Results for 'Consciousness States*'

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  1.  82
    The value of spontaneous EEG oscillations in distinguishing patients in vegetative and minimally conscious states.Andrew And Alexander Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi - 2013 - In Eror Basar & et all (eds.), Application of Brain Oscillations in Neuropsychiatric Diseases. Supplements to Clinical Neurophysiology. Elsevier. pp. 81-99.
    Objective: The value of spontaneous EEG oscillations in distinguishing patients in vegetative and minimally conscious states was studied. Methods: We quantified dynamic repertoire of EEG oscillations in resting condition with closed eyes in patients in vegetative and minimally conscious states (VS and MCS). The exact composition of EEG oscillations was assessed by the probability-classification analysis of short-term EEG spectral patterns. Results: The probability of delta, theta and slow-alpha oscillations occurrence was smaller for patients in MCS than for VS. Additionally, only (...)
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  2. EEG oscillatory states as neuro-phenomenology of consciousness as revealed from patients in vegetative and minimally conscious states.Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):149-169.
    The value of resting electroencephalogram (EEG) in revealing neural constitutes of consciousness (NCC) was examined. We quantified the dynamic repertoire, duration and oscillatory type of EEG microstates in eyes-closed rest in relation to the degree of expression of clinical self-consciousness. For NCC a model was suggested that contrasted normal, severely disturbed state of consciousness and state without consciousness. Patients with disorders of consciousness were used. Results suggested that the repertoire, duration and oscillatory type of EEG (...)
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  3. Consciousness is not a property of states: A reply to Wilberg.Jacob Berger - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):829-842.
    According to Rosenthal's higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, one is in a conscious mental state if and only if one is aware of oneself as being in that state via a suitable HOT. Several critics have argued that the possibility of so-called targetless HOTs—that is, HOTs that represent one as being in a state that does not exist—undermines the theory. Recently, Wilberg (2010) has argued that HOT theory can offer a straightforward account of such cases: since consciousness (...)
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  4. Prognostic Value of Resting-State EEG Structure in Disentangling Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States: A Preliminary Study.Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi - 2013 - Neurorehabilitation and Neural Repair 27 (4):345-354.
    Background: Patients in a vegetative state pose problems in diagnosis, prognosis and treatment. Currently, no prognostic markers predict the chance of recovery, which has serious consequences, especially in end-of-life decision-making. Objective: We aimed to assess an objective measurement of prognosis using advanced electroencephalography (EEG). Methods: EEG data (19 channels) were collected in 14 patients who were diagnosed to be persistently vegetative based on repeated clinical evaluations at 3 months following brain damage. EEG structure parameters (amplitude, duration and variability within quasi-stationary (...)
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  5. A twitch of consciousness: defining the boundaries of vegetative and minimally conscious states.Quentin Noirhomme & Caroline Schnakers - unknown
    Some patients awaken from their coma but only show reflex motor activity. This condition of wakeful (eyes open) unawareness is called the vegetative state. In 2002, a new clinical entity coined ‘‘minimally conscious state’’ defined patients who show more than reflex responsiveness but remain unable to communicate their thoughts and feelings. Emergence from the minimally conscious state is defined by functional recovery of verbal or nonverbal communication.1 Our empirical medical definitions aim to propose clearcut borders separating disorders of consciousness (...)
     
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  6. Minimally Conscious States, Deep Brain Stimulation, and What is Worse than Futility.Grant Gillett - 2011 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 8 (2):145-149.
    The concept of futility is sometimes regarded as a cloak for medical paternalism in that it rolls together medical and value judgments. Often, despite attempts to disambiguate the concept, that is true and it can be applied in such a way as to marginalize the real interests of a patient. I suggest we replace it with a conceptual toolkit that includes physiological futility, substantial benefit (SB), and the risk of unacceptable badness (RUB) in that these concepts allow us to articulate (...)
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  7. Conscious states as objects of awareness: on Uriah Kriegel, Subjective consciousness: a self-representational theory.Brie Gertler - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):447-455.
    Conscious states as objects of awareness: on Uriah Kriegel, Subjective consciousness: a self - representational theory Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9763-9 Authors Brie Gertler, Corcoran Department of Philosophy, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  8. Are conscious states conscious in virtue of representing themselves?: On Uriah Kriegel’s Subjective consciousness: a self-representational theory.Berit Brogaard - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):467-474.
