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Juan Comesaña
University of Arizona
  1. Evidentialist Reliabilism.Juan Comesaña - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):571-600.
    I argue for a theory that combines elements of reliabilism and evidentialism.
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  2.  80
    Rationality and Truth.Stewart Cohen & Juan Comesaña - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), The New Evil Demon. Oxford University Press.
    The traditional view in epistemology is that we must distinguish between being rational and being right (that is also, by the way, the traditional view about practical rationality). In his paper in this volume, Williamson proposes an alternative view according to which only beliefs that amount to knowledge are rational (and, thus, no false belief is rational). It is healthy to challenge tradition, in philosophy as much as elsewhere. But, in this instance, we think that tradition has it right. In (...)
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  3. Unsafe Knowledge.Juan Comesaña - 2005 - Synthese 146 (3):395-404.
    Ernest Sosa has argued that if someone knows that p, then his belief that p is “safe”. and Timothy Williamson has agreed. In this paper I argue that safety, as defined by Sosa, is not a necessary condition on knowledge – that we can have unsafe knowledge. I present Sosa’s definition of safety and a counterexample to it as a necessary condition on knowledge. I also argue that Sosa’s most recent refinements to the notion of safety don’t help him to (...)
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  4. A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem.Juan Comesaña - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (1):27-47.
  5. Williamson on Gettier Cases and Epistemic Logic.Stewart Cohen & Juan Comesaña - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):15-29.
    Timothy Williamson has fruitfully exploited formal resources to shed considerable light on the nature of knowledge. In the paper under examination, Williamson turns his attention to Gettier cases, showing how they can be motivated formally. At the same time, he disparages the kind of justification he thinks gives rise to these cases. He favors instead his own notion of justification for which Gettier cases cannot arise. We take issue both with his disparagement of the kind of justification that figures in (...)
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  6.  66
    Having False Reasons.Juan Comesaña & Matthew McGrath - 2014 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms. Oxford University Press. pp. 59-80.
  7. Is Evidence of Evidence Evidence?Eyal Tal & Juan Comesaña - 2017 - Noûs 51 (1):95-112.
    We examine whether the "evidence of evidence is evidence" principle is true. We distinguish several different versions of the principle and evaluate recent attacks on some of those versions. We argue that, whatever the merits of those attacks, they leave the more important rendition of the principle untouched. That version is, however, also subject to new kinds of counterexamples. We end by suggesting how to formulate a better version of the principle that takes into account those new counterexamples.
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  8. Perceptual Reasons.Juan Comesana & Matthew McGrath - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):991-1006.
    The two main theories of perceptual reasons in contemporary epistemology can be called Phenomenalism and Factualism. According to Phenomenalism, perceptual reasons are facts about experiences conceived of as phenomenal states, i.e., states individuated by phenomenal character, by what it’s like to be in them. According to Factualism, perceptual reasons are instead facts about the external objects perceived. The main problem with Factualism is that it struggles with bad cases: cases where perceived objects are not what they appear or where there (...)
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  9.  43
    Whither Evidentialist Reliabilism?Juan Comesaña - 2018 - In Kevin McCain (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence. Springer. pp. 307-25.
    Evidentialism and Reliabilism are two of the main contemporary theories of epistemic justification. Some authors have thought that the theories are not incompatible with each other, and that a hybrid theory which incorporates elements of both should be taken into account. More recently, other authors have argued that the resulting theory is well- placed to deal with fine-grained doxastic attitudes (credences). In this paper I review the reasons for adopting this kind of hybrid theory, paying attention to the case of (...)
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  10. The Diagonal and the Demon.Juan Comesaña - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (3):249 - 266.
    Reliabilism about epistemic justification - the thesis that what makes a belief epistemically justified is that it was produced by a reliable process of belief-formation - must face two problems. First, what has been called "the new evil demon problem", which arises from the idea that the beliefs of victims of an evil demon are as justified as our own beliefs, although they are not - the objector claims - reliably produced. And second, the problem of diagnosing why skepticism is (...)
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  11.  71
    A Note on Knowledge-First Decision Theory and Practical Adequacy.Juan Comesaña - forthcoming - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.
  12.  69
    Williamson on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic and the Knowledge Norm for Rational Belief: A Reply to a Reply to a Reply.Stewart Cohen & Juan Comesaña - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (4):400-415.
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  13. Is Evidence Knowledge?Juan Comesaña & Holly Kantin - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):447-454.
    We argue that if evidence were knowledge, then there wouldn’t be any Gettier cases, and justification would fail to be closed in egregious ways. But there are Gettier cases, and justification does not fail to be close in egregious ways. Therefore, evidence isn’t knowledge.
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  14.  80
    Evidence of Evidence is Evidence.Juan Comesaña & Eyal Tal - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):557-559.
    Richard Feldman has proposed and defended different versions of a principle about evidence. In slogan form, the principle holds that ‘evidence of evidence is evidence’. Recently, Branden Fitelson has argued that Feldman’s preferred rendition of the principle falls pray to a counterexample related to the non-transitivity of the evidence-for relation. Feldman replies arguing that Fitelson’s case does not really represent a counterexample to the principle. In this note, we argue that Feldman’s principle is trivially true.
