d'usage. S'y prêterait-elle? Pourtant, la philosophe française est depuis plus de vingt ans lue, reçue et écoutée dans les universités du monde entier, des Etats-Unis à la Chine en passant par l'Amérique du Sud. Tous les textes rassemblés ici, comme autant de variations, sans jamais le dire, souhaitent contribuer à la reconnaissance de l'oeuvre. Un inédit "Ne rien oublier et tout apprendre" de la philosophe et un texte de Pascalle Monnier, écrivain, accompagnent le volume."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This article aims to characterise the visions of ecologisation found within scientific approaches embraced by different epistemic communities, and which have inspired empirical work and public action on agrifood system transitions. Based on comparative readings of works anchored in our two disciplinary fields (ecology and sociology), we identified six large ensembles of epistemic communities as well as their points of convergence and divergence. We identify six ideotypical visions of ecologisation based on the types of ‘relationships to nature’ embedded in these (...) large sets of epistemic communities: protectionism, functionalism, structuralism, post-structuralism, relational and pragmatist-experience-based. We suggest that pragmatist-experience-based approaches allow us to transcend two classical oppositions: between realism and constructivism, and between a conception of nature as passive and external as opposed to active and relational. Without claiming to offer a detailed analysis of these approaches, we hope that our work can be used as a tool to support reflection among scientists and other actors involved in agrifood system transitions. (shrink)

In letters that Husserl and Frege exchanged during late 1906 and early 1907, when it is thought that Frege abandoned his attempts to solve Russell's paradox, Husserl expressed his views about the "paradox". Studied here are three deep-rooted differences between their approaches to pure logic present beneath the surface in these letters. These differences concern Husserl's ideas about avoiding paradoxical consequences by shunning three potentially para-dox producing practices. Specifically, he saw the need for: 1) correctly drawing the line between meaning (...) analyses and logical analyses; 2) an epistemology of pure logic; 3) a subtler under-standing of the semantics of statements than Frege proposed. This study is part of a project to lend insight into the questions that Russell's paradox raises for logic and epistemology once signaled by Gödel, an admirer of Husserl's work. (shrink)

Offers over forty stories about individuals who have dealt with the loss of a loved one, and advice on handling situations surrounding death and dying such as talking with children about grief, suicide, and funeral arrangements.

Le propos est précédé par une illustration, la seule de l’ouvrage, extraite d’une Histoire de l’industrie du coton en Grande-Bretagne parue en 1835. Il s’agit de la reproduction d’un dessin représentant le processus d’impression de motifs sur du calicot. On y voit deux hommes travailler, de façon semble-t-il minutieuse, sur deux grandes machines installées dans un atelier spacieux. L’illustration est égayée par les motifs imprimés sur les pans de tissu, qui occupent une grande partie de l’esp..

For centuries, heirloom rice varieties have been grown on the terraces of the Cordillera Mountains of Luzon, Philippines, terroirs known for their significant historical, cultural, and aesthetic values. However, heritage heirloom rice farming is gradually being abandoned, mainly because of its lower productivity and the struggle of the sector to create a sustainable niche market for heirloom rice by branding its cultural, social, and nutritional values. We propose several demand-side intervention strategies for the valorization of heirloom rice. To support the (...) development of a segmented marketing strategy for heritage farming, we provide evidence on urban consumers’ willingness to purchase heirloom rice. We interviewed 500 urban consumers from Metro Manila in July–August 2015, who placed a purchasing bid on a kilogram of heirloom rice. Consumers’ bids averaged PHP 72.61 kg−1, which is less than half its current market price. This explains why heirloom rice struggles to gain market share in urban markets in the Philippines. Given this bid price, we estimate a potential market size of PHP 20.3 billion that could be created for heirloom rice and tapped into by heritage farmers. Findings further indicate that women, business owners, and consumers who buy packaged rice and eat pigmented rice are willing to pay more for heirloom rice. Finally, our evidence suggests that proper information framing will be necessary to create demand and support the valorization of heirloom rice to preserve cultural heritage and in situ biodiversity of rice landraces in the Philippines. (shrink)

Ce livre cherche à mettre en évidence les liens qui existent entre l’émergence de l’État moderne et le statut de la mère entre 1603 et 1675. L’association entre la mère nourricière et la nation anglaise, célébrée dans Richard II de Shakespeare comme « cette nourrice, cette matrice féconde en princes royaux » perdure et s’infléchit au xviie siècle. À partir de minutieuses analyses textuelles, développées dans cinq chapitres et présentées dans une foisonnante introduction, Rachel Trubowitz mont...

L'offre de services de géolocalisation via un téléphone mobile implique de connaître la localisation et l'identifiant du téléphone, donc de collecter des données relatives à un utilisateur identifié ou identifiable. À ce titre, la loi Informatique et Libertés exige que l'utilisateur consente en toute transparence à bénéficier d'un service géolocalisant et que ses données de localisation soient détruites ou anonymisées une fois la prestation fournie. Si, dans certains cas, l'utilisateur aspire à être localisé, dans d'autres cas, la personne concernée ignore (...) que sa position géographique est connue de tiers. Cette traçabilité subie laisse entrevoir de redoutables perspectives de contrôle ou d'abus tant de la part des services répressifs que des entreprises. L'enjeu ne porte pas uniquement sur les risques d'atteinte à la liberté d'aller et venir, et au respect de la vie privée. De façon plus pernicieuse, l'autonomie informationnelle et décisionnelle du citoyen peut être remise en cause.Location Based Services are information services that can be accessed with mobile phones. They rely on the system s knowledge of the geographical position and the identifier of the phone being used, and therefore on collecting data on an identified or identifiable user. In this respect, the French data protection act stipulates that users agree to be supplied with an LBS service on a fully transparent basis and that their location data must be erased or made anonymous once the service has been provided. In some cases, locationbased services are provided on the user s own request, but in other cases, the individual concerned is unaware of the fact that third parties know where s/he is. This creates potentialfor surveillance and misuse on the part of both police and businesses. What is at stake here is not only the right of individuals to freedom of movement and to privacy but also, and more perniciously, citizens autonomy with regard to information and decision-making. (shrink)

Written descriptions can be no more than passwords to this great game. Guy Debord In every job that must be done, there is an element of fun.Mary Poppins1This article, formerly known to us as “Citi...

Dans cette étude, qui procède d’une thèse de doctorat défendue à l’Université Lyon 3 en 2008, Flore Kimmel-Clauzet interroge la survie des grands poètes grecs dans l’imaginaire religieux, politique et culturel de l’Antiquité. C’est bel et bien de survie qu’il est question, puisque la présence des poètes dans la société grecque continue de se faire sentir longtemps après leur mort. En effet, les performances répétées de leur poésie les gardent au centre des préoccupations culturelles des cités...