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  1.  88
    What Pain Asymbolia Really Shows.Colin Klein - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):493-516.
    Pain asymbolics feel pain, but act as if they are indifferent to it. Nikola Grahek argues that such patients present a clear counterexample to motivationalism about pain. I argue that Grahek has mischaracterized pain asymbolia. Properly understood, asymbolics have lost a general capacity to care about their bodily integrity. Asymbolics’ indifference to pain thus does not show something about the intrinsic nature of pain ; it shows something about the relationship between pains and subjects, and how that relationship might break (...)
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  2.  26
    What the Body Commands : The Imperative Theory of Pain.Colin Klein - unknown
    In What the Body Commands, Colin Klein proposes and defends a novel theory of pain. Klein argues that pains are imperative; they are sensations with a content, and that content is a command to protect the injured part of the body. He terms this view "imperativism about pain," and argues that imperativism can account for two puzzling features of pain: its strong motivating power and its uninformative nature. Klein argues that the biological purpose of pain is homeostatic; like hunger and (...)
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  3. An Imperative Theory of Pain.Colin Klein - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (10):517-532.
    forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy.
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  4.  57
    Cognitive Ontology and Region- Versus Network-Oriented Analyses.Colin Klein - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (5):952-960.
    The interpretation of functional imaging experiments is complicated by the pluripotency of brain regions. As there is a many-to-one mapping between cognitive functions and their neural substrates, region-based analyses of imaging data provide only weak support for cognitive theories. Price and Friston argue that we need a ‘cognitive ontology’ that abstractly categorizes the function of regions. I argue that abstract characterizations are unlikely to be cognitively interesting. I argue instead that we should attribute functions to regions in a context-sensitive manner. (...)
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  5. Reduction Without Reductionism: A Defence of Nagel on Connectability.Colin Klein - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):39-53.
    Unlike the overall framework of Ernest Nagel's work on reduction, his theory of intertheoretic connection still has life in it. It handles aptly cases where reduction requires complex representation of a target domain. Abandoning his formulation as too liberal was a mistake. Arguments that it is too liberal at best touch only Nagel's deductivist theory of explanation, not his condition of connectability. Taking this condition seriously gives a powerful view of reduction, but one which requires us to index explanatory power (...)
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  6. Images Are Not the Evidence in Neuroimaging.Colin Klein - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (2):265-278.
    fMRI promises to uncover the functional structure of the brain. I argue, however, that pictures of ‘brain activity' associated with fMRI experiments are poor evidence for functional claims. These neuroimages present the results of null hypothesis significance tests performed on fMRI data. Significance tests alone cannot provide evidence about the functional structure of causally dense systems, including the brain. Instead, neuroimages should be seen as indicating regions where further data analysis is warranted. This additional analysis rarely involves simple significance testing, (...)
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  7. Pain Signals Are Predominantly Imperative.Manolo Martínez & Colin Klein - 2016 - Biology and Philosophy 31 (2):283-298.
    Recent work on signaling has mostly focused on communication between organisms. The Lewis–Skyrms framework should be equally applicable to intra-organismic signaling. We present a Lewis–Skyrms signaling-game model of painful signaling, and use it to argue that the content of pain is predominantly imperative. We address several objections to the account, concluding that our model gives a productive framework within which to consider internal signaling.
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  8.  33
    What Do Predictive Coders Want?Colin Klein - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2541-2557.
    The so-called “dark room problem” makes vivd the challenges that purely predictive models face in accounting for motivation. I argue that the problem is a serious one. Proposals for solving the dark room problem via predictive coding architectures are either empirically inadequate or computationally intractable. The Free Energy principle might avoid the problem, but only at the cost of setting itself up as a highly idealized model, which is then literally false to the world. I draw at least one optimistic (...)
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  9.  12
    Brain Regions as Difference-Makers.Colin Klein - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (1-2):1-20.
    Contrastive neuroimaging is often taken to provide evidence about the localization of cognitive functions. After canvassing some problems with this approach, I offer an alternative: neuroimaging gives evidence about regions of the brain that bear difference-making relationships to psychological processes of interest. I distinguish between the specificity and what I call the systematicity of a difference-making relationship, and I show how at least some neuroimaging experiments can give evidence for systematic difference-making.
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  10. The Dual Track Theory of Moral Decision-Making: A Critique of the Neuroimaging Evidence.Colin Klein - 2011 - Neuroethics 4 (2):143-162.