    Are conscious states conscious in virtue of representing themselves? Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-8 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9762-x Authors Berit Brogaard, Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, St. Louis, 599 Lucas Hall, One University Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63121-4400, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  9. Conscious states and conscious creatures: Explanation in the scientific study of consciousness.Tim Bayne - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):1–22.
    Explanation does not exist in a metaphysical vacuum. Conceptions of the structure of a phenomenon play an important role in guiding attempts to explain it, and erroneous conceptions of a phenomenon may direct investigation in misleading directions. I believe that there is a case to be made for thinking that much work on the neural underpinnings of consciousness—what is often called the neural correlates of consciousness—is driven by an erroneous conception of the structure of consciousness. The aim (...)
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  10. Conscious states: Where are they in the brain and what are their necessary ingredients?William Hirstein - 2013 - Mens Sana Monographs 11 (1):230-238.
    One of the final obstacles to understanding consciousness in physical terms concerns the question of whether conscious states can exist in posterior regions of the brain without active connections to the brain's prefrontal lobes. If they can, difficult issues concerning our knowledge of our conscious states can be resolved. This paper contains a list of types of conscious states that may meet this criterion, including states of coma, states in which subjects are absorbed in a perceptual task, states in (...)
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  11.  75
    Phenomenality, conscious states, and consciousness inessentialism.Mikio Akagi - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (4):803-819.
    I draw attention to an ambiguity of the expression ‘phenomenal consciousness’ that is an avoidable yet persistent source of conceptual confusion among consciousness scientists. The ambiguity is between what I call phenomenality and what I call conscious states, where the former denotes an abstract property and the latter denotes a phenomenon or class of its instances. Since sentences featuring these two terms have different semantic properties, it is possible to equivocate over the term ‘consciousness’. It is also (...)
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  12. Mindmelding, Chapter 9: Sharing conscious states.William Hirstein - 2012 - In Mindmelding: Consciousness, Neuroscience, and the Mind's Privacy. New York: Oxford University Press.
    This chapter explains how mindmelding — the direct experience by one person of another's conscious states — is in fact possible. The temporal lobes causally interact with the prefrontal lobes by way of fiber bundles that run underneath the cortical surface. This provides the perfect first experiment in mindmelding: to ‘branch’ those fiber bundles and run the other end into the brain of another person. Evidence is provided that these bundles have close connections to consciousness, in that whatever affects (...)
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  13. Dreaming and the brain: Toward a cognitive neuroscience of conscious states.J. Allan Hobson, Edward F. Pace-Schott & Robert Stickgold - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):793-842; 904-1018; 1083-1121.
    Sleep researchers in different disciplines disagree about how fully dreaming can be explained in terms of brain physiology. Debate has focused on whether REM sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. A review of psychophysiological studies shows clear quantitative differences between REM and NREM mentation and between REM and waking mentation. Recent neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies also differentiate REM, NREM, and waking in features with phenomenological implications. Both evidence and theory suggest that there are isomorphisms between (...)
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  14.  22
    Our conscious states picture and apprehend our nervous processes.Sidney E. Mezes - 1931 - Journal of Philosophy 28 (22):600-607.
  15.  7
    Consciousness: states, mechanisms and disorders.Andrea E. Cavanna & Andrea Nani (eds.) - 2014 - New York: Novinka.
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  16. The timing of conscious states.David M. Rosenthal - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):215-20.
    Striking experimental results by Benjamin Libet and colleagues have had an impor- tant impact on much recent discussion of consciousness. Some investigators have sought to replicate or extend Libet’s results (Haggard, 1999; Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Haggard, Newman, & Magno, 1999; Trevena & Miller, 2002), while others have focused on how to interpret those findings (e.g., Gomes, 1998, 1999, 2002; Pockett, 2002), which many have seen as conflicting with our commonsense picture of mental functioning.
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  17.  19
    Altered States of Consciousness in North American Indian Ceremonials.Wolfgang G. Jilek - 1982 - Ethos: Journal of the Society for Psychological Anthropology 10 (4):326-343.
  18.  4
    Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective.Graham A. Jamieson (ed.) - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.
