Results for 'Consciousness States*'

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Conscious States and Conscious Creatures: Explanation in the Scientific Study of Consciousness.Tim Bayne - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):1–22.
    Explanation does not exist in a metaphysical vacuum. Conceptions of the structure of a phenomenon play an important role in guiding attempts to explain it, and erroneous conceptions of a phenomenon may direct investigation in misleading directions. I believe that there is a case to be made for thinking that much work on the neural underpinnings of consciousness—what is often called the neural correlates of consciousness—is driven by an erroneous conception of the structure of consciousness. The aim (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  2.  89
    Minimally Conscious States, Deep Brain Stimulation, and What is Worse Than Futility.Grant Gillett - 2011 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 8 (2):145-149.
    The concept of futility is sometimes regarded as a cloak for medical paternalism in that it rolls together medical and value judgments. Often, despite attempts to disambiguate the concept, that is true and it can be applied in such a way as to marginalize the real interests of a patient. I suggest we replace it with a conceptual toolkit that includes physiological futility, substantial benefit (SB), and the risk of unacceptable badness (RUB) in that these concepts allow us to articulate (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  3. Conscious States as Objects of Awareness: On Uriah Kriegel, Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory.Brie Gertler - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):447-455.
    Conscious states as objects of awareness: on Uriah Kriegel, Subjective consciousness: a self - representational theory Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9763-9 Authors Brie Gertler, Corcoran Department of Philosophy, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  4. Are Conscious States Conscious in Virtue of Representing Themselves?: On Uriah Kriegel’s Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory.Berit Brogaard - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):467-474.
    Are conscious states conscious in virtue of representing themselves? Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-8 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9762-x Authors Berit Brogaard, Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, St. Louis, 599 Lucas Hall, One University Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63121-4400, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  5. Conscious States: Where Are They in the Brain and What Are Their Necessary Ingredients?William Hirstein - 2013 - Mens Sana Monographs 11 (1):230-238.
    One of the final obstacles to understanding consciousness in physical terms concerns the question of whether conscious states can exist in posterior regions of the brain without active connections to the brain's prefrontal lobes. If they can, difficult issues concerning our knowledge of our conscious states can be resolved. This paper contains a list of types of conscious states that may meet this criterion, including states of coma, states in which subjects are absorbed in a perceptual task, states in (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6.  87
    Are Conscious States Conscious in Virtue of Representing Themselves?: On Uriah Kriegel’s Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. [REVIEW]Berit Brogaard - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):467-474.
  7. Dreaming and the Brain: Toward a Cognitive Neuroscience of Conscious States.J. Allan Hobson, Edward F. Pace-Schott & Robert Stickgold - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):793-842; 904-1018; 1083-1121.
    Sleep researchers in different disciplines disagree about how fully dreaming can be explained in terms of brain physiology. Debate has focused on whether REM sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. A review of psychophysiological studies shows clear quantitative differences between REM and NREM mentation and between REM and waking mentation. Recent neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies also differentiate REM, NREM, and waking in features with phenomenological implications. Both evidence and theory suggest that there are isomorphisms between (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   107 citations  
  8. The Timing of Conscious States.David M. Rosenthal - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):215-20.
    Striking experimental results by Benjamin Libet and colleagues have had an impor- tant impact on much recent discussion of consciousness. Some investigators have sought to replicate or extend Libet’s results (Haggard, 1999; Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Haggard, Newman, & Magno, 1999; Trevena & Miller, 2002), while others have focused on how to interpret those findings (e.g., Gomes, 1998, 1999, 2002; Pockett, 2002), which many have seen as conflicting with our commonsense picture of mental functioning.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  9. Dreaming and the Brain: Toward a Cognitive Neuroscience of Conscious States.J. Allan Hobson, Edward F. Pace-Schott & Robert Stickgold - 2003 - In Edward F. Pace-Schott, Mark Solms, Mark Blagrove & Stevan Harnad (eds.), Sleep and Dreaming: Scientific Advances and Reconsiderations. Cambridge University Press. pp. 793-842.
