A plateau has been reached in how to analyze people's use of their common property resources. We require fresh ways of thinking about the issue. Four new and very different approaches are sketched in the article.

Of the three strategies available for managing common property resources (CPR)—centralized control, privatization and local management—this essay focuses on the last, which has proven quite effective in various settings throughout the Third World, with the key to success being local ability to control access to the resource. The major factors at issue in the Sundarbans situation are: historically external pressure on the forest; currently dense population in adjacent areas; a land distribution even more unequal than the norm (...) in Bangladesh; and a decentralized local government structure initiated in the mid-1980s. The first three factors have encouraged the local population to view this CRP as a frontier to be exploited,rather than as a resource to be preservedfor sustained yield. Thus to the extent that the new local government structure proves to be democratic and responsive to popular needs, it would most likely accelerate destruction of the Sundarbans, using the area as a cheap and easy way to provide some livelihood to the rural poor and landless. Accordingly, decentralization cannot be a viable strategy for preserving this unique forest resource; only a strong central control can ensure its survival into the next century. (shrink)

Public access to the commons is often restricted, thus leading to implicit regulations. This is relevant toward spatial systems, as an important geographical issue is access to various sites over space, and this paper presents varying degrees of accessibility in different places. There is a dialectic struggle to enhance access to the commons as a fundamental right of the public, with the need to balance tourism and recreational uses of coastal resources with conservation and preservation eff orts. This paper (...) will aid policy makers and those concerned with beach access in Connecticut better understand the nature and complexity of how citizens and officials within coastal municipalities have come to perceive, in a collective sense, their beaches/ municipal parks as common property resources to be utilized for recreational purposes while balancing environmental conservation efforts simultaneously. Various legal frameworks, as well as federal and state efforts in coastal zones in key states, in addition to historically recent court cases in Connecticut resulting in legal enhancements toward increasing public access to nonresidents of specific municipalities, have shaped who can and who cannot access the commons. (shrink)

Water has a dual role in the Sundarbans area of southwestern Bangladesh. Hydrologic processes are vital to the ecological functioning and cultural identity of the mangrove ecosystem. But at the same time, large scale water development creates external forces that threaten the Sundarbans environment. Water is managed to a limited degree as a common property resource, both in the Sundarbans and in larger regions. It is also managed as private property, a public good, a state-controlled resource, an (...) open access resource, and a natural hazard. And to a large degree, it is not managed at all. By focussing on water, we begin to understand the linkages between the Sundarbans area and larger regional contexts; and between common property resource systems and the broader array of institutional, political, and property relations. Section one of this paper provides an overview of the role of water in the Sundarbans, including modern human modifications of deltaic hydrology. Section two surveys water management issues and institutions at six geographical scales: the International Basin; 2) India and Bangladesh; 3) Greater Bengal; 4) Bangladesh; 5) southwestern Bangladesh; and 6) Khulna district. The conclusion stresses the role that the political geography of water will play both within and outside the Sundarbans ecosystem. (shrink)

This paper introduces a refined approach to conceptualising the commons in order to shed new light on cooperative practices. Specifically, it proposes the novel concept of Common-Property Assets. CPAs are exclusively human-made resources owned under common-property ownership regimes. Our CPA model combines quantity and quality. While these two dimensions are largely pre-existing in the conventional case of natural common-pool resources, they directly depend on members’ collective action in CPAs. We apply this theoretical framework (...) to farm machinery sharing agreements—a widespread grassroots cooperative phenomenon in agriculture—using a systematic literature review to generalise the findings from a sample of 54 studies published from 1950 to 2018. Our findings show that in successful CPAs, members endorse and do not deviate from a quantity-quality equilibrium that is collectively agreed upon. Despite the existence of thresholds for both quantity and quality due to membership heterogeneity, qualitative changes in respect of the common good are possible in CPAs that promote democratic practices. Our study has potentially strong implications for developing ethics in cooperatives and the sustainable development of communities worldwide. (shrink)

Metacognition, the ability to monitor and evaluate our own cognitive processes, confers advantages to individuals and their own judgment. A more recent hypothesis, however, states that explicit metacognition may also enhance the collective judgment of groups, and may enhance human collaboration and coordination. Here, we investigate this social function hypothesis of metacognition with arguably one of the oldest collaboration problems humans face, common-pool resource use. Using an agent-based model that simulates repeated group interactions and the forming of collective judgments (...) about resource extraction, we show that (1) in “kind” environments (where confidence and judgment accuracy correlate positively), explicit metacognition may allow groups to reach more accurate judgments compared to groups exchanging object-level information only; while (2) in “wicked” environments (where confidence and judgment accuracy correlate negatively), explicit metacognition may protect groups from the large judgment errors yielded by groups using metacognitive information for individual-level learning only (implicit metacognition). With explicit metacognition, this research highlights a novel mechanism which, among others, provides a testable explanation of the often-observed finding that groups all over the world communicate to enhance common property use. (shrink)

