Results for 'Counter-Closure'

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Counter Closure and Knowledge Despite Falsehood.Brian Ball & Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (257):552-568.
    Certain puzzling cases have been discussed in the literature recently which appear to support the thought that knowledge can be obtained by way of deduction from a falsehood; moreover, these cases put pressure, prima facie, on the thesis of counter closure for knowledge. We argue that the cases do not involve knowledge from falsehood; despite appearances, the false beliefs in the cases in question are causally, and therefore epistemologically, incidental, and knowledge is achieved despite falsehood. We also show that the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   18 citations  
  2.  58
    Counter-Closure.Federico Luzzi - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):673-683.
    The focus of this paper is the prima facie plausible view, expressed by the principle of Counter-Closure, that knowledge-yielding competent deductive inference must issue from known premises. I construct a case that arguably falsifies this principle and consider five available lines of response that might help retain Counter-Closure. I argue that three are problematic. Of the two remaining lines of response, the first relies on non-universal intuitions and forces one to view the case I construct as exhibiting a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   44 citations  
  3.  50
    Contextualism and Counter-Closure.Federico Luzzi - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (1):187-199.
    I argue that DeRose's attributor contextualism cannot straightforwardly preserve the widespread view that, when a subject believes q solely on the basis of competent deduction from p, knowledge of q requires knowledge of p. I present a novel challenge to the compatibility of this widespread view with DeRose's contextualism, then argue that the tension can be resolved in only one of two ways: if DeRose rejects the widespread view or if DeRose accepts the existence of a range of contextualism-specific Gettier-style (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  4. Contextualism and Counter‐Closure.Luzzi Federico - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (1):187-199.
    I argue that DeRose's attributor contextualism cannot straightforwardly preserve the widespread view that, when a subject believes q solely on the basis of competent deduction from p, knowledge of q requires knowledge of p. I present a novel challenge to the compatibility of this widespread view with DeRose's contextualism, then argue that the tension can be resolved in only one of two ways: if DeRose rejects the widespread view or if DeRose accepts the existence of a range of contextualism‐specific Gettier‐style (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  29
    Knowing by Way of Tracking and Epistemic Closure.Murali Ramachandran - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):217-223.
    Tracking accounts of knowledge were originally motivated by putative counter-examples to epistemic closure. But, as is now well known, these early accounts have many highly counterintuitive consequences. In this note, I motivate a tracking-based account which respects closure but which resolves many of the familiar problems for earlier tracking account along the way.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6. Learning From Learning From Our Mistakes.Clayton Littlejohn - 2016 - In Pedro Schmechtig & Martin Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 51-70.
    What can we learn from cases of knowledge from falsehood? Critics of knowledge-first epistemology have argued that these cases provide us with good reason for rejecting the knowledge accounts of evidence, justification, and the norm of belief. I shall offer a limited defense of the knowledge-first approach to these matters. Knowledge from falsehood cases should undermine our confidence in like-from-like reasoning in epistemology. Just as we should be open to the idea that knowledge can come from non-knowledge, we should be (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  36
    Knowledge, Assertion, and Inference.Peter Baumann - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (4):487-490.
    This paper argues that three plausible principles are mutually inconsistent: One ought to assert only what one knows; If it is proper to assert some proposition q, then it is, barring special and not very common circumstances, proper to assert any proposition p from which q has been competently inferred; and Some propositions are both properly assertible and known by competent inference from propositions which one does not know. Each pair of two principles constitutes an argument against the remaining principle, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Inferential Knowledge and the Gettier Conjecture.Rodrigo Borges - forthcoming - In Rodrigo Borges Claudio de Almeida & Peter Klein (eds.), Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem. Oxford University Press.
    I propose and defend the conjecture that what explains why Gettiered subjects fail to know is the fact that their justified true belief depends essentially on unknown propositions. The conjecture follows from the plausible principle about inference in general according to which one knows the conclusion of one’s inference only if one knows all the premises it involves essentially.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  79
    Knowledge-to-Fact Arguments (Bootstrapping, Closure, Paradox and KK).Murali Ramachandran - 2016 - Analysis 76 (2):142-149.
