Hope has been an important topic in philosophy since its beginnings. One can identify three main sources of interest in hope: Hope can be relevant in a religious framework (for example, when Thomas Aquinas discusses hope as one of the theological virtues, or when Immanuel Kant discusses the question ‘What may I hope?’ in connection with God’s existence and immortality); hope has been assigned a positive role in politics (for example, by Ernst Bloch in his monumental Marxist work The Principle (...) of Hope, by John Rawls in his defence of a ‘realist utopia’ or by pragmatists like Richard Rorty and Cornel West); and hope has been considered part of the human moral psychology (for example, when treated as an emotion by ancient Greek philosophy or in accounts of the passions in the works of Enlightenment thinkers). In recent decades, there has been a surge of interest in hope in analytically oriented philosophy, which centres on the moral psychology of hope (see, for example, Martin 2013). This debate is animated by the questions of what hope is and when it is valuable and rational. In her fascinating book, Katie Stockdale proceeds from and contributes to this debate, but does so with a specific political interest: she investigates the role, value and rationality of hope in contexts of oppression, such as those caused by colonialism, racism and sexism. She engages with feminist approaches in moral, social and political philosophy and develops her account in dialogue with literary writings that provide real-world examples of experiences of hope and hopelessness. In doing so, Stockdale broadens the scope for thinking about hope and provides an admirable piece of philosophy that is connected to real experiences. One further significant—and in my view laudable—feature of her approach is that her aim is not to defend a uniquely positive role of hope, but rather to provide a nuanced discussion of its advantages and dangers, as well as the value of hopelessness (for example, as involved in bitterness). (shrink)

Presenting real life cases from clinical practice, this book claims that children can be conceived of as moral equals without ignoring the fact that they still are children and in need of strong family relationships. Drawing upon recent advances in childhood studies and its key feature, the ‘agentic child’, it uncovers the ideology of adultism which has seeped into much what has been written about childhood ethics. However, this book also critically examines those positions that do accord moral equality to (...) children but on grounds not strong enough to support their claim. It lays the groundwork for a theory of moral equality by assessing the concepts of parenthood, family, best interest, paternalism, and, above all, autonomy and trust which are so important in envisioning what we owe the child. It does not only show how children – like adults – should be considered moral agents from infancy but also how ethical theories addressing adults can significantly profit from recognizing this. The analysis takes into account contributions from European as well as American scholars and makes use of a wide range of ethical, psychological, cultural, and social-scientific research. (shrink)

A typical problem of modern medicine results from the gap between scientific knowledge and its application in individual cases. Whereas scientific knowledge is generalized and impersonal information, medical practice takes place under conditions which are singular, individual and irreversible. The paper examines whether prognosis is able to bridge this gap or hiatus theoreticus. It is shown that diagnosis of a single case always relies on prognostic considerations. The individual prognosis (as distinguished from the nosologic prognosis of a certain disease) enables (...) doctors to apply scientific knowledge and practice according to the actual situation, the history and personal preferences of the patient. Prognosis – not diagnosis – therefore legitimizes medical interference. A methodology of individual prognosis as the basis for a theory of practice is discussed. (shrink)

Moral distress is defined as the inability to act according to one’s own core values. During the COVID-19 pandemic, moral distress in medical personnel has gained attention, related to the impact of pandemic-associated factors, such as the uncertainty of treatment options for the virus and the accelerated pace of deaths. Measures to provide aid and mitigate the long-term pandemic effect on providers are starting to be designed. Yet, little has been said about the moral distress experienced by patients and the (...) relational and additive effect on provider moral distress. Pandemic-associated factors affecting moral distress in patients include the constraining effects of isolation on spiritual and religious traditions as well as the intentional separation of patients from their families. This paper will explore the idea that patients are suffering their own moral distress and further how this impacts the intensity of moral distress experienced by the providers—nurses and physicians. The paucity of research in this area with the implications on patient’s distress, decision making, and distress experienced by providers compels further investigation and analysis. (shrink)

The concept of citizenship in Europe after World War II faces two major challenges: migration and European integration. This introduction precedes a group of articles examining debates and law-making processes related to the concept of citizenship in Europe after World War II. The introduction sketches the historical development of citizenship in European representative democracies, taking into account four basic dimensions for analyzing changes in the concept of citizenship.

