Any historical and critical appreciation of Hegel's basic thesis of the identity of metaphysics with logic cannot fail to compare it with his charging Kant and Fichte with attaching a merely subjective meaning to logical determinations, as well as Schelling with spinozism and extrinsicalness in conceiving the absolute indifference of subject with object. This paper aims to give an account of Hegel's notion of nature as it arises from the fulfillment of the logical idea (as the Anderssein of the idea (...) in which it is in the form of the alienation (Entaeusserung)) by focussing attention on the logical pathway of the notion of externality (Aeusserlichkeit) in the Doctrine of Being. I argue for an alternative to the received view on the outcome of the Logic of Being, by pointing out two different meanings, overlooked so far, attached to the category of measure vs. the notion of Mode and to Spinoza's substance in 1812 and 1832. (shrink)
Per Husserl, come per Bolzano, la logica e una dottrina della sdenza. Husserl prende pero piu sul serio l'idea che le teorie scientifiche siano costituite dagli atti mentali di soggetti conoscenti. Quella che segue e un' esposizione della concezione husserliana dellalogica e dellascienza, fondata appunto sugli atti; essa approdera a una delineazione dell'idea husserliana di «ontologia formale».
PART I The first chapter contains some arguments in favour of four general requirements on a theory of meaning which Michael Dummett has formulated: connection between meaning and understanding, distinction between sense and force, compositionality, and manifestability. The second chapter contains a condensed account of the theory of meaning centered on bivalent truth-conditions, and a detailed analysis of Dummett's argument against such a theory and against classical logic. The third chapter is a description of Dummett's theory of meaning centered on (...) the notion of direct verification, and of Prawitz's semantics which can be embedded in the latter theory of meaning so as to justify intuitionistic logic. The weakest points of Dummett's idea are two: 1) it is difficult to make verificationism compatible with the holistic character of justification; 2) logical revisionism may involve a too drastic disagreement between verificationism and linguistic practice. -/- PART II. The second part contains a presentation of a theory of meaning centered on the notion which I have called immediate argumental role. The fundamental idea of the theory is that the sense of a word is given by all the argumentation rules concerning the word. Chapters IV-VII make precise the basic idea by explaining the notion of "argumentation rule" and by defining the notion of "concerning", and other notions among which "immediate argumental role of a sentence" and "global argumental role". Chapters VIII-X deal with the main philosophical features of the theory: 1) the theory satisfies the four requirements considered in the first chapter; 2) despite its compositionality, the theory is compatible with epistemological holism; 3) the theory admits the possibility of meaningful paradoxical languages; 4) the theory distinguishes between the understandability of a language and its correctness in a given epistemic situation (understandability does not imply correctness); 5) the theory is pluralist with respect to the understandability of different logics and neutral with respect to their validity. (shrink)