    Sleep researchers in different disciplines disagree about how fully dreaming can be explained in terms of brain physiology. Debate has focused on whether REM sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. A review of psychophysiological studies shows clear quantitative differences between REM and NREM mentation and between REM and waking mentation. Recent neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies also differentiate REM, NREM, and waking in features with phenomenological implications. Both evidence and theory suggest that there are isomorphisms between (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   90 citations  
  10. The Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States: Current Knowledge and Remaining Questions.Joseph T. Giacino & J. T. Whyte - 2005 - Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilation 20 (1):30-50.
  11. Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective.Graham Jamieson (ed.) - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    The phenomenon of hypnosis provides a rich paradigm for those seeking to understand the processes that underlie consciousness. Understanding hypnosis tells us about a basic human capacity for altered experiences that is often overlooked in contemporary western societies. Throughout the 200 year history of psychology, hypnosis has been a major topic of investigation by some of the leading experimenters and theorists of each generation. Today hypnosis is emerging again as a lively area of research within cognitive (systems level) neuroscience (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  12. 'Another I': Representing Conscious States, Perception, and Others.Christopher Peacocke - 2005 - In Jose Luis Bermudez & José Luis Bermúdez (eds.), Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    What is it for a thinker to possess the concept of perceptual experience? What is it to be able to think of seeings, hearings and touchings, and to be able to think of experiences that are subjectively like seeings, hearings and touchings?
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  13. Guiding the Study of Brain Dynamics by Using First- Person Data: Synchrony Patterns Correlate with Ongoing Conscious States During a Simple Visual Task.Antoine Lutz, Jacques Martinerie, Jean-Philippe Lachaux & Francisco J. Varela - 2002 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the Usa 99 (3):1586-1591.
    Laboratoire de Neurosciences Cognitives et Imagerie Ce´re´brale (LENA), Hoˆpital de La Salpeˆtrie`re, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS).
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   81 citations  
  14.  29
    The Entropic Brain: A Theory of Conscious States Informed by Neuroimaging Research with Psychedelic Drugs.Robin L. Carhart-Harris, Robert Leech, Peter J. Hellyer, Murray Shanahan, Amanda Feilding, Enzo Tagliazucchi, Dante R. Chialvo & David Nutt - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
  15.  35
    Phenomenality, Conscious States, and Consciousness Inessentialism.Mikio Akagi - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (4):803-819.
    I draw attention to an ambiguity of the expression ‘phenomenal consciousness’ that is an avoidable yet persistent source of conceptual confusion among consciousness scientists. The ambiguity is between what I call phenomenality and what I call conscious states, where the former denotes an abstract property and the latter denotes a phenomenon or class of its instances. Since sentences featuring these two terms have different semantic properties, it is possible to equivocate over the term ‘consciousness’. It is also (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. EEG Oscillatory States as Neuro-Phenomenology of Consciousness as Revealed From Patients in Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States.Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):149-169.
    The value of resting electroencephalogram (EEG) in revealing neural constitutes of consciousness (NCC) was examined. We quantified the dynamic repertoire, duration and oscillatory type of EEG microstates in eyes-closed rest in relation to the degree of expression of clinical self-consciousness. For NCC a model was suggested that contrasted normal, severely disturbed state of consciousness and state without consciousness. Patients with disorders of consciousness were used. Results suggested that the repertoire, duration and oscillatory type of EEG (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  17.  40
    The Value of Spontaneous EEG Oscillations in Distinguishing Patients in Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States.Andrew And Alexander Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi - 2013 - In Eror Basar & et all (eds.), Application of Brain Oscillations in Neuropsychiatric Diseases. Supplements to Clinical Neurophysiology. Elsevier. pp. 81-99.
    Objective: The value of spontaneous EEG oscillations in distinguishing patients in vegetative and minimally conscious states was studied. Methods: We quantified dynamic repertoire of EEG oscillations in resting condition with closed eyes in patients in vegetative and minimally conscious states (VS and MCS). The exact composition of EEG oscillations was assessed by the probability-classification analysis of short-term EEG spectral patterns. Results: The probability of delta, theta and slow-alpha oscillations occurrence was smaller for patients in MCS than for VS. Additionally, only (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  18.  84
    Kafka, Paranoic Doubles and the Brain: Hypnagogic Vs. Hyper-Reflexive Models of Disrupted Self in Neuropsychiatric Disorders and Anomalous Conscious States. [REVIEW]Aaron L. Mishara - 2010 - Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 5:13.