Eco-Islam is often discussed from a theological perspective, but there are hardly any studies on the activist’s practices, their experiences and reasoning. In order to fill this gap and to emphasise the importance of studying lived religion, this article presents three interviews with young Eco-Islam activists in Germany. By using the method of cultural analysis, the author compares, summarises and abstracts their statements and activities, so that a comprehensive configuration is revealed. Cultural analysis focuses on cultural constellations and tries to (...) think historical, social and biographical components together. To understand the Eco-Islam activist’s perspectives at a deeper cultural level, the author firstly represents a thick description of the statements and activities of her three respondents. Afterwards, she scrutinises the actors’ practices and processes by applying the dimensions of belief, practice and community on their everyday life and performative action. At last she filters three related themes on a cultural constellational level. Contribution: In this article, the author simultaneously highlights the implicit connections of eco-Islamic Activism to aspects of Othering and empowerment, aspects of (re-) interpretation of religious norms and aspects of transgressing environmental activism and the idea of an Islamic community. (shrink)

El avance de los estudios sobre filosofías socráticas ha permitido una vuelta renovada al examen de pasajes intertextuales en el corpus platónico. El presente trabajo explora pasaje del sueño de Teeteto, 201c ss. y sus vínculos con la filosofía antisténica. En primer lugar, analiza las características de esta obra en el contexto del diálogo socrático. En segundo lugar, traza las coordenadas exegéticas del pasaje del sueño, y finalmente, ofrece una interpretación de la filosofía antisténica que revela contactos relevantes con el (...) planteo platónico. Por esta vía, se despliega una hipótesis sobre el sentido general del diálogo y su modo de comprender el fenómeno del conocimiento. (shrink)

In this paper we consider the relations existing between four deductive systems that have been called categorial grammars and have relevant connections with linguistic investigations: the syntactic calculus, bilinear logic, compact bilinear logic and Curry''s semantic calculus.