    The dual-track theory of moral reasoning has received considerable attention due to the neuroimaging work of Greene et al. Greene et al. claimed that certain kinds of moral dilemmas activated brain regions specific to emotional responses, while others activated areas specific to cognition. This appears to indicate a dissociation between different types of moral reasoning. I re-evaluate these claims of specificity in light of subsequent empirical work. I argue that none of the cortical areas identified by Greene et al. are (...)
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  11.  21
    Hypocrisy and Moral Authority.Jessica Isserow & Colin Klein - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (2):191-222.
    Hypocrites invite moral opprobrium, and charges of hypocrisy are a significant and widespread feature of our moral lives. Yet it remains unclear what hypocrites have in common, or what is distinctively bad about them. We propose that hypocrites are persons who have undermined their claim to moral authority. Since this self-undermining can occur in a number of ways, our account construes hypocrisy as multiply realizable. As we explain, a person’s moral authority refers to a kind of standing that they occupy (...)
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  12. Philosophical Issues in Neuroimaging.Colin Klein - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (2):186-198.
    Functional neuroimaging (NI) technologies like Positron Emission Tomography and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) have revolutionized neuroscience, and provide crucial tools to link cognitive psychology and traditional neuroscientific models. A growing discipline of 'neurophilosophy' brings fMRI evidence to bear on traditional philosophical issues such as weakness of will, moral psychology, rational choice, social interaction, free will, and consciousness. NI has also attracted critical attention from psychologists and from philosophers of science. I review debates over the evidential status of fMRI, including (...)
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  13.  50
    Imperatives, Phantom Pains, and Hallucination by Presupposition.Colin Klein - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):917-928.
    Several authors have recently argued that the content of pains (and bodily sensations more generally) is imperative rather than descriptive. I show that such an account can help resolve competing intuitions about phantom limb pain. As imperatives, phantom pains are neither true nor false. However, phantom limb pains presuppose falsehoods, in the same way that any imperative which demands something impossible presupposes a falsehood. Phantom pains, like many chronic pains, are thus commands that cannot be satisfied. I conclude by showing (...)
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  14. Imperativism and Pain Intensity.Colin Klein & Manolo Martínez - forthcoming - In David Bain, Michael Brady & Jennifer Corns (eds.), The Nature of Pain.
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  15.  34
    What is a Cognitive Ontology, Anyway?Annelli Janssen, Colin Klein & Marc Slors - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (2):123-128.
    This special issue brings together philosophical perspectives on the debate over cognitive ontology. We contextualize the papers in this issue by considering several different senses of the term “cognitive ontology” and linking those debates to traditional debates in philosophy of mind.
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  16. Dispositional Implementation Solves the Superfluous Structure Problem.Colin Klein - 2008 - Synthese 165 (1):141 - 153.
    Consciousness supervenes on activity; computation supervenes on structure. Because of this, some argue, conscious states cannot supervene on computational ones. If true, this would present serious difficulties for computationalist analyses of consciousness (or, indeed, of any domain with properties that supervene on actual activity). I argue that the computationalist can avoid the Superfluous Structure Problem (SSP) by moving to a dispositional theory of implementation. On a dispositional theory, the activity of computation depends entirely on changes in the intrinsic properties of (...)
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  17.  15
    Mechanisms, Resources, and Background Conditions.Colin Klein - 2018 - Biology and Philosophy 33 (5-6):36.
    Distinguishing mechanistic components from mere causally relevant background conditions remains a difficulty for mechanistic accounts of explanation. By distinguishing resources from mechanical parts, I argue that we can more effectively draw this boundary. Further, the distinction makes obvious that there are distinctive resource explanations which are not captured by a traditional part-based mechanistic account. While this suggests a straightforward extension of the mechanistic model, I argue that incorporating resources and resource explanations requires moving beyond the purely local account of levels (...)
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  18.  35
    Decoding the Brain: Neural Representation and the Limits of Multivariate Pattern Analysis in Cognitive Neuroscience.J. Brendan Ritchie, David Michael Kaplan & Colin Klein - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axx023.
    Since its introduction, multivariate pattern analysis, or ‘neural decoding’, has transformed the field of cognitive neuroscience. Underlying its influence is a crucial inference, which we call the decoder’s dictum: if information can be decoded from patterns of neural activity, then this provides strong evidence about what information those patterns represent. Although the dictum is a widely held and well-motivated principle in decoding research, it has received scant philosophical attention. We critically evaluate the dictum, arguing that it is false: decodability is (...)
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  19.  55
    Confirmation, Refutation, and the Evidence of fMRI.Christopher Mole & Colin Klein - 2010 - In Stephen Hanson & Martin Bunzl (eds.), Foundational Issues in Human Brain Mapping. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 99.