    Kafka's writings are frequently interpreted as representing the historical period of modernism in which he was writing. Little attention has been paid, however, to the possibility that his writings may reflect neural mechanisms in the processing of self during hypnagogic (i.e., between waking and sleep) states. Kafka suffered from dream-like, hypnagogic hallucinations during a sleep-deprived state while writing. This paper discusses reasons (phenomenological and neurobiological) why the self projects an imaginary double (autoscopy) in its spontaneous hallucinations and how Kafka's writings (...)
    Direct download (14 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  19.  48
    Incidence and Prevalence of the Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States.J. Graham Beaumont & Pamela M. Kenealy - 2005 - Neuropsychological Rehabilitation 15 (3):184-189.
  20.  19
    Our Conscious States Picture and Apprehend Our Nervous Processes.Sidney E. Mezes - 1931 - Journal of Philosophy 28 (22):600-607.
  21. Minimally Conscious States.Douglas Katz - 2001
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22.  21
    Inferred Conscious States and the Equality Axiom.A. H. Pierce - 1905 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (6):150-155.
  23.  2
    Inferred Conscious States and the Equality Axiom.A. H. Pierce - 1905 - Journal of Philosophy 2 (6):150.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Unconscious Mens Rea: Criminal Responsibility for Lapses and Minimally Conscious States.Katrina Sifferd - 2016 - In Dennis Patterson & Michael Pardo (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.
    In a recent book, Neil Levy argues that culpable action – action for which we are morally responsible – is necessarily produced by states of which we are consciously aware. However, criminal defendants are routinely held responsible for criminal harm caused by states of which they are not conscious in Levy’s sense. In this chapter I argue that cases of negligent criminal harm indicate that Levy’s claim that moral responsibility requires synchronic conscious awareness of the moral significance of an act (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25.  66
    Does the Four Score Correctly Diagnose the Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States?Richard Malone, Caroline Schnakers & Kathleen Kalmar - unknown
    Wijdicks and colleagues1 recently presented the Full Outline of UnResponsiveness (FOUR) scale as an alternative to the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS)2 in the evaluation of consciousness in severely brain-damaged patients. They studied 120 patients in an intensive care setting (mainly neuro-intensive care) and claimed that “the FOUR score detects a locked-in syndrome, as well as the presence of a vegetative state.”1 We fully agree that the FOUR is advantageous in identifying locked-in patients given that it specifically tests for eye (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  26. Consciousness is Not a Property of States: A Reply to Wilberg.Jacob Berger - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):829-842.
    According to Rosenthal's higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, one is in a conscious mental state if and only if one is aware of oneself as being in that state via a suitable HOT. Several critics have argued that the possibility of so-called targetless HOTs?that is, HOTs that represent one as being in a state that does not exist?undermines the theory. Recently, Wilberg (2010) has argued that HOT theory can offer a straightforward account of such cases: since consciousness (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  27. Prognostic Value of Resting-State EEG Structure in Disentangling Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States: A Preliminary Study.Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi - 2013 - Neurorehabilitation and Neural Repair 27 (4):345-354.
    Background: Patients in a vegetative state pose problems in diagnosis, prognosis and treatment. Currently, no prognostic markers predict the chance of recovery, which has serious consequences, especially in end-of-life decision-making. -/- Objective: We aimed to assess an objective measurement of prognosis using advanced electroencephalography (EEG). -/- Methods: EEG data (19 channels) were collected in 14 patients who were diagnosed to be persistently vegetative based on repeated clinical evaluations at 3 months following brain damage. EEG structure parameters (amplitude, duration and variability (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  28.  2
    Reorganization of the Connectivity Between Elementary Functions – A Model Relating Conscious States to Neural Connections.Jesper Mogensen & Morten Overgaard - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
  29.  6
    What Should Be the Roles of Conscious States and Brain States in Theories of Mental Activity?D. E. Dulany - 2011 - Mens Sana Monographs 9 (1):93.
    Answers to the title's question have been influenced by a history in which an early science of consciousness was rejected by behaviourists on the argument that this entails commitment to ontological dualism and "free will" in the sense of indeterminism. This is, however, a confusion of theoretical assertions with metaphysical assertions. Nevertheless, a legacy within computational and information-processing views of mind rejects or de-emphasises a role for consciousness. This paper sketches a mentalistic metatheory in which conscious states are (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  30. Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective.Graham Jamieson (ed.) - 2007 - Oxford University Press UK.