INTRODUCTIONPhilosophical investigations of the concept of responsibility, mirroring its most common function in ordinary language and thought, have been geared for the most part to clarifying intuitions concerning moral and legal accountability for actions. But the resurgence of interest in ethical theories concerned with human virtues has resurrected old questions about our responsibility for our character, attitudes, and emotions. The philosophical tradition that takes virtues as a central moral category has taught us to think of virtues not only as involving (...) dispositions to actions, but also dispositions to desires and emotions. It has also taught us to think of actions as only one of the proper objects of moral evaluation, alongside, for example, motives, intentions, beliefs, desires, and emotions. So it is natural that interest in ethical theories concerned with the virtues would yield interest in responsibility for our attitudes and emotions.Robert Adams has already done much to draw our attention to the different concept of responsibility we are forced to define if we focus on our intuitions about moral accountability for emotions, attitudes, and beliefs, rather than for actions. See R. Adams, “The Virtue of Faith,” in Adams, The Virtue of Faith (Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 9–24; and “Involuntary Sins,” Philosophical Review 94 (1985): 3–31. I disagree with his account of responsibility for such states, but I am indebted to his illuminating discussions of the topics. Thomas Aquinas, who of course is one of the most important architects of the tradition that takes virtues to be central moral categories, holds a very complex set of views about our responsibility for our emotions. My aim in this essay is to develop and explain Aquinas’s views about whether and when, why, and to what extent we can be responsible for our emotions. I hope to show, in so doing, that his view is plausible, and fits well with some of our own conflicting intuitions about the question. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Environmental Atrocities and Non-Sentient LifeClaudia Card (bio)Environmental Atrocities and Non-Sentient Life1. To Whom (or to What) Can Evils Be Done?Mention of environmental atrocities calls to mind such catastrophes as major oil spills, which ruin the fishing (not to mention the fish) for extended periods. Such carelessness is not simply a disaster to human projects. It destroys or endangers species and ecosystems as well as individual organisms, plant and animal. (...) It pollutes waters that normally sustain life and interferes with the healthy development of new biotic communities. Not all environmental catastrophes result from of failures of attention. Massive deforestation with agent orange by U.S. armed forces during the war in Viet Nam was no accident.If culpably produced, such catastrophes are moral atrocities—major evils—at least to humans and other animals who suffer horribly or die miserable deaths. Intuitively, I lean toward the even stronger judgment that such culpable omissions and deeds are atrocities also in the sense of evils to a great many kinds of life, including non-sentient nature—plants, [End Page 23] species, biotic communities, and ecosystems. But can that intuition be sustained philosophically?To do so may require showing not only that non-sentient lives suffer but also that they create moral constraints. Some argue, using Kenneth Goodpaster's concept "moral considerability" (what a being has if it should receive direct moral consideration), that even non-sentient beings can constrain us morally in virtue of their having interests that give rise to rights or define a good, a wellbeing, that can be harmed.1 "Interests" here cannot refer, of course, to what the organism cares about. They refer, rather, to what it needs in order to survive, do well, even flourish; what is in the organism's interests is what contributes to its good or wellbeing.Yet thinking about evil has led me to distinguish questions of harm from questions of wrong, that is, of moral constraint. It is not always wrong to cause even extreme harm. In this essay I support the more modest thesis that the idea of "intolerable harm" is no barrier to the idea that environmental atrocities can be evils even to non-sentient life. The question remains whether there are other barriers. Evildoers not only cause intolerable harm but are culpably wrong to do it. To whom must that wrong be done? In concluding I turn briefly to that issue, raising more questions than I can currently answer. Some may be disappointed. Yet the limits of my ambitions in this essay do not make them trivial. For any plausible account of environmental atrocities in a sense that includes evil to non-sentient beings must be able to make sense of the idea of doing such entities intolerable harm and should also indicate something of the range of non-sentient beings so vulnerable and in what ways they are vulnerable. These are my present objectives.In my book The Atrocity Paradigm I develop the theory that evils are reasonably foreseeable intolerable harms produced (or supported, aggravated, maintained, and so on) by culpable wrongdoing.2 Taking atrocities, such as genocide, slavery, and saturation bombings of cities, as paradigm evils, I refer to this view as "the atrocity theory" of evils. It both draws on and mediates between stoic and utilitarian approaches to evil. On my theory, evils have two irreducibly distinct components, wrongdoing and harm, linked by causality. Evil is popularly equated with wickedness or moral turpitude. But on the atrocity theory, the depth of harm to victims, rather than perpetrators' motives, is usually what distinguishes evils from other wrongs.The atrocity theory not only focuses attention more on harm than on [End Page 24] wrongdoing but also directs attention to the grossest harms. Some of the worst damage culpably inflicted by human agents has been to the natural environment. Can such damage be downright evil? In my book I indicated that the atrocity theory was intended to make sense of evils done "to many living beings, not just people or even just sentient beings,"3 although I did not defend that idea or work out the details. The present essay attempts a working out of... (shrink)

The world population aged significantly over the twentieth century, leading to an increase in the number of individuals presenting progressive, incapacitating, incurable chronic-degenerative diseases. Advances in medicine to prolong life prompted the establishment of instruments to ensure their self-determination, namely the living will, which allows for an informed person to refuse a type of treatment considered unacceptable according to their set of values. From the knowledge on the progression of Alzheimer disease, it is possible to plan the medical care, even (...) though there is still no treatment available. Irreversible cognitive incapacity underlines the unrelenting loss of autonomy of the demented individual. Such a loss requires the provision of specific and permanent care. Major ethical issues are at stake in the physician–patient–family relationship, even when dementia is still at an early stage. The authors suggest that for an adequate health care planning in Alzheimer disease the living will can be presented to the patient in the early days of their geriatric care, as soon as the clinical, metabolic or even genetic diagnosis is accomplished. They also suggest that the appointment of a health care proxy should be done when the person is still in full enjoyment of his cognitive ability, and that the existence and scope of advance directives should be conveyed to any patient in the early stages of the disease. It follows that ethical guidelines should exist so that neurologists as well as other physicians that deal with these patients should discuss these issues as soon as possible after a diagnosis is reached. (shrink)

