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  1. Negative Truths From Positive Facts.Colin Cheyne & Charles Pigden - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):249 – 265.
    According to the truthmaker theory that we favour, all contingent truths are made true by existing facts or states of affairs. But if that is so, then it appears that we must accept the existence of the negative facts that are required to make negative truths (such as 'There is no hippopotamus in the room.') true. We deny the existence of negative facts, show how negative truths are made true by positive facts, point out where the (reluctant) advocates of negative (...)
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  2. Pythagorean Powers or a Challenge to Platonism.Colin Cheyne & Charles R. Pigden - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):639 – 645.
    The Quine/Putnam indispensability argument is regarded by many as the chief argument for the existence of platonic objects. We argue that this argument cannot establish what its proponents intend. The form of our argument is simple. Suppose indispensability to science is the only good reason for believing in the existence of platonic objects. Either the dispensability of mathematical objects to science can be demonstrated and, hence, there is no good reason for believing in the existence of platonic objects, or their (...)
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  3. Rationality and Reality: Conversations with Alan Musgrave.Colin Cheyne & John Worrall (eds.) - 2006 - Springer.
  4.  36
    Existence Claims and Causality.Colin Cheyne - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):34 – 47.
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  5.  94
    Getting in Touch with Numbers: Intuition and Mathematical Platonism.Colin Cheyne - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):111-125.
    Mathematics is about numbers, sets, functions, etc. and, according to one prominent view, these are abstract entities lacking causal powers and spatio-temporal location. If this is so, then it is a puzzle how we come to have knowledge of such remote entities. One suggestion is intuition. But `intuition' covers a range of notions. This paper identifies and examines those varieties of intuition which are most likely to play a role in the acquisition of our mathematical knowledge, and argues that none (...)
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  6. Necessary Existence and A Priori Knowledge.Colin Cheyne - unknown
    According to mathematical platonism, mathematical entities (e.g. numbers) exist as abstract objects. If numbers are abstract objects, then I doubt our ability to know of their existence.objects lack causal powers and spatio-temporal location. On the other hand, we human knowers exist within the causal nexus and are wholly spatio-temporal. So our epistemic isolation from abstract objects is total and unbridgeable (Benacerraf 1973, Cheyne 2001). Any version of mathematical platonism that is worth taking seriously must claim that we can and do (...)
     
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  7.  11
    Exploiting Placebo Effects for Therapeutic Benefit.Colin Cheyne - 2005 - Health Care Analysis 13 (3):177-188.
    It is widely believed that medically inert treatments (“placebos”) can bring about therapeutic benefits. There is also evidence that medically active treatments may also have “placebo” effects. Since anything that has the potential to benefit patients ought to be exploited, subject to appropriate ethical standards, it has been suggested that more should be done to investigate and exploit the power of the placebo for therapeutic benefit. I explore the acute epistemic and ethical constraints that such exploitation is likely to face, (...)
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  8. The Asymmetry of Formal Logic.Colin Cheyne - unknown
    By an argument form I shall mean a schema consisting of a string of symbols that are place-­‐holders for either logical terms or non-­‐logical (descriptive/content) terms: substituting terms of the appropriate kind for the symbols yields an argument. A substitution instance of an argument form is an argument that arises as a result of such a substitution. By a valid argument I shall mean an argument such that it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. (...)
     
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  9. Knowledge, Cause, and Abstract Objects Causal Objections to Platonism.Colin Cheyne - 2001
     
