23 found
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Craig DeLancey [21]Craig Stephen Delancey [2]Craig S. Delancey [1]
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Craig DeLancey
State University of New York at Oswego
  1.  74
    Ontology and Teleofunctions: A Defense and Revision of the Systematic Account of Teleological Explanation.Craig S. Delancey - 2006 - Synthese 150 (1):69-98.
    I defend and revise the systematic account of normative functions (teleofunctions), as recently developed by Gerhard Schlosser and by W. D. Christensen and M. H. Bickhard. This account proposes that teleofunctions are had by structures that play certain kinds of roles in complex systems. This theory is an alternative to the historical etiological account of teleofunctions, developed by Ruth Millikan and others. The historical etiological account is susceptible to a general ontological problem that has been under-appreciated, and that offers important (...)
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  2.  87
    Passionate Engines: What Emotions Reveal About the Mind and Artificial Intelligence.Craig DeLancey - 2001 - Oxford University Press USA.
    DeLancey shows that our understanding of emotion provides essential insight on key issues in philosophy of mind and artificial intelligence. He offers us a bold new approach to the study of the mind based on the latest scientific research and provides an accessible overview of the science of emotion.
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  3. Basic Moods.Craig DeLancey - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):527-538.
    The hypothesis that some moods are emotions has been rejected in philosophy, and is an unpopular alternative in psychology. This is because there is wide agreement that moods have a number of features distinguishing them from emotions. These include: lack of an intentional object and the related notion of lack of a goal; being of long duration; having pervasive or widespread effects; and having causes rather than reasons. Leading theories of mood have tried to explain these purported features by describing (...)
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  4. Does a Parsimony Principle Entail a Simple World?Craig DeLancey - 2011 - Metaphysica 12 (2):87-100.
    Many scholars claim that a parsimony principle has ontological implications. The most common such claim is that a parsimony principle entails that the “world” is simple. This ontological claim appears to often be coupled with the assumption that a parsimony principle would be corroborated if the “world” were simple. I clarify these claims, describe some minimal features of simplicity, and then show that both these claims are either false or they depend upon an implausible notion of simplicity. In their stead, (...)
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  5.  18
    Teleofunctions and Oncomice: The Case for Revising Varner's Value Theory.Craig Delancey - 2004 - Environmental Ethics 26 (2):171-188.
    The view that organisms deserve moral respect because they have their own purposes is often grounded in a specification of the biological functions that the organism has. One way to identify such functions, adopted by Gary Varner, is to determine the etiology of some behavior based on the evolution of the structures enabling it. This view suffers from some unacceptable problems, including that some organisms with profound defects will by definition have a welfare interest in their defects. For example, this (...)
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  6.  89
    Meaning Naturalism, Meaning Irrealism, and the Work of Language.Craig Stephen Delancey - 2007 - Synthese 154 (2):231-257.
    I defend the hypothesis that organisms that produce and recognize meaningful utterances tend to use simpler procedures, and should use the simplest procedures, to produce and recognize those utterances. This should be a basic principle of any naturalist theory of meaning, which must begin with the recognition that the production and understanding of meanings is work. One measure of such work is the minimal amount of space resources that must go into storing a procedure to produce or recognize a meaningful (...)
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  7.  39
    Architecture Can Save the World: Building and Environmental Ethics.Craig Delancey - 2004 - Philosophical Forum 35 (2):147–159.
  8.  29
    Emotion and the Function of Consciousness.Craig DeLancey - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):492-99.
    Certain arguments that phenomenal conscious states play no role, or play a role that could be different, depend upon the seeming plausibility of thought experiments such as the inverted spectrum or phenomenal zombie. These thought experiments are always run for perceptual states like colour vision. Run for affective states like emotions, they become absurd, because the prior intension of our concepts of emotional states are that the phenomenal experience is inseparable from their motivational aspects. Our growing scientific understanding of emotion (...)
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  9.  71
    The Modal Arguments and the Complexity of Consciousness.Craig DeLancey - 2013 - Ratio 26 (1):35-50.
    This paper explores consequences of the claim that phenomenal experiences are physical events of great descriptive complexity. This claim is attractive both because it can explain our most perplexing intuitions about the quality of consciousness and also because it is suggestive of very productive research opportunities. I illustrate the former by showing that two of the most compelling anti-physicalist arguments about phenomenal experience – the modal argument of Kripke and the conceivability argument of Chalmers – are not sound if this (...)
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  10.  96
    Phenomenal Experience and the Measure of Information.Craig DeLancey - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (3):329-352.