The essay articulates a rhapsodic reflection on the place of images, their surfacing, and the invisible that sustains them. By way of introduction, it focuses on (1) the initial scenes of Pasolini’s Medea (1969). Following this spellbinding sequence, it addresses (2) the abiding philosophical attraction to the phenomenon of dreams and visions. This will lead to (3) the story of a momentous flight from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Western coast of Italy, sometime during the VI century BCE. One of (...) the outcomes of this event was the founding of Velia, Elea in Attic Greek. These meanderings take us to the periphery of the region “we” call “the West.” More precisely, they point to the periphery of a certain received way of thinking and may contribute to unsettle it. For what begins to emerge from this rhapsody is an unusual profile of the most celebrated pre-classical thinker: Parmenides. (shrink)

Who or what counts as a feminist subject? This article considers the place of the child, in particular, within the framework of feminist theories of the subject. Locating these theories in a framework of ‘oppositional’ theory, the article asks how and when the child appears in this field of theory. Although children’s oppression and representations of the child in culture have been continuously addressed in contemporary feminism at least since the 1970s, it is simultaneously the case that the child appears (...) in feminism as well as other theories of the subject as the other to the presumed adult subject, even – and sometimes especially – when that subject is being retheorized in oppositional terms, that is, against a hegemonic order of things. The article focuses on instances of the child’s appearance as a resource in feminist theories of the subject, and particularly in feminist uses of psychoanalysis. After considering male poststructuralist or postmodern uses of the child, this article contrasts their generic use of the child with feminist uses of psychoanalysis in the work of Valerie Walkerdine, Judith Butler and Teresa de Lauretis. Psychoanalysis, even in its feminist guises, emerges as a technology of childhood that figures the child as the adult’s ontological origin, and as such an origin that the adult theorist can claim to know by way of psychoanalysis itself. Frequently constituted as a not-yet subject, the child stands in for this ontological origin, from which theorists of the subject, both feminist and not, refashion theories of subjective resistance to the very forms of power that make us subjects in the first place. Working both with and against feminist and other appropriations of the child by way of its ontological positioning, this article attempts to offer an alternative theorization of subjects that accounts for the differences between children and adults. While undercutting the claims to knowledge of the child as the site of human ontology, this alternative theorization also makes a claim to the transformative possibilities that have been located in ontology itself. In addressing feminist uses of the child together with theories of the feminist subject, this article speaks not only to questions of the child, but to the possibility of a feminist politics that begins from a position of privilege – that is, one that does not require subordination as a condition of its own possibility. (shrink)

The construct of autonomy appears in the literature associated with individual psychological wellbeing. In Ryff's model, autonomy is presented as one of the dimensions of wellbeing, along with self-acceptance, positive relationships with others, environmental mastery, purpose in life, and personal growth. The present study compared the levels of autonomy and psychological wellbeing between Spanish and Colombian young people. Ryff's Scale of Psychological Wellbeing and the Transition to Adulthood Autonomy (EDATVA according to its initials in Spanish) scales were used on a (...) sample of 1,146 young people aged between 16 and 21; 506 Spanish and 640 Colombian. Results showed differences in autonomy and in two of the four dimensions proposed by the EDATVA: self-organization and critical thinking. Similarly, important differences were observed in the subscales of positive relations and purpose in life. The importance of contextual factors in the development of psychological well-being and autonomy in young people in transition to adulthood is discussed. (shrink)

