Results for 'Cognitive access'

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  1. Perceptual Consciousness Overflows Cognitive Access.Ned Block - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (12):567-575.
    One of the most important issues concerning the foundations ofconscious perception centerson thequestion of whether perceptual consciousness is rich or sparse. The overflow argument uses a form of ‘iconic memory’ toarguethatperceptual consciousnessisricher (i.e.,has a higher capacity) than cognitive access: when observing a complex scene we are conscious of more than we can report or think about. Recently, the overflow argumenthas been challenged both empirically and conceptually. This paper reviews the controversy, arguing that proponents of sparse perception are committed (...)
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  2. Does Perceptual Consciousness Overflow Cognitive Access? The Challenge From Probabilistic, Hierarchical Processes.Steven Gross & Jonathan Flombaum - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (3):358-391.
    Does perceptual consciousness require cognitive access? Ned Block argues that it does not. Central to his case are visual memory experiments that employ post-stimulus cueing—in particular, Sperling's classic partial report studies, change-detection work by Lamme and colleagues, and a recent paper by Bronfman and colleagues that exploits our perception of ‘gist’ properties. We argue contra Block that these experiments do not support his claim. Our reinterpretations differ from previous critics' in challenging as well a longstanding and common view (...)
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  3. Consciousness and Cognitive Access.Ned Block - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):289-317.
    This article concerns the interplay between two issues that involve both philosophy and neuroscience: whether the content of phenomenal consciousness is 'rich' or 'sparse', whether phenomenal consciousness goes beyond cognitive access, and how it would be possible for there to be evidence one way or the other.
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  4.  68
    Cognitive Access and Cognitive Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Issues.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):188-204.
    The well-known distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness has moved away from the conceptual domain into the empirical one, and the debate now is focused on whether the neural mechanisms of cognitive access are constitutive of the neural correlate of phenomenal consciousness. In this paper, I want to analyze the consequences that a negative reply to this question has for the cognitive phenomenology thesis – roughly the claim that there is a “proprietary” phenomenology of thoughts. (...)
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  5.  10
    Cognitive Accessibility Predicts Word Order of Couples’ Names in English and Japanese.Adele E. Goldberg & Karina Tachihara - 2020 - Cognitive Linguistics 31 (2):231-249.
    We investigate the order in which speakers produce the proper names of couples they know personally in English and Japanese, two languages with markedly different constituent word orders. Results demonstrate that speakers of both languages tend to produce the name of the person they feel closer to before the name of the other member of the couple. In this way, speakers’ unique personal histories give rise to a remarkably systematic linguistic generalization in both English and Japanese. Insofar as closeness serves (...)
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  6. Perceptual Consciousness and Cognitive Access From the Perspective of Capacity-Unlimited Working Memory.Steven Gross - forthcoming - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B.
    Theories of consciousness divide over whether perceptual consciousness is rich or sparse in specific representational content and whether it requires cognitive access. These two issues are often treated in tandem because of a shared assumption that the representational capacity of cognitive access is fairly limited. Recent research on working memory challenges this shared assumption. This paper argues that abandoning the assumption undermines post-cue-based “overflow” arguments, according to which perceptual conscious is rich and does not require (...) access. Abandoning it also dissociates the rich/sparse debate from the access question. The paper then explores attempts to reformulate overflow theses in ways that don’t require the assumption of limited capacity. Finally, it discusses the problem of relating seemingly non-probabilistic perceptual consciousness to the probabilistic representations posited by the models that challenge conceptions of cognitive access as capacity-limited. (shrink)
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  7.  15
    Cognitive Access to Numbers: The Philosophical Significance of Empirical Findings About Basic Number Abilities.Marcus Giaquinto - unknown
    How can we acquire a grasp of cardinal numbers, even the first very small positive cardinal numbers, given that they are abstract mathematical entities? That problem of cognitive access is the main focus of this paper. All the major rival views about the nature and existence of cardinal numbers face difficulties; and the view most consonant with our normal thought and talk about numbers, the view that cardinal numbers are sizes of sets, runs into the cognitive (...) problem. The source of the problem is the plausible assumption that cognitive access to something requires causal contact with it. It is argued that this assumption is in fact wrong, and that in this and similar cases we should accept that a certain recognise-and-distinguish capacity is sufficient for cognitive access. We can then go on to solve the cognitive access problem, and thereby support the set-size view of cardinal numbers, by paying attention to empirical findings about basic number abilities. To this end some selected studies of infants, pre-school children and a trained chimpanzee are briefly discussed. (shrink)
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  8. Sensorimotor Theory, Cognitive Access and the ‘Absolute’ Explanatory Gap.Victor Loughlin - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3):611-627.