    This paper defends the hypothesis that phenomenal experiences may be very complex information states. This can explain some of our most perplexing anti-physicalist intuitions about phenomenal experience. The approach is to describe some basic facts about information in such a way as to make clear the essential oversight involved, by way illustrating how various intuitive arguments against physicalism (such as Frank Jackson.
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  11.  60
    After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency. By Quentin Meillassoux.Craig Delancey - 2012 - The European Legacy 17 (3):403 - 404.
    The European Legacy, Volume 17, Issue 3, Page 403-404, June 2012.
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  12.  82
    Review of Jesse J. Prinz, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion[REVIEW]Craig DeLancey - 2005 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (10).
  13.  31
    Real Emotions.Craig DeLancey - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):467-487.
    I argue that natural realism is the best approach to explaining some emotional actions, and thus is the best candidate to explain the relevant emotions. I take natural realism to be the view that these emotions are motivational states which must be identified by using (not necessarily exclusively) naturalistic discourse which, if not wholly lacking intentional terms, at least does not require reference to belief and desire. The kinds of emotional actions I consider are ones which continue beyond the satisfaction (...)
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  14.  27
    Consciousness and the Superfunctionality Claim.Craig DeLancey - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (3):433-451.
    The superfunctionality claim is that phenomenal experiences are more than functional (objective, causal) relations. This is one of the most widely used but least attacked claims in the anti-physicalist literature on consciousness. Coupled with one form of structuralism, the view that science only explains functional relations, the superfunctionality claim entails that science will not explain phenomenal experience. The claim is therefore essential to many anti-physicalist arguments. I identify an open question argument for the superfunctionality claim that expresses an intuition deserving (...)
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  15.  16
    Commitment and Attunement.Craig DeLancey - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):579-594.
    Heidegger’s view of attunement, and evolutionary theories of emotion, would appear to be wholly independent accounts of affects. This paper argues that we can understand the phenomenology of attunement and the evolutionary functionalist theory of emotions as distinct perspectives on those same emotions. The reason that the two perspectives are distinct is that some affects can act as commitment mechanisms, and this requires them to be experienced in a way that obscures their ultimate functional role. These perspectives are potentially mutually (...)
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  16.  16
    Emotion and the Computational Theory of Mind.Craig DeLancey - 1997 - In S. O'Nuillain, Paul McKevitt & E. MacAogain (eds.), Two Sciences of Mind. John Benjamins.
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  17.  27
    Review of Georg Brun, Ulvi Doguoglu, Dominique Kuenzle (Eds.), Epistemology and Emotions[REVIEW]Craig DeLancey - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (3).
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  18.  13
    Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension (Review).Craig DeLancey - 2010 - Symploke 18 (1-2):415-417.
  19.  20
    Affect Programs, Intentionality, and Consciousness.Craig DeLancey - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):197-198.
    I express two concerns with the theory of emotion that Rolls provides: (1) rewards and punishers alone fail to explain the basic emotions; (2) Rolls needs to clarify his notion of the intentionality of emotions. I also criticize his theory of consciousness, arguing that it fails to explain qualia, and that ironically it is emotions which make this most evident.
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  20.  5
    Teleofunctions and Oncomice: The Case for Revising Varner’s Value Theory.Craig Delancey - 2004 - Environmental Ethics 26 (2):171-188.
    The view that organisms deserve moral respect because they have their own purposes is often grounded in a specification of the biological functions that the organism has. One way to identify such functions, adopted by Gary Varner, is to determine the etiology of some behavior based on the evolution of the structures enabling it. This view suffers from some unacceptable problems, including that some organisms with profound defects will by definition have a welfare interest in their defects. For example, this (...)
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  21.  18
    Review of Ronald de Sousa, Why Think? Evolution and the Rational Mind[REVIEW]Craig DeLancey - 2007 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (12).
  22.  14
    Lewis's DS Approach is a Tool, Not a Theory.Craig DeLancey - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):201-201.
    Lewis argues convincingly that a DS approach to emotion theory will be fruitful. He also appears to hold that there are DS principles that constitute a theory or are substantial empirical claims. I argue that this latter move is a mistake.
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  23. Emotion, Action, and Intentionality.Craig Stephen Delancey - 1999 - Dissertation, Indiana University
    The thesis defends the view that there are basic emotions---pancultural emotions that can be, but are not necessarily, propositional attitudes---and endorses a version of the affect program theory of emotions, augmented with a special stress upon the relation of emotions to motor capabilities and strategies. After developing a taxonomy of affects, I argue against the reduction of emotions to other mental states like belief, desire, or judgment. I then discuss how affects relate to belief. First, I consider the claims of (...)
     
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