PARANORMAL IS ABNORMAL ACTION OF MIND ON MATTER.\\ ONE NEEDS FIRST A THEORY OF NORMAL ACTION OF MIND ON MATTER.\\ CLASSICAL THEORY INADEQUATE: NO `MIND' IN THE DYNAMICS.\\ QUANTUM THEORY IS FORMULATED AS A THEORY OF MIND-MATTER INTERPLAY!\\ SIMPLER THAN CLASSICAL PHYSICS!\\ I SHALL:\\ 1. SHOW HOW QUANTUM THEORY OF MIND-MATTER IS CONSTRUCTED.\\ 2. DO TWO IMPORTANT MIND-MATTER CALCULATIONS.\\ 3. LOOK AT RAMIFICATIONS FOR PARANORMAL.

This paper argues that logical inferentialists should reject multiple-conclusion logics. Logical inferentialism is the position that the meanings of the logical constants are determined by the rules of inference they obey. As such, logical inferentialism requires a proof-theoretic framework within which to operate. However, in order to fulfil its semantic duties, a deductive system has to be suitably connected to our inferential practices. I argue that, contrary to an established tradition, multiple-conclusion systems are ill-suited for this purpose because (...) they fail to provide a 'natural' representation of our ordinary modes of inference. Moreover, the two most plausible attempts at bringing multiple conclusions into line with our ordinary forms of reasoning, the disjunctive reading and the bilateralist denial interpretation, are unacceptable by inferentialist standards. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Broome and others have argued that it makes no sense, or at least that it cannot be true, to say that it is better for a given person that he or she exist than not. That argument can be understood to suggest that, likewise, it makes no sense, or at least that it cannot be true, to say that it is worse for a given person that he or she exist than that he or she never have existed at (...) all. This argument is of critical importance to the question of whether consequentialist theory should take a traditional, aggregative form or a less conventional, person‐affecting, or person‐based, form. I believe that, potentially, the argument represents a far more serious threat to the person‐based approach than does, for example, Parfit's two medical programmes example. Parfit's example nicely illustrates the distinction between aggregative and person‐based approaches and raises important questions. But the example — though not, I think, by Parfit — is sometimes pressed into service as a full‐fledged counterexample against the person‐based approach. As such, I argue, the example is not persuasive. In contrast, the Broomeian argument, if correct, is definitive. For that argument relies on certain metaphysical assumptions and various uncontroversial normative claims — and hence nicely avoids putting into play the controversial normative claims that lie at the very heart of the debate. The purpose of the present paper, then, is to evaluate the Broomeian argument. I argue that this potentially definitive challenge to a person‐based approach does not in fact succeed. (shrink)

The conclusion to The Realm of Reason gives briefly examples of other areas a fully developed rationalism has to elucidate. These include, amongst others, explaining self‐ and other‐ascriptions of mental states and the possibility of conforming to the normative requirements of rationality, and further elucidating the notion of knowing what it is for a given content to be true.

Philosophical applications of familiar paracomplete and paraconsistent logics often rely on an idea of . With respect to the paraconsistent logic LP (the dual of Strong Kleene or K3), such is standardly cashed out via an LP-based nonmonotonic logic due to Priest (1991, 2006a). In this paper, I offer an alternative approach via a monotonic multiple-conclusion version of LP.

In Chapter 17 of his magnificent Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit asks what he describes as an ‘awesome question’: ‘How many people should there ever be?’ For a utilitarian like me, the answer seems simple: there should be however many people it takes to make the world best. Unfortunately, if I answer Parfit's awesome question in this way, I may sink myself in a quagmire of axiological confusion. In this paper, I first describe certain aspects of the quagmire. Then I (...) introduce and explain some of the elements of a novel axiological view – ‘justicism’. Justicism is derived from some ideas originally suggested by Franz Brentano. It was developed in an effort to solve certain other problems confronting utilitarianism – problems explicitly about justice. I think, however, that as a sort of happy by-product, justicism also generates a plausible answer to Parfit's awesome question. This may come as a bit of surprise, since justicism is a form of totalism, and it is widely thought that no totalistic theory can provide a satisfactory answer to Parfit's question. After presenting and explaining my proposed solution, I address some objections. (shrink)

