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Colin P. Ruloff [9]Colin Ruloff [3]
  1.  87
    Swinburne on Basing and Deviant Inferential Pathways.Colin Ruloff - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (1):87-95.
    In his Epistemic Justification , Swinburne offers a sophisticated and intuitively plausible causal-doxastic analysis of the basing relation that has escaped the attention of those working on this relation, where the basing relation can be understood as the relation that holds between a reason and one’s belief when the belief is held for that reason. In this paper, I aim to fill this lacuna in the literature by arguing that, despite its initial plausibility, Swinburne’s analysis of the basing relation is (...)
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  2.  29
    Some Remarks on Bonjour on Warrant, Proper Function, and Defeasibility.Colin Ruloff - 2010 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 4 (2):215-228.
    A number of counterexamples have recently been leveled against Alvin Plantinga's Proper Functionalism, counterexamples aimed at showing that Plantinga's theory fails to provide sufficient conditions for warrant — that elusive epistemic property which together with true belief yields knowledge. Among these counterexamples, Laurence Bonjour's is perhaps the most formidable and, if successful, shows that Proper Functionalism is simply too weak to serve as an acceptable theory of warrant. In this paper, I argue that, contrary to initial appearances, BonJour's counterexample is (...)
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  3.  2
    Some Remarks on Bonjour on Warrant, Proper Function, and Defeasibility.Colin P. Ruloff - 2000 - Principia: Revista Internacional de Epistemologia 4 (2):215-228.
    A number of counterexamples have recently been leveled against Alvin Plantinga’s Proper Functionalism, counterexamples aimed at showing that Plantinga’s theory fails to provide sufficient conditions for warrant — that elusive epistemic property which together with true belief yields knowledge. Among these counterexamples, Laurence BonJour’s is perhaps the most formidable and, if successful, shows that Proper Functionalism is simply too weak to serve as an acceptable theory of warrant. In this paper, I argue that, contrary to initial appearances, BonJour’s counterexample is (...)
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  4.  92
    Epistemic Supervenience and Internalism: A Trilemma.Colin Ruloff - 2009 - Theoria 75 (2):129-151.
    Epistemic Internalism (EI) is the claim that an agent S is justified in believing that p at a time t iff S has either an actual or potential direct awareness of the grounds or properties that confer justification on p at t . In this paper I argue that EI does not provide the proponent of EI with an intuitively clear analysis of epistemic justification. More exactly, after identifying two different versions of EI – a weak version and a strong (...)
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  5.  4
    Some Remarks on Bonjour on Warrant, Proper Function, and Defeasibility.Colin P. Ruloff - 2000 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 4 (2):215-228.
    A number of counterexamples have recently been leveled against Alvin Plantinga's Proper Functionalism, counterexamples aimed at showing that Plantinga's theory fads to provide sufficient conditions for warrant — that elusive epistemic property which together with true belief yields knowledge Among these counterexamples, Laurence Bonjour s is perhaps the most formidable and, if successful, shows that Proper Functionalism is simply too weak to serve as an acceptable theory of warrant In this paper, I argue that, contrary to initial appearances, BonJour's counterexample (...)
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  6.  65
    Evidentialism, Warrant, and the Division of Epistemic Labor.Colin P. Ruloff - 2003 - Philosophia 31 (1-2):185-203.
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  7.  64
    Modal Stability and Warrant.Colin P. Ruloff - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (2):173-188.
    Keith DeRose believes that it is a strength of his contextualist analysis that it explains why the recently much-discussed skeptical Argument from Ignorance (AI) is so persuasive. Not only that, however; DeRose also believes that he is able to explain the underlying dynamics of AI by utilizing solely the epistemological and linguistic resources contained within his contextualist analysis. DeRose believes, in other words, that his contextualist analysis functions as a genuinely self-contained explanation of skepticism. But does it? In this paper (...)
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  8.  29
    Divine Thoughts and Fregean Propositional Realism.Colin P. Ruloff - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 76 (1):41-51.
    Anderson and Welty have recently advanced an argument for the claim that the laws of logic are ontologically dependent upon a necessarily existent mind, i.e. God. In this paper I argue that a key premise of Anderson and Welty’s argument—viz., a premise which asserts that \(x\) is intrinsically intentional only if \(x\) is mind-dependent—is false, for on a broadly Fregean account of propositions, propositions are intrinsically intentional but not mind-dependent.
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  9.  33
    Plantinga's S5 Modal Argument, Obvious Entailment, and Circularity.Colin P. Ruloff - 2004 - Philo 7 (1):71-78.
    In the second chapter of his Modality, Probability and Rationality, James Sennett argues that Plantinga’s famed S5 Modal Argument (hereafter “MA”) for the existence of an unsurpassably great being is objectionably circular since it’s impossible for one to understand the premises of Plantinga’s MA without understanding these premises to logically entail its conclusion. That is to say, Sennett’s charge is that Plantinga’s MA is circular since there is no understanding of the premises of Plantinga’s MA that is independent of its (...)
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  10.  5
    Plantinga’s S5 Modal Argument, Obvious Entailment, and Circularity: Response to Sennett.Colin P. Ruloff - 2004 - Philo 7 (1):71-78.
    In the second chapter of his Modality, Probability and Rationality, James Sennett argues that Plantinga’s famed S5 Modal Argument for the existence of an unsurpassably great being is objectionably circular since it’s impossible for one to understand the premises of Plantinga’s MA without understanding these premises to logically entail its conclusion. That is to say, Sennett’s charge is that Plantinga’s MA is circular since there is no understanding of the premises of Plantinga’s MA that is independent of its conclusion. In (...)
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  11. Mark Rowlands, Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again Reviewed By.Colin P. Ruloff - 2005 - Philosophy in Review 25 (3):215-217.
     
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  12. Ronney Mourad, Transcendental Arguments and Justified Christian Belief Reviewed By.Colin P. Ruloff - 2006 - Philosophy in Review 26 (1):52-54.