    The leading idea of this article is that one cannot acquire knowledge of any non-epistemic fact by virtue of knowing that one that knows something. The lines of reasoning involved in the surprise exam paradox and in Williamson’s _reductio_ of the KK-principle, which demand that one can, are thereby undermined, and new type of counter-example to epistemic closure emerges.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  6
    Dretske on Self-Knowledge and Contrastive Focus: How to Understand Dretske's Theory, and Why It Matters.Michael Roche & William Roche - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.
    Dretske’s theory of self-knowledge is interesting but peculiar and can seem implausible. He denies that we can know by introspection that we have thoughts, feelings, and experiences. But he allows that we can know by introspection what we think, feel, and experience. We consider two puzzles. The first puzzle, PUZZLE 1, is interpretive. Is there a way of understanding Dretske’s theory on which the (potential) knowledge affirmed by its positive side is different than the (potential) knowledge denied by its negative (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  48
    Undercutting Underdetermination‐Based Scepticism.Natalie Alana Ashton - 2015 - Theoria 81 (4):333-354.
    According to Duncan Pritchard, there are two kinds of radical sceptical problem; the closure-based problem, and the underdetermination-based problem. He argues that distinguishing these two problems leads to a set of desiderata for an anti-sceptical response, and that the way to meet all of these desiderata is by supplementing a form of Wittgensteinian contextualism with disjunctivist views about factivity. I agree that an adequate response should meet most of the initial desiderata Pritchard puts forward, and that some version of Wittgensteinian (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  24
    What Does Knowledge-Yielding Deduction Require Of Its Premises?Federico Luzzi - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3):261-275.
    According to the principle of Knowledge Counter-Closure , knowledge-yielding single-premise deduction requires a known premise: if S believes q solely on the basis of deduction from p, and S knows q, then S must know p. Although prima facie plausible, widely accepted, and supported by seemingly compelling motivations, KCC has recently been challenged by cases where S arguably knows q solely on the basis of deduction from p, yet p is false or p is true but not known . (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  13.  56
    Knowledge From Non-Knowledge.Branden Fitelson - unknown
    The Naive View (TNV) of Inferential Knowledge (slogan): (TNV) Inferential knowledge requires known relevant premises. One key aspect of (TNV) is “counter-closure” [9, 10].
    Translate
      Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  45
    Interest-Relative Invariantism and Knowledge From Ignorance.Federico Luzzi - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):31-42.
    The principle of Counter-Closure embodies the widespread view that when a proposition is believed solely as the conclusion of single-premise deduction, it can be known only if the premise is also known. I raise a problem for the compatibility of Jason Stanley's Interest-Relative Invariantism (IRI) with Counter-Closure. I explore the landscape of options that might help Stanley resolve this tension and argue that a trilemma confronts Stanley: he must either (i) renounce a key intuition that lies at the (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Interest‐Relative Invariantism and Knowledge From Ignorance.Luzzi Federico - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):31-42.
    The principle of Counter‐Closure embodies the widespread view that when a proposition is believed solely as the conclusion of single‐premise deduction, it can be known only if the premise is also known. I raise a problem for the compatibility of Jason Stanley's Interest‐Relative Invariantism with Counter‐Closure. I explore the landscape of options that might help Stanley resolve this tension and argue that a trilemma confronts Stanley: he must either renounce a key intuition that lies at the foundation of his view; (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure.Joshua Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.
    Closure for justification is the claim that thinkers are justified in believing the logical consequences of their justified beliefs, at least when those consequences are competently deduced. Many have found this principle to be very plausible. Even more attractive is the special case of Closure known as Single-Premise Closure. In this paper, I present a challenge to Single-Premise Closure. The challenge is based on the phenomenon of rational self-doubt – it can be rational to be less than fully confident in (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   26 citations  
  17. Explaining Causal Closure.Justin Tiehen - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2405-2425.
    The physical realm is causally closed, according to physicalists like me. But why is it causally closed, what metaphysically explains causal closure? I argue that reductive physicalists are committed to one explanation of causal closure to the exclusion of any independent explanation, and that as a result, they must give up on using a causal argument to attack mind–body dualism. Reductive physicalists should view dualism in much the way that we view the hypothesis that unicorns exist, or that the Kansas (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  18.  64
    Towards Closure on Closure.Fred Adams, John A. Barker & Julia Figurelli - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):179-196.