    Sensorimotor Theory is the claim that it is our practical know-how of the relations between our environments and us that gives our environmental interactions their experiential qualities. Yet why should such interactions involve or be accompanied by experience? This is the ‘absolute’ gap question. Some proponents of SMT answer this question by arguing that our interactions with an environment involve experience when we cognitively access those interactions. In this paper, I aim to persuade proponents of SMT to accept the (...)
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  9.  31
    A Cognitive Access Definition of Privacy.Madison Powers - 1996 - Law and Philosophy 15 (4):369 - 386.
    Many of the contemporary disagreements regarding privacy are conceptual in nature. They concern the meaning or definition of privacy and the analytic basis of distinguishing privacy rights from other kinds of rights recognized within moral, political, or legal theories. The two main alternatives within this debate include reductionist views, which seek a narrow account of the kinds of invasions or intrusions distinctly involving privacy losses, and anti-reductionist theories, which treat a much broader array of interferences with a person as separate (...)
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  10.  32
    Phenomenological Overflow and Cognitive Access.David Rosenthal - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):522-523.
    I argue that the partial-report results Block cites do not establish that phenomenology overflows cognitive accessibility, as Block maintains. So, without additional argument, the mesh he sees between psychology and neuroscience is unsupported. I argue further that there is reason to hold, contra Block, that phenomenology does always involve some cognitive access to the relevant experience.
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  11.  28
    Phenomenal Consciousness and Cognitive Accessibility.Michael Tye - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):527-528.
    Block tries to show that the results of the Sperling experiment lend support to the view that phenomenology outstrips cognitive accessibility. I argue that Block fails to make a compelling case for this general claim on the basis of the Sperling data.
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  12.  39
    Contradictory Belief and Cognitive Access.Joseph I. Owens - 1989 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 14 (1):289-316.
  13.  74
    Phenomenal Consciousness, Representational Content and Cognitive Access: A Missing Link Between Two Debates.Hilla Jacobson - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):1021-1035.
    Two debates loom large in current discussions on phenomenal consciousness. One debate concerns the relation between phenomenal character and representational content. Representationalism affirms, whereas “content separatism” denies, that phenomenal character is exhausted by representational content. Another debate concerns the relation between phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access. “Access separatism” affirms, whereas, e.g., the global workspace model denies, that there are phenomenally conscious states that are not cognitively accessed. I will argue that the two separatist views are related. (...) separatism supports content separatism by undermining the most prominent sort of arguments in favor of representationalism, namely ones that appeal to the phenomenology of perceptual experiences. (shrink)
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  14.  18
    What is “Cognitive Accessibility” Accessibility To?Pierre Jacob - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):508-508.
    I first argue that some of Block's formulations may misleadingly suggest that the function of mechanisms of so-called cognitive accessibility is to make one aware, not of visible features of the visible world, but of one's own psychological life. I then ask whether Block's view of phenomenology in the present target article is consistent with his endorsement of non-representationalism elsewhere.
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  15. Cognitive Phenomenology, Access to Contents, and Inner Speech.Marta Jorba & Agustin Vicente - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (9-10):74-99.
    In this paper we introduce two issues relevantly related to the cognitive phenomenology debate, which, to our minds, have not been yet properly addressed: the relation between access and phenomenal consciousness in cognition and the relation between conscious thought and inner speech. In the first case, we ask for an explanation of how we have access to thought contents, and in the second case, an explanation of why is inner speech so pervasive in our conscious thinking. We (...)
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  16.  57
    Two Plus Blue Equals Green: Grapheme-Color Synesthesia Allows Cognitive Access to Numerical Information Via Color.J. Daniel McCarthy, Lianne N. Barnes, Bryan D. Alvarez & Gideon Paul Caplovitz - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1384-1392.
  17. What is Cognitive Access?Gilbert Harman - manuscript
    Block is concerned with the question whether there are cases of phenomenology in the absence of cognitive access. I assume that, more precisely, the question is whether there are cases in which a subject S has a phenomenological experience E to which S does not have direct cognitive access?
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  18. Phenomenal and Access Consciousness Ned Block and Cynthia MacDonald: Consciousness and Cognitive Access.Ned Block - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):289 - 317.
  19.  15
    Many Ways to Awareness: A Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Access.Carroll E. Izard, Paul C. Quinn & Steven B. Most - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):506-507.
