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    The Mind Almost Works That Way.Clarke Murray - 2003 - Proceedings of the 1st Annual Hawaii International Conference on the Arts and Humanities.
    This paper proceeds in two parts. In the first part, I set out Fodor’s concerns about abduction in his recent books, The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way and In Critical Condition. In the second part, I attempt to meet these concerns by suggesting how - within the framework of the Massive Modularity Hypothesis - abduction functions, specifically in the context of means-end reasoning to connect Input Modules and Output Modules. My suggestion will be that natural selection is the Mother of (...)
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  2. Knowledge is Not a Conceptual Kind.Clarke Murray - 2004 - Proceedings of the 2nd Annual Hawaii International Conference on the Arts and Humanities.
    I argue that knowledge is a natural kind found in the modules of a massively modular mind. As such, it is not a conceptual kind. The result is that knowledge must be studied empirically and not by appeal to a priori analysis.
     
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  3. Natural Selection and Indexical Representation.Clarke Murray - 1996 - In Mathieu Marion Robert S. Cohen (ed.), Quebec Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Boston: Springer Press. pp. 50-61.
    In this defense of Reliabilism, I argue that there has been 'selection for' accurate indexical beliefs. I offer empirical evidence and examples to suggest that Steve Stich's defense of the opposite claim in The Fragmentation of Reason is misguided.
     
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  4. Reliability and Two Kinds of Epistemic Justification.Clarke Murray - 1987 - In Newton Garver Peter H. Hare (ed.), Naturalism and Rationality. Buffalo: Prometheus Press. pp. 159-170.
    In this paper, I argue that there are two kinds of epistemic justification: one is objective and the other, subjective. Internalists are interested in the subjective variety of justification. Externalists are interested in the objective notion of justification. A paper by Stewart Cohen fails to distinguish these two varieties of epistemic justification and, as a result, criticizes externalists for failing to address the internalist, subjective notion of epistemic justification. But, since that notion is not the one that externallists care about, (...)
     
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  5. An Evolutionary Solution to the Radical Concept Nativism Puzzle.Clarke Murray - 2007 - Adaptation and Representation Virtual Conference.
    I argue for an evolutionary solution to Fodor's radical concept nativism puzzle.
     
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  6. Toward Saving Nozick From Kripke.Clarke Murray & Fred Adams - 2003 - In W. Loffler P. Weingartner (ed.), Proceedings of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Kirchberg, Austria: The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 18-19.
    We argue that some key examples by Kripke involving red barns and such fail to provide any counterexample to Nozick's tracking theory of knowledge.
     
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