    Tracking theories of knowledge are widely known to have the consequence that knowledge is not closed. Recent arguments by Vogel and Hawthorne claim both that there are no legitimate examples of knowledge without closure and that the costs of theories that deny closure are too great. This paper considers the tracking theories of Dretske and Nozick and the arguments by Vogel and Hawthorne. We reject the arguments of Vogel and Hawthorne and evaluate the costs of closure denial for tracking theories (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   17 citations  
  19. Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts.Luca Moretti & Tomoji Shogenji - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (1):1-25.
    _ Source: _Page Count 25 This paper considers two novel Bayesian responses to a well-known skeptical paradox. The paradox consists of three intuitions: first, given appropriate sense experience, we have justification for accepting the relevant proposition about the external world; second, we have justification for expanding the body of accepted propositions through known entailment; third, we do not have justification for accepting that we are not disembodied souls in an immaterial world deceived by an evil demon. The first response we (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  20.  37
    On a Loophole in Causal Closure.Johan Gamper - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-6.
    Standard definitions of causal closure focus on where the causes in question are. In this paper, the focus is changed to where they are not. Causal closure is linked to the principle that no cause of another universe causes an event in a particular universe. This view permits the one universe to be affected by the other via an interface. An interface between universes can be seen as a domain that violates the suggested account of causal closure, suggesting a view (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Epistemic Closure and Epistemic Logic I: Relevant Alternatives and Subjunctivism.Wesley H. Holliday - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (1):1-62.
    Epistemic closure has been a central issue in epistemology over the last forty years. According to versions of the relevant alternatives and subjunctivist theories of knowledge, epistemic closure can fail: an agent who knows some propositions can fail to know a logical consequence of those propositions, even if the agent explicitly believes the consequence (having “competently deduced” it from the known propositions). In this sense, the claim that epistemic closure can fail must be distinguished from the fact that agents do (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  22.  47
    Epistemic Closure in Folk Epistemology.James R. Beebe & Jake Monaghan - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosopohy.
    We report the results of four empirical studies designed to investigate the extent to which an epistemic closure principle for knowledge is reflected in folk epistemology. Previous work by Turri (2015a) suggested that our shared epistemic practices may only include a source-relative closure principle—one that applies to perceptual beliefs but not to inferential beliefs. We argue that the results of our studies provide reason for thinking that individuals are making a performance error when their knowledge attributions and denials conflict with (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Closing in on Causal Closure.Robert K. Garcia - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (1-2):96-109.
    I examine the meaning and merits of a premise in the Exclusion Argument, the causal closure principle that all physical effects have physical causes. I do so by addressing two questions. First, if we grant the other premises, exactly what kind of closure principle is required to make the Exclusion Argument valid? Second, what are the merits of the requisite closure principle? Concerning the first, I argue that the Exclusion Argument requires a strong, “stringently pure” version of closure. The latter (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Causal Closure Principles and Emergentism.E. J. Lowe - 2000 - Philosophy 75 (294):571-586.
    Causal closure arguments against interactionist dualism are currently popular amongst physicalists. Such an argument appeals to some principles of the causal closure of the physical, together with certain other premises, to conclude that at least some mental events are identical with physical events. However, it is crucial to the success of any such argument that the physical causal closure principle to which it appeals is neither too strong nor too weak by certain standards. In this paper, it is argued that (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  25. Human Cognitive Closure and Mysterianism: Reply to Kriegel.Erhan Demircioglu - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (1):125-132.
    In this paper, I respond to Kriegel’s criticism of McGinn’s mysterianism. Kriegel objects to a particular argument for the possibility of human cognitive closure and also gives a direct argument against mysterianism. I intend to show that neither the objection nor the argument is convincing.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26.  37
    Examining the Effectiveness of Climate Change Frames in the Face of a Climate Change Denial Counter‐Frame.Aaron M. McCright, Meghan Charters, Katherine Dentzman & Thomas Dietz - 2016 - Topics in Cognitive Science 8 (1):76-97.