    Block's target article makes a significant contribution toward sorting the neural bases of phenomenal consciousness from the neural systems that underlie cognitive access to it. However, data from developmental science suggest that cognitive access may be only one of several ways to access phenomenology. These data may also have implications for the visual-cognitive phenomena that Block uses to support his case.
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  20.  69
    What is Cognitively Accessed?Gilbert Harman - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):505-505.
    Is Block's issue about accessing an experience or its object? Having certain experiences appears to be incompatible with accessing the experience itself. And any experience of an object accesses that object. Such access either counts as cognitive or does not. Either way, Block's issue seems resolvable without appeal to the scientific considerations he describes.
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  21.  82
    Information Retrieval and Cognitive Accessibility.Palle Yourgrau - 1987 - Synthese 70 (February):229-246.
  22.  29
    Aristotle on Phainomenal Cognition: Accessibility and Epistemological Limitation.Raphael Zillig - 2019 - Manuscrito 42 (4):439-468.
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  23.  9
    Contradictory Beliefs and Cognitive Access.Halvor Nordby - 2003 - SATS 4 (1):116-127.
  24.  31
    How Chromatic Phenomenality Largely Overflow its Cognitive Accessibility.John Beeckmans - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (4):917-928.
    It has been suggested that the core neural bases for visual phenomenal consciousness and for access consciousness are located in anatomically separate regions. If this is correct, and if, as Block suggests, the core neural substrate of visual phenomenality is located early in the visual cortex where detailed chromatic information is available, then it would be reasonable to infer that our intuitions of chromatically rich visual phenomenality are plausible. It is furthermore suggested that during perception cognitive access (...)
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  25.  18
    Incomplete Stimulus Representations and the Loss of Cognitive Access in Cerebral Achromatopsia.Robert William Kentridge - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):508-509.
    When processing of stimuli occurs without attention, phenomenal experience, as well as cognitive access, may be lost. Sensory representations are, however, constructed by neural machinery extending far beyond sensory receptors. In conditions such as cerebral achromatopsia incomplete sensory representations may still elicit phenomenal experience but these representations might be too aberrant to be integrated into the wider cognitive workspace.
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  26.  35
    Subjects' Access to Cognitive Processes: Demand Characteristics and Verbal Report.John G. Adair & Barry Spinner - 1981 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 11 (1):31–52.
    The present paper examines the arguments and data presented by Nisbett and Wilson relevant to their thesis that subjects do not have access to their own cognitive processes. It is concluded that their review of previous research is selective and incomplete and that the data they present in behalf of their thesis does not withstand a demand characteristics analysis. Furthermore, their use of observer-subject similarity as evidence of subjects' inability to access cognitive processes makes tests of (...)
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  27.  2
    Partial Awareness Can Be Induced by Independent Cognitive Access to Different Spatial Frequencies.Cheongil Kim & Sang Chul Chong - 2021 - Cognition 212:104692.
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  28. The Problem of the Directness of the Cognitive Access to One's Own Mental States.Anita Pacholik-Zuromska - 2010 - Filozofia Nauki 18 (1):53.
  29.  19
    A Mindfulness-Based Decentering Technique Increases the Cognitive Accessibility of Health and Weight Loss Related Goals.Katy Tapper & Zoyah Ahmed - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  30. Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience.Ned Block - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.
    How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we could tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to (...)
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  31.  53
    Access, Phenomenology and Sorites.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2018 - Ratio 31 (3):285-293.
    The non-transitivity of the relation looks the same as has been used to argue that the relation has the same phenomenal character as is non-transitive—a result that jeopardizes certain theories of consciousness. In this paper, I argue against this conclusion while granting the premise by dissociating lookings and phenomenology; an idea that some might find counter-intuitive. However, such an intuition is left unsupported once phenomenology and cognitive access are distinguished from each other; a distinction that is conceptually and (...)
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  32.  38
    A Gap in Nisbett and Wilson’s Findings? A First-Person Access to Our Cognitive Processes.Claire Petitmengin, Anne Remillieux, Béatrice Cahour & Shirley Carter-Thomas - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2):654-669.
    The well-known experiments of Nisbett and Wilson lead to the conclusion that we have no introspective access to our decision-making processes. Johansson et al. have recently developed an original protocol consisting in manipulating covertly the relationship between the subjects’ intended choice and the outcome they were presented with: in 79.6% of cases, they do not detect the manipulation and provide an explanation of the choice they did not make, confirming the findings of Nisbett and Wilson. We have reproduced this (...)
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  33.  97
    Overflow, Access, and Attention.Ned Block - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):530-548.
