Conciliationism holds that disagreement of apparent epistemic peers often substantially undermines rational confidence in our opinions. Uniqueness principles say that there is at most one maximally rational doxastic response to any given batch of total evidence. The two views are often thought to be tightly connected. This paper distinguishes two ways of motivating conciliationism, and two ways that conciliationism may be undermined by permissive accounts of rationality. It shows how conciliationism can flourish under certain strongly permissive accounts of rationality. This (...) occurs when the motivation for conciliationism does not come from taking disagreement as evidence of one's own rational failings. However, divorcing the motive for conciliating from worries about rationality does not remove a feature of conciliationism that some find troubling: that conciliationism can lead to cases of “rational toxicity,” in which the most rational response to one's evidence involves violating some rational ideal. (shrink)

Conciliation in the Qurʾan is an essential read in understanding how the Qurʾan persuades its audience to resolve societal conflicts. The author brings to light the central ethical notion of iḥsān (gracious conduct), and explores the challengin.

The concept of Conciliation Ethics in the Qurʾan is a crucial aspect of Islamic Law: Conciliation features notably in the Qurʾanic text which gives rise to Islamic rules and regulations, Conciliation is an important dispute resolution method in an Islamic legal system, and Conciliation-related Qurʾanic textual analysis reveals a broad range of legal language and concepts. Traditional studies of Conciliation in the Qurʾan have often focussed on the process of ṣulḥ through intermediaries, particularly in marriage (...) and between groups of Muslims, whilst there is a dearth of Western scholarship in this area. Using Classical Arabic tafsīr and Western literature on Conciliation as a general concept, this paper examines holistically and analytically the concept of Conciliation Ethics in the Qurʾan, investigating its scope, constituent elements, emphasis and purpose. This paper argues, based on a manual survey of the entire Qurʾan, that Conciliation is not limited to isolated contexts or verses where ṣulḥ is mentioned explicitly. The paper finds that Conciliation is a pervasive concept throughout the hierarchy of social relationships. It is achieved through behaviours such as good conduct, attitudes such as ‘Differentiation’ and ‘Externalisation’ and preventative strategies of dispute avoidance, and sometimes includes a contract or Reconciliation process. It is emphasised in the Qurʾan through a range of stylistic features and is of fundamental importance in maintaining the fabric of society. (shrink)

Our aim in this chapter is to draw attention to what we see as a disturbing feature of conciliationist views of disagreement. Roughly put, the trouble is that conciliatory responses to in-group disagreement can lead to the frustration of a group's epistemic priorities: that is, the group's favoured trade-off between the "Jamesian goals" of truth-seeking and error-avoidance. We show how this problem can arise within a simple belief aggregation framework, and draw some general lessons about when the problem is most (...) pronounced. We close with a tentative proposal for how to solve the problem raised without rejecting conciliationism. (shrink)

What should your reaction be when you find out that someone that you consider an "epistemic peer" disagrees with you? Two broad approaches to this question have gained support from different philosophers. Precise characterizations of these approaches will be given later, but consider for now the following approximations. First, there is the "conciliatory" approach, according to which the right reaction to a disagreement is to move one's opinion towards that of one's peer, in proportion to the degree of trust that (...) one accords to that peer—for instance, if you thought that, in case of disagreement, you are equally likely to be right, then the conciliatory approach would have it that you should meet your epistemic peer halfway. The other, "nonconciliatory" approach, holds that one's reaction to a disagreement need not be perfectly in line with one's prior degree of trust in the other party. Notice an important asymmetry between these two approaches: the conciliatory approach has it that conciliation is the right reaction to any disagreement, whereas the nonconciliatory approach has it that there are some possible disagreements the correct reaction to which is not to conciliate (or not to the extent mandated by conciliatory views). This article examines the dispute between conciliatory and nonconciliatory views by distinguishing and examining possible answers to four different questions. (shrink)