    The phenomenon of hypnosis provides a rich paradigm for those seeking to understand the processes that underlie consciousness. Understanding hypnosis tells us about a basic human capacity for altered experiences that is often overlooked in contemporary western societies. Throughout the 200 year history of psychology, hypnosis has been a major topic of investigation by some of the leading experimenters and theorists of each generation. Today hypnosis is emerging again as a lively area of research within cognitive neuroscience informing basic (...)
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  19. The vegetative and minimally conscious states: Current knowledge and remaining questions.Joseph T. Giacino & J. T. Whyte - 2005 - Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilation 20 (1):30-50.
  20. Dreaming and the brain: Toward a cognitive neuroscience of conscious states.J. Allan Hobson, Edward F. Pace-Schott & Robert Stickgold - 2003 - In Edward F. Pace-Schott, Mark Solms, Mark Blagrove & Stevan Harnad (eds.), Sleep and Dreaming: Scientific Advances and Reconsiderations. Cambridge University Press. pp. 793-842.
    Sleep researchers in different disciplines disagree about how fully dreaming can be explained in terms of brain physiology. Debate has focused on whether REM sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. A review of psychophysiological studies shows clear quantitative differences between REM and NREM mentation and between REM and waking mentation. Recent neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies also differentiate REM, NREM, and waking in features with phenomenological implications. Both evidence and theory suggest that there are isomorphisms between (...)
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  21. Minimally conscious states.Douglas Katz - 2001
     
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  22.  6
    Inferred Conscious States and the Equality Axiom.A. H. Pierce - 1905 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (6):150-155.
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  23.  24
    Shamanism and Altered States of Consciousness.Douglass Price-Williams & Dureen J. Hughes - 1994 - Anthropology of Consciousness 5 (2):1-15.
    There has been a renewed interest in psychology and anthropology in the idea of altered states of consciousness. This paper begins by examining the meaning of this term and the extent to which such experiences are reported globally. The topic of shamanism is then discussed, first with respect to its social functions, and then to what is known about its psychological aspects (which is little). Far more is known about altered states of consciousness (ASCs) as they are expressed (...)
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  24.  30
    Inferred conscious states and the equality axiom.A. H. Pierce - 1905 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (6):150-155.
  25.  97
    Are conscious states conscious in virtue of representing themselves?: On Uriah Kriegel’s Subjective consciousness: a self-representational theory. [REVIEW]Berit Brogaard - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):467-474.
  26.  5
    The Chemistry of Conscious States: Toward a Unified Model of the Brain and the Mind.J. Allan Hobson - 1994 - Basic Books.
    Argues that the brain and the mind are one--that the thoughts, feelings, dreams, and memories that constitute our consciousness are in fact an amalgam of electrical impulses and chemical interactions.
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  27.  94
    Sources of Richness and Ineffability for Phenomenally Conscious States.Xu Ji, Eric Elmoznino, George Deane, Axel Constant, Guillaume Dumas, Guillaume Lajoie, Jonathan A. Simon & Yoshua Bengio - 2024 - Neuroscience of Consciousness 2024 (1).
    Conscious states—state that there is something it is like to be in—seem both rich or full of detail and ineffable or hard to fully describe or recall. The problem of ineffability, in particular, is a longstanding issue in philosophy that partly motivates the explanatory gap: the belief that consciousness cannot be reduced to underlying physical processes. Here, we provide an information theoretic dynamical systems perspective on the richness and ineffability of consciousness. In our framework, the richness of conscious (...)
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  28. Conceiving of Conscious States.Christopher Peacocke - 2012 - In Jonathan Ellis & Daniel Guevara (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind. , US: Oxford University Press.
    For a wide range of concepts, a thinker’s understanding of what it is for a thing to fall under the concept plausibly involves knowledge of an identity. It involves knowledge that the thing has to have the same property as is exemplified in instantiation of the concept in some distinguished, basic instance. This paper addresses the question: can we apply this general model of the role of identity in understanding to the case of subjective, conscious states? In particular, can we (...)
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  29. Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective.Graham A. Jamieson (ed.) - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    The phenomenon of hypnosis provides a rich paradigm for those seeking to understand the processes that underlie consciousness. Understanding hypnosis tells us about a basic human capacity for altered experiences that is often overlooked in contemporary western societies. Throughout the 200 year history of psychology, hypnosis has been a major topic of investigation by some of the leading experimenters and theorists of each generation. Today hypnosis is emerging again as a lively area of research within cognitive (systems level) neuroscience (...)