A broad range of intellectual perspectives may be brought to bear on any important social institution. To this general rule, the institution of private property is no exception. The desirability of private property has been endlessly debated across the disciplines: philosophical, historical, economic, and legal. Yet there is very little consensus over its proper social role and limitations. Is it possible to find a unique solution to questions of property and private ownership, good for all resources (...) and for all times? The famous defense of private property that is found in chapter 5 of John Locke'sSecond Treatise of Governmentanswers this question in the affirmative, for Locke writes as though all property was given to mankind in common, and then seeks to find the quickest and most expeditious way to convert all common property into private property. His implicit, but undefended, assumption is that common forms of property are both undesirable and unstable, while private forms of ownership are always just the opposite. Yet his preferred method for moving from a commons to a regime of private property—the unilateral decision to appropriate by each actor—is one that has been frequently condemned as a sop to unbridled egotism, even though it is subject to two constraints: the first against waste, and the second requiring the appropria-tor to leave “enough, and as good” for others. (shrink)

In the management of common property resources, privatization is often advocated as the surest path to sustainability because of its reliance on human self-interest in natural resources decision making. This article demonstrates that the motive of self-interest, though powerful, does not necessarily lead to environmental outcomes that promote the common good. The key to avoiding the Tragedy of the Commons is not private ownership but controlling access.

In this chapter I argue that the old common law concept of the commons can make a major contribution to how we regulate human tissue and genetic information in the twenty-first century. But if we want to use this concept, we will have to act fast, because private corporate interests have already realised the relevance of the commons for holdings in human tissue and genetic information. Instead of a commonly created and held resource, however, they have sought to create (...) one derived from many persons' mutual labour but owned privately: what I call, with deliberate irony, a 'corporate commons'. (shrink)

This paper examines the question whether, and to what extent, John Locke’s classic theory of property can be applied to the current debate involving intellectual property rights (IPRs) and the information commons. Organized into four main sections, Section 1 includes a brief exposition of Locke’s arguments for the just appropriation of physical objects and tangible property. In Section 2, I consider some challenges involved in extending Locke’s labor theory of property to the debate about IPRs and (...) digital information. In Section 3, it is argued that even if the labor analogy breaks down, we should not necessarily infer that Locke’s theory has no relevance for the contemporary debate involving IPRs and the information commons. Alternatively, I argue that much of what Locke has to say about the kinds of considerations that ought to be accorded to the physical commons when appropriating objects from it – especially his proviso requiring that “enough and as good” be left for others – can also be applied to appropriations involving the information commons. Based on my reading of Locke’s proviso, I further argue that Locke would presume in favor of the information commons when competing interests (involving the rights of individual appropriators and the preservation of the commons) are at stake. In this sense, I believe that Locke offers us an adjudicative principle for evaluating the claims advanced by rival interests in the contemporary debate about IPRs and the information commons. In Section 4, I apply Locke’s proviso in my analysis of two recent copyright laws: the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). I then argue that both laws violate the spirit of Locke’s proviso because they unfairly restrict the access that ordinary individuals have previously had to resources that comprise the information commons. Noting that Locke would not altogether reject copyright protection for IPRs, I conclude that Locke’s classic property theory provides a useful mechanism for adjudicating between claims about how best to ensure that individuals will be able to continue to access information in digitized form, while at the same time also allowing for that information to enjoy some form of legal protection. (shrink)

The rapid emergence of digital media has created both new economic opportunities and new risks for authors, publishers, and users in regards to intellectual property. There is a theoretical conflict raging between those who believe "information should be free" and those attempting to protect intellectual property through surveillance and control of access. The Intellectual Commons works to develop a theory of intellectual property that is based on a theory of natural rights that assumes the existence of a (...) "natural world" of intellectual resources. (shrink)

In many countries and resource sectors, the state is devolving responsibility for natural resource management responsibility to ``communities'' or local user groups. However, both policymakers and researchers in this area have tended to ignore the implications of gender and other forms of intra-community power differences for the effectiveness and equity of natural resource management. In the irrigation sector, despite the rhetoric on women's participation, a review of evidence from South Asia shows that organizations often exclude women through formal or informal (...) membership rules and practices. Women may have other ways to obtain irrigation services, but even if they are effective, these other informal ways of obtaining irrigation services are typically less secure. As resource management – and rights to resources – are transferred from the state to local organizations, ensuring women's participation is essential for gender equity in control over resources. Greater involvement of women can also strengthen the effectiveness of local organizations by improving women's compliance with rules and maintenance contributions. Further detailed and comparative research is required to identify the major factors that affect women's participation and control over resources, if devolution policies are to be both equitable and sustainable. (shrink)

The article takes up and challenges the Lockean conception of common sense and common right to property in two ways: first, through a critical investigation of Locke's historical connection to colonialism, and second, by turning to contemporary indigenous conceptions of common sense. Locke's practical experiences in the founding of Carolina, I argue, serve not simply to explain the problematical colonial impulses of the Second Treatise, but indeed to help undo the credibility of that text's ideological claim (...) to acquire and assimilate. Next, I turn from an internal historicized critique of the Second Treatise to a contemporary external challenge, examining current indigenous perspectives de-legitimized by the Second Treatise. I contend that traditionalized conceptions of indigenous knowledge and understanding provide a strategic revitalization of common sense in ways that re-define and re-characterize the word's roots not only in the common but also in the senses themselves. The article concludes by questioning whether these revitalized ‘traditionalisms’ — as much as they challenge exclusionary Lockean conceptions of the ‘common’ and common sense — also carry the risk of denying aspects of indigenous modernity and excluding alternative indigenous conceptions of land and resource use. (shrink)