In this paper, it is argued that only in the section on dialectic in the Critique of Judgment does Kant reach a definitive and conclusive version of deduction, after discovering the concept of the supersensible. In the section on the deduction of pure aesthetic judgments, Kant does not satisfactorily explain the critical distinction between the sensible nature of humanity and the supersensible nature of human reason presupposed in the concept of universal communicability. While the concept of the supersensible illustrates this (...) distinction, it is only through this concept that Kant that can justify the specific possibility of claiming subjective validity in taste. The priority of the solution found in the dialectic is illustrated not only by a comparative analysis of the two sections, but also by a historical reconstruction of the process of the formation of the work, which shows that the first formulation of the concept of validity coincides with the use of the concept of the supersensible. (shrink)

The Conclusion provides a summary of the argument and its illustrations. The book’s argumentative arc ends with the claim that humanistic liberal education as practiced in the PTEV provides an example of how to build common ground for dialogue and enrichment among religious and secular approaches in higher education toward the end of developing a more effective approach to educating students for the 21st century. The evidence presented by the vocation programs examined in the book supports the conclusion (...) that these experiments provide American higher education with intellectual and cultural resources, examples of organizational innovation, and pedagogical practices that, taken together, constitute an alternative to the current situation that for too many students breeds either acquiescence in drift or a too narrow drive for achievement. The Conclusion ends by sketching reasons to think that a realignment of undergraduate education around the quest for purpose can make it possible for today’s students to break out of this dispiriting culture of acquiescence toward growth in academic learning, social development, and the formation of identities sustained by purpose. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Does Feminism Discriminate against Men? Are Men Worse off than Women? Taking the Second Sexism Seriously Conclusion.

The concluding chapter explores how the unjust physiological effects of racism and sexism might be countered as part of feminist and critical race movements for social justice. Social-political change can result in physiological transformation, and this change can take place in a number of ways. Most important are institutional changes. In addition, however, physiological changes can take place on a personal, individual level, and those transformations can range from greater to lesser involvement of conscious awareness of physiological states. In particular, (...) this chapter focuses on transformative methods on the individual level that work directly with biologically unconscious habits, rather than detouring through conscious thought. Developing the notion of a physiological therapy that does not prioritize bringing unconscious habits to conscious awareness, the book’s conclusion proposes a double-barreled approach of working for institutional change and transforming biologically unconscious habits as a response to the physiological effects of racism and sexism. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the kinds of analytic techniques that have led to conclusions concerning differences in the cognitive performance of men and women. It begins with a description of the derivation of different measures of effect size and the potential hazards in using meta-analytic techniques. In turn the likelihood of biases occurring in the publication of research, in the sampling of participants, and in the sampling of test items, and the issue of the possible heterogeneity of research studies, especially with (...) regard to their methodological quality are assessed. The chapter examines the arguments that the use of meta-analysis tends to constrain researchers in their choice of research questions, and that meta-analytic techniques constitute a “package” or technology that encourages a positivist, realist interpretation of gender differences in cognition. Nevertheless, the conclusion that the ideas, arguments, and evidence lead to a rather different, constructionist interpretation, and that as a consequence future research into gender differences in human cognition will need to address a wider range of research questions using a wider range of research methodologies is presented. (shrink)

Multiple -conclusion logic extends formal logic by allowing arguments to have a set of conclusions instead of a single one, the truth lying somewhere among the conclusions if all the premises are true. The extension opens up interesting possibilities based on the symmetry between premises and conclusions, and can also be used to throw fresh light on the conventional logic and its limitations. This is a sustained study of the subject and is certain to stimulate further research. Part I (...) reworks the fundamental ideas of logic to take account of multiple conclusions, and investigates the connections between multiple - and single - conclusion calculi. Part II draws on graph theory to discuss the form and validity of arguments independently of particular logical systems. Part III contrasts the multiple - and the single - conclusion treatment of one and the same subject, using many-valued logic as the example; and Part IV shows how the methods of 'natural deduction' can be matched by direct proofs using multiple conclusions. (shrink)