    The phenomenon of hypnosis provides a rich paradigm for those seeking to understand the processes that underlie consciousness. Understanding hypnosis tells us about a basic human capacity for altered experiences that is often overlooked in contemporary western societies. Throughout the 200 year history of psychology, hypnosis has been a major topic of investigation by some of the leading experimenters and theorists of each generation. Today hypnosis is emerging again as a lively area of research within cognitive neuroscience informing basic (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31.  95
    Conceiving of Conscious States.Christopher Peacocke - 2012 - In J. Ellis & D. Guevara (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
    For a wide range of concepts, a thinker’s understanding of what it is for a thing to fall under the concept plausibly involves knowledge of an identity. It involves knowledge that the thing has to have the same property as is exemplified in instantiation of the concept in some distinguished, basic instance. This paper addresses the question: can we apply this general model of the role of identity in understanding to the case of subjective, conscious states? In particular, can we (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32.  37
    Consciousness and the Origins of Thought.Janet Levin - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):644.
    In this thoughtful, rich, and extremely ambitious book, Norton Nelkin develops a "Scientific Cartesian" theory of sensation and perception, consciousness, conceptual content, and concept formation. The theory is Cartesian primarily because its account of mental states is realist, individualist, and internalist; Nelkin also holds, with Descartes, that perceptions are spontaneous judgments and that at least some of our concepts are innate. But, unlike Descartes, Nelkin rejects dualism and treats the mind as something that can be studied by the same (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  33.  35
    Voluntary Control of Two Lateralized Conscious States: Validation of Electrical and Behavioral Studies.P. S. Gott, E. C. Hughes & K. Whipple - 1984 - Neuropsychologia 22:65-72.
  34.  63
    Nietzsche, Consciousness, and Human Agency.Tsarina Doyle - 2011 - Idealistic Studies 41 (1-2):11-30.
    This paper examines how Nietzsche’s view of the mind and its relationship to nature informs his account of human agency. In particular, it focuses on his approach to the causal efficacy of conscious mental states. By examining the Leibnizean and Kantian background to this approach, I contend that Nietzsche proposes a naturalist but non-eliminativist account of mind, central to which is his anti-Cartesian denial that consciousness is intrinsic to the mental. However, Nietzsche ultimately oscillates between two accounts: the first, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  35.  30
    Access is Mainly a Second-Order Process: SDT Models Whether Phenomenally (First-Order) Conscious States Are Accessed by Reflectively (Second-Order) Conscious Processes☆.Michael Snodgrass, Natasha Kalaida & E. Samuel Winer - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):561-564.
    Access can either be first-order or second-order. First order access concerns whether contents achieve representation in phenomenal consciousness at all; second-order access concerns whether phenomenally conscious contents are selected for metacognitive, higher order processing by reflective consciousness. When the optional and flexible nature of second-order access is kept in mind, there remain strong reasons to believe that exclusion failure can indeed isolate phenomenally conscious stimuli that are not so accessed. Irvine’s [Irvine, E. . Signal detection theory, the exclusion (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  36. Functional Neuroanatomy of Altered States of Consciousness: The Transient Hypofrontality Hypothesis.A. Dietrich - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (2):231-256.
    It is the central hypothesis of this paper that the mental states commonly referred to as altered states of consciousness are principally due to transient prefrontal cortex deregulation. Supportive evidence from psychological and neuroscientific studies of dreaming, endurance running, meditation, daydreaming, hypnosis, and various drug-induced states is presented and integrated. It is proposed that transient hypofrontality is the unifying feature of all altered states and that the phenomenological uniqueness of each state is the result of the differential viability of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  37.  14
    Altered States of Consciousness.Charles T. Tart (ed.) - 1990 - (Third Edition).
  38. The Chemistry of Conscious States: Toward a Unified Model of the Brain and the Mind.J. Allan Hobson - 1994 - Basic Books.