In football it was recently demonstrated, that patterns of motivational constructs in young talented football players are relatively stable in early adolescence, and are associated with specific performance related outcomes (Zuber, Zibung, & Conzelmann, 2015). The aim of the present study was to check whether the motivational patterns found in youth elite football also re-emerge in ice hockey, showing similar relations to performance. 135 young male ice hockey talents (MAge = 17.26, SD = 1.24) playing on the highest and second (...) highest level of their age group were questioned about five motivational constructs. Six months later, their coaches rated their players’ current game performance. The results demonstrated a very high similarity of the patterns in ice hockey with the ones earlier found in football. In terms of the transition to performance levels, the highly intrinsically achievement-oriented players were rated by their coaches as belonging to the top-level players significantly more often (OR = 2.6), whereas the non-achievement-oriented failure-fearing players show a higher chance to be rated as part of the lowest performance group (OR = 3.8). The results indicate the importance of achievement motivation for performance in ice hockey also, and this generalizability thus provides relevant clues which are important for consideration in national programs for talent identification across several sports. (shrink)

Animals are frequently utilized as a teaching-learning tool in multiple educational settings. It is, therefore, important to understand what students think about this topic, in particular medical and veterinary students as “life caregivers” and competent people for a dynamic and responsible social intervention. In this context, this research aims to characterize and disseminate a set of issues related to animal welfare/wellbeing in higher education in the North of Portugal, particularly as regards the teaching of students of the Integrated Master in (...) Medicine (MIM) and Veterinary Medicine (MIMV). After ethical approval, a survey was delivered on paper to 180 undergraduate MIM (n = 100) and MIMV (n = 80) students. After collecting 139 questionnaires partially or fully completed, with varying response rates for each question, it was concluded that most of the students consider that animal experimentation is ethically acceptable when the benefits balance the harms and assuming that refinement of animal procedures is warranted; they also agree to the establishment, maintenance and performance of animal procedures solely for educational purposes as a way of ensuring optimal acquisition of theoretical knowledge, attitudes and behaviors and technical skills. Nevertheless, it is the responsibility of teachers to explore and implement pedagogical methodologies thar are equally effective but more humane and compassionate towards sentient living beings. (shrink)

Reiner Schürmann’s late meditations on anarchy, in his engagements with Heidegger as well as Broken Hegemonies, unfold out of an unexpected ancestry—his early studies on Meister Eckhart. The fruits of such work date from the early ’70s, particularly the luminous Maître Eckhart et la joie errante (Schürmann 1972.1), but also a number of essays attesting the continuity, centrality, and consequentiality of this line of inquiry. In Schürmann’s reading of the Rhenish Master, the present essay especially highlights the question concerning ethics, (...) the status of praxis or, more precisely, the semantic torsion impressed upon the language of action. It also underscores Schürmann’s emphasis on the genuinely philosophical significance of Eckhart’s sermons and of mysticism as such, refusing to confine the theme of “knowing nothing” to the mystical experience and the theological elaborations thereof, as though this could be kept safely separated from the exercise of thinking. (shrink)

Physician-assisted dying is currently an intensely discussed topic in several countries. Despite differences in legislation and application, countries with end-of-life laws have similar eligibility criteria for assistance in dying: individuals must be in a hopeless situation and experience unbearable suffering. Hopelessness, as a basic aspect of the human condition, is a central topic in Albert Camus’ philosophical work The Myth of Sisyphus, which addresses the question of suicide. Suffering in the face of a hopeless situation, and the way doctors approach (...) this suffering, is the topic of his novel The Plague, which describes the story of a city confronted with a plague epidemic. In this paper, I draw philosophical and ethical conclusions about physician-assisted dying based on an analysis of central concepts in the work of Camus—specifically, those treated in The Myth of Sisyphus and The Plague. On the basis of my interpretation of Camus’ work, I argue that hopelessness and unbearable suffering are useless as eligibility criteria for physician-assisted dying, given that they do not sufficiently elucidate where the line should be drawn between patients who should to be eligible for assistance and those who should not. (shrink)

In this study we relate four different measures: the theodicy models proposed by van der Ven, the coping strategies proposed by Pargament, a measure of positive or negative self-image and the post critical belief scales we ourselves have developed. We analysed the data of 251 Dutch-speaking Belgians. In the analysis we focus on the relation of the different measures with the post critical belief scales. Different types of believers are using different theodicy models, somewhat different coping strategies and we observe (...) some differences in self-image, where believers have a more positive self-image than non-believers. We could suggest that there is a specific theodicy model used by symbolic believers and another theodicy model used by more literal believers. The former could be interpreted as more developed and perhaps more religiously mature. (shrink)