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  10.  67
    A Paradox of Justified Believing.Colin Cheyne - 2009 - Ratio 22 (3):278-290.
    The following principles may plausibly be included in a wide range of theories of epistemic justification: (1) There are circumstances in which an agent is justified in believing a falsehood, (2) There are circumstances in which an agent is justified in believing a principle of epistemic justification, (3) Beliefs acquired in compliance with a justifiably-believed epistemic principle are justified. I argue that it follows from these three individually plausible claims that an agent's belief may be both justified and unjustified. I (...)
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  11.  51
    Pythagorean Powers.Colin Cheyne & Charles R. Pigden - unknown
    The Quine/Putnam indispensability argument is regarded by many as the chief argument for the existence of platonic objects. We argue that this argument cannot establish what its proponents intend. The form of our argument is simple. Suppose indispensability to science is the only good reason for believing in the existence of platonic objects. Either the dispensability of mathematical objects to science can be demonstrated and, hence, there is no good reason for believing in the existence of platonic objects, or their (...)
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  12.  14
    Numbers, Reference, and Abstraction.Colin Cheyne - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 90 (1):291-315.
  13.  47
    Problems with Profligate Platonism.Colin Cheyne - 1999 - Philosophia Mathematica 7 (2):164-177.
    According to standard mathematical platonism, mathematical entities (numbers, sets, etc.) are abstract entities. As such, they lack causal powers and spatio-temporal location. Platonists owe us an account of how we acquire knowledge of this inaccessible mathematical realm. Some recent versions of mathematical platonism postulate a plenitude of mathematical entities, and Mark Balaguer has argued that, given the existence of such a plenitude, the attainment of mathematical knowledge is rendered non-problematic. I assess his epistemology for such a profligate platonism and find (...)
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  14.  33
    Reduction, Elimination, and Firewalking.Colin Cheyne - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (2):349-357.
    Schwartz (1991) argues that the worry that successful reduction would eliminate rather than conserve the mental is a needless worry. He examines cases of reduction from the natural sciences and claims that if reduction of the mental is like any of those cases then it would not be a case of elimination. I discuss other cases of scientific reduction which do involve elimination. Schwartz has not shown that reduction of the mental could not be like such cases, so his argument (...)
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  15.  13
    Epistemic Value and Fortuitous Truth.Colin Cheyne - 2010 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 1 (1):109-134.
    Why are the conditions for propositional knowledge so difficult to discover or devise in this post-Gettier age? Why do not most epistemologists agree on roughly the same analysis as they appear to have done in the pre-Gettier paradise? I argue that the problem lies in that fact that the epistemologists' intuitive concept of knowledge appeals to desiderata that probably cannot be satisfied. Unfortunately, if we abandon some of these desiderata, it is difficult to settle on a concept of knowledge which (...)
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  16.  1
    Getting in Touch with Numbers: Intuition and Mathematical Platonism.Colin Cheyne - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: A Quarterly Journal 57 (1):111-125.
    Mathematics is about numbers, sets, functions, etc. and, according to one prominent view, these are abstract entities lacking causal powers and spatio-temporal location. If this is so, then it is a puzzle how we come to have knowledge of such remote entities. One suggestion is intuition. But `intuition' covers a range of notions. This paper identifies and examines those varieties of intuition which are most likely to play a role in the acquisition of our mathematical knowledge, and argues that none (...)
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  17.  1
    Getting in Touch with Numbers: Intuition and Mathematical Platonism.Colin Cheyne - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):111-125.
    Mathematics is about numbers, sets, functions, etc. and, according to one prominent view, these are abstract entities lacking causal powers and spatio-temporal location. If this is so, then it is a puzzle how we come to have knowledge of such remote entities. One suggestion is intuition. But ‘intuition’ covers a range of notions. This paper identifies and examines those varieties of intuition which are most likely to playa role in the acquisition of our mathematical knowledge, and argues that none of (...)
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  18.  9
    Review. [REVIEW]Colin Cheyne - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1):140-142.
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  19. Epistemic Value and Fortuitous Truth.Colin Cheyne - 1997 - Principia: Revista Internacional de Epistemologia 1 (1):109-134.
    Why are the conditions for propositional knowledge so difficult to discover or devise in this post Gettier age? Why do not most epistemologists agree on roughly the same analysis as they appear to have done in the pre Gettier paradise? I argue that the problem lies In that fact that the epistemologists' intuitive concept of knowledge appeals to desiderata that probably cannot be satisfied. Unfortunately, if we abandon some of these desiderata, it is difficult to settle on a concept of (...)
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  20. Epistemic Value and Fortuitous Truth.Colin Cheyne - 1997 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 1 (1):109-134.
    Why are the conditions for propositional knowledge so difficult to discover or devise in this post-Gettier age? Why do not most epistemologists agree on roughly the same analysis as they appear to have done in the pre-Gettier paradise? I argue that the problem lies in that fact that the epistemologists intuitive concept of knowledge appeals to desiderata that probably cannot be satisfied. Unfortunately, if we abandon some of these desiderata, it is difficult to settle on a concept of knowledge which (...)
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