I argue that our experience of time supports the B-Theory of time and not the A-Theory of time. We do not experience pastness, presentness, and futurity as mind-independent properties of events. My method in supporting this experiential claim is to show that our experience of presentness is like our experience of hereness--in neither case are we aware of a mind-independent property over and above the events or objects to which we ascribe the presentness or hereness.
The traditional description of A- and B-time is that the former consists of a mind-independent past, present, and future, and that the latter consists solely of the time relations--earlier than, simultaneous with, and later than. Although this description makes it look as if there are two clearly contrasting concepts of time, it does not differentiate the passage of A-time from the succession in B-time. Nor does it explain what it means for events in B-time to be equally real and for (...) events in A-time not to be equally real. I argue that although McTaggart and numerous others have thought that there is a difference between the two kinds of time, it remains undescribed. (shrink)
In a recent article entitled “Tensed Sentences and Free Repeatability” (The Philosophical Review,” 1973), Stephen E. Braude puts forward the following argument: (a) Nonsimultaneous replicas of tensed sentences have the same sense; (b) therefore, tensed sentences are not translatable into tenseless sentences. I point out that the plausibility of (a) depends on which theory of meaning is true. If the rules of use theory of meaning is true, then (a) is true, but if either the content or reference theory of (...) meaning is true, (a) is questionable. I also point out that some philosophers, such as Nelson Goodman and W. V. O. Quine, who deny (b) in order to make philosophical claims about the status of temporal becoming and perspicuous languages, do not state whether the equivalence of tensed and tenseless sentences is an equivalence of rules of use, content, or reference. Braude has shown that a rules of use version of (b) is true, but not that a content or reference version of (b) is true. (shrink)
I argue that the proper way to think of the difference between A- and B-time is not as the difference between transition and the lack of transition, as is common, but as A-transition and B-transition. However, it is not evident what the difference is between these two kinds of transition. Thus, it is not evident what the difference is between A- and B-time.
The common assumption in the debate between the A- and B-theories is that there is a difference between A- and B-time. A-time has been said to be characterized by a flow, whereas B-time has been said not to consist of a flow. This way of construing the debate, however, is mistaken. Both A- and B-time possess "flow" or transition. But if this is so, we need to ask how B-time flow differs from A-time flow. I argue that none of the (...) ways in which the difference has been characterized is satisfactory. My conclusion is that the debate between A- and B-time either needs to be recast or given up. (shrink)
Debate between the A- and B-theories has rested on the supposition that there is a clear difference between A- and B-time. I argue that this supposition is mistaken for two reasons. We cannot distinguish the two conceptions of time by means of Bergsonian intuition. Unless we can do so, we cannot distinguish them at all. I defend by imagining various ways to intuit the two kinds of time, and maintaining that none of them works. I defend by showing that the (...) issue is an experiential one, unlike metaphysical issues that are less connected to experience. My conclusion is that no progress will be made in the debate between the two theories until it becomes clear what the difference is between the two kinds of time. (shrink)
It is a commonplace that Kierkegaard believed Christians should adopt a stance of suspicion toward their beliefs. What appear to be genuine Christian beliefs may, he thought, really be spurious, not by virtue of being false, but by virtue of arising in illegitimate ways. Kierkegaard's works are replete with descriptions of these illegitimate ways – the psychological and sociological conditions that produce what people mistakenly take to be genuine Christian beliefs.
John Locke asserted that God could have, if he wished, given the ability to think, feel, and love to matter instead of to spirit. The inference he drew from this assertion was that all the "ends of morality and religion" could be accounted for even if people were purely material. Matter and spirit, therefore, are on a par with respect to these ends. I argue for this parity, concluding that it doesn't matter whether Christians are materialists or dualists.
Advocates of the A-Theory of time argue that pastness, presentness and futurity are mind-independent properties of events on the grounds that tensed and tenseless sentences are not semantically equivalent. However, their arguments for semantic nonequivalence do not entail state of affairs nonequivalence, and this latter nonequivalence must also obtain in order for the A-Theory to be true. The situation is like arguing that hereness and thisness are extra, mind-independent properties of places and objects on the grounds that sentences in which (...) "here" and "this" are used do not mean the same as their referential counterparts. Since we are not tempted to say that hereness is an extra property of places because of this semantic nonequivalence, we should not be tempted to say that presentness is an extra property of events because of the semantic nonequivalence of tensed and tenseless sentences. (shrink)
Virtues are rarely treated in introductory ethics courses; standard fare usually consists of ethical theory and contemporary social problems. These latter topics, however, do not "fit" our moral lives as closely as do the former, and studying them does not have as much effect on conduct as does studying virtues. For these reasons, it would be good to treat virtues in introductory ethics courses in addition to the standard topics.
In a previous paper I argued that there is conceptual parity between Christian materialism and Christian dualism because nonmatter is neutral with respect to thinking and feeling -- it might do these but it also might not. This undermines the explanatory power of immaterial souls. J. P. Moreland responded by saying that dualists reject this neutral conception of souls: souls are not generic immaterial substances, but consist of a special kind of nonmatter, namely, nonmatter whose essence it is to think (...) and feel. I reply that conceptual parity can still be maintained: Christian materialists can claim that brains are not neutral either, but consist of a special kind of matter, namely, thinking and feeling matter. So there is parity whether one adopts a topic-neutral approach or an essentialist approach. (shrink)
The theory of agency has been put forward to avoid the charge that uncaused actions are capricious. I argue that the introduction of agency does not remove the capriciousness that uncaused actions are said to have, because free actions, even with agency, still must possess those characteristics that the indeterminist’s uncaused actions possess: having no sufficient condition, and being able to be different even if all prior happenings and circumstances were the same. Moreover, an appeal to goals and purposes, though (...) blunting the charge of capriciousness, does not show how agency removes capriciousness, for the indeterminist can make the same appeal without mentioning agency. What I say does not refute the theory of agency, but only the claim that agency removes capriciousness from uncaused actions. (shrink)
Articles: "Generosity of Spirit" by Joseph Kupfer, "Gratitude and Justice" by Patrick Boleyn-Fitzgerald, "Humility" by Nancy Snow, "The Practice of Pride" by Tara Smith, "The Cognitive Structure of Compassion" by Martha C. Nussbaum, "Reasons for Love" by Robert C. Solomon, "The Value of Hope" by Luc Bovens, "Patience and Courage" by Eamonn Callan, "Forgivingness" by Robert C. Roberts, "Trust as an Affective Attitude" by Karen Jones.