This paper argues that social trust is the emergent product of a complex system of property relations, backed up by a sub-system of mutual monitoring. This happens in a context similar to Ostrom’s commons, where cooperation is necessary for the management of resources, in the absence of external authorities to enforce sanctions. I show that social trust emerges in this context because of an institutional structure that enables individuals to develop a generalized disposition to internalize the external effects (...) of their actions. This is made possible by the “patrimonial” nature of this structure. (shrink)

The article takes up and challenges the Lockean conception of common sense and common right to property in two ways: first, through a critical investigation of Locke's historical connection to colonialism, and second, by turning to contemporary indigenous conceptions of common sense. Locke's practical experiences in the founding of Carolina, I argue, serve not simply to explain the problematical colonial impulses of the Second Treatise, but indeed to help undo the credibility of that text's ideological claim (...) to acquire and assimilate. Next, I turn from an internal historicized critique of the Second Treatise to a contemporary external challenge, examining current indigenous perspectives de-legitimized by the Second Treatise. I contend that traditionalized conceptions of indigenous knowledge and understanding provide a strategic revitalization of common sense in ways that re-define and re-characterize the word's roots not only in the common but also in the senses themselves. The article concludes by questioning whether these revitalized ‘traditionalisms’ — as much as they challenge exclusionary Lockean conceptions of the ‘common’ and common sense — also carry the risk of denying aspects of indigenous modernity and excluding alternative indigenous conceptions of land and resource use. (shrink)

Capitalism is often defended by appeals to natural rights: only in a free market, it is said, are people protected from the illegitimate intrusions of others. Coercion, either to prevent exchanges or to redistribute wealth, violates people's rights. But much of the property people have acquired came not from their own effort or the efforts of those who gave them gifts, but instead was taken from nature. Thus the question I propose to discuss in this paper: How is it (...) that an unowned natural resource can legitimately be acquired for private benefit? Much thought has been given by libertarian defenders of capitalism to justifying the claim that, once owned, property cannot be taken without its owner's consent. Relatively little attention has been paid, however, to how the original acquisition can be justified. Indeed, I argue here that if one approaches the problem of resource appropriation from the perspective of the Lockean ‘proviso,’ that enough and as good must be left in common, then the typical method of acquiring property under capitalism is unjust. Libertarians must either give up the individualistic, state of nature approach to economic justice or admit that appropriation of natural resources requires compensation of people who do not get a share of the resource. (shrink)

Secure property rights are considered a common institutional feature of rapidly growing economies. Although different property rights regimes have prevailed around the world over time, relatively little scholarship has empirically characterized the historical property rights of societies outside Western Europe. Using data from Egypt’s Mamluk Sultanate, this article provides a detailed characterization of land tenure patterns and identifies changes to real property holdings associated with an institutional bargain between Egypt’s slave soldiers—the mamluks—and the sultan. Although (...) agricultural land was a collective resource of the state, individual mamluks—state actors themselves—established religious endowments as a privatizing work-around to the impermissibility of transferring mamluk status to their sons. The article’s characterization of landholding patterns in medieval Egypt provides an empirical illustration of how Middle Eastern institutions differed from those in other world regions as well as an understanding for how and why regimes come under political stress as a result of their property rights institutions. (shrink)

In On Global Justice, Mathias Risse claims that the earth’s original resources are collectively owned by all human beings in common, such that each individual has a moral right to use the original resources necessary for satisfying her basic needs. He also rejects the rival views that original resources are by nature owned by no one, owned by each human in equal shares, or owned and co-managed jointly by all humans. I argue that Risse’s arguments fail (...) to establish a form of ownership at all and, moreover, that his arguments against the three rival views he considers all fall short. His argument establishes, rather, a moral constraint on any conventional system of property ownership. (shrink)

Natural Property Rights presents a novel theory of property based on individual, pre-political rights. The book argues that a just system of property protects people's rights to use resources and also orders those rights consistent with natural law and the public welfare. Drawing on influential property theorists such as Grotius, Locke, Blackstone, and early American statesmen and judges, as well as recent work in in normative and analytical philosophy, the book shows how natural rights guide (...) political and legal reasoning about property law. It examines how natural rights justify the most familiar institutions in property, including public property, ownership, the system of estates and future interests, leases, servitudes, mortgages, police regulation, and eminent domain. Thought-provoking and comprehensive, the book challenges leading contemporary justifications for property and shows how property both secures individual freedom and serves the common good. (shrink)

The scope and type of property rights recognized over the effectiveness of antibiotics have a direct effect on how those claiming ownership engage in the exploitation and stewardship of this scarce resource. We examine the different property claims and rights the four major interest groups are asserting on antibiotics: (i) the inventors, (ii) those demanding that the resource be treated like any other transferable commodity, (iii) those advocating usage restrictions based on good stewardship principles and (iv) those considering (...) the resource as common heritage of humankind. (shrink)