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  15.  58
    A Plea for Falsehoods.Juan Comesaña - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
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  16.  98
    What Lottery Problem for Reliabilism?Juan Comesaña - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):1-20.
    It can often be heard in the hallways, and occasionally read in print, that reliabilism runs into special trouble regarding lottery cases. My main aim in this paper is to argue that this is not so. Nevertheless, lottery cases do force us to pay close attention to the relation between justification and probability.
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  17.  70
    Normative Requirements and Contrary-to-Duty Obligations.Juan Comesaña - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (11):600-626.
    I argue that normative requirements should be interpreted as the conditional obligations of dyadic deontic logic. Semantically, normative requirements are conditionals understood as restrictors, the prevailing view of conditionals in linguistics. This means that Modus Ponens is invalid, even when the premises are known.
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  18. We Are (Almost) All Externalists Now.Juan Comesana - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):59-76.
    In this paper I argue against Mentalism, the claim that all the factors that contribute to the epistemic justification of a doxastic attitude towards a proposition by a subject S are mental states of S. My objection to mentalism is that there is a special kind of fact (what I call a "support fact") that contributes to the justification of any belief, and that is not mental. My argument against mentalism, then, is the following: Anti-mentalism argument: 1. If mentalism is (...)
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  19.  64
    Can We Believe for Practical Reasons?Juan Comesaña - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):189-207.
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  20.  33
    Empirical Justification and Defeasibility.Juan Comesaña - forthcoming - Synthese:1-16.
    Two truisms about empirical justification are that experience plays a crucial role in it and that it is defeasible. There are, of course, different ways of developing these truisms into philosophical theories. I favor one particular view about the role of experience in empirical justification which may be thought to lead to problems in accommodating its defeasibility. My aim in this paper is to argue that the problems are illusory, based on an entrenched misconception how defeaters work.
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  21. Justified Vs. Warranted Perceptual Belief: Resisting Disjunctivism.Juan Comesaña - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):367-383.
    In this paper I argue that McDowell’s brand of disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge is ill-motivated. First, I present a reconstruction of one main motivation for disjunctivism, in the form of an argument that theories that posit a “highest common factor” between veridical and non-veridical experiences must be wrong. Then I show that the argument owes its plausibility to a failure to distinguish between justification and warrant (where “warrant” is understood as whatever has to be added to true belief to yield (...)
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  22.  87
    Difference‐Making in Epistemology.Juan Comesaña & Carolina Sartorio - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):368-387.
  23.  51
    On Sharon and Spectre’s Argument Against Closure.Juan Comesaña - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1039-1046.
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  24. Epistemic Pragmatism.Juan Comesaña - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (2):237-260.
    By “epistemic pragmatism” in general I will understand the claim that whether propositions instantiate certain key epistemic properties (such as being known orbeing justifiably believed) depends not just on factors traditionally recognized as epistemic, but also on pragmatic factors, such as how costly it would be to the subject if the proposition were false. In what follows I consider two varieties of epistemic pragmatism. According to what I shall call moderate epistemic pragmatism, how much evidence we need in favor of (...)
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  25.  84
    Conservatism, Preservationism, Conservationism and Mentalism.J. Comesana - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):489-492.
  26. Knowledge and Subjunctive Conditionals.Juan Comesaña - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (6):781-791.
    What relation must hold between a fact p and the corresponding belief that p for the belief to amount to knowledge? Many authors have recently proposed that the relation can be captured by subjunctive conditionals. In this paper I critically evaluate the main proposals along those lines.
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  27.  39
    On a Puzzle About Withholding.Juan Comesaña - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (251):374-376.
    I discuss Turri's puzzle about withholding. I argue that attention to the way in which evidence can justify withholding dissolves the puzzle.
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  28.  23
    Falsehood and Entailment.Juan Comesaña - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):82-94.
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  29. Could There Be Exactly Two Things?Juan Comesaña - 2008 - Synthese 162 (1):31 - 35.
    Many philosophers think that, necessarily, any material objects have a fusion (let’s call that doctrine “Universalism”). In this paper I point out a couple of strange consequences of Universalism and related doctrines, and suggest that they are strange enough to constitute a powerful argument against those views.
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  30.  69
    Conciliation and Peer-Demotion in the Epistemology of Disagreement.Juan Comesana - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (3):237-252.
    What should your reaction be when you find out that someone that you consider an "epistemic peer" disagrees with you? Two broad approaches to this question have gained support from different philosophers. Precise characterizations of these approaches will be given later, but consider for now the following approximations. First, there is the "conciliatory" approach, according to which the right reaction to a disagreement is to move one's opinion towards that of one's peer, in proportion to the degree of trust that (...)
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  31.  52
    Safety and Epistemic Frankfurt Cases.Juan Comesaña - 2013 - In John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa. Springer. pp. 165--178.