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  30. 'Another I': Representing Conscious States, Perception, and Others.Christopher Peacocke - 2005 - In José Luis Bermúdez (ed.), Thought, reference, and experience: themes from the philosophy of Gareth Evans. New York : Oxford University Press: Clarendon Press.
    What is it for a thinker to possess the concept of perceptual experience? What is it to be able to think of seeings, hearings and touchings, and to be able to think of experiences that are subjectively like seeings, hearings and touchings?
     
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  31. Consciousness cannot be separated from function.Michael A. Cohen & Daniel C. Dennett - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (8):358--364.
    Here, we argue that any neurobiological theory based on an experience/function division cannot be empirically confirmed or falsified and is thus outside the scope of science. A ‘perfect experiment’ illustrates this point, highlighting the unbreachable boundaries of the scientific study of consciousness. We describe a more nuanced notion of cognitive access that captures personal experience without positing the existence of inaccessible conscious states. Finally, we discuss the criteria necessary for forming and testing a falsifiable theory of consciousness.
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  32.  70
    “Not to Be Aware Anymore”: Indigenous Sumatran Ideas and Shamanic Experiences of Changed States of Awareness/Consciousness.Nathan Porath - 2013 - Anthropology of Consciousness 24 (1):7-31.
    Anthropologists working on altered states of consciousness (ASC) have suggested that we should do away with psychologizing concepts and use people's own terms for these experiences. With material drawn from the Orang Sakai of Sumatra this paper shows that practitioners who utilize ASC do recognize the alteration of states of awareness as preconditions for numinous interactions. Also critically discussed is the term ASC.
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  33.  22
    On the qualitative nature of conscious states: Insights from a structuralist theory of mind and meaning.Carles Salazar - 2024 - Anthropology of Consciousness 35 (1):96-110.
    The point of departure of this paper is Penrose's definition of conscious action as that in which stimulus and response are linked by a non‐algorithmic relationship, which Penrose defines as ‘understanding’. My purpose is to explore the nature of this understanding by means of a two‐step process. The first step is provided by Tononi's Integrated Information Theory of consciousness. This theory provides us with a quantitative measure of conscious states that we need to transform into qualitative meaning. In the (...)
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  34.  58
    Laying the Foundations for a Theory of Consciousness: The Significance of Critical Brain Dynamics for the Formation of Conscious States.Joachim Keppler - 2024 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 18:1379191.
    Empirical evidence indicates that conscious states, distinguished by the presence of phenomenal qualities, are closely linked to synchronized neural activity patterns whose dynamical characteristics can be attributed to self-organized criticality and phase transitions. These findings imply that insight into the mechanism by which the brain controls phase transitions will provide a deeper understanding of the fundamental mechanism by which the brain manages to transcend the threshold of consciousness. This article aims to show that the initiation of phase transitions and (...)
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  35.  52
    Incidence and prevalence of the vegetative and minimally conscious states.J. Graham Beaumont & Pamela M. Kenealy - 2005 - Neuropsychological Rehabilitation 15 (3):184-189.
  36. Mindmelding: Consciousness, Neuroscience, and the Mind's Privacy.William Hirstein - 2012 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    [This download contains the Table of Contents and Chapter 1]. I argue here that the claim that conscious states are private, in the sense that only one person can ever experience them directly, is false. There actually is a way to connect the brains of two people that would allow one to have direct experience of the other's conscious, e.g., perceptual states. This would allow, for instance, one person to see that the other had deviant color perception (which was masked (...)
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  37. Peacocke's 'Concepts of conscious states'.Benj Hellie - manuscript
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  38.  15
    What should be the roles of conscious states and brain states in theories of mental activity?D. E. Dulany - 2011 - Mens Sana Monographs 9 (1):93.
    Answers to the title's question have been influenced by a history in which an early science of consciousness was rejected by behaviourists on the argument that this entails commitment to ontological dualism and "free will" in the sense of indeterminism. This is, however, a confusion of theoretical assertions with metaphysical assertions. Nevertheless, a legacy within computational and information-processing views of mind rejects or de-emphasises a role for consciousness. This paper sketches a mentalistic metatheory in which conscious states are (...)