This study aims to uncover the processes of interaction through which knowledge acquisition in new employee orientation is monitored and controlled. Using video-recordings of orientation lectures as data, the study focuses on question–answer sequences in which the lecturer’s question probes into the state of the employees’ knowledge; in particular, it looks at the third turn of the sequence, in which the lecturer comes to a conclusion concerning the participants’ knowledge. This is shown to be an unavoidably practical accomplishment, which (...) is contingent on both the often ambivalent responses of the participants and the design of the knowledge-probing question. Also, the lecturer orients to being responsible for providing the employees with the necessary knowledge that they do not have. The study contributes to discussion of the interactional organization of knowledge in institutional settings, and it sheds light on the pros and cons of lectures as interactional encounters. (shrink)

What is it to have conclusive reasons to believe a proposition P? According to a view famously defended by Dretske, a reason R is conclusive for P just in case [R would not be the case unless P were the case]. I argue that, while knowing that P is plausibly related to having conclusive reasons to believe that P, having such reasons cannot be understood in terms of the truth of this counterfactual condition. Simple examples show that it is possible (...) to believe P on the basis of reasons that satisfy the counterfactual, and still get things right about P only as a matter of luck. Seeing where this account of conclusive reasons goes wrong points to an important distinction between having conclusive reasons and relying on reasons that are in point of fact conclusive. It also has wider consequences for whether modal principles like sensitivity and safety can rule out the pernicious kind of epistemic luck, or the kind of luck that interferes with knowledge. (shrink)

Cette conclusion cherche à restituer la psychologie associationniste du xixe siècle dans son projet épistémologique au-delà de la diversité des positions de l’époque. On y défend l’idée que l’importance de l’association des idées fut de permettre de prétendre fonder la psychologie comme science empirique de l’esprit. C’est la nouvelle fonction de l’association, dégagée en réalité dès l’œuvre de Hume, qui a permis un tel projet : non plus simple transition habituelle d’une idée à une autre, mais principe génétique de (...) l’ensemble de la vie mentale. (shrink)

Le but principal et premier de cette conclusion est de mettre en évidence le lien intrinsèque entre les récits de la « vie de Jésus » et le conflit d’interprétation au sujet du Nazaréen, tel qu’il résulte précisément de ses « actes de puissance » et de leur signification messianique ou non. Le deuxième but est d’expliciter l’analogie entre le conflit d’interprétation, tel qu’il se présente à l’époque néotestamentaire, et la figure qu’il prend aujourd’hui au sein du « forum-Jésus (...) », l’enjeu étant d’en dégager la signification proprement théologique. The objective of this conclusion is first and foremost to highlight the intrinsic link between the narratives of the “life of Jesus” and the conflict of interpretation concerning the Nazarene, which results from his “acts of power” and their messianic significance or lack of significance. The second objective is to make explicit the analogy between the conflict of interpretation, as it is to be found in the neo-testamentary period, and the shape it has taken on today within the “Jesus forum”, the challenge being indeed to bring out the specifically theological significance. (shrink)

Over the past two decades, several consistent procedures have been designed to infer causal conclusions from observational data. We prove that if the true causal network might be an arbitrary, linear Gaussian network or a discrete Bayes network, then every unambiguous causal conclusion produced by a consistent method from non-experimental data is subject to reversal as the sample size increases any finite number of times. That result, called the causal flipping theorem, extends prior results to the effect that causal (...) discovery cannot be reliable on a given sample size. We argue that since repeated flipping of causal conclusions is unavoidable in principle for consistent methods, the best possible discovery methods are consistent methods that retract their earlier conclusions no more than necessary. A series of simulations of various methods across a wide range of sample sizes illustrates concretely both the theorem and the principle of comparing methods in terms of retractions. (shrink)

The paper studies the extension of harmony and stability, major themes in proof-theoretic semantics, from single-conclusion natural-deduction systems to multiple -conclusions natural-deduction, independently of classical logic. An extension of the method of obtaining harmoniously-induced general elimination rules from given introduction rules is suggested, taking into account sub-structurality. Finally, the reductions and expansions of the multiple -conclusions natural-deduction representation of classical logic are formulated.