    Prior research on the influence of various ways of framing anthropogenic climate change do not account for the organized ACC denial in the U.S. media and popular culture, and thus may overestimate these frames' influence in the general public. We conducted an experiment to examine how Americans' ACC views are influenced by four promising frames for urging action on ACC —when these frames appear with an ACC denial counter-frame. This is the first direct test of how exposure to an ACC (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  27.  61
    Closure Reconsidered.Yuval Avnur - 2012 - Philosophers' Imprint 12 (9).
    Most solutions to the skeptical paradox about justified belief assume closure for justification, since the rejection of closure is widely regarded as a non-starter. I argue that the rejection of closure is not a non-starter, and that its problems are no greater than the problems associated with the more standard anti-skeptical strategies. I do this by sketching a simple version of the unpopular strategy and rebutting the three best objections to it. The general upshot for theories of justification is that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  28.  80
    On an Argument From Analogy for the Possibility of Human Cognitive Closure.Erhan Demircioglu - 2016 - Minds and Machines 26 (3):227-241.
    In this paper, I aim to show that McGinn’s argument from analogy for the possibility of human cognitive closure survives the critique raised on separate occasions by Dennett and Kriegel. I will distinguish between linguistic and non-linguistic cognitive closure and argue that the analogy argument from animal non-linguistic cognitive closure goes untouched by the objection Dennett and Kriegel raises.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  21
    An Empirical Investigation of the Relationships Between Ethical Beliefs, Ethical Ideology, Political Preference and Need for Closure.Van Kenhove Patrick, Vermeir Iris & Verniers Steven - 2001 - Journal of Business Ethics 32 (4):347-361.
    An analysis is presented of the relationships between consumers ethical beliefs, ethical ideology, Machiavellianism, political preference and the individual difference variable "need for closure". It is based on a representative survey of 286 Belgian respondents. Standard measurement tools of proven reliability and robustness are used to measure ethical beliefs (consumer ethics scale), ethical ideology (ethical positioning), Machiavellianism (Mach IV scale) and need for closure. The analysis finds the following. First, individuals with a high need for closure tend to have beliefs (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   18 citations  
  30.  65
    Grounding Causal Closure.Justin Tiehen - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered in every (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Why Safety Doesn't Save Closure.Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2011 - Synthese 183 (2):127-142.
    Knowledge closure is, roughly, the following claim: For every agent S and propositions P and Q, if S knows P, knows that P implies Q, and believes Q because it is so implied, then S knows Q. Almost every epistemologist believes that closure is true. Indeed, they often believe that it so obviously true that any theory implying its denial is thereby refuted. Some prominent epistemologists have nevertheless denied it, most famously Fred Dretske and Robert Nozick. There are closure advocates (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  32. A Critique to the Significance of Gettier Counter-Examples.Jianbo Cao - 2006 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 1 (4):675-687.
    Usually, people think that Gettier counter-examples challenged the traditional tripartite definition of knowledge and fundamentally changed the characteristic of the contemporary epistemology. This paper argues that regard for Gettier counter-examples is exaggerated, because (i) the JTB definition is neither an important nor a comprehensive one that covers all knowledge. Moreover, the significance of Gettier counter-examples is limited. (ii) The source of Gettier counter-examples lies in one arbitrary judgment, two mix-ups, three false assumptions, and a misunderstanding about the JTB definition.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Narrative Closure.Noël Carroll - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (1):1 - 15.
    In this article, “Narrative Closure,” a theory of the nature of narrative closure is developed. Narrative closure is identified as the phenomenological feeling of finality that is generated when all the questions saliently posed by the narrative are answered. The article also includes a discussion of the intelligibility of attributing questions to narratives as well as a discussion of the mechanisms that achieve this. The article concludes by addressing certain recent criticisms of the view of narrative expounded by this article.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  34.  7
    The ‘Default View’ of Perceptual Reasons and ‘Closure-Based’ Sceptical Arguments.Genia Schönbaumsfeld - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (2):114-135.