    In this response to 32 commentators, I start by clarifying the overflow argument. I explain why the distinction between generic and specific phenomenology is important and why we are justified in acknowledging specific phenomenology in the overflow experiments. Other issues discussed are the relations among report, cognitive access, and attention; panpsychic disaster; the mesh between psychology and neuroscience; and whether consciousness exists.
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  34. Phenomenal Consciousness, Attention and Accessibility.Tobias Schlicht - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (3):309-334.
    This article re-examines Ned Block‘s ( 1997 , 2007 ) conceptual distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. His argument that we can have phenomenally conscious representations without being able to cognitively access them is criticized as not being supported by evidence. Instead, an alternative interpretation of the relevant empirical data is offered which leaves the link between phenomenology and accessibility intact. Moreover, it is shown that Block’s claim that phenomenology and accessibility have different neural substrates is highly (...)
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  35. Accessibility Versus Action-Centeredness in the Representation of Cognitive Skills.Ron Sun & Xi Zhang - unknown
    We believe that the distinction between procedural and declarative knowledge unnecessarily confounds two issues: action-centeredness and accessibility, and can be made clearer through separating the two aspects. The work presents an integrated model of skill learning that takes into account both implicit and explicit processes and both action-centered and non-action-centered knowledge. We examine and simulate human data in the Letter Counting task. The work shows how the data may be captured using either the action-centered knowledge alone or the combined action-centered (...)
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  36.  10
    Cognitive Strategy Accessibility as a Function of Task Requirement in Educable Mentally Retarded Adolescents.Leonard S. Blackman & Agnes Lin Burger - 1976 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 8 (3):221-223.
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  37. The Cognitive Ecology of the Internet.Paul Smart, Richard Heersmink & Robert Clowes - 2017 - In Stephen Cowley & Frederic Vallée-Tourangeau (eds.), Cognition Beyond the Brain: Computation, Interactivity and Human Artifice (2nd ed.). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 251-282.
    In this chapter, we analyze the relationships between the Internet and its users in terms of situated cognition theory. We first argue that the Internet is a new kind of cognitive ecology, providing almost constant access to a vast amount of digital information that is increasingly more integrated into our cognitive routines. We then briefly introduce situated cognition theory and its species of embedded, embodied, extended, distributed and collective cognition. Having thus set the stage, we begin by (...)
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  38. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
    The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory on the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of rival (...)
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  39. Cognition and the Web: Extended, Transactive, or Scaffolded?Richard Heersmink & John Sutton - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (1):139-164.
    In the history of external information systems, the World Wide Web presents a significant change in terms of the accessibility and amount of available information. Constant access to various kinds of online information has consequences for the way we think, act and remember. Philosophers and cognitive scientists have recently started to examine the interactions between the human mind and the Web, mainly focussing on the way online information influences our biological memory systems. In this article, we use concepts (...)
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  40. Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion and Cognitive Science.John R. Searle - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (1):585-642.
    Cognitive science typically postulates unconscious mental phenomena, computational or otherwise, to explain cognitive capacities. The mental phenomena in question are supposed to be inaccessible in principle to consciousness. I try to show that this is a mistake, because all unconscious intentionality must be accessible in principle to consciousness; we have no notion of intrinsic intentionality except in terms of its accessibility to consciousness. I call this claim the The argument for it proceeds in six steps. The essential point (...)
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  41. Extended Cognition and the Explosion of Knowledge.David Ludwig - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology (3):1-14.
    The aim of this article is to show that externalist accounts of cognition such as Clark and Chalmers' (1998) “active externalism” lead to an explosion of knowledge that is caused by online resources such as Wikipedia and Google. I argue that externalist accounts of cognition imply that subjects who integrate mobile Internet access in their cognitive routines have millions of standing beliefs on unexpected issues such as the birth dates of Moroccan politicians or the geographical coordinates of villages (...)
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  42. Dreams: An Empirical Way to Settle the Discussion Between Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Theories of Consciousness.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2014 - Synthese 191 (2):263-285.
    Cognitive theories claim, whereas non-cognitive theories deny, that cognitive access is constitutive of phenomenology. Evidence in favor of non-cognitive theories has recently been collected by Block and is based on the high capacity of participants in partial-report experiments compared to the capacity of the working memory. In reply, defenders of cognitive theories have searched for alternative interpretations of such results that make visual awareness compatible with the capacity of the working memory; and so the (...)
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  43.  62
    Cognitive Practices and Cognitive Character.Richard Menary - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):147 - 164.