    This chapter focuses on the confirmation, refutation, and evidence of functional magnetic resonance imaging data, and discusses the application of neuroimaging techniques to various fields, including cognitive sciences. It addresses the question of the role of neuroimaging data in providing informative evidence regarding hypotheses in cognitive science and explains differences in data, high-level null hypotheses, and ways to accommodate null hypotheses. Finally, the chapter looks into the scope of neuroimaging data in the cognitive sciences.
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  20.  18
    Pain, Care, and the Body: A Response to de Vignemont.Colin Klein - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):588-593.
    Frédérique de Vignemont argues on the basis of several empirical counterexamples that Bain and Klein are wrong about the relationship between pain and bodily care. I argue that the force of the putative counterexamples is weak. Properly understood, the association between pain and care is preserved in a way that is consistent with both de Vignemont's own views and the empirical facts.
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  21.  39
    The Penumbral Theory of Masochistic Pleasure.Colin Klein - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):41-55.
    Being whipped, getting a deep-tissue massage, eating hot chili peppers, running marathons, and getting tattooed are all painful. Sometimes they are also pleasant—or so many people claim. Masochistic pleasure consists in finding such experiences pleasant in addition to, and because of, the pain. Masochistic pleasure presents a philosophical puzzle. Pains hurt, they feel bad, and are aversive. Pleasures do the opposite. Thus many assume that the idea of a pleasant pain is downright unintelligible. I disagree. I claim that cases of (...)
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  22.  46
    Kicking the Kohler Habit.Colin Klein & Gabriel Love - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):609 – 619.
    Kohler's experiments with inverting goggles are often thought to support enactivism by showing that visual re-inversion occurs simultaneous with the return of sensorimotor skill. Closer examination reveals that Kohler's work does not show this. Recent work by Linden et al. shows that re-inversion, if it occurs at all, does not occur when the enactivist predicts. As such, the empirical evidence weighs against enactivism.
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  23.  17
    The Brain at Rest: What It Is Doing and Why That Matters.Colin Klein - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (5):974-985.
    Neuroimaging studies of the resting state continue to gather philosophical and scientific attention. Most discussions assume an identification between resting-state activity and activity in the so-called default mode network. I argue we should resist this identification, structuring my discussion around a dilemma first posed by Morcom and Fletcher. I offer an alternative view of rest as a state dominated by long-term processes and show how interaction effects might thereby let rest shed light on short-term changes in activation.
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  24.  38
    Consciousness, Intention, and Command-Following in the Vegetative State.Colin Klein - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (1):27-54.
    Some vegetative state patients show fMRI responses similar to those of healthy controls when instructed to perform mental imagery tasks. Many authors have argued that this provides evidence that such patients are in fact conscious, as response to commands requires intentional agency. I argue for an alternative reading, on which responsive patients have a deficit similar to that seen in severe forms of akinetic mutism. Akinetic mutism is marked by the inability to form and maintain intentions to act. Responsive patients (...)
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  25.  39
    Variability, Convergence, and Dimensions of Consciousness.Colin Klein & Jakob Hohwy - unknown
  26. Multiple Realizability and the Semantic View of Theories.Colin Klein - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):683-695.
    Multiply realizable properties are those whose realizers are physically diverse. It is often argued that theories which contain them are ipso facto irreducible. These arguments assume that physical explanations are restricted to the most specific descriptions possible of physical entities. This assumption is descriptively false, and philosophically unmotivated. I argue that it is a holdover from the late positivist axiomatic view of theories. A semantic view of theories, by contrast, correctly allows scientific explanations to be couched in the most perspicuous, (...)
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  27.  48
    Response to Tumulty on Pain and Imperatives.Colin Klein - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (10):554-557.
    Maura Tumulty has raised two objections to my imperative account of pain.1 First, she argues that there is a disanalogy between pains and other imperative sensations like itch, hunger, and thirst. Suppose (with Hall) one thinks that an itch says “Scratch here!”2 Scratch the itch, and it dutifully disappears. Not so with pain. The pain of a broken ankle has the content ‘Do not put weight on that ankle!’ Yet the coddled ankle still throbs: obeying the imperative does not extinguish (...)
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  28. Events as Changes in the Layout of Affordances.Anthony Chemero, Colin Klein & William Cordeiro - unknown
    In a target article that appeared in this journal, Thomas Stoffregen 2000 questions the possibility of ecological event perception research. This paper describes an experiments performed to examine the perception of the disappearance of gap-crossing affordances, a variety of event as defined by Chemero 2000. We found that subjects reliably perceive both gap-crossing affordances and the disappearance of gap-crossing affordances. Our findings provide empirical evidence in favor of understanding events as changes in the layout of affordances, shoring up event perception (...)
     