I classify different sorts of natural resources and suggest how these resources may be acquired. I also argue that inventions, whether gadgets or artificial life forms, should not be privately owned. Gadgets and life-forms are not created (although the term 'invention' suggests otherwise); they are discovered, and hence have much in common with more familiar natural resources such as sunlight that ought not to be privately owned. Nonetheless, inventors of gadgets, like discoverers of certain more familiar (...) resources, sometimes should be granted exclusive but temporary control over their inventions as an incentive for making unknown items widely accessible. (shrink)

This article addresses the heritage of Grotius's concept of common goods as developed in his seminal work Mare liberum. This contribution identifies the basic tenets of Grotius's thinking on the nature of common property and identifies the relevance of these ideas for the present day management of global commons, i.e., the areas and natural resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Successively, the article examines the regimes for: the deep seabed, the high seas, and marine mammals; (...) outer space, particularly the moon; the two polar regions; and the atmosphere, in particular the ozone layer and the climate system. The article demonstrates how some of the original tenets of Grotius's concept of res communis – in particular the idea of inexhaustibility – can no longer be upheld and how the freedom of access to the global commons has become increasingly qualified and supplemented, if not replaced by a new law of international co-operation aimed at conservation and sustainable use of natural wealth and resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. The global commons function as laboratories for the testing of new principles of international law and new forms of international co-operation, which can be said to clearly build upon the Grotian heritage. (shrink)

Having an adequate and extensively recognized resource governance system is essential for the conservation and sustainable use of crop genetic resources in a highly populated planet. Despite the widely accepted importance of agrobiodiversity for future plant breeding and thus food security, there is still pervasive disagreement at the individual level on who should own genetic resources. The aim of the article is to provide conceptual clarification on the following concepts and their relation to agrobiodiversity stewardship: open access, commons, (...) private property, state property and common heritage of humankind. After presenting each property regime, we will examine whether and how these incentivize the conservation, improvement and sharing of crop genetic resources, and conclude by defending a mixed property regime. (shrink)

We provide characterizations of the equal division values and their convex mixtures, using a new axiom on a fixed player set based on player nullification which requires that if a player becomes null, then any two other players are equally affected. Two economic applications are also introduced concerning bargaining under risk and common-pool resource appropriation.

We introduce the papers in this special issue by providing an overarching perspective on the variety in kinds of commons and the ethical issues stemming from their diversity. Despite a long history of local commons management, recent decades have witnessed a surge of scholarly interest in the concept of “the commons,” including a growing management literature. This swell was impelled especially by Garrett Hardin’s paper of 1968, and the body of work generated by Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues. However, the (...) term itself has come to be used in a variety of ways. To contextualize its ethical dimensions, we map a number of commons-related concepts such as common-pool resources, common property regime, excludability and subtractability, common-pool resource types and commons or “commoning” as a source of production. Following a brief summary of papers in this special issue, the essay concludes with an identification of implications for research, practice and policy. (shrink)

When we talk about intellectual property, it is often implicitly assumed that we are talking about private intellectual property. However, private property and the idea of private ownership do not exhaust the possibilities for accounts of ownership and of property. There are other ways that ownership can operate, such as common property. A resource is common property if its use is ‘governed by rules whose point is to make them available for use (...) by all or any members of the society.’. (shrink)

Whereas conventional analyses characterize environmental problems as examples of market failure, proponents of free-market environmentalism (FME) consider the problem to be a lack of markets and, in particular, a lack of enforceable and exchangeable property rights. Enforcing property rights alleviates disputes about, as well as the overuse of, most natural resources. FME diagnoses of pollution are much weaker, however. Most FME proponents suggest that common-law tort suits can adequately protect private property and ecological resources (...) from pollution. Yet such claims have not been substantiated. Further research is needed before the common law, or regulatory reforms grounded in common-law principles, can be seen as a viable alternative to traditional environmental regulation. (shrink)

This article examines the transformation of property rights over fishery resources in Longlake, China, where a gradual evolutionary process from a common property regime to a state property regime occurred between the late 1970s and the late 1980s. It explores the active role played by economic actors as well as the underlying economic, political, and sociocultural forces in transforming both formal and informal property rules. Stressing the different ways formal and informal property rules (...) change, this article contributes to our understanding of property rights transformation and institutional change in general. (shrink)

In German, nouns are assigned to one of the three gender classes. For most animal names, however, the assignment is independent of the referent’s biological sex. We examined whether German-speaking children understand this independence of grammar from semantics or whether they assume that grammatical gender is mapped onto biological sex when drawing inferences about sex-specific biological properties of animals. Two cross-linguistic studies comparing German-speaking and Japanese-speaking preschoolers were conducted. The results suggest that German-speaking children utilize grammatical gender as a cue (...) for inferences about sex-specific properties of animals. Further, we found that Japanese- and German-speaking children recruit different resources when drawing inferences about sex-specific properties: Whereas Japanese children paralleled their pattern of inference about properties common to all animals, German children relied on the grammatical gender class of the animal. Implications of these findings for studying the relation between language and thought are discussed. (shrink)