Conciliationism is a view—well, a family of views—in the epistemology of disagreement. The idea, simply put, is that, in a wide range of cases where you find yourself in disagreement with another reasoner about the truth of some proposition, you are rationally obliged to adjust your credence in the direction of hers. Conciliationism enjoys a fair bit of prima facie plausibility. Most versions of it, however, suffer from a common (and rather obvious) problem: self-incrimination. Although there is some recognition in (...) the recent literature on disagreement that there is a problem in this vicinity, it, more often than not, is completely ignored. When it is not completely ignored, both the conciliationists and their critics tend to frame the problem incorrectly. As a result, they end up focusing most of their attention on pseudo-problems rather than the genuine worry. Furthermore, even when they have hit on the genuine worry, conciliationists have tended to give surprising and implausible responses to it. Even by their own lights, conciliationists aren’t justified in believing their conciliationist theses. In this paper, I argue that it’s time to come clean. Time to look for a view on the epistemic significance of disagreement that we can actually be justified in believing. (shrink)

Although work–family conflict is highly relevant for both families and businesses, scarce attention has received from business ethics perspective. This article focuses on the latter, presenting a set of relevant insights from Catholic Social Teaching (CST). After reviewing the foundations and principles presented by CST regarding work–family relationships, a set of normative propositions are presented to develop work–family policies and for a correct personal work–family balance. It is argued that business responsibility with employees’ family should be considered as a part (...) of Corporate Social Responsibility. In addition, the applications of these principles and propositions can lead to a mutual enrichment of both business and family. (shrink)

Abstract This essay is a response to three review articles on two recently published books dealing with aspects of Hinduism and science: Jonathan Edelmann's Hindu Theology and Biology: The Bhāgavata Purāṇa and Contemporary Theory, and my own, Hindu Perspectives on Evolution: Darwin, Dharma and Design. The task set by the editor of Zygon for the three reviewers was broad: they could make specific critiques of the two books, or they could use them as starting points to engage in a broad (...) discussion of Hinduism and science, or religion and science in general. In my response, I first provide a fairly detailed reply to David Gosling's many critiques of my book, and in the process call into question his Advaitic conciliation of Hinduism and science. Thomas Ellis's thesis of basic incompatibility between Hinduism and science is much closer to my own viewpoint. One of the main objectives of my book was to explain and illustrate this incompatibility with specific regard to Hindu and Darwinian perspectives on evolution. In this essay I provide a few examples in support of Ellis's incompatibility thesis, encompassing both epistemological and metaphysical dissonances. Finally, I reflect upon Varadaraja V. Raman's wide-ranging exposition on the all-encompassing nature of the Hindu tradition that readily accommodates both religious and scientific quests for knowledge. Raman uses the two books only as starting points for his own thoughts, without reference to my book. I confine myself, accordingly, to a brief critique of his complementarity approach to Hinduism and science, and of his radical inclusivism that enfolds basically all philosophical positions into the warm embrace of the Hindu tradition, including even the extreme antireligious materialism of the Cārvāka. (shrink)

Après avoir montré que la conception arendtienne de l’éducation vise à concilier autorité et liberté, cet article aborde certains facteurs socio-techniques qui, selon Hannah Arendt, affectent dans ses fondements le milieu éducatif au point que la crise de l’autorité et de la transmission enregistrée dans cette « sphère particulière » n’est susceptible que de solutions inédites. Car si la crise de l’éducation est d’abord le résultat d’une rupture avec la tradition, elle se traduit également par l’incapacité à gérer la démesure (...) qu’entraîne le progrès en ce domaine. L’ouverture aux générations futures permet toutefois de redonner à l’éducation sa place dans la fondation et le maintien d’un monde public commun. After demonstrating how the arendtian conception of education aims to reconcile authority and freedom, this article tackles some of the social and technical stakes, which, according to H. Arendt, have a basic effect on the world of education to the point that the crisis of authority and transmission noted in that “special sphere” will only respond to unusual solutions. For, if the crisis in education is first of all the result of the break with tradition, it is also revealed through an inability to control the excesses which seem to follow progress made in this field. Its opening to future generations enables education, however, to regain its place in the foundation and the preservation of a common public world. (shrink)