    _ Source: _Volume 7, Issue 2, pp 114 - 135 It is a commonly accepted assumption in contemporary epistemology that we need to find a solution to ‘closure-based’ sceptical arguments and, hence, to the ‘scepticism or closure’ dilemma. In the present paper I argue that this is mistaken, since the closure principle does not, in fact, do real sceptical work. Rather, the decisive, scepticism-friendly moves are made before the closure principle is even brought into play. If we cannot avoid the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Epistemic Closure Under Deductive Inference: What is It and Can We Afford It?Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2731-2748.
    The idea that knowledge can be extended by inference from what is known seems highly plausible. Yet, as shown by familiar preface paradox and lottery-type cases, the possibility of aggregating uncertainty casts doubt on its tenability. We show that these considerations go much further than previously recognized and significantly restrict the kinds of closure ordinary theories of knowledge can endorse. Meeting the challenge of uncertainty aggregation requires either the restriction of knowledge-extending inferences to single premises, or eliminating epistemic uncertainty in (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  36.  57
    Epistemic closure.Peter Baumann - 2011 - In Duncan Pritchard & Sven Bernecker (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 597--608.
    This article gives an overview over different principles of epistemic closure, their attractions and their problems.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  37.  60
    Information Closure and the Sceptical Objection.Luciano Floridi - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1037-1050.
    In this article, I define and then defend the principle of information closure (pic) against a sceptical objection similar to the one discussed by Dretske in relation to the principle of epistemic closure. If I am successful, given that pic is equivalent to the axiom of distribution and that the latter is one of the conditions that discriminate between normal and non-normal modal logics, a main result of such a defence is that one potentially good reason to look for a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  38. Skepticism, Information, and Closure: Dretske's Theory of Knowledge.Christoph Jäger - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):187 - 201.
    According to Fred Dretske's externalist theory of knowledge a subject knows that p if and only if she believes that p and this belief is caused or causally sustained by the information that p. Another famous feature of Dretske's epistemology is his denial that knowledge is closed under known entailment. I argue that, given Dretske's construal of information, he is in fact committed to the view that both information and knowledge are closed under known entailment. Hence, if it is true (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  39.  40
    Nozick's Defense of Closure.Peter Baumann - 2012 - In Kelly Becker & Tim Black (eds.), The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology. Cambridge University Press. pp. 11--27.
    This paper argues against common views that at least in many cases Robert Nozick is not forced to deny common closure principles. More importantly, Nozick does not – despite first (and second) appearances and despite his own words – deny closure. On the contrary, he is defending a more sophisticated and complex principle of closure. This principle does remarkably well though it is not without problems. It is surprising how rarely Nozick’s principle of closure has been discussed. He should be (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  40. Sensitivity, Safety, and Closure.Sven Bernecker - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (4):367-381.
    It is widely thought that if knowledge requires sensitivity, knowledge is not closed because sensitivity is not closed. This paper argues that there is no valid argument from sensitivity failure to non-closure of knowledge. Sensitivity does not imply non-closure of knowledge. Closure considerations cannot be used to adjudicate between safety and sensitivity accounts of knowledge.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  41. Grounding Causal Closure.Justin Tiehen - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3).
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered in every (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. A Story of Unrequited Love.Lawrence J. Hatab - 2015 - Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (2):287-296.
    Aristotle’s Poetics defends the value of tragic poetry, presumably to counter Plato’s critique in the Republic. Can this defense resonate with something larger and rather surprising, that Aristotle’s overall philosophy displays a tragic character? I define the tragic as pertaining to indigenous and inescapable limits on life, knowledge, control, achievement, and agency. I explore how such limits figure in Aristotle’s physics, metaphysics, and biological works. Accordingly I want to disturb the common account of Aristotle’s thought as a neat system of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  56
    Epistemic Closure and Commutative, Nonassociative Residuated Structures.Sebastian Sequoiah-Grayson - 2013 - Synthese 190 (1):113-128.