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  29. Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind. [REVIEW]Colin Klein - 2010 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 31 (3-4).
    Robert Rupert is well-known as a vigorous opponent of the hypothesis of extended cognition . His Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind is a first-rate development of his "systems-based" approach to demarcating the mind. The results are impressive. Rupert's account brings much-needed clarity to the often-frustrating debate over HEC: much more than just an attack on HEC, he gives a compelling picture of why the debate matters.
     
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  30. Critical Notice: Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind by Robert Rupert.Colin Klein - unknown
    Robert Rupert is well-known as an vigorous opponent of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC). His Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind is a first-rate development of his “systems-based” approach to demarcating the mind. The results are impressive. Rupert’s account brings much-needed clarity to the often-frustrating debate over HEC: much more than just an attack on HEC, he gives a compelling picture of why the debate matters.
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  31. Maudlin on Computation.Colin Klein - manuscript
    I argue that computationalism is compatible with a plausible supervenience thesis about conscious states. The most plausible way of making it compatible, however, involves abandoning counterfactual conditions on implementation.
     
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  32.  81
    An Ideal Solution to Disputes About Multiply Realized Kinds.Colin Klein - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):161 - 177.
    Multiply realizable kinds are scientifically problematic, for it appears that we should not expect discoveries about them to hold of other members of that kind. As such, it looks like MR kinds should have no place in the ontology of the special sciences. Many resist this conclusion, however, because we lack a positive account of the role that certain realization-unrestricted terms play in special science explanations. I argue that many such terms actually pick out idealizing models. Idealizing explanation has many (...)
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  33.  9
    Redeployed Functions Versus Spreading Activation: A Potential Confound.Colin Klein - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):280-281.
    Anderson's meta-analysis of fMRI data is subject to a potential confound. Areas identified as active may make no functional contribution to the task being studied, or may indicate regions involved in the coordination of functional networks rather than information processing per se. I suggest a way in which fMRI adaptation studies might provide a useful test between these alternatives.
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  34.  8
    Topic Modeling Reveals Distinct Interests Within an Online Conspiracy Forum.Colin Klein, Peter Clutton & Vince Polito - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  35. Significance, Evidence, and the Uncomfortable Science of fMRI.Colin Klein - unknown
    Functional magnetic resonance imaging (or fMRI)1 is widely used to support hypotheses about brain function. Many find the images produced from fMRI data to be especially compelling evidence for scientific hypotheses [McCabe and Castel, 2008]. There are many problems with all of this; I want to start with two of them, and argue that they get us closer to an under-appreciated worry about many imaging experiments.
     