A common worry about moral conciliationism is that it entails at best uncertainty about many of our moral beliefs and at worst epistemological moral scepticism. Against this worry, I argue that moral conciliationism saves us from epistemological moral scepticism and enables us to be confident in many of our moral beliefs. First, I show that only taking disagreements seriously as a threat to our beliefs allows us to utilise agreements in support of our beliefs (call this symmetry). Next, I argue (...) that utilising moral agreements as an epistemic resource allows moral conciliationism to resist the potentially worrisome reduction in confidence of our moral beliefs. Taking the relevance of moral agreement into account, I argue that it is anti-conciliationism that must meet the challenge of epistemological moral scepticism. For this, I suggest that moral inquiry is best understood as a collective endeavour. If so, then agreement on our moral judgments is required to justify the confidence we have in many of our moral beliefs. However, by symmetry, this appeal is possible only if one accepts the conciliatory attitude towards disagreements. Hence, accepting, rather than rejecting moral conciliationism, is the way out of moral scepticism. (shrink)

"Est-il possible pour une nation de se réconcilier? C’est à cette question simple mais nécessaire que cet essai est dédié. La mort de Nelson Mandela en décembre 2013 a conduit à un recueillement mondial au début du XXIe siècle. Les ennemis d’hier se sont réunis autour du mythe du prisonnier réconciliateur. Cette réunion n’indique sans doute pas l’adhésion aux actions du militant sud-africain : célébrer Mandela, c’est chercher à bénéficier de son aura. Une ère de réconciliations a commencé à la (...) fin du XXe siècle. Les processus sont canalisés et enclos dans la tradition libérale : le libéralisme se présente comme le chantre de la paix et du bonheur. Pourtant le monde n’aurait jamais été si violent... Cette contradiction devrait suffire à disqualifier le libéralisme comme projet politique viable, et pourtant, le monde continue à lui confier les rênes. L’auteure piste donc à la fois les réussites et les échecs des réconciliations contemporaines. Elle s’interroge sur ces réconciliations politiques mais aussi philosophiques et scientifiques qui n’auraient jamais pu avoir lieu du temps des deux blocs. Elle propose un chemin à rebrousse-poil, en montrant que la paix et la conciliation ne sont possibles qu’au prix du conflit et de la confrontation. Passant par l’Afrique du Sud, mais aussi le Kurdistan, l’Algérie ou le Canada, l’auteure propose non pas de ne pas réconcilier, mais de réconcilier en déconciliant. Elle ne le propose pas comme une simple idée, mais esquisse les traits d’une pratique" (4ème de couv.). (shrink)

The article considers three episcopal assemblies held in Gaul, which the manuscript tradition has not preserved, all involved in doctrinal debates on grace and free will. The first two, the council of Arles and the synod of Lyon, took place in the second half of the fifth century and concerned the affair of the presbyter Lucidus. The third is the Council of Valence that met just before the Second Council of Orange (529), that is, the council that marks the “resolution” (...) of the conflict and also the only documented. With the idea that the history of the councils occupies important points in the reconstruction of the debate on grace and free will, even in the case of councils whose acts have not been transmitted, the article seeks to enhance these three events by reconsidering indirect sources. The episcopal meetings of Arles, Lyon, and Valence are, indeed, an integral part of the doctrinal work on grace and free will, which for about a century interested monastic and ecclesiastical circles in Gaul. Moreover, the recovery of their history restores well the complexity of the cultural, religious and political climate in which they took place. (shrink)