    K-axiom-based epistemic closure for explicit knowledge is rejected for even the most trivial cases of deductive inferential reasoning on account of the fact that the closure axiom does not extend beyond a raw consequence relation. The recognition that deductive inference concerns interaction as much as it concerns consequence allows for perspectives from logics of multi-agent information flow to be refocused onto mono-agent deductive reasoning. Instead of modeling the information flow between different agents in a communicative or announcement setting, we model (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  44.  56
    Representations of Structural Closure Operators.José Gil-Férez - 2011 - Archive for Mathematical Logic 50 (1-2):45-73.
    We continue the work of Blok and Jónsson by developing the theory of structural closure operators and introducing the notion of a representation between them. Similarities and equivalences of Blok-Jónsson turn out to be bijective representations and bijective structural representations, respectively. We obtain a characterization for representations induced by a transformer. In order to obtain a similar characterization for structural representations we introduce the notions of a graduation and a graded variable of an M-set. We show that several deductive systems, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  45.  60
    Fallibilism, Closure, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Adam Zweber - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2745-2757.
    I argue that fallibilism, single-premise epistemic closure, and one formulation of the “knowledge-action principle” are inconsistent. I will consider a possible way to avoid this incompatibility, by advocating a pragmatic constraint on belief in general, rather than just knowledge. But I will conclude that this is not a promising option for defusing the problem. I do not argue here for any one way of resolving the inconsistency.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  86
    Epistemic Closure, Skepticism and Defeasibility.Claudio Almeida - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):197-215.
    Those of us who have followed Fred Dretske's lead with regard to epistemic closure and its impact on skepticism have been half-wrong for the last four decades. But those who have opposed our Dretskean stance, contextualists in particular, have been just wrong. We have been half-right. Dretske rightly claimed that epistemic status is not closed under logical implication. Unlike the Dretskean cases, the new counterexamples to closure offered here render every form of contextualist pro-closure maneuvering useless. But there is a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  47.  73
    On Noël Carroll on Narrative Closure.Susan L. Feagin - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (1):17-25.
    This paper examines various claims by Noël Carroll about narrative closure and its relationship to narrative connections, which are, roughly, causal connections generously conceived to include necessary conditions for sufficient conditions for an effect. I propose supplementing the expanded notion of a cause with Michael Bratman’s notion of a psychological connection to account for the particular role that human agents play in narratives. A novel and a film are used as examples to illustrate how the concept of a psychological connection (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  13
    Simulating a Model of Metabolic Closure.Athel Cornish-Bowden, Gabriel Piedrafita, Federico Morán, María Luz Cárdenas & Francisco Montero - 2013 - Biological Theory 8 (4):383-390.
    The goal of synthetic biology is to create artificial organisms. To achieve this it is essential to understand what life is. Metabolism-replacement systems, or (M, R)-systems, constitute a theory of life developed by Robert Rosen, characterized in the statement that organisms are closed to efficient causation, which means that they must themselves produce all the catalysts they need. This theory overlaps in part with other current theories, including autopoiesis, the chemoton, and autocatalytic sets, all of them invoking some idea of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  49. The New and Old Ignorance Puzzles: How Badly Do We Need Closure?Brent G. Kyle - 2015 - Synthese 192 (5):1495-1525.
    Skeptical puzzles and arguments often employ knowledge-closure principles . Epistemologists widely believe that an adequate reply to the skeptic should explain why her reasoning is appealing albeit misleading; but it’s unclear what would explain the appeal of the skeptic’s closure principle, if not for its truth. In this paper, I aim to challenge the widespread commitment to knowledge-closure. But I proceed by first examining a new puzzle about failing to know—what I call the New Ignorance Puzzle . This puzzle resembles (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50.  36
    Closure and Underdetermination Again.Ju Wang - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (4):1129-1140.
    In contemporary epistemology, sceptical arguments are motivated either by the closure principle or the underdetermination principle. Therefore, it is very important to figure out the structure of the sceptical argument before coming up with an anti-sceptic strategy. With a review of the debate on the relationship between the two principles from Anthony Brueckner to Kevin McCain, it is argued that while maintaining the weak closed justification , closure and underdetermination are not logically equivalent. As a result, two independent responses are (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 1000