The population ethics literature has long focused on attempts to avoid the repugnant conclusion. We show that a large set of social orderings that are conventionally understood to escape the repugnant conclusion do not in fact avoid it in all instances. As we demonstrate, prior results depend on formal definitions of the repugnant conclusion that exclude some repugnant cases, for reasons inessential to any "repugnance" (or other meaningful normative properties) of the repugnant conclusion. In particular, the (...) literature traditionally formalizes the repugnant conclusion to exclude cases that include an unaffected sub-population. We relax this normatively irrelevant exclusion, and others. Using several more inclusive formalizations of the repugnant conclusion, we then prove that any plausible social ordering implies some instance of the repugnant conclusion. This understanding-that it is impossible to avoid all instances of the repugnant conclusion-is broader than the traditional understanding in the literature that the repugnant conclusion can only be escaped at unappealing theoretical costs. Therefore, the repugnant conclusion provides no methodological guidance for theory or policy-making, because it does not discriminate among candidate social orderings. So escaping the repugnant conclusion should not be a core goal of the population ethics literature. (shrink)

Formal arguments have proven that avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion is impossible without rejecting one or more highly plausible population principles. To many, such proofs establish not only a deep challenge for axiology, but also pose an important practical problem of how policymaking can confidently proceed without resolving any of the central questions of population ethics. Here we offer deflationary responses: first to the practical challenge, and then to the more fundamental challenge for axiology. Regarding the practical challenge, we provide (...) an overview of recent literature that explores the implications for public policy of the Repugnant Conclusion and related puzzles within population ethics, and shows that there is more commonality in the implications of different population axiologies than is generally recognized. The upshot is that uncertainty about population ethics presents no important problem for policymaking, and the importance of population ethics to policymaking has been overstated. We then turn to more fundamental issues about axiology, and describe a new series of formal proofs that undermine the idea that any plausible axiology could avoid the Repugnant Conclusion, including those that are assumed to avoid it in the literature. The philosophical upshot is that the Repugnant Conclusion cannot plausibly be avoided, and so it is a mistake to assume as a constraint on a plausible axiology that it must be avoided, as is assumed by most of the literature in population ethics, including by all of the fundamental impossibility theorems. (shrink)

. I give a systematic presentation of a fairly large family of multiple-conclusion modal logics that are paraconsistent and/or paracomplete. After providing motivation for studying such systems, I present semantics and tableau-style proof theories for them. The proof theories are shown to be sound and complete with respect to the semantics. I then show how the “standard” systems of classical, single-conclusion modal logics fit into the framework constructed.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the shorter Greek version of the book of Tobit, GI, which is included in the Catholic Bible, was thought to be the oldest version. It was defined as ‘a lesson on almsgiving and its redeeming powers’. As the discoveries of the Semitic copies of Tobit at Qumran, GI is recognised to be a reworking of the longer version GII, most probably originally written in Aramaic, between 225 and 175 BCE. In all versions of (...) Tobit, the theme of almsgiving is introduced as specifically directed to Jewish kinsmen, but towards the end, is to be directed to all poor, suggesting that it may have been written by a Hellenistic Jew. Although the surface context of the narrative of Tobit is the Jewish tradition of proper observation of mitzvot and sacrifice and eventual reward, the various versions contain varying degrees of ancient Near Eastern wisdom, and an ironic, subversive reflection of hypocritical righteousness. This article questioned why the endings differ markedly in different versions. To try to find answers, a semantic comparison was made between GI and the most complete Aramaic version 4Q196. Contribution: This article considered the implications of source criticism in the reception of the various versions of Tobit. The possibility was examined that the pre-Christian, Aramaic version 4Q196Tobit does not confirm the excessive focus on almsgiving as righteousness apparent in the GI version of LXX Tobit. (shrink)

Johnson‐Laird and coworkers' Mental Model theory of propositional reasoning is shown to be somewhere in between what logicians have defined as “credulous” and “skeptical” with respect to the conclusions it draws on default reasoning problems. It is then argued that in situations where skeptical reasoning has been shown to lead to problematic conclusions due to not being skeptical enough, the bolder Mental Model theory will likewise make counterintuitive predictions. This claim is supported by the consideration of two of those situations, (...) namely problems involving reinstatement and floating conclusions. It is discussed how the recent “principle of pragmatic modulation” could be a first step in order to overcome the mild credulity of Mental Model reasoning. (shrink)