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  39. Another I" : representing conscious states, perception, and others.Christopher Peacocke - 2005 - In José Luis Bermúdez (ed.), Thought, reference, and experience: themes from the philosophy of Gareth Evans. New York : Oxford University Press: Clarendon Press.
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  40. Cartography of conscious states: Integration of East and West.Roland Fischer - 1978 - In A. A. Sugarman & R. E. Tarter (eds.), Expanding Dimensions of Consciousness. Springer. pp. 24--57.
     
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  41. Free Will and Consciousness: Experimental Studies.Joshua Shepherd - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):915-927.
    What are the folk-conceptual connections between free will and consciousness? In this paper I present results which indicate that consciousness plays central roles in folk conceptions of free will. When conscious states cause behavior, people tend to judge that the agent acted freely. And when unconscious states cause behavior, people tend to judge that the agent did not act freely. Further, these studies contribute to recent experimental work on folk philosophical affiliation, which analyzes folk responses to determine whether (...)
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  42.  89
    The Mystery of Consciousness.John R. Searle - 1990 - Granta Books.
    It has long been one of the most fundamental problems of philosophy, and it is now, John Searle writes, "the most important problem in the biological sciences": What is consciousness? Is my inner awareness of myself something separate from my body? In what began as a series of essays in The New York Review of Books, John Searle evaluates the positions on consciousness of such well-known scientists and philosophers as Francis Crick, Gerald Edelman, Roger Penrose, Daniel Dennett, David (...)
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  43. Relativistic Implications for Physical Copies of Conscious States.Andrew Knight - manuscript
    The possibility of algorithmic consciousness depends on the assumption that conscious states can be copied or repeated by sufficiently duplicating their underlying physical states, leading to a variety of paradoxes, including the problems of duplication, teleportation, simulation, self-location, the Boltzmann brain, and Wigner’s Friend. In an effort to further elucidate the physical nature of consciousness, I challenge these assumptions by analyzing the implications of special relativity on evolutions of identical copies of a mental state, particularly the divergence of (...)
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  44. The Metaphysical Fact of Consciousness in Locke's Theory of Personal Identity.Shelley Weinberg - 2012 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (3):387-415.
    Locke’s theory of personal identity was philosophically groundbreaking for its attempt to establish a non-substantial identity condition. Locke states, “For the same consciousness being preserv’d, whether in the same or different Substances, the personal Identity is preserv’d” (II.xxvii.13). Many have interpreted Locke to think that consciousness identifies a self both synchronically and diachronically by attributing thoughts and actions to a self. Thus, many have attributed to Locke either a memory theory or an appropriation theory of personal identity. But (...)
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  45. Previews and prospects for the cognitive neuroscience of hypnosis and conscious states.Graham A. Jamieson - 2007 - In Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-11.
  46. Consciousness: A Four-fold taxonomy.J. Jonkisz - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (11-12):55-82.
    This paper argues that the many and various conceptions of consciousness propounded by cognitive scientists and philosophers can all be understood as constituted with reference to four fundamental sorts of criterion: epistemic (concerned with kinds of consciousness), semantic (dealing with orders of consciousness), physiological (reflecting states of consciousness), and pragmatic (seeking to capture types of consciousness). The resulting four-fold taxonomy, intended to be exhaustive, suggests that all of the distinct varieties of consciousness currently encountered (...)
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  47. Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective.Tim Bayne - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
  48. The vegetative and minimally conscious states: A comparison of clinical features and functional outcome.Joseph T. Giacino & Kathleen Kalmar - 1997 - Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilation 12:36-51.
  49. A Conceptual Framework for Consciousness Based on a Deep Understanding of Matter.Joachim Keppler - 2012 - Philosophy Study 2 (10):689-703.
    One of the main challenges in consciousness research is widely known as the hard problem of consciousness. In order to tackle this problem, I utilize an approach from theoretical physics, called stochastic electrodynamics (SED), which goes one step beyond quantum theory and sheds new light on the reality behind matter. According to this approach, matter is a resonant oscillator that is orchestrated by an all-pervasive stochastic radiation field, called zero-point field (ZPF). The properties of matter are not intrinsic (...)
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  50. Quantum reality, the emergence of complex order from virtual states, and the importance of consciousness in the universe.Lothar Schafer - 2006 - Zygon 41 (3):505-532.
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