  32.  9
    Memory for Emotional Words: The Role of Semantic Relatedness, Encoding Task and Affective Valence.Pilar Ferré, Isabel Fraga, Montserrat Comesaña & Rosa Sánchez-Casas - 2015 - Cognition and Emotion 29 (8):1401-1410.
  33.  57
    Easy Knowledge Makes No Difference: Reply to Wielenberg.Juan Comesaña & Carolina Sartorio - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (2):221–224.
    We have recently proposed a diagnosis of what goes wrong in cases of ‘easy-knowledge.’ Erik Wielenberg argues that there are cases of easy knowledge thatour proposal cannot handle. In this note we reply to Wielenberg, arguing that our proposal does indeed handle his cases.
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  34.  4
    Justified Vs. Warranted Perceptual Belief: Resisting Disjunctivism.Juan Comesaña - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):367-383.
    In this paper I argue that McDowell’s brand of disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge is ill-motivated. First, I present a reconstruction of one main motivation for disjunctivism, in the form of an argument that theories that posit a “highest common factor” between veridical and non-veridical experiences must be wrong. Then I show that the argument owes its plausibility to a failure to distinguish between justification and warrant.
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  35.  30
    El debate sobre el realismo científico: confirmación, éxito predictivo y probabilidad.Manuel Comesaña - 2004 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 29 (2):59-71.
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  36. La teoría de la verdad en Habermas.Manuel Comesaña - 1994 - Dianoia 40 (40):245-262.
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  37.  37
    ¿Tiene Derecho a Existir la Filosofía de la Ciencia?Manuel Comesaña - 2001 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2001:151-157.
    En este trabajo se suscribe la tesis de que la filosofía de la ciencia—al igual que las demás ramas de la filosofía—consiste en discusiones interminables sobre problemas que no se pueden resolver, pero se sostiene también que, a pesar (o a causa) de eso, tiene derecho a existir debido a que cumple funciones importantes, entre ellas precisamente la de dar lugar a discusiones interminables sobre problemas que no se pueden resolver, actividad que a las personas con genuina vocación filosófica les (...)
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  38.  41
    Without Justification, by Jonathan Sutton. [REVIEW]J. Comesana - 2009 - Mind 118 (471):878-882.
  39.  15
    Éxito predictivo y realismo.Manuel Comesaña - 2015 - Revista de filosofía (Chile) 71:23-30.
    El realismo científico enfrenta el problema de la subdeterminación de la teoría por los datos generada por la equivalencia empírica entre teorías rivales. Podría superarlo si fuera verdadero el predictivismo –el débil, ya que el fuerte tropieza con una dificultad que parece insuperable–. En tal caso, contribuiría además a refutar el escepticismo con respecto al mundo externo, pero no, como se ha sostenido, porque la experiencia dé más apoyo al realismo “ingenuo” del sentido común que a dicho escepticismo sino porque (...)
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  40.  39
    Review of Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Pyrrhonian Skepticism[REVIEW]Juan Comesaña - 2005 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (6).
  41.  18
    Comments on Carl Ginet's “Self-Evidence”.Juan Comesaña - 2009 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 54 (2):41-47.
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  42.  7
    Éxito predictivo y realismo.Manuel Comesaña - 2015 - Revista de Filosofía 71:23-30.
    El realismo científico enfrenta el problema de la subdeterminación de la teoría por los datos generada por la equivalencia empírica entre teorías rivales. Podría superarlo si fuera verdadero el predictivismo –el débil, ya que el fuerte tropieza con una dificultad que parece insuperable–. En tal caso, contribuiría además a refutar el escepticismo con respecto al mundo externo, pero no, como se ha sostenido, porque la experiencia dé más apoyo al realismo “ingenuo” del sentido común que a dicho escepticismo sino porque (...)
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  43.  14
    Review of Stephen Hetherington (Ed.), Aspects of Knowing: Epistemological Essays[REVIEW]Juan Comesaña - 2007 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (5).
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  44. Seguridad y sueños en la epistemología de Sosa.Xoán Comesaña - 2009 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):75-81.
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  45.  1
    The Role of Emotionality in the Acquisition of New Concrete and Abstract Words.Pilar Ferré, David Ventura, Montserrat Comesaña & Isabel Fraga - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  46. Comments on Carl Ginet’s “Self-Evidence”.Juan Comesaña - 2009 - Veritas 54 (2).
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  47. En defensa de un externalismo epistémico.J. Comesaña - 2002 - Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 28 (2):173-200.
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  48. Escepticismo semántico y teorías del significado.Juan Comesaña - 1998 - Análisis Filosófico 18 (2):143-150.
    In several works H. Putnam has developed an argument addressed against “realist” semantic theories . In this paper I argue that Putnam´s argument is weaker than what is generally supposed as Devitt has shown in Realism and Truth. I desagree, however, with Devitt´s latest strategy against model-theoretic arguments as presented in an “Afterword” to that book.
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  49. Security and Dreams in the Epistemology of Sosa.Juan Comesana - 2009 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):75-81.
     
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  50. Seguridad y sueños en la epistemología de Sosa.Juan Comesaña - 2009 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (1).
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