This paper explores the possibility of extending Locke’s theory with respect to tangible property so that it might offer a feasible theoretical basis for intellectual property too. The main conclusion is that such an attempt must fail. Locke’s theory comes in three parts: a general justification of property which serves to explain why assets ought to be under the exclusive control of individuals; a positive method of private appropriation whereby an individual acquires a prima facie exclusive claim (...) to previously commonly held natural resources; and third, a negative requirement that other individuals’ crucial interests are not harmed by such an appropriation. For each of these, the difficulties involved in applying that part of the theory to the sphere of ideas are discussed, and a central aspect of intellectual property that raises the problems of application is highlighted. (shrink)

The issue of biopiracy has attracted considerable attention in recent years. The Convention on Biological Diversity adopted a principle of state sovereignty over biological resources and the genetic information contained within those resources to address this issue. It is argued that this principle has not been adequately justified and that there are other solutions to the issue of biopiracy, based on different theories of justice, that deserve greater consideration. These alternatives include the common heritage of mankind principle (...) and the global commons principle. (shrink)

This dissertation argues that we have no good reason to accept any one theory of properties as correct. To show this, I present three possible bases for theory-choice in the properties debate: coherence, explanatory adequacy, and explanatory value. Then I argue that none of these bases resolve the underdetermination of our choice between theories of properties. First, I argue considerations about coherence cannot resolve the underdetermination, because no traditional theory of properties is obviously incoherent. Second, I argue considerations of explanatory (...) adequacy cannot resolve the underdetermination, because every traditional theory of properties lacks the theoretical resources to adequately explain resemblance, causal powers, and predication. However, these inadequacies are easily remedied with theoretical modifications. But this results in an overabundance of modified, but adequate, theories of properties. Third, I argue explanatory virtues cannot resolve the underdetermination, because we have no reason to think explanatory virtues make theories of properties more likely to be true. I reject the common argument that explanatory virtues are truth-conducive in theories of properties because they are truth-conducive in scientific theories. Since none of the three bases for theory choice can resolve the underdetermination, I conclude that we have no good reason to accept any one theory of properties as correct. Finally, I consider the possibility of choosing one theory over the others on pragmatic grounds. But I argue that pragmatic grounds cannot resolve the underdetermination either. Instead, I suggest we accept the view I call 'instrumental pluralism,' which allows practitioners to use whatever theory of properties they find useful. Adviser: Jennifer McKitrick. (shrink)

Many valuable natural resources are found outside current territorial limits, for example, on the Moon and in the deep sea. As technology advances, these resources become more accessible. I argue that the claim that all humanity owns these resources is insupportable if taken literally. Because they are truly unowned, we need to develop a principle of justice in acquisition which describes the procedure that must be followed to obtain property rights to these unowned objects. I conclude (...) with a tentative development of such a principle based on the moral ideals of fairness, freedom, and the maximization of the common good. (shrink)

Concerns of intellectual property infringement in China slow the dissemination of clean technology (Cleantech) innovation that could help bring the pace of global warming under control. We use the U.S. post‐World War 2 policy decisions with respect to Japan and Europe (the Marshall Plan) to show how this problem can be addressed. To help Japan become a western style democracy and stem the tide of communism, the U.S. transferred much of its extant intellectual property to Japan with a (...) promise to open US markets to Japanese goods. The United States did not require Japan to open its markets to U.S. goods. As a result, Japan became a staunch U.S. political ally in Asia, but also a serious economic competitor to the United States. While the Marshall Plan deployed different resources, the political outcomes were similar to Japan: Western Europe was a bulwark against communism. As global warming has become a major strategic issue, we argue that a comparable IPR initiative is required for China. This is not just a matter of doing the right thing as members of global commons, but is also matter of national security. We propose that by facilitating and managing the flow and sharing of U.S., EU, and Japanese Cleantech intellectual property with China—through a Cleantech Marshall Plan—a positive strategic relationship may be built while helping to bring global warming under control. (shrink)

Climate change presents an unprecedented and existential threat. Proposals addressing this threat are criticized as impractical, costly, and/or beyond the legitimate scope of government power. We engage the latter critique by turning to John Locke's writings. Locke is both a proponent of limited government and profoundly influential on liberal democracies. He argues that government exists solely to enforce the natural law, and in doing so, protects life, liberty, and property. While Locke presents the Earth's resources as existing to (...) be exploited, he limits property acquisition, arguing that natural law prohibits spoilage and requires that we leave ample, quality resources for others to utilize. We argue that since these caveats are part of the natural law, government is obligated to take comprehensive action addressing climate change. (shrink)