    The argument of this paper is that we should think of the extension of cognitive abilities and cognitive character in integrationist terms. Cognitive abilities are extended by acquired practices of creating and manipulating information that is stored in a publicly accessible environment. I call these cognitive practices (2007). In contrast to Pritchard (2010) I argue that such processes are integrated into our cognitive characters rather than artefacts; such as notebooks. There are two routes to (...) extension that I contrast in the paper, the first I call artefact extension which is the now classic position of the causal coupling of an agent with an artefact. This approach needs to overcome the objection from cognitive outsourcing: that we simply get an artefact or tool to do the cognitive processing for us without extending our cognitive abilities. Enculturated cognition, by contrast, does not claim that artefacts themselves extend our cognitive abilities, but rather that the acquired practices for manipulating artefacts and the information stored in them extend our cognitive abilities (by augmenting and transforming them). In the rest of the paper I provide a series of arguments and cases which demonstrate that an enculturated approach works better for both epistemic and cognitive cases of the extension of ability and character. (shrink)
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  44.  42
    Understanding Perspectivism (Open Access): Scientific Challenges and Methodological Prospects.Michela Massimi & Casey D. Mccoy - 2020 - New York, NY, USA: Routledge.
    This edited collection is the first of its kind to explore the view called perspectivism in philosophy of science. The book brings together an array of essays that reflect on the methodological promises and scientific challenges of perspectivism in a variety of fields such as physics, biology, cognitive neuroscience, and cancer research, just as a few examples. What are the advantages of using a plurality of perspectives in a given scientific field and for interdisciplinary research? Can different perspectives be (...)
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  45.  64
    Pharmacological Cognitive Enhancement : How Neuroscientific Research Could Advance Ethical Debate.Hannah Maslen, Nadira Faulmüller & Julian Savulescu - unknown
    There are numerous ways people can improve their cognitive capacities: good nutrition and regular exercise can produce long-term improvements across many cognitive domains, whilst commonplace stimulants such as coffee temporarily boost levels of alertness and concentration. Effects like these have been well-documented in the medical literature and they raise few ethical issues. More recently, however, clinical research has shown that the off-label use of some pharmaceuticals can, under certain conditions, have modest cognition-improving effects. Substances such as methylphenidate and (...)
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  46. Is Vision Continuous with Cognition?: The Case for Cognitive Impenetrability of Visual Perception.Zenon Pylyshyn - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):341-365.
    Although the study of visual perception has made more progress in the past 40 years than any other area of cognitive science, there remain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to general cognition. This paper sets out some of the arguments for both sides and defends the position that an important part of visual perception, which may be called early vision or just vision, is prohibited from accessing relevant expectations, knowledge and utilities - in other words (...)
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  47. Embodied Cognition and Perception: Dewey, Science and Skepticism.Crippen Matthew - 2017 - Contemporary Pragmatism 14 (1):112-134.
    This article examines how Modern theories of mind remain even in some materialistic and hence ontologically anti-dualistic views; and shows how Dewey, anticipating Merleau-Ponty and 4E cognitive scientists, repudiates these theories. Throughout I place Dewey’s thought in the context of scientific inquiry, both recent and historical and including the cognitive as well as traditional sciences; and I show how he incorporated sciences of his day into his thought, while also anticipating enactive cognitive science. While emphasizing Dewey’s continued (...)
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  48.  29
    Accessing the Unsaid: The Role of Scalar Alternatives in Children’s Pragmatic Inference.David Barner, Neon Brooks & Alan Bale - 2011 - Cognition 118 (1):84-93.
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  49.  30
    Cognitive Science: A Philosophical Introduction.Rom Harré - 2002 - Sage Publications.
    This is the first major textbook to offer a truly comprehensive review of cognitive science in its fullest sense. Ranging across artificial intelligence models and cognitive psychology through to recent discursive and cultural theories Rom Harre offers a breathtakingly original yet accessible integration of the field. At its core this textbook addresses the question "is psychology a science?" with a clear account of scientific method and explanation and their bearing on psychological research. A pivotal figure in psychology and (...)
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  50.  90
    The Cognitive Integration of E-Memory.Robert W. Clowes - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (1):107-133.
    If we are flexible, hybrid and unfinished creatures that tend to incorporate or at least employ technological artefacts in our cognitive lives, then the sort of technological regime we live under should shape the kinds of minds we possess and the sorts of beings we are. E-Memory consists in digital systems and services we use to record, store and access digital memory traces to augment, re-use or replace organismic systems of memory. I consider the various advantages of extended (...)
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