Formal epistemologists criticise the Conciliatory View of peer disagreement for being non-commutative with conditionalisation, path dependent and does not preserve the independence between propositions. Failing to commute with conditionalisation, one may switch the order between conciliating and conditionalising and obtain different outcomes. Failing to be path independent, the outcome of conciliation varies with the order of the acquisition of new testimonies. Failing to preserve the independence between propositions, one may suffer from a sure-loss and hence be deemed irrational. The (...) three formal deficiencies urge people to abandon the Conciliatory View. This paper aims to show that one may save the Conciliatory View by conciliating with nonlinear functions. Research in the study of opinion pooling shows that the three deficiencies are not problems of the Conciliatory View, but problems of linear averaging. Hence, one can get rid of these formal deficiencies by making conciliation with nonlinear averaging functions. After showing how the three deficiencies can be avoided, I will explore the features of nonlinear averaging functions and argue that they have properties that correctly capture people’s intuition concerning disagreement. The conclusion, therefore, is to suggest epistemologists develop a more fine-grained taxonomy for cases of disagreement. With a deliberate categorisation of different kinds of disagreement, epistemologists can pick the proper averaging rule to apply in each specific case, and get rid of possible formal deficiencies. (shrink)

Canadian government agencies now promote participatory research among researchers to find solutions to problems in education with the involvement of professionals working on the field. This text is based on two examples in education and describes the intermediary work done by researchers with professionals at the start-up of the research. It demonstrated how groundwork and communication with the research partners might bring the scientific and professional communities closer.

Pietraszewski misrepresents both the nature of behaviour in conflict and the ability of psychology to theorise the relational properties of group designation. At the behavioural level, he focusses exclusively on “attack,” when consolation/care in conflict is equally present and important. At the theoretical level, he ignores existing psychological work on how group perception is shaped by the meta-contrast principle.

Court conciliation conducted by judges in Chinese people’s courts has been playing a vital role in resolving civil disputes. When it heaps praises and compliments, it also faces severe criticisms such as pressing parties to settle due to judges’ over-engagement. To date, except for mere criticisms from the legal literature, few efforts have been made to reveal how judges get engaged linguistically in conciliation and whether their engagement exceeds the limit in each phase of court conciliation. This (...) paper, taking the engagement system of the appraisal framework and the exchange structure model as the theoretical basis, aims to analyze the features of judges’ engagement and the underlying forces that influence their engagement. Data-analysis shows that for court conciliation conducted in court, judges often employ dialogically contractive resources in uni-directional information exchange structures to warrant their engagement. Under the co-influence of the driving and curbing forces, judges are often “dancing with shackles” in court conciliation. (shrink)

A sizeable body of literature suggests that informal methods of dispute resolution — and, in particular, conciliation — flourish only in societies marked by extensive social hierarchy. Given this literature, it is quite surprising to discover that in the mid-nineteenth century, the United States embarked on an extensive debate regarding whether to adopt "conciliation courts," whose primary function was to reconcile the disputants by persuading them to embrace an equitable compromise. First created by the French Revolutionaries in 1790, (...) conciliation courts were widely established throughout continental Europe. Observing this development, leading American lawyers and politicians pondered seriously whether the United states ought to follow suit. Debate over whether to embrace such institutions occurred at the very highest of levels, and a series of states enacted constitutional provisions authorizing their legislatures to create conciliation courts. Ultimately, however, despite the widespread interest in such institutions, these were never established — except in the notable case of the Freedmen’s Bureau courts of the Reconstruction South. This Article explores this largely forgotten episode in American legal history. It examines why a nation that was radically egalitarian by standards of the time would seriously consider embracing an institution that we tend more commonly to associate with inegalitarian, strongly hierarchical societies — and why, after coming so close to adopting conciliation courts, it ultimately failed to do so. In the process, by situating the debate over conciliation courts in a broader social and legal context, the Article also excavates the origins of the modern, quintessentially American commitment to the virtues of formal, adversarial process. (shrink)