Balancing, integrating, or otherwise sorting out private ownership, control, and property rights, on the one hand, with social, common, and shared goods or rights, on the other, is manifest in socio-ethical issues ranging from eminent domain to gay marriage and from endangered species protection to social security. In fact, when one surveys the contemporary socio-ethical landscape with this problem in mind, there appears hardly an issue that it does not touch; and it is frequently the central or underlying (...) component. This is perhaps not surprising for issues involving taxation or other government revenue generating mechanisms that pay for public services and programs—e.g. education, postal service, transportation infrastructure, and policing. But it extends well beyond resourcing governmental institutions and initiatives. It is present in different ways and to different degrees in issues as diverse as AIDS drug availability, fisheries management, euthanasia, affordable housing and home loan availability, gun control, permit issuance and zoning for high impact industry, global warming, health care accessibility, bottled water, and prostitution. (shrink)

Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned it to something that is his own, (...) and thereby makes it his Property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, hath by his labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other Men. For this Labour being the unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once joyned to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, section 27. (shrink)

The hazard of postharvest pest losses is ubiquitous in peasant farming systems; as a result, farmers invariably have some response to the threat of these losses. Responses to postharvest pests may be more extensive than to field pests, even when, by statistical measures, the usual levels of losses are comparable. In studies of pest management practices in three contrasting areas in Kenya, it was found that farmers virtually always rely on an array of techniques and strategies, usually including both older (...) and more modern practices. There is considerable variation among regions in the techniques used, due not only to climatic and socioeconomic factors, but also to variations in cultural history and preferences. The ways in which management practices have changed over time also vary by region. The major changes have been related to overall system change. Four main sources of change have been paramount: (1) population growth and the intensification of land use; (2) the introduction of new cash crops; (3) the introduction of new marketing infrastructure; and (4) the perception of increased environmental risk. Their effect on the replacement of older practices by newer ones is often interrelated. Traditional techniques are often based on materials derived from bushland, but increasing population density makes these difficult to continue as bushland and its common property resources disappear. Simultaneously, tolerance for losses is reduced as land availability is constrained. With the introduction of a cash crop infrastructure, new methods of pest management, especially pesticide use, become more readily available and may spread rapidly. Areas with good market infrastructure but varying population density may still differ considerably because with abundant land it is possible to compensate for expected losses by additional planting.A study of an FAO project to improve postharvest management through earlier harvesting and a redesigned storage crib indicate some reasons for its lack of widespread acceptance. Little or no attempt was made to adapt techniques to varying circumstances; instead, a single “solution” was meant to be applied across areas of vastly different conditions. In many cases, this project represented a radical response to a problem farmers considered they were coping with acceptably using existing methods. Although it probably represents an improvement over traditional storage methods in purely technical terms, the new technique also often involved major costs, readjustments, and cultural disruptions that may not have been anticipated by its designers. More likely to succeed would be a strategy that begins with some of farmers' existing practices and whose objective is to develop and offer a range of possible improvements from which farmers could select individual components appropriate to their conditions and needs. (shrink)

In its governance activities for genetic resources, the international community has adopted various approaches to their ownership, including: free access; common heritage of mankind; intellectual property rights; and state sovereign rights. They have also created systems which combine elements of these approaches. While governance of plant and animal genetic resources is well-established internationally, there has not yet been a clear approach selected for human genetic resources. Based on assessment of the goals which international governance of (...) human genetic resources ought to serve, and the implications for how they will be accessed and utilised, it is argued that common heritage of mankind will be the most appropriate approach to adopt to their ownership/control. It does this with the aim of stimulating discussion in this area and providing a starting point for deeper consideration of how a common heritage of mankind, or similar, regime for human genetic resources would function and be implemented. (shrink)

Economic principles operate in much the same way whether on land or in the oceans. It is the very same tragedy of the commons that almost wiped out the buffalo that is now endangering precious fish stocks. The answer to these challenges, in both cases, is privatization. Establishment of private property will not only solve the problems of the over fishing of the ocean commons, but will also create incentives for investors to use new technologies that could radically increase (...) the productivity of the ocean for fish and other resources. In order to make these gains however, we must make an irrevocable commitment to defining and defending these property rights as a permanent institution of the future of our oceans. (shrink)

PurposeBased on social exchange theory, this study aimed to investigate, from the cost-benefits perspective, the intention to co-create open educational resources.Design/Methodology/ApproachParticipants in the study included 311 undergraduate students selected from those enrolled in a course on the China University MOOC platform. Regression analysis was conducted to examine cost and benefits factors that influenced participants’ intentions to co-create OER.Findings From the perspective of benefits, expected reciprocity, increase in knowledge self-efficacy, and creative self-efficacy were found to significantly and positively impact the (...) intention to co-create OER, while increase in internet self-efficacy was not. From the perspective of cost, perceived effort and perceived privacy were found to significantly and negatively impact the intention to co-create OER, while perceived intellectual property risks were not significant.Originality/ValueThree strategies are recommended to promote the intention to co-create OER based on the findings of this study: focusing on OER communities and developing reciprocity norms; popularizing and promoting knowledge and use of Creative Commons copyright licenses; providing easy-to-use online resource editing tools for use with OER repositories.Research Limitations/ImplicationsFuture research should explore other ages, cultural backgrounds, and types of online learning experience to help broaden the universality of the results. (shrink)

