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Constantin C. Brîncuș
University of Bucharest
  1. What Makes Logical Truths True?Constantin C. Brîncuș - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (3): 249-272.
    The concern of deductive logic is generally viewed as the systematic recognition of logical principles, i.e., of logical truths. This paper presents and analyzes different instantiations of the three main interpretations of logical principles, viz. as ontological principles, as empirical hypotheses, and as true propositions in virtue of meanings. I argue in this paper that logical principles are true propositions in virtue of the meanings of the logical terms within a certain linguistic framework. Since these principles also regulate and control (...)
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  2. A Carnapian Approach to Counterexamples to Modus Ponens.Constantin C. Brîncuș & Iulian D. Toader - 2013 - Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7:78-85.
    This paper attempts to motivate the view that instead of rejecting modus ponens as invalid in certain situations, one could preserve its validity by associating such situations with non-normal interpretations of logical connectives.
     
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    Are the Open-Ended Rules for Negation Categorical?Constantin C. Brîncuș - forthcoming - Synthese:1-8.
    Vann McGee has recently argued that Belnap’s criteria constrain the formal rules of classical natural deduction to uniquely determine the semantic values of the propositional logical connectives and quantifiers if the rules are taken to be open-ended, i.e., if they are truth-preserving within any mathematically possible extension of the original language. The main assumption of his argument is that for any class of models there is a mathematically possible language in which there is a sentence true in just those models. (...)
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    ”John P. Burgess, Philosophical Logic, Princeton University Press, 2009”. [REVIEW]Constantin C. Brîncuș - 2013 - Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8 (1):90-92.
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  5. Categoricity and Negation. A Note on Kripke’s Affirmativism.Constantin C. Brîncuș & Iulian D. Toader - 2019 - In The Logica Yearbook 2018. London: College Publications. pp. 57-66.
    We argue that, if taken seriously, Kripke's view that a language for science can dispense with a negation operator is to be rejected. Part of the argument is a proof that positive logic, i.e., classical propositional logic without negation, is not categorical.
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  6.  49
    ”Carnap’s Ideal of Explication and Naturalism, Edited by Pierre Wagner, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012". [REVIEW]Constantin C. Brîncuș - 2014 - Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8 (2).
  7.  52
    Philosophical Accounts of First-Order Logical Truths.Constantin C. Brîncuş - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (3):369-383.
    Starting from certain metalogical results, I argue that first-order logical truths of classical logic are a priori and necessary. Afterwards, I formulate two arguments for the idea that first-order logical truths are also analytic, namely, I first argue that there is a conceptual connection between aprioricity, necessity, and analyticity, such that aprioricity together with necessity entails analyticity; then, I argue that the structure of natural deduction systems for FOL displays the analyticity of its truths. Consequently, each philosophical approach to these (...)
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  8. The Epistemic Significance of Valid Inference – A Model-Theoretic Approach.Constantin C. Brîncuș - 2015 - In Sorin Costreie & Mircea Dumitru (eds.), Meaning and Truth. Bucharest: PRO Universitaria Publishing. pp. 11-36.
    The problem analysed in this paper is whether we can gain knowledge by using valid inferences, and how we can explain this process from a model-theoretic perspective. According to the paradox of inference (Cohen & Nagel 1936/1998, 173), it is logically impossible for an inference to be both valid and its conclusion to possess novelty with respect to the premises. I argue in this paper that valid inference has an epistemic significance, i.e., it can be used by an agent to (...)
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