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  36. Phantom Limbs and the Imperative Account of Pain.Colin Klein - unknown
    Amputation of a limb can result in the persistent hallucination that the limb is still present [Ramachandran and Hirstein, 1998]. Distressingly, these socalled ‘phantom limbs’ are often quite painful. Of a friend whose arm had been amputated due to gas gangrene, W.K. Livingston writes: I once asked him why the sense of tenseness in the hand was so frequently emphasized among his complaints. He asked me to clench my fingers over my thumb, flex my wrist, and raise the arm into (...)
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  37.  19
    Reliability in Cognitive Neuroscience: A Meta-Meta Analysis.Colin Klein - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (4):606-609.
    Reliability in Cognitive Neuroscience: A Meta-Meta Analysis. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.838818.
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  38. Error, Reference, and the First Horn of Hempel's Dilemma.Colin Klein - unknown
    It would be nice if our definition of ‘physical’ incorporated the distinctive content of physics. Attempts at such a definition quickly run into what’s known as Hempel’s dilemma. Briefly: when we talk about ‘physics’, we refer either to current physics or to some idealized version of physics. Current physics is likely wrong and so an unsuitable basis for a definition. ‘Ideal physics’ can’t itself be cashed out except as the science which has completed an accurate survey of the physical; appeals (...)
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  39.  9
    Olympia and Other O-Machines.Colin Klein - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):925-931.
    Against Maudlin, I argue that machines which merely reproduce a pre-programmed series of changes ought to be classed with Turing’s O-Machines even if they would counterfactually show Turing Machine-like activity. This can be seen on an interventionist picture of computational architectures, on which basic operations are the primitive loci for interventions. While constructions like Maudlin’s Olympia still compute, then, claims about them do not threaten philosophical arguments that depend on Turing Machine architectures and their computational equivalents.
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  40.  13
    Did the Chinese Have a Change of Heart?Esther Klein & Colin Klein - 2012 - Cognitive Science 36 (2):179-182.
    In their “The Prevalence of Mind-Body Dualism in Early China,” Slingerland and Chudek use a statistical analysis of the early Chinese corpus to argue for Weak Folk Dualism (WFD). We raise three methodological objections to their analysis. First, the change over time that they find is largely driven by genre. Second, the operationalization of WFD is potentially misleading. And, third, dating the texts they use is extremely controversial. We conclude with some positive remarks.
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  41. Idealization is Simplification, Not Representation.Colin Klein - unknown
    The problem with idealization is not just that, when idealizing, scientists ask us to suppose false things. Many people do that. No, the puzzling thing about idealizers—unlike astrologers, spodomancers, and homeopaths—is that it is worth listening to them. Supposing that populations of rabbits are in- finite is useful for a variety of ecological explanations. Yet we are not up to our necks in rabbits; the puzzle is why it should be useful to suppose that we are.
     
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  42.  4
    Alcino J. Silva, Anthony Landreth, and John Bickle, Engineering the Next Revolution in Neuroscience. New York: Oxford University Press , 204 Pp., $39.95. [REVIEW]Colin Klein - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (3):486-489.
  43. Spheres Are Not Multiply Realizable.Colin Klein - unknown
    Are spheres multiply realizable? A venerable tradition implies that they are. Putnam’s discussion of the peg and holes (in [Putnam, 1975]) is often taken to show that all volumetric shape properties are multiply realizable . The argument runs: (a) physics is the science of the “ultimate constituents” (Putnam’s phrase) of matter, and so (b) physics can only track the behavior of each of the simple constituents of a particular system, but (c) tediously tracking individual particles doesn’t make for a very (...)
     
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  44. Experimental Philosophy and Individual Differences: Some Pitfalls.Colin Klein - unknown
    Reasonable individuals can disagree about philosophical questions. This disagreement sometimes takes the form of conflicting intuitions; the seminar room provides many examples. Experimental philosophers, who have devoted themselves to the systematic study of intuitions, have found empirical support for what anecdotes suggest. Their data often reveals that a significant minority of subjects have intuitions counter to those of the majority.1 A recent replication of [Knobe, 2003a] discovered three distinct subgroups of subjects with three distinct patterns of response. Only about one-third (...)
     
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  45. Aristotle on Functionalism.Colin Klein - manuscript
  46. Idealization in Cognitive Psychology: A Case Study.Colin Klein - manuscript
    develops themes from the dissertation. I argue that two models of prosopagnosia are best understood as idealizing models, and as such are subject to importantly different methodological constraints from non-idealized theories of face recognition.
     
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  47. Toward an Accurate Phenomenology of Pain.Colin Klein - manuscript
     
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