RESUMEN En este artículo pretendemos analizar la posición de Hans Jonas en relación con las llamadas teorías del desarrollo, colocándolo entre los críticos de la idea de crecimiento, aunque no entre los tecnófobos. Con este fin, comenzaremos revisando brevemente las principales corrientes desarrollistas florecientes en la posguerra y, basados en El Principio de Responsabilidad, presentaremos las críticas de Jonas articuladas con su propuesta política para un reequilibrio entre países ricos y pobres en relación con el tema del crecimiento. ABSTRACT In (...) this article we intend to analyze the position of Hans Jonas in relation to the so-called development theories, placing him among the critics of the idea of economic growth, although not among the technophobes. To this end, we will begin by briefly reviewing the main flourishing developmental currents in the postwar period and, based on The Imperative of Responsibility, we will present Jonas's criticisms articulated with his political proposal for a rebalancing between rich and poor countries in relation to the issue of growth. (shrink)

An increasing amount of research has examined the management of competing logics, and possible tensions arising between them, within “hybrid organizations.” However, the ways in which the relationships of hybrids with other organizations shape the conciliation of these logics and tensions have received limited attention so far. In this theoretical paper, we examine how hybrid organizations deal with interorganizational collaboration, in particular whether and how their hybridity can be maintained when they partner with “dominant-logic organizations.” Drawing on empirical literature (...) on social enterprise–corporate collaborations, we develop a framework and several propositions on how competing logics and their balancing within hybrid organizations may be affected by interactions with organizations underpinned by one dominant logic. We suggest that influences will mostly depend on the type of collaboration pursued. A collaboration based on a lower level of engagement and interaction between the two partners is likely to give precedence to one logic over the other, reducing inter-logic tensions but possibly compromising organizational hybridity. By contrast, a collaboration featuring numerous interactions and mission compatibility may facilitate sustained hybridity if tensions are acknowledged and managed. Our propositions contribute to the literatures on hybrid organizations, interorganizational collaboration, and social enterprise. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2017 Heft: 216 Seiten: 399-421.

Certains en possèdent déjà : les animaux de compagnie, les espèces protégées et les animaux d'élevage. Mais les droits que nous leur avons consentis sont minimaux et incohérents. Nous traitons différemment les chiens, que nous considérons comme des membres de la famille, et les cochons, réduits au rang d'objets produits en masse et abattus dans d'indignes conditions. Pourtant cochons et chiens présentent une sensibilité et une intelligence similaires. Comment en sommes-nous venus à les classer dans des catégories si différentes? C'est (...) que nous sommes spécistes. Le terme, peu connu en France, fera bientôt partie de notre vocabulaire. A l'instar du racisme et du sexisme, dont il poursuit la logique. Le spécisme consiste à traiter différemment, et sans la moindre raison valable, deux espèces qui présentent les mêmes caractéristiques. Tout comme nous avons longtemps dénié aux femmes les mêmes droits que les hommes. L'affirmation de l'antispécisme sera celle de l'animalisme, un mouvement philosophique qui promeut la nécessité d'accorder des droits à tous les animaux, en raison de leur capacité à souffrir. Loin d'être anecdotique, l'animalisme incarne le mouvement idéologique le plus révolutionnaire ; pour la première fois depuis 2000 ans, il entend sortir nos systèmes de pensée occidentaux de leur logique anthropocentriste et reconnaître que nous, qui sommes des animaux, avons des obligations morales à l'égard de nos cousins. Surtout, l'animalisme s'inscrit dans une logique d'écologie politique, éloignée de celle incarnée dans les élections. Non plus une écologie superficielle, qui se soucie seulement de préserver les écosystèmes, les ressources et quelques espèces en péril, mais une écologie profonde, qui repense complètement la place de l'homme dans le monde. Pour que ce dernier ne vive plus en parasite, mais en symbiose avec toutes les formes de vivant. Cela oblige à une refonte de nos institutions et à briser la vision à court-terme du temps politique. Cela nous oblige aussi à une réforme intellectuelle qui remette en question la notion de " profit ". Le capitalisme, le socialisme, le communisme, le néo-libéralisme sont aujourd'hui discrédités, si ce n'est dépassés. (shrink)