The testimonies of Stilpo of Megara show an anti-Platonic position within the megaric program against fundationists attempts. This paper studies a particular point of this deployment. We will review the origin of the views that locate thruth on the onomastic or on the predicative level. This initial survey will provide the basis for the study of the paradoxes of the nomination, an element Stilpo used as a tool to challenge the theory of Forms, and the analysis of the aporias of (...) predication, through which he rejects the combination of parts of the sentence in order to represent reality. The figure of Stilpo reveals the dialogical context in which ancient philosophies developed and, at the same time, displays ways of thinking the relationship between language and reality often forgotten. (shrink)

The interdisciplinary field of emotion studies disregarded historical perspectives on translation and left out a substantial body of scientific research on feelings and emotions that was not published in English. Yet these texts were foundational in forging the scientific concept of emotion in experimental psychology in the 19th century. The current approach to emotion science overlooks that translation issues occurred between three languages, German, French, and English, as physiological psychologists at the time were reading each other in these languages all (...) the while writing about the same topics in their respective language. Historical perspectives are important to clarify the ambiguities of emotion terms and include non-Anglophone frameworks into current transdisciplinary debates. (shrink)

Com esse trabalho procuramos percorrer alguns fragmentos do poema de Parmênides com o objetivo de apontar para o surgimento de uma tradiçáo ontológica seguida de perto por Platáo. Analisamos em seguida a disposiçáo ao parricídio apresentada no texto de “O Sofista”. Em nenhum momento desse diálogo, Platáo confronta a verdade do que é. Para fazer isso ele deveria se opor à primeira via de Parmênides e isso ele náo o faz. Ao contrário, garantindo o pensamento de Parmênides, o que ele (...) faz é apenas reforçar a tradiçáo filosófica do Ser. Pelo viés desse parricídio náo cumprido, ele reforçou o discurso de Parmênides e, por conseguinte, a própria ontologia. (shrink)

This chapter expresses that radical feminist perspectives on marriage and motherhood are in danger of being lost in the quest for equal rights. For more than a decade, feminist philosophers and lesbian/gay activists have been optimistic about the potentialities of legal marriage and legitimated motherhood. Feminist philosophers are taking as valuable theoretical paradigms for ethics many kinds of caring relationships that have been salient in women's lives. "Family" is itself a family resemblance concept. Apart from the institution of marriage and (...) historical ideals of the family, it is uncertain what characteristics mother‐child relationships would have, for many alternatives are possible. Historically, motherhood has been a core element of patriarchy. Moral philosophy might also be transformed by greater attention to the fact that adult experience and its potentialities are significantly conditioned by the childhoods of adults and of those children's relationships to adults. (shrink)

Este artigo é parte de uma pesquisa mais ampla que analisa os processos sociais e culturais envolvidos na condição da monoparentalidade feminina, enfatizando jornadas exaustivas e responsabilização pela economia dos cuidados e reprodução social da vida. Objetiva-se analisar como as estruturas opressoras patriarcais afetam e refletem nas vivências de mulheres que exercem a maternidade solo. A investigação se deu a partir da seguinte questão: Como a sobrecarga e os estereótipos promovidos pelo patriarcado colonialista, por meio da divisão sexual do trabalho, (...) atingem as mães solo? Ancora-se na abordagem da história oral e autoetnográfica, na pesquisa social-qualitativa bibliográfica e no estudo de campo, sob a perspectiva espistemológica feminista interseccional e decolonial. Constata-se que os empecilhos promovidos por tais estruturas opressoras impedem ou adiam processos emancipatórios e alocam famílias monoparentais femininas em lugares de vulnerabilidade financeira, afetiva e social. Entretanto, apesar destes obstáculos, as mães solo do recorte pesquisado, resistem e lutam pela emancipação financeira, social e emocional. (shrink)