The comparative study of synchronic occurrences of a particular construction in interactional corpora from different languages can provide a complete understanding of the development of the construction as a response to some basic intimately associated set of interactional moves and cognitive demands. A comparative formal analysis of lists in Spanish and English conversations shows that in both languages the construction has developed a stylized intonation pattern based on the holding of tones by means of lengthening of nuclear syllables, a durable (...) syntactic organization based on parataxis and an almost identical inventory of lexicalized expressions to index the end of the list. A parallel analysis of lists in their interactional contexts shows that in both English and Spanish conversation the formal properties of lists emerge as adaptations to a recurrent set of communicative tasks. The first type of `framing' lists is used for its incremental structure in the negotiation of common background between interlocutors, whereas the second type of `demonstrative' lists is used for its rhetorical structure to provide evidence for a claim and is directed to obtaining agreement. (shrink)

The challenge of producing sufficient food to feed a growing world population cannot now be met by industrialized and green revolution agriculture as production is currently at or above a sustainable level. Future growth has to occur on resource-poor and marginal lands, where farmers have little or no access to external resources or research and extension support. A precedent for such growth occurred during the agricultural revolution in Britain. Over a period of two centuries crop and livestock production increased (...) 3–4 fold as innovative technologies and techniques developed by farmers were extended to other farmers through tours, farmer groups, open days, and publications, and then adapted to local conditions by rigorous experimentation. These technologies maximized the use of on-farm resources at a time when there was no government ministry of agriculture, no research stations, and no extension institutions. But at the same time as this revolution in on-farm resource use, agriculture also expanded into uncultivated lands, increasing aggregate production but destroying common property resources and so threatening the livelihoods of the poor. (shrink)

:A norm of equal treatment is cited regularly in the American jurisprudence of property “takings” under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, as a benchmark of fair treatment of owners. According to an increasingly prevalent version of this equality norm, courts should look to parity of treatment among property owners in investigating whether particular regulations “take” property. This essay argues, however, that such an equality norm is misplaced, and that courts should judge fairness by the (...) criterion of expectation—including reasonable expectations of regulation.A norm of equality becomes problematic in the face of the economic theory of the evolution of property. This theory posits that as resources become more congested, their uses carry increasing common pool costs or “externalities”—a scenario that should predictably result in more stringent resource management—up to and including the establishment of regulatory regimes as well as property rights themselves. This evolutionary pattern, however, places earlier and later resource users in different positions vis-à-vis both common pool externalities and regulatory responses, and their different temporal positions fragment the meaning of equal treatment and destabilize it as a jurisprudential norm. This essay argues that while equal treatment may be a benchmark for special or invidious cases, like those relating to civil rights, the great bulk of takings cases involve regulatory responses to congesting resources, where a norm of equal treatment breaks down. Thus, in seeking fair treatment, takings jurisprudence should downplay equality and instead look to the understanding of property as a basis of expectations—but those expectations should include the anticipation of reasonable regulatory responses to resource congestion. (shrink)

We propose a theoretical model to explain the usage of time-inconsistent behavior as a strategy to exploit others when reputation and trust have secondary effects on the economic outcome. We consider two agents with time-consistent preferences exploiting common resources. Supposing that an agent is believed to have time-inconsistent preferences with probability p, we analyze whether she uses this misinformation when she has the opportunity to use it. Using the model originally provided by Levhari and Mirman (Bell J Econ (...) 11(1):322–334, 1980), we determine the optimal degree of present bias that the agent would like to have while pretending to have time-inconsistent preferences and we provide the range of present-bias parameter under which deceiving is optimal. Moreover, by allowing the constant relative risk aversion class of utility form, we characterize the distinction between pretending to be naive and sophisticated. (shrink)

Lockean approaches to property take it that persons can unilaterally acquire private ownership over hitherto unowned resources. Such natural law accounts of property rights are often thought to be of limited use when dealing with the complexities of natural resource use outside of the paradigm of private ownership of land for agricultural or residential development. The tragedy of the commons has been shown to be anything but an inevitability, and yet Lockeanism seems to demand that even the (...) most robust common property arrangements be converted to privatized units. This often motivates a move away from natural law in the moral analysis of property rights. I argue however that it is not the deontological nature of Lockean principles that are at fault, but rather the manner of their application. Lockean theory often exhibits a bias in favour of private property: assuming that only private property can protect one’s interest in autonomy, and therefore asserting that each individual has a power of private acquisition. Starting with a claim against interference however enables us to mould the appropriate property rights to each individual’s particular interest in autonomy. This sometimes leads to private ownership, but often leads to various forms of commons. (shrink)

This paper analyzes resource utilization of the Sundarbans in terms of the contradictory issues and pressures generated by foreign assistance and commercial interests in Bangladesh. In the paper, the historical legacy of resource definition and use that shaped the development of forest policy under the British is considered. In addition, the critical role of the state and the interests and pressures on the Government are explored as these shape the larger context in which current natural resource policy is generated and (...) maintained. Three areas of potential conflict between current devlopment policy and resource management control are noted. They are 1) the privatization of production and resource exploitation in contrast to common property resource use, 2) the need to meet foreign exchange requirements versus local user interests, and 3) commercial versus local user interests.The paper argues that national and international fiscal and economic constraints operate to favor commercial interests and natural resource exports at the cost of policies that emphasize an active approach to the generation and preservation of renewable resources such as the Sundarbans. (shrink)