    Argues that the brain and the mind are one--that the thoughts, feelings, dreams, and memories that constitute our consciousness are in fact an amalgam of electrical impulses and chemical interactions.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  39. Consciousness: Individuated Information in Action.Jakub Jonkisz - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
    Within theoretical and empirical enquiries, many different meanings associated with consciousness have appeared, leaving the term itself quite vague. This makes formulating an abstract and unifying version of the concept of consciousness – the main aim of this article –into an urgent theoretical imperative. It is argued that consciousness, characterized as dually accessible (cognized from the inside and the outside), hierarchically referential (semantically ordered), bodily determined (embedded in the working structures of an organism or conscious system), and (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  40.  47
    Does the FOUR Score Correctly Diagnose the Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States?Caroline Schnakers, Joseph Giacino, Kathleen Kalmar, Sonia Piret, Eduardo Lopez, Mélanie Boly, Richard Malone & Steven Laureys - 2006 - Annals of Neurology 60 (6):744-745.
  41. Cartography of Conscious States: Integration of East and West.Roland Fischer - 1978 - In A. A. Sugarman & R. E. Tarter (eds.), Expanding Dimensions of Consciousness. Springer. pp. 24--57.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42.  30
    A Twitch of Consciousness: Defining the Boundaries of Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States.Quentin Noirhomme & Caroline Schnakers - unknown
    Some patients awaken from their coma but only show reflex motor activity. This condition of wakeful (eyes open) unawareness is called the vegetative state. In 2002, a new clinical entity coined ‘‘minimally conscious state’’ defined patients who show more than reflex responsiveness but remain unable to communicate their thoughts and feelings. Emergence from the minimally conscious state is defined by functional recovery of verbal or nonverbal communication.1 Our empirical medical definitions aim to propose clearcut borders separating disorders of consciousness (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  43. Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective.Tim Bayne - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
  44.  53
    Access is Mainly a Second-Order Process: SDT Models Whether Phenomenally (First-Order) Conscious States Are Accessed by Reflectively (Second-Order) Conscious Processes.Michael Snodgrass, Natasha Kalaida & E. Samuel Winer - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):561-564.
    Access can either be first-order or second-order. First order access concerns whether contents achieve representation in phenomenal consciousness at all; second-order access concerns whether phenomenally conscious contents are selected for metacognitive, higher order processing by reflective consciousness. When the optional and flexible nature of second-order access is kept in mind, there remain strong reasons to believe that exclusion failure can indeed isolate phenomenally conscious stimuli that are not so accessed. Irvine’s [Irvine, E. . Signal detection theory, the exclusion (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45. The Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States: A Comparison of Clinical Features and Functional Outcome.Joseph T. Giacino & Kathleen Kalmar - 1997 - Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilation 12:36-51.
  46. Peacocke's 'Concepts of Conscious States'.Benj Hellie - manuscript
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. How to Define Consciousness—and How Not to Define Consciousness.Prof Max Velmans - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (5):139-156.
    Definitions of consciousness need to be sufficiently broad to include all examples of conscious states and sufficiently narrow to exclude entities, events and processes that are not conscious. Unfortunately, deviations from these simple principles are common in modern consciousness studies, with consequent confusion and internal division in the field. The present paper gives example of ways in which definitions of consciousness can be either too broad or too narrow. It also discusses some of the main ways in (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  48. Toward a Neurophysiological Foundation for Altered States of Consciousness.Shadab Tabatabaeian & Carolyn Jennings - 2018 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41.
    Singh's cultural evolutionary theory posits that methods of inducing shamanic altered states of consciousness differ, resulting in profoundly different cognitive states. We argue that, despite different methods of induction, altered states of consciousness share neurophysiological features and cause shared cognitive and behavioral effects. This common foundation enables further cross-cultural comparison of shamanic activities that is currently left out of Singh's theory.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49.  4
    The Conscious Self: The Immaterial Center of Subjective States.David H. Lund - 2005 - Humanity Books.
    Self-consciousness and the self -- Diachronic unity, diachronic singularity, and the subject of consciousness -- A modal argument for immateriality -- Intelligibility concerns and causal objections -- Concluding remarks.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  50.  16
    The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World.Christopher S. Hill & Colin McGinn - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):300.
    As the subtitle indicates, this book is concerned with the relationship between consciousness and the physical world. It recommends a novel and disturbingly pessimistic view about this topic that it calls “naturalistic mysterianism.” The view is naturalistic because it maintains that states of consciousness are reducible to physical properties of the brain. It counts as “mysterian” because it asserts that the physical properties in question are entirely beyond our ken—that they lie well beyond the scope of contemporary neuroscience, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000