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to consider arguments both for and against intellectual property rights that are premised on each of two conceptions of the information commons that attributes either moral value or disvalue to its preservation. Design/methodology/approach – The methodology is the philosophically standard one of reflective equilibrium. The author considers the argument for a morally protected information commons that is grounded in Locke's famous proviso limiting original acquisition of material property to situations that (...) leave enough of the resource to others and Hardin's famous argument that holding material property in common leads to overuse and depletion – a Tragedy of the commons. In particular, the arguments are evaluated according to whether they cohere with ordinary foundational commitments. Findings – The author argues that neither conception of the commons is directly applicable to information objects and hence is relevant with respect to the issue of whether legal protection of IP rights is morally justified. Originality/value – The identification of key differences between material objects and information objects that shows the irrelevance of these two leading conceptions in resolving the general issue of whether legal protection of IP rights is justified. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Tyranny of Merit: What’s Become of the Common Good? by Michael J. SandelYoko NagaseMichael J. Sandel. The Tyranny of Merit: What’s Become of the Common Good? New York: Penguin Books, 2021. 272 pp. Hardcover, £9.99. ISBN 978-0-141-99117-7.Is a meritocratic capitalist society a utopia? The answer depends on who you are. A libertarian is likely to embrace the meritocratic credo that talent and effort deserve rewards, (...) regarding their success in a competitive market system as their own doing and even looking down on those who are not successful (25). A liberal may emphasize the need for a redistributive safety net and yet still promote meritocratic capitalism as utopian as we may ever achieve.1 Michael Young, who coined the term meritocracy in 1958, depicted an imaginary meritocratic society as a dystopia (116). In The Tyranny of Merit, Michael J. Sandel spends six out of seven chapters exemplifying the misery of not-being-a-winner in a meritocratic society.The Tyranny of Merit does a brilliant job at providing an “A-ha!” moment to anyone who has been compelled to accept, and to live with, the seemingly fair meritocratic rule of evaluating individuals, despite the frustrating awareness that something is not quite right. The author articulates exactly what’s wrong with meritocratic capitalism.The problem of meritocratic capitalism is, succinctly put, “merit drives out grace” (58). Meritocratic capitalism denigrates those who lack abilities or, worse, it humiliates those who hold jobs that are needed by the society but do not pay a lot (203). Meritocracy provides a justification for inequality that markets deliver by making people believe that their success is their own doing, not something they inherit (120, 125). However, distribution of income and wealth based on the natural distribution of talent and abilities on which the success depends is just as arbitrary as the distribution based on the [End Page 154] historical and social fortune such as class.2 This lack of gratitude and humility among those who are rewarded richly by the markets, Sandel points out, discourages the successful people from caring for the common good or those who are less fortunate than themselves (14, 59).Any mainstream introductory economics textbook would say that prices provide market participants with information about the scarcity of productive inputs and incentive to pursue their self-interests (utility and profits), resulting in markets’ delivering goods and services that best serve consumers’ needs and wants. These textbooks would also clarify that efficiency that markets deliver in allocating productive resources and goods does not imply that the outcomes are necessarily fair or equitable. What is not necessarily made explicitly clear, however, is that market prices do not represent moral values. Rawls, Hayek, and Friedman agreed with Knights in that a market price depends on supply and demand that depend on institutional settings such as property rights, taxation, and support for higher education; therefore, distributing according to the market outcome has “little or no ethical significance.”3 Sandel laments that, in reality, those who are marked by markets as lacking merits (via low pay) live with a sense of demoralizing, humiliating failure (185). The outcome is a lack of contributive justice; those who lack merits struggle to achieve the recognition and honor that they deserve for what they offer through their works (203).What is likely to be completely missing in introductory economics classes at universities is the emphasis on contributive justice. Contributive justice, in my view, is the most important concept introduced by The Tyranny of Merit. The author emphasizes that individuals should be given a chance “to win the social recognition and esteem that go with producing what others need and value” (206). The author challenges us to think again how we should value different types of occupations (191). Aren’t plumbers, social workers, and teachers just as important for society as bankers? Why should there be any prejudice against those who choose not to go to universities? (73). Economics should emphasize that we are not just consumers; we are (proudly?) producers as well. Chapter 3 of The Tyranny of Merit provides many examples of politicians embracing meritocratic policies based on... (shrink)

The volume consists of two parts, of which the former describes the two central elements of Locke’s account. First, Sreenivasan explains how he understands Locke’s attempt to show that common ownership of natural resources is consistent with the existence of a procedure whereby private ownership rights can be acquired without universal agreement. Solving this consent problem, Locke construes common ownership as involving merely a right to those conditions necessary for self-preservation. He then argues that where non-appropriators are (...) left with enough to achieve subsistence, unilateral appropriation does not violate such a right. Locke’s sufficiency condition ensures this by requiring that the able-bodied must have access to the relevant production or employment opportunities, while the disabled must be capable of